The Latvian Nation - A Study in the Geography of Political Integration

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Summary

In the past Political Geography has been pre-occupied with the state and spatial structures and processes emanating from this conventional territorial delimitation. As a consequence, the nation has been rarely examined in its own right. This thesis is a contribution toward rectifying this state of affairs by attempting to develop a spatial explanation of the Latvian nation. It is hoped that it will demonstrate what Geography can add to the already abundant literature on the nation and nationalism.

It is suggested that a methodology should be developed from which a spatial explanation can contribute toward a valid perspective on a topic which in general has often been misunderstood within social thought. The nation is a subjective and emotive phenomenon and has to be viewed as a product of specific societal and geographical circumstances which can be identified and analysed. It is postulated that by treating the nation as part of a political integrative process functioning within a given polity and a given level of historical development, its raison d'être can be more clearly understood. The factors which explain its existence are thus the integrative processes working for an identity with such a group phenomenon.

The Latvian nation is accordingly treated in its spatial and temporal totality by isolating and studying the integrative processes which explain such a community. Within this integrative framework, two important aspects are incorporated into the methodology: firstly, the concept of modernisation and the processes emanating from it, and secondly, the particular political structure of which the nation forms a part.

It is postulated that the use of the concept of modernisation adds a spatial perspective to the study of the nation and facilitates the identification of integrative factors which help to explain the develop-

ment of such a group. Modernisation with its concomitant processes of urbanisation, industrial growth, greater social and geographical mobility, etc., is a pre-requisite for the formation of the Latvian nation and as these processes develop within the Latvian region the nation progresses from merely a social phenomenon to a political movement with tailored territorial and political aspirations.

The second aspect, that of changing polities suggests that in the Latvian case where the nation is formed within the framework of the Tsarist Empire, attains independence in the form of a state of its own (1920-1940), and is subsequently absorbed into the Soviet Union, that the policies pursued by the various central authorities will to a large degree determine the form taken by integration at the national level. Thus from these three polities, spatial re-organisations occur which are in themselves contributors toward the role the nation plays within Latvian society.

Modernisation is an on-going process. Within the contemporary period, it continues to play a part in the integrative process at the national level even although it is deliberately used by Moscow to weaken national identity and to destroy nationalism. Modernisation does not necessarily destroy the nation even although it weakens its social boundaries by further facilitating inter-actions, assimilations, and social communication between various communities. It is suggested that in the Latvian case modernisation contributes toward enhancing national integration rather than inhibiting it and that this process has reinforced a need to identify with an abstract ideal, the nation.

The first chapter attempts to put into context a political geographical approach to the nation by assessing the contribution Political Geography can make to a phenomenon which has been largely neglected by Geographers. It attempts to develop a loose and viable framework in which the nation can be studied and formulates a spatial

perspective for the Latvian nation based on the more previous generalised considerations. This theoretical framework thus explores three important manifestations of the nation and its relationship to varying polities; its formation, relationship to the state of which it forms a part, and reaction to statehood.

Chapter two explores the formation of the Latvian nation attempting to identify the integrative processes taking place within the context of a modernising society and the spatial causes and effects relating to such re-organisations and changes. The goals, aspirations and group attributes of Latvian nationalism are studied as are the territorial and political designs of the Latvians toward achieving control over their own political region in the form of a Latvian state.

Chapter three examines the impact of independence on the nation and the ensuing integrative factors operating within statehood. The role of the Latvian national ruling élite plays in such a process is studied within the context of the policies they promote and the part they play in national integration. The political geographical patterns emanating from statehood are looked at in relation both to the varying ethnic, social and other interest groups within the state structure and to the part territorial integration plays in national group cohesiveness.

Chapter four studies the impact on the nation of its loss of statehood and of its incorporation into a multi-national state whose élites are pre-occupied with the disintegration of nationalism. The role central authority plays in transforming Latvian society is examined within the context of the modernisation process and the effect centralisation of decision-making and territorial re-organisations has had on the Latvian peoples and their region is scrutinised. An attempt is also made to identify spatial and societal patterns of national disintegration as they affect the population of this area and the success modernisation and the policies pursued by central authority have had in contributing to both

its integration and disintegration.

In conclusion, an attempt is made to identify the salient integrative processes as they occur within the temporal and spatial totality of the modernisation process.

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A Note on Transliteration and Translation

Russian language sources are transliterated in accordance with the system used by Soviet Studies Journal which is given below. The only exceptions to this method employed are words which have an existing English spelling (eg. Moscow, Latvia, Trotsky).

In the case of personal names which have differing forms in Russian and Latvian, the Russian form is used (eg. Ya. Kalnberzin instead of J. Kalnberzins).

Latvian sources are translated and appear in brackets after the original title in both the running notes and the bibliography.

Transliteration System Used

А a	Л l	Ц ts
Б b	М m	Ч ch
В v	Н n	Ш sh
Г g	О o	Щ shch
Д d	П p	Ъ "
Е e	Р r	Ы y
Ж zh	С s	Ь '
З z	Т t	Э e
И i	У u	Ю yu
Й i	Ф f	Я ya
К k	Х kh	

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter One

1.1. Introductory Remarks

The approach taken in this thesis is to examine the nation as a spatial process by identifying those factors which explain the political integration and disintegration of the nation. An attempt is made to build upon the relevant literature in Political Geography and to utilise the theory already developed on the political integration of communities in other Social Sciences. By so doing, it is hoped that a qualitative assessment can be made of the factors which aid in the political integration and disintegration of the nation.

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter is aimed at explaining the spatial development of the Latvian nation. The underlying assumption for the study of the nation is based on a generalised and widely applicable perspective on the political organisation of space and the process which is the cause-effect of spatial structure. Therefore, an examination of the nation in its historical totality is necessary in order that a spatial approach and explanation can be comprehended, and the factors which constitute its existence and socio-political behaviour fully scrutinised.

> "As long as we continue to confine ourselves to a particularistic analysis of the nationalism of different countries and epochs on the one hand, and treating nationalism as a single undifferentiated phenomenon on the other hand, there is little prospect of scientific advance on this subject."[1].

Within the construct of the nation, behavioural and structural elements can be inferred which together constitute part of the total process. By taking an integrated approach we are illustrating that by using all these elements there is a need to indicate various perspectives rather than a particular approach.

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1. L. Wirth, 'Types of Nationalism', American Journal of Sociology, vol.41, (1936), pp. 723-37, p. 724.

The nation, like any other political manifestation, has a process by which it comes into being and functions. For the purposes of this study, process can be defined as the arrangement of empirically observed units, flowing, moving or interacting where the whole complex of the flow constitutes the process. Every political process has a geographical region uniquely associated with it and no geographical area escapes some relationship with a political process.

Process is thus the key to spatial arrangements and attributes with which the Geographer is concerned, and a basis from which the nation and the study of the integration of such a group phenomenon can be analysed in its temporal totality.

Within Political Geography, the study of the nation has received little direct attention, usually being researched within the context of the state and its political territorial structure. Only a handful of geographical works have indirectly dealt with contemporary aspects of nationalism.[2] Little theory or methodology have been formulated for the study of the nation within this sub-discipline.

There are a number of possible explanations for this state of affairs in Political Geography. The discipline has become pre-occupied with the study of the state and its territorial organisation. Kaspeson and Minghi suggest that this has tended to impede the theoretical

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2 C. Smith's work on, 'Arab Nationalism: A Study in Political Geography', Geography Journal, vol.43, Nov. 1958, pp. 229-42, is one of the few studies concerned with the nation and nationalism. However, his work concentrates solely on Pan-Arab Nationalism describing the similarities which bind and hinder the possible development of this social and political movement into a Pan-Arab Union. He does not define what he means by nationalism suggesting very superficially that: "History, geography, language, culture and to a large extent religion encourage a closer union of Arab peoples". (p. 231)

development of the discipline.[3] Works, such as those by Whittlesey (1944)[4], who saw the state as the most important political feature in the study of Political Geography, and by De Blij (1967)[5], who examined the development of the nation within the context of the state suggesting that the nation cannot be understood without its interchangeable connection with the state, have failed to attempt any explanation of the nation from a geographical perspective.

In the 1950's, the so-called Functional School of Geography, led by Hartshorne, Gottmann and Jones[6], attempted to move away from the intertwined usage of the area being examined and that of the state, developing a less rigid approach to spatial phenomena by introducing the idea that the legal institution of the state and its territory should not necessarily coincide with the geographical area being examined. In their functional approaches to understanding spatial structures and processes, they touched upon the nation and also set a premise from which the study of the nation could be adapted to their

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3 J. Kaspeson & R. Minghi, The Structure of Political Geography, Chicago, 1969, p. 12.

4 D. Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, New York, 1944, p. 111.

5 H. De Blij, Systematic Political Geography, New York, 1967, pp. 2-9.

6 R. Hartshorne, 'The Functional Approach to Political Geography', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.40, 1950, pp. 95-130. J. Gottmann, 'The Political Partitioning of Our World, an attempt at analysis', World Politics, vol.4, 1952, pp. 512-9. S. Jones, 'A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.44, 1954, nr. 2, pp. 111-123.

In an earlier work, Hartshorne had attempted to divorce the study of the nation from that of the state by ignoring legal boundaries and examining various socio-economic and group attributes on a world scale. His approach did not explain the nation, instead it merely described. R. Hartshorne, 'The Politico-Geographic Pattern of the World', Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, vol.218, 1941, pp. 45-57.

models and analysis. However, their attention was till very much directed toward the structure and functioning of the state and its political territorial organisation.

The tendency to ignore the nation, viewing it only within the context of the state, has in part contributed to the confusion as to exactly what the difference is between the nation and state. The term 'nation-state' is often used interchangeably with the term 'state' and this is one of the major reasons which has led to a problem of semantics and definition of what actually constitutes a nation and a state.

The concept of the state and man's relationship to the state has thus been misinterpreted because of the usage of 'nation-state'. No state is completely homogeneous in the sense that only one nation falls within its political and legal bounded space nor is one nation necessarily synonymous and falls within the category of only one state's territory.

> "A nation may comprise part of a state, be coterminous with a state or extend beyond the borders of a single state."[7]

Like other branches of the Political and Social Sciences, Political Geography has been plagued with using 'nation-state' as a central focus and terminological alternative for their studies of the state. Much of the blame for this has to be attached to the Geopolitik School of thought of the 1930's and the Political Geographers and

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7 Plano & Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 1969.

Darwinists, Ratzel, Ritter, Kjellen and Maull.[8] It was particularly Ratzel's contribution to this subjective science which laid the basis on which Political Geographers and a number of Political Scientists confused the nation with the state. Ratzel, designated with the rather ominous title of 'the father of modern Political Geography', was concerned with the spatial growth of states. In his 'Organic Theory of the State', Ratzel put forward the thesis that all components of the state 'grow' together into one 'body' which has a 'life' of its own. To him, the state was in its essence, a spirit, an idea, in which and through which all nationals are bound spiritually into one organic whole, into unity and multiplicity. Along with Karl Ritter's 'Cycle theory of State Growth', the Swedish Geopolitik, Kjellen's conception of the state as a geographical organism in space, and Maull's idea that the state was analogous to a cellular organism were all utilized in conjunction with Ratzel's theory to provide the rationale for the scheme of territorial expansion's reflecting the geographical distribution of the German people propounded by the German fascists.

This misuse by Geopolitik has been rejected by Political

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8 F. Ratzel, Politische Geographie, Munich, 1897; R. Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebenform, Leipzig, 1917; R. Kjellen, Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege, Berlin, 1921; O. Maull, Das Wesen der Geopolitik, Leipzig, 1936; R. Hartshorne, 'Recent Developments in Political Geography', in W.A.D. Jackson & M.S. Samuels, Politics and Geographic Relationships, New Jersey, (2nd edition), 1971, pp. 43-54; L.K.D. Kristof, 'The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics', Journal of Conflict Resolutions, vol.4, 1960, pp. 15-51; G. Kiss, 'Political Geography into Geopolitics', Geographical Review, vol.32, 1942, pp. 632-45; A. Abdel-Malek, 'Geopolitics and National Movements: An Essay on the Dialectics of Imperialism', R. Peet (ed.), Radical Geography: Alternative Viewpoints on Contemporary Social Issues, London, 1977, pp. 293-307.

Geographers but to some degree its legacy continues with identity and loyalty to the nation being confused with identity and loyalty to the state. Since nationalism has in many instances, such as by the Geopolitik school, been equated with loyalty to the state, Political Geographers have been somewhat pre-conditioned to perceive the state as the certain ultimate victor in any test of loyalties and identification. The terms nation, Volksdeutsch, Volkstum, Volksgenosse, and the state, Deutschland were seen as the same. With this perceived linkage between the nation and the state, Hitler could voice his appeals in terms of the nation and the state as one.

The classic works of Hartshorne(1950), Gottmann (1952) and Jones (1954), also introduced into Political Geography the concepts of process and behaviour. Hitherto, mainstream Political Geography had been characterised by mere description with a bias toward an historical-morphological approach.[9] By developing theory on process and behaviour, the structure of political-spatial phenomena could be better understood. With the introduction of behavioural studies and work on the process and structure of geographical problems, a spatial explanation of the nation is therefore possible using these three important concepts which together inter-relate and cover a comprehensive ambit which any academic approach to the study of the nation rightfully demands.

The development and application of the Systems Approach to Political Geography has recently become a convenient tool by which political problems can be understood within a spatial context. With this type of approach, the discipline has shaken off the shackles of being structure-orientated and firmly implanted into Political Geography the holistic approach of examining geographical problems from the aspect of process, behaviour and structure as interchangeable phenomena. However, the application of the Systems Analysis has tended to favour the study of

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9 D. Whittlesy, op.cit.

the state at the expense of the study of the nation. A politically-defined piece of space tends to be the starting point from which other political phenomena are studied, and the nation is seen merely as one component of the political system of the state.

It also appears that there has been a lack of confidence shown by Political Geographers in developing a spatial explanation for the nation. No spatial approach is available in the Social Sciences, yet an abundance of theory exists which either touches upon geography as a factor in analysing the nation or has avenues of thought which are specifically geographical yet not recognised by the author as such.

Any explanation of the nation has therefore to move out of past tendencies in Political Geography which remained firmly within a rigid categorisation of Geography. If Political Geography can move out of this 'academic straight-jacket' and concentrate on inter-disciplinary problems it can only benefit and at the same time make a more meaningful contribution to Geography.

As R.L. Merritt correctly points out:

> "Building or holding together a political community depends upon more than the spatial factor alone or even the amount of interaction associated with it. This fact forces the analyst to move to the examination of the political, sociological and psychological variables."[10]

Political Geography has to be viewed as emphasising the importance of linking the political process to its spatial attributes rather than simply the traditional definition of the discipline given by Hartshorne as; "...the variation of political phenomena from place to place."[11]

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10 R.L. Merritt, 'Locational Aspects of Political Integration', in Cox, Reynolds, and Rokkan, Locational Approaches to Power and Conflict, New York, 1974, pp. 187-211, p. 207.

11 R. Hartshorne,'Political Geography in the Modern World', Journal of Conflict, vol.4, March 1960, pp. 45-57, p. 52.

The former approach allows a spatial study of the nation to be undertaken and contribute to existing works on the subject.

Within Political Geography, literature on political integration is also sparse. The works of Hartshorne, Gottmann and Jones however deal with this subject, even though they do not recognise it as such. Hartshorne's article, 'The Functional Approach to Political Geography', viewed political organisations of people and of space as caught up in competition between two opposing forces, one integrative the other disintegrative. He referred to them as centripetal and centrifugal. To Hartshorne, the centripetal forces active within the state was the raison d'être of its political community. If the centrifugal forces were stronger than the centripetal ones, then the continued existence of the state would be put in jeopardy.

Gottmann also developed a similar line of approach to that of Hartshorne. He defined the opposing forces within the state structure as 'circulation' and 'iconography'. To him, the accessibility of geographical space was an important pre-requisite for interaction and circulation between communities.

Jones's, 'A Unified Field theory of Political Geography', is also a contribution which is of relevance to the study of political integration. His 'political idea' in his chain of causal events is comparable to Gottmann's 'iconography' and his 'movement factor' has similar connotations attached to it as Gottmann's 'circulation'.

There has also been an attempt by a number of Political Geographers to measure integration by using quantitative techniques. This type of study has tended to be concerned with territorial integration involving the development of cohesive interaction between areas by examining the co-ordinated flows of transactions or communications over space.

Studies by Soja (1968), Witthuhn (1968) and Mackay (1958) have attempted to measure the spatial aspects of territorial integration by

using such techniques as Transaction Flow Analysis and Gravity Models.[12] They suggested that by so doing, they could identify more accurately when political and territorial integration was taking place by pinpointing a 'threshold', beyond which the focus of attention of communities would be re-directed to one central focus and that this would be integration.

These quantitative approaches can be questioned on a number of grounds. They lack a theoretical understanding and definition of what political integration is, the use of usually only one variable in attempting to measure this process, and the assumption that increasing transactions, flows and interactions are a good index of political-territorial integration. Nor do they directly measure the growth of community or sense of obligation, which may lag far behind observable and measurable interactions. One, for example, cannot deduce that the Soviet Union is integrated as a community even although trade and economic exchange is higher between fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics than between one SSR and another country or area outwith the USSR.

R.L. Merritt, in examining the locational aspects of political integration did not even attempt to define what he meant by 'political integration', being content to examine the merits and defects of core areas, hinterlands, boundaries and spatial discontinuities in an

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12 E. Soja, 'Communication and Territorial Integration in East Africa', East Lakes Geographer, vol.4, 1968, pp. 39-57; B.O. Witthuhn, 'The Spatial Integration of Uganda as Shown by the Diffusion of Postal Agencies, 1900-1965', East Lakes Geographer, vol.4, 1968, pp. 5-20; J.S. Mackay, 'Interactance hypothesis and boundaries in Canada: a preliminary study', Canadian Geographer, vol.2, 1958, pp. 1-8. See also S.J. Brams, 'Transaction Flows in the International System', American Political Science Review, vol.60, 1966, pp. 880-98 and K.R. Cox, 'A Spatial Interactional Model for Political Geography', East Lakes Geographer, vol.4, 1968, pp. 58-76.

emphasis on the structural integration of the state.[13]

In short, a spatial approach to political integration by Political Geographers has tended to lack a definition of what they understand the subject to be. They are structure orientated, pre-occupied with the state and inter-state integration, and make massive generalisations, using few variables in assessing this process.

It is therefore necessary to look to other branches of the Social Sciences in order to come to some tentative conclusions as to how political integration can be of any value to a geographical study of the nation.

Within Political Science, the centre of interest on political integration is also focussed upon the state and inter-state relationships. One of the earliest works in this field is by Karl Deutsch who put forward the concept of a 'security community' which has since been widely used in the social sciences. Deutsch defined this concept as the attainment of:

> "...institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among the population."[14]

Haas, in a study of political integration between European states defined Political Integration as:

> "...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."[15]

For the study of the nation as a process, a more flexible and relevant definition of political integration is needed. The political

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13 R.L. Merritt, op.cit., pp. 187-211.

14 K. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, New Jersey, 1957, p. 2.

15 E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, 1958, p. 16.

scientists, Jacob and Teune[16], attempted to set forth the problems of defining the concept and developing it in order to identify variables associated with political integration. In so doing, they systematically investigated variables which can be interpreted flexibly and applied to a number of levels of political integration.

For the purposes of this work, Jacob and Teune's definition of political integration comes closest to understanding how such a process is relevant to the spatial study of the nation.

> "Political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity. That is, they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and awareness."[17]

This political integrative perspective can therefore lead to the formation and continuance of the group at the national level.

One of the major problems that has arisen in analysing the political integrative process is defining the subject matter which constitutes the existence of a political community. It is necessary to identify those factors that have an influence in producing integration or inhibiting it. Even when the factors have been defined and isolated there is the difficulty of measuring the impact of each variable and all the variables in combination upon the political geographical processes.

Efforts to reconcile this problem and definitions of what is political integration have tended to emphasise levels of integration with varying identified 'thresholds' beyond which a political community of some sort is cohesive and begins to relate with its newly formed

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16 P. Jacob & H. Teune, 'The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of Political Community', in P. Jacob & J.V. Toscano, The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia, 1964, pp. 1-45.

17 ibid., p. 4.

socio-political entity. For example, Etzioni (1965)[18], suggests that integration in a community takes place when it has an effective control over the means of violence, has a centre of decicision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community and it is a dominant force of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens. Jacob and Teune suggest a costing model of integration whereby the variables identified as contributing to the political integration of a community are appraised, and where the benefits exceed the costs, the "price of merger" would appear.[19] Soja's study of territorial integration between East African political communities also identified a threshold which he attempted to quantify. Soja suggested that beyond his defined 'threshold', "...two units become solidly linked together in a chain of interreactive behaviour."[20] By using the concept of salience, he suggested that the identification of the threshold had become "operational" and that integration had taken place.

The major problems with defining and using the term "threshold" is deciding when political integration actually takes place and what factors in the integrative process come before others or are more easily achieved within the political system. It has been particularly quantificational approaches which are responsible for identifying this specific point when integration is seen as taking place. By using such methods, Quantitative Geography has ignored some of the more important aspects in the study of integration.

As has already been pointed out, another major problem has been the usage of only one indicator to conclude if integration has actually taken place.[21] One has to contest such statements as that made by Alker and Puchala who argue that:

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18 A. Etzioni, Political Unification, New York, 1965, p. 4.

19 Jacob & Teune, (1964), op.cit., p. 15.

20 E. Soja, (1968), op.cit., p. 42.

21 For example, E. Soja, 1968, op.cit., B. Witthuhn, 1968, op.cit.

> "...the level of economic interaction between nations can serve as a reliable indicator of their degree of political integration."[22]

One must therefore recognise that political integration is empirically difficult to measure and compare with similar processes taking place in other geographical regions. Instead one must envisage a given set of relationships which are to some degree integrated or a progression of events leading to a positive or negative form of integration. To suggest that a given nation or state is fully integrated at a specific time or with the form of state sovereignty which exists at a given point in history would be false. One can only infer that a nation has been sufficiently integrated as an entity by examining the processes and criteria which define such a group.

All the factors that are postulated in contributing to integration at the national group level have to be seen as inter-related and as part of the total process. Political integration has therefore to be viewed as a relative rather than an absolute term. It can only be inferred from certain observations which come to light through rigorous empirical examination.

As opposed to political integration, disintegration would work against the existence of such a community by re-aligning such national group demands, goals and attributes towards a different focus or foci than that of the nation. For political integration to become operative within this context, the nation has to be in existence in order that its disintegration can come about. However, at every stage of integration or disintegration, there is an on-going process of competing foci in its development.

A number of case studies, already available in Political Geography, Political Science, and Sociology can be used in order to develop a

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22 H. Alker & D. Puchala, 'Trends in Economic Partnership', in D. Singer, (ed), Quantitative International Politics, New York, 1968, p. 288.

spatial explanation of why and how the political disintegration of the nation can come about. Within Political Geography, a number of works have centred upon political re-organisation of space and in the context of this thesis, some of the basic ideas of these scholars can be applied to the nation.

Political Geographical literature has treated the process of political disintegration of space and its inhabitants and the effects of such geographical change by examining such processes as the defederation of post colonial systems.[23] the disintegration of colonialism,[24] and the partition and transfers of territory.[25] The factors which result in spatial and political disintegration can be applied and help explain the disintegration of the national group.[26]

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23 M. Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis, New York, 1966; C.A. Fisher, 'The Geographical Setting of the Proposed Malaysian Federation: Some Preliminary Considerations', Journal of Tropical Geography, vol.17, 1963, pp. 99-115.

24 R.L. Merritt, 'Systems and the Disintegration of Empire', in R. Kaspeson & J. Minghi, 1969, op.cit., pp. 243-257.

25 V.K. Shaudys, 'Geographic Consequences of Establishing Sovereign Political Units', Professional Geographer, vol.14, 1962, pp. 16-20; N.J. Pounds, 'History and Geography: A Perspective on Partition', Journal of International Affairs, vol.18, 1964, pp. 162-72; N.J. Pounds, Divided Germany and Berlin, Princeton, 1962: A.A. Michel, The Indus River: A Study of the Effects of Partition, New Haven, 1967.

26 For example, E.H. Dale, 'The State Idea: Missing Prop of the West Indies Federation', Scottish Geographical Magazine, vol.78, 1962, pp. 166-76, examines the reasons behind the disintegration of the West Indies Federation and its formal demise in 1962, pointing out that the non-contiguity of territory, cultural and social diversity of the various island communities, differing views and attitudes toward federation and a weak centre of decision making, account for the break up of a political entity falsely united by the British Government.

We can therefore suggest that Political Geography is concerned both with the political integration of a region as a spatial entity and the integration of the population as a social entity. In the study of the nation, both region and population are inextricably inter-related in the causation and continuance of such a community grouping.

A political region can be defined as an area in space which is politically organised into some entity. In this context it follows Jones's concept of 'the field' in his chain of links.[27] It is a unique unit in itself and everything within its bounded space is related to the whole of that region in some form.

The Latvian political region can be defined as that part of space which the Latvian nation, as a potential political unit or political unit, occupies. The Latvian political region like any other political attribute does not remain constant through time even although its boundaries as defined by the geographical distribution of the Latvian nation may not change. The characteristics of this political region therefore develop and adapt to the processes operating within and affecting the region from outside its immediate ambit.

The Latvian nation, like its neighbouring Estonian and Lithuanian national groups, are unique examples of nations going through the political processes of striving toward control over their own territory spearheaded by their nationalist movements, attaining political independence in the form of a state for a twenty year period (1920-1940) and losing statehood with incorporation into the Soviet Union.

An integral part of this research has not only been to determine the factors which aided in the formation, growth and questioning of the nation but also to analyse what constitutes the national group at any given point in its temporal and spatial development. Therefore in

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27 The 'field' of a political system is normally the territory associated with it as in Jones's chain of political idea-decision-movement-field-political area. S. Jones, 1954, op.cit., pp. 111-23.

understanding what constitutes a nation and how it functions as a socio-economic and political unit, we can comprehend what are the integrative and disintegrative factors working for and against its existence.

As processes, integration and disintegration are a function of both time and space. The various perspectives which are examined are within a constantly changing framework with an on-going structure, form and behaviour.

Within the context of the Latvian political region, integration can also be used as a direction of thought in pursuing an understanding of not only the national group itself and how its formation comes about, but also its relationship to the various other groups within the region and the socio-economic and national cleavages which are characteristic of it since its inception. Thus integration within the territorial confines of the Latvian political region can help shed some light on the Latvian nation per se and between different nations and state structures. Where the latter processes occur, that of a territorial change and another national elite ruling the political region, it may result in the threat of the existence or disintegration of the Latvian nation. This process is therefore an integral part of understanding the formation, behaviour, continuance and questioning of the Latvian nation as a group attribute and the inter-relationships, interactions and assimilations active and influencing the peoples of the political region.

The factors that may exert influence upon a peoples and contribute to the process by which the group attributes of the nation and nationalism come about vary in time and in space. Within the context of this thesis and the pre-occupation with attempting to explain the Latvian nation, the theoretical framework is designed in such a way as to illustrate the case of the East European nations where the formation of their national group came before it had acquired statehood. This is in contrast with Western Europe, where the state and its political and territorial

structure generally existed before the advent of modern nationalism.

In Western Europe, the nation was usually a product of the state as the state and its political institutions tended to produce uniformities in administration through its centralised decision making. This structure thus helped to build a national consciousness within an already defined political territory. The state having preceeded nationalism in, for example, England, France and Switzerland, had already defined its boundaries. In a very crude sense, the state demanded a nation because there was a universal commerce within the state body.

In Eastern Europe, where feudalism continued well into the nineteenth century, statehood came after national group formation. In contrast to Western Europe where the movement of peoples had ceased at an early date, migrations in the east continued into modern times, often in the form of deliberate colonisation. For example, the settlement of Germans in Southern Russia and Hungary repeatedly injected new racial, religious and linguistic elements into the area. The result was:

> "...the vast area lying between the solid masses of Germans on the west and the Russians on the east remained ethnographically a patchwork. The territories occupied by various religious, linguistic and cultural groups assumed grotesque shapes, bearing no relation whatever to economic or strategic frontiers."[28]

The boundaries of the existing states in this region therefore rarely coincided with that of the territorial demands of the nations and thus, to acquire control over their own territories which in theory is the ultimate goal of nationalism, the Empires of Eastern and Central Europe had to be spatially reorganised to accommodate the creation of sovereign units out of the territory occupied by these nations.

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28 O.I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities, New York, 1945, p. 20.

The formation of the West European state and its later inter-related development of a national identity has preoccupied Political Geographers with little consideration being paid to the formation of the nation on the East European model. This has in itself contributed to the confusion and usage of the term 'nation-state' and possibly also to the lack of works by Geographers on the nation.

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1.2 The Nation and the Integrative Process

The nation is the central theme of this study. Cobban defines the nation by stating that:

> "Any community, the members of which are conscious of themselves as members of a community and wish to maintain the identity of their community is a nation."[29]

To enlarge upon this definition, we can add that the members of such a community, either in real or perceived terms, have shared in a common traditional past and have through time attained values, goals and attributes which are unique to that group. The nation can also be differentiated from other group loyalties and group consciousness by its connection with an area of geographical territory which the group perceives as belonging to them.

This differs from the state. The latter is a legal concept whereas the nation is purely a subjective, emotional group phenomenon. The state has a particular form of political organisation with members and a defined political territory within which there are common political institutions and an effective government of some sort.

Individuals function within the context of various social relations and therefore as groups in a given society. This group can be in a primitive society a tribe in which the tribal community is the member's religion, politics and economy. In a modern capitalist society, group inter-relations and identities become more complicated and sophisticated, with individuals not being exclusively members of one group. They can be members of a varying array of groups including those defined by class, religion, state, nation, language, racial origin, etc. Even within a group, its members have conflicting group consciousness. We must therefore differentiate more concisely between the nation as a group and other groups into which people are organised.

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29 A. Cobban, National Self Determination, London, 1945, p. 48.

Kohn defines the importance of the nation as a group phenomenon after its formation:

> "The group consciousness to which the individual, in case of conflict of group loyalties, owes supreme loyalty."[30]

Allegiance to the nation has in the past alienated individuals of similar class, religious convictions and members of the same state, against each other. The national group has therefore the appearance of being one of the supreme loyalties in group togetherness.

A more integrally complicated problem of definition arises when an attempt is made to differentiate between the nation and nationalism. Both are inter-related concepts. Smith suggests that nationalism:

> "...is an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation like others."[31]

Within this context, nationalism is viewed more as a political phenomena, an organised movement with the ultimate aim of achieving political control over the decision-making processes affecting the territory which their nation occupies. On the other hand, the nation is more of a social phenomena and can exist without the desire by its members to attain statehood. However, in all national groups there is usually present an element of nationalism. As long as the nation exists, nationalism will continue although its importance and strength will vary in accordance with the aspirations and goals of its members.

Ideologically, nationalism must also be differentiated from such doctrines as rationalism, liberalism, utilitarianism and marxism even although it can emerge simultaneously with these ideologies. These other doctrines focus attention on differing manifestations of the individual

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30 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, New York, 1944, pp. 10-11.

31 A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, London, 1971, p. 171.

or on a different type or larger group than that of the nation thus reducing pre-occupation with the national phenomenon and detracting from its significance and the importance of its group attributes. In specific circumstances, these ideologies can work against nationalism as a political movement viewing other aspects of society more important than narrow national interests.

In a superficial sense, it appears logical to infer that nationalism is inter-related with these other ideologies. In some respects, this is partly due to the role élites within nationalist movements perceive their ideological goals and expectations. Modern nationalism often appears at first as an extension of liberal and democratic ideals and as their application, beyond the individual to the entire national group of which the individuals perceive themselves a part. 'Democratic self-government' becomes 'national self government' while 'liberty' becomes 'national freedom'.

Thus nationalism by its very nature is based on an ideal with which its members see as being obstructed or its peoples exploited in the past and present by some form of political and socio-economic oppression. Democracy, freedom, and individualism are therefore preached as part of their movement as they perceive themselves as fighting against a common threat, that of non-democracy, repression and socio-economic inequality.

The integrative processes which form the nation are better introduced if they are viewed within the temporal and spatial context in which national group formation comes about.

The German Romantic School of the late eighteenth century, which had a profound influence on nationalist ideologies in Eastern Europe, was very much influenced by the ideas of Herder and his conception of the nation. Herder's nation was little else than an extension of the Old Germanic Blutgemeinschaft with the nation being simply viewed as a

mere extension of the family unit which was held together by natural ties. He argued that the nation was a natural unit and that it had always existed but that in its earlier primitive form had possessed only an instinctive feeling amongst its members of togetherness. He suggested that through time, the tribe, Volksstamm, acquired a consciousness of its unity and by so doing became a social and political entity and a nation. Herder argued that eventually each nation would be synonymous with a natural state and that all nations had this right to statehood.[32]

Herder and his followers thus stressed the importance of looking into the past to ascertain the existence of the nation. Thus a common ethnic basis and racial origin, history and especially language and culture were the criteria which defined the Romantic movements' conception of the nation. To them the national group was a natural phenomena existing through time and not a product of a specific historical epoch.

Within Eastern Europe, the nation did not exist before the nineteenth century due to the socio-economic, political and institutional framework in which the inhabitants of this area found themselves. Feudalism and the traditionalism of economic life had to be altered before individuals could become aware of their similarities, either real or perceived, which gave them membership of the national groups.

Both the nation and its nationalist movements are products of a specific historical period and therefore could not have and did not exist, as Herder suggests, through time. Neither is the nation a 'natural phenomena'. Individuals have to become socially and politically aware of their common goals and group attributes which bind them together, before a nation comes into existence. Modernisation and a capitalist economy are necessary pre-conditions as nationalism involves the spread of an

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32 Herder postulated that any other state was a Gewaltstaat, created by physical force and as such against any human ideals of liberty.

idea which by its very nature is disseminated courtesy of the modernisation process. Inherent in the spread of this nationalism is a middle class, the vehicle of the national group. This social group is itself a product of the modernisation process and capitalism.

Kohn mentions:

> "...it (the nation), is a product of the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history."[33]

To this we can add E.H. Carr's postulation that:

> "...the national movements in Eastern Europe would not have arisen if it had not been for the growth of the capitalist system and the industrial revolution."[34]

The awareness of national group identity and nationalism is a response to the breaking up of the older traditional societies under a variety of pressures among which the processes and results of economic change in the modern period are of central importance.

We have therefore to determine how this group was formed and what criteria can be identified as leading toward the political integration of the national group.

The process by which the national group comes into being is viewed in this study within the context of modernisation[35] and the spatial and societal effects such a process has in the milieu in which this process

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33 H. Kohn, 1944, op.cit., p. 6.

34 E.H. Carr, et.al., Nationalism: A Royal Institute of International Affairs Report, London, 1939, p. 112.

35 See for example, D. Apter, Some Conceptional Approaches to the Study of Modernisation, New Jersey, 1968; C. Black, The Dynamics of Modernisation, New York, 1967; C.A. Almond, 'Political System and Political Change', American Behavioural Scientist, vol.6, 1963. Modernisation theory has been little used by Geographers. For a quantitative geographical approach to the subject see, P. Gould, 'Tanzania, 1920-63: The Spatial Impress of the Modernisation Process', World Politics, vol.22, nr. 2, 1970, pp. 149-170. Also, E. Soja, The Geography of Modernisation in Kenya, New York, 1968.

operates.

> "...modernisation may be defined as the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution.....Political scientists frequently limit the term 'modernisation' to the political and social changes accompanying industrialisation, but a holistic definition is better suited to the complexity and interrelatedness of all aspects of the process."[36]

To Cyril Black's definition and approach to modernisation we can add A.D. Smith's ideas on the subject.

> "Modernisation is the more or less painful transition from the 'traditional' to the 'modern' type of society."[37]

This process therefore entails the structural differentiation which dislodges people from their roles into a modern capitalist society characterised by greater movement and communication, urbanisation, industrial growth, social stratification, literacy and political and social awareness. By its very definition, it enhances geographical and social contact between people enlarging and operating in a wider milieu which before this process had developed, had been limited to the pre-industrial village community, clan or tribe.

Modernisation is a multi-dimensional concept and cannot be operationally defined by one variable. It is a flexible term offering a holistic approach to the study of the political integration of the nation. It thus helps to differentiate the progression of circumstances, spatial, socio-economic and political, which lead to national group formation, divorcing itself from the traditional-feudal society which has its own inherent characteristics.

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36 C. Black, 1967, op.cit., p. 7.

37 A.D. Smith, 1971, op.cit., p. 42.

"Tradition and modernity are seen as opposed forces, the latter growing at the expense of the former."[38]

Modernisation develops at different rates through modern history and in different areas.

It is postulated that modernisation is necessary for integration to take place at the national group level. Central to this argument is that modernisation can help explain the political integration of the national group and the rise of a nationalist movement. Relatively permanent factors like race, religion, language or a common culture, as stressed by the Romantic School of thought, cannot totally or largely explain the nation and nationalism in themselves. They have to be seen within the context of the modernisation process.

In feudal society, communities are small scale and fairly isolated entities. The social cohesion and continuance of these communities depends upon conditions of an agrarian economy and a low relatively stagnant level of technology and economic development. In this traditional society, the nation is a meaningless term to the individual who lives out his entire life in a small, closed, isolated community. To him, the concept of the nation is beyond his subjective reasoning and comprehension. A localist perspective is the norm within these peasant communities with the rural and urban sectors co-existing as separate worlds largely unknown and ignorant of each other. The village thus represents the sum total and the boundaries of the peasant's intellectual and social geography, beyond this perceiving the rest of space as a terra incognita. Thus the Russian mir, (village, literary meaning, 'world') represents the 'world' of the peasant occupant while the compact feudal communities found in Germany, the 'universitas', has a similar connotation attached to it.

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38 H. Brookfield, Interdependent Development, London, 1975, p. 77.

The relative social immobility and lack of communication in the feudal period, coupled with the lack of literacy and geographical localism, therefore kept the individual orientated toward his immediate social-geographic group (tribe, village, clan, etc.) with which its members experienced close personal interaction with one another.

Religions or dynastic traditions were also more important than an ethnic or national basis of integration and group identity. If the rulers of a given society belonged to a different ethnic group than their subjects, then it did not matter if their rulers were of a different ethnic type. They did not identify on ethnic grounds to the same degree as they have in the recent historical period.

It was not until the Rennaissance and the Reformation that peoples became more geographically and socially mobile, with their intellectual horizons broadening, embracing greater knowledge of other and different social groupings, stimulating perceptions of the differences. At the same time, the role of religion as a common identification point of political loyalties weakened, while dynastic and feudal allegiance as ultimate justification of a political entity was increasingly displaced by the idea, as put forward by the Romantics, of the 'natural right' of people to be governed in accordance with their own wishes and demands.

Modernisation is therefore necessary for the awareness of the national group to come about. The disintegration of traditional societies is brought about by modernisation and this heralds the beginning of capitalist relations based on commodities, exchange and other related economic inter-dependency of regions and peoples. Wider intra-communicative effectiveness and awareness of a wider milieu of common identity and uniqueness develop as part of this change from feudal to a modern form of society. This change within a given area can thus manifest itself in the formation of a nation.

Those traditions, customs and loyalties to the village are transformed into a wider framework replacing those elements of identity to the village, clan or tribe with those more adaptable and acceptable to a wider and larger group.

Nationalism does not necessarily destroy all former primordial loyalties to the traditional community but does weld them into new functions serving the broader societal concept of the nation. Where there is a common basis, (e.g. language, religion, ethnic background, common heritage, etc.), this can provide the means of enlarging the national concept and giving it firmer and eventually defined geographical boundaries.

With the modernisation of society, individuals need to replace their sense of a lost community by creating other groups more adapted to the new circumstances. It is this universal desire for security and a sense of belonging to a group that underlies an explanation for national group integration in Eastern Europe. In the feudal society this need was satisfied through, for example, the village and its community. With industrialisation and urban growth the nation can therefore satisfy this need.

> "Nationalism was a necessary condition, apparently, for the success of the new industrial order. Loyalty to the nation replaced the former narrower loyalties. Village loyalties were too narrow a basis to support an effective integration of the whole society and even under early industrialism, let alone later stages, the nation is the smallest economic and social unit that can be effective. Loyalty to the king or feudal lord also had to be replaced, because industrialisation seemed to require a more abstract ideal, such as the nation, for the common good."[39]

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39 L. Reissman, The Urban Process, New York, 1964, pp. 17-18.

It was the urban industrial environment which became the leading focus for this form of group identity. Individuals moving into the urban areas became alienated from their traditional, rural background by the very process of becoming spatially mobile. A sense of belonging to an integrated, parochial and small community was no longer felt. The new urban inhabitant in nineteenth century Eastern Europe became role confused, 'anomic', in terms of Durkheim's division of labour and 'alienated' in terms of Marxian proletarianism.

> "The bonds of kinship, of neighbourliness and the sentiments arising out of living together for generations under a common folk tradition are likely to be absent, or at best relatively weak in an aggregate (urban set-up), the members of which have such diverse origins and backgrounds. Under such circumstances, competition and formal control mechanisms furnish the substitutes for the bonds of solidarity that are relied upon to hold a folk society together."[40]

The city, because of its heterogeneous character, greater density of population and developing market economy, became the vortex of social and economic change and the leading centre for nationalism. In no other part of space was there such an ideal situation for nationalism to emerge. This partly explains why the origins of modern nationalism are to be found in urban areas and the usual instigators of this ideology are the emerging middle class who are themselves a product of the industrial city.

This developed modern society offers economic and behavioural rewards for successful group alignments to individuals who have been uprooted by social, economic and technological change and exposed to the rise of economic competition. By the very nature of modernisation, the individual, particularly the migrant moving to the city, becomes

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40 L. Wirth, 'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology, vol.44, 1938, p. 11.

'modernised' and as such has, "...greater capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment."[41] Hence large numbers have felt the need and desire for such a group and have put their loyalties, trust and aspirations within the context of the nation.

Although it is very difficult to measure nationalism, there is an obvious relationship between the various modernisation processes and the integration of the national group. Inter-related with modernisation are spatial changes which manifest themselves in the re-organisation of a given region. One of the most important aspects of these changes was the move toward an industrial-urban economy with the political and economic centres of gravity moving to this new focus whereas before the traditional source of wealth and power had remained with the feudal lord in the rural areas. The whole process of development and technological change introduced new concepts of movement, greater mobility and communication between peoples. As these processes continued, one of the consequences was integration at the national level.

One of the most important aspects of modernisation is social and geographical mobility. Strictly speaking, modernisation produces literacy, culture, communication and hence a greater facility for a national group awareness to develop. These processes cannot come about until people become more socially mobile through both the re-stratification of society and education. In a spatial context, an area becomes more accessible to the inhabitants of the region through the very processes of social and spatial mobility thus resulting in more interaction with individuals through this increased movement. Communication is also made more effective over wider areas thus enhancing the communicative process.

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41 J.S. Migdal, 'Why Change? Toward a New Theory of Change Among Individuals in the Process of Modernisation', World Politics, vol.26, nr. 2, (1974), pp. 189-306, p. 192.

Geographical and social movement is necessary to cause a sufficient change in a group's level of organisation to permit it to make demands at the societal level. It also gives members of a group a greater opportunity to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects with members of its own group than with outsiders. The group search for similarities in their composition and make-up and so define their national group geographically.

For transactions to take place between peoples, both communication and movement are a pre-condition. In this context, we are concerned with the movement and flows of ideas, goods and people within and between various geographical areas. Relations between one area of space and other areas cannot exist unless there is movement across the limits of the territory concerned.

The adoption of a group language or dialect and the acceptance by members of that group of a wide range of social customs, traditions, group symbols and mutual knowledge of the past are all parts of the enhanced communicative process. The expansion of the area occurs with improvements in mobility or circulation especially through the growth of trade, urbanisation, industrialisation, technological innovation, transport networks, literacy, expansion of the mass media, accessibility to information flows, etc. Hence groups that have the capacity and willingness to develop such effective communicative habits are set apart from other groups by the formation of communicative barriers which can be of a geographical, socio-economic, cultural or later, political nature.

Movement is therefore the key factor and communication the pre-condition for integration. With the shift to a capitalist economy people from the surrounding rural areas conglomerate in the cities. The process by which this movement is the cause is the change in the mode of production. The Marxist Geographer, David Harvey clarifies the relationship between capitalism and urbanisation:

> "...a change in the mode of production results in a change in the meaning of urbanisation. Whereas feudal cities were primarily political organisations, industrial cities are characterised by the development of the built environment, functioning as a collectivized means of production. The built environment additionally functions as a means of consumption (there being a dynamic interplay between the productive and consumptive modes) as well as a means of reproduction."[42]

Urbanisation is therefore intrinsically related to the intensification of the communicative process and in effect results in the formation and expression of the new form of industrial society geared to the destruction of traditional, pre-industrial modes of living.

> "Urbanisation is a product of increasing economic specialisation and advanced technology. The only way it is possible to advance from a subsistance basis is by specialisation of economic activities. The linkage between specialisms necessitate the accumulation of people and this is the process of urbanisation."[43]

Urban growth has inter-related spatial effects in a given geographical area. By its very process it has a close if not intertwined relationship with industrialisation which comprises the economic shift from agriculture to manufacturing, from the land to the factory. These spatial and social changes are necessary if nationalism and the integration of the nation are to come about. Without them, society would remain in its pre-industrial phase, unaware of what a nation is and what similarities other peoples have in common with their given traditional type of group experiences.

The urban process also aids in the formation or further entrenchment of core areas. From empirical evidence, it can be seen that economic development has gone hand in hand with the faster rate of

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42 D. Harvey, 'A Discussion on the Political Economy of Urbanism', Antipode, vol.7, nr. 1, February 1975, pp. 64-67, p. 64.

43 H. Carter, The Study of Urban Geography, London 1973, p. 28.

growth of some regions over others.

> "The spatial expansion of capitalism in search of new markets and investment opportunities is highly selective, favouring growth in some cities, regions and nations overseas, ...just as at home some regions prosper while others become more depressed."[44]

Economic change takes place at different stages within a given polity. The regions that have grown more rapidly usually have more favourable geographical factors at their disposal such as location, accessibility to markets, nodality, resources and transport networks. They have therefore attracted larger populations from the surrounding areas at the expense of less endowed regions.

This 'uneven development'[45] which is more marked as a consequence of modernisation, orientates a polity around specific geographical or core areas. With the full impact of modernisation, these core areas accumulate capital becoming and functioning as economic and political centres of wealth and power for the surrounding region. A centre-periphery relationship builds up on the basis of production and exchange. Thus the core area has a defined hinterland which looks toward the centre in a socio-economic and political sense.

The importance of the core area in the formation and structure of the state has been an important theme in Political Geography. Yet there has been little consideration paid to the relationship between the core area and the formation and integration of the nation. This appears to be mainly due to the use of West European examples in forming theory on the subject where the state structure evolved before that of the nation. However, some of the remarks which have been made in relation

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44 D.M. Smith, Human Geography: a welfare approach, London, 1977, p. 122.

45 E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, London, 1962, pp. 91-2, examines this concept in detail and its importance to understanding geographical inequalities.

to the development and growth of the state can be expanded upon and applied to the study of the nation.

The political geographers, Ratzel (1896) and Whittlesey (1944) made the rather presumptious mistake of suggesting that the core area is a necessary pre-condition in the formation of the nation and the state.[46] They further viewed the core area as being an automatic, purely geographical phenomenon under-estimating the importance of economics and ignoring the relevance of social communication and other related factors in the formation of the nation. Hartshorne sets the importance of the core area in context.

> "A core area is neither sufficient nor essential in the evolution of a nation or a state. What is essential is a common idea that convinces the people in all the regions that they belong together."[47]

Although placing less emphasis on the core area and suggesting that other factors had to be examined in the growth of states, Hartshorne still continued to make the central theme of his argument the core idea without stressing the inter-relationship and relevance of other factors. He saw the core area as a purely geographical concept without considering in any detail the political economy of the area and the importance of developing habits of and facilities for greater social communication.

However, the core area is an important political integrative factor in advancing a region's level of integration, and responding to the needs and requirements of other areas of the region.

Within Eastern Europe, the core areas operated as both contributory causes to nationalist tensions and as centres of national group

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46 Ratzel, (1896), op.cit., Whittlesey, (1944), op.cit., p. 7.

47 R. Hartshorne, 'The Functional Approach to Political Geography', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.40, (1950), pp. 95-130, p. 116.

identification and formation. In the former case, the nation that inhabited and 'controlled' the core area of the state, as for example the Russians through their role in the development from the Muscovy state to the Russian Empire, were seen to wield the 'power' of the state, while those on the periphery, the non-Russians, generally had to accept overlordship from this ethnic group's ruling elite.

The core areas on the periphery, which acted as nuclei from which the surrounding population could look toward economically and culturally, thus functioned as the foci of expression for various national groups helping to give a unity and centrality to the people that surrounded this node. Thus through historical antecedence and economic growth, Riga became the expression and core area of Latvian nationalism, Belgrade for Serbian nationalism and Minsk for Belorussian national identity.[48]

Thus when regional inequality, be it economic, political or social, is equated with the spatial distribution of a nation, then this can lead to a demand centred on arguments of national inequality which can contribute to the nationalist cause.

In an empirical study involving evidence from a number of European states, Pounds and Ball suggested that if one core area exists the growth and integration would be enhanced in a state and later help form a more integrative unitary polity.

> "Those states which grew up by a process of accretion around a central or eccentric but nevertheless internal core area have a higher degree of unity and cohesion than the others."[49]

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48 Guthier examines the importance of Minsk in the development of a Belorussian national identity: S.L. Guthier, 'The Belorussians: National Identification & Assimilation', Soviet Studies, vol.29, nr. 1, January 1977, pp. 37-61 & nr. 2, April 1977, pp. 270-283.

49 N. Pounds & S. Ball, 'Core Areas - The Development of the European States System', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.54, 1964, pp. 24-40.

There is little doubt that one centre which the surrounding population look to for various functions has obvious advantages in the formation of nations and states. Although a geographical base in the form of a core area is an important phenomenon, it should not be viewed as an automatic response by which accretion and political integration comes about by itself. However, the importance of the core-periphery structure is a vital aspect in both regional and national integration with the centre growing faster and thus acting as a suction pump pulling in the more dynamic elements on the periphery.

In the absence of high levels of political organisation, the periphery of a region will comprise those areas the populations of which share major values of the core area, identifying with the symbols and iconography of it and accepting its authoritative and cultural institutions. Where one core area exists in a region, the communicative processes will develop in such a way that the periphery will become more dependent on the core area. Where two or more core areas exist in a given region, loyalties and the function of that region will possibly not be as integrated as it would be with only one core area.

Cities, in themselves, can also play an important part in the formation of the nation. Although inter-related with the concept of the core area, a city can become, because of its larger size than any other urban centre in the region and greater diversity of economic functions and institutions, a focus for loyalty and national expression. Jefferson refers to such a city as the Primate city.

> "...the largest city shall be super-eminent and not merely in size but in national influence."[50]

A Primate city can therefore play an important role in the formation and integration of both a nation and a polity. There are a number

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50 M. Jefferson, 'The Law of the Primate City', Geographical Review, vol.29, 1939, p. 227.

of cases where a dominant town, either through modernisation or some economic and historical processes can become the expression and centre of that nation. Sometimes this can be inter-related with a state's governmental functions as a decision making node in the form of a capital city.

The growth of physical communication through the greater sophistication of transport networks in the modernising period enhances contact between peoples on a scale which was impossible within traditional societies. By this process, transactions are made easier and accessibility makes people more aware of their perceived or real similarities. This aids in giving the core area a central role, expressing in them a political focus to which the surrounding area looks.

With these resulting spatial changes, boundaries are formed. They can be defined by a number of geographical, cultural, economic or political criteria, (e.g. physical geography, non-contiguity in space, break in transactions or movement between peoples, the uneven distribution of the population, etc.). The boundary as it develops as a consequence of a nation defining itself takes on an important political role both in the formation of the nation and the state. If a territory is easily identifiable with boundaries, then this can aid in the integration of the national group.

> "In conditions of low social communication and mobility... the population of a borderland between two political units is likely to have a distinctive set of characteristics."[51]

This can lead to boundary conflict, an important aspect in the study of political integration. The core area wants to attain power and dominance over its nation. It attempts to make the boundary the absolute division of its peoples by orientating the loyalties and

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51 R.L. Merritt, 1974, op.cit., p. 196.

and activities of the borderland inhabitants toward the core area. It does this by insuring that the spatial periphery of the national group is part of the whole nation. Such policies as making the periphery accessible to the centre by developing the transport network and by promoting the movement of ideas, commodities and people aid in orientating the periphery inward toward the core.

An important pre-condition for defining the spatial area of the potential nation is education and the type and form of information received through this process. The vanguard in both the modernisation process and national group formation is the middle class who have attained the knowledge and requirements to furnish the population of a specific geographical region with a national awareness. This class needs some vehicle through which they can spread the idea of nationalism. This is done by using the mass media to reach the masses. It therefore requires only the antecedent conditions of geographical mobility into the urban areas to set the whole process in motion. From this emigration to the urban areas, the indigenous population is subjected to greater access of information flow and through social mobility, an indigenous middle class emerges, itself a product of the city and the social group by which nationalism is disseminated to the surrounding area.

> "Increasing urbanisation has tended to raise literacy, rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure, increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic and political participation."[52]

To build national groups, literacy, empathy and communication are necessary pre-requisites all of which are integral components in the diffusion of the modernisation process throughout space.

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52 D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, 1964, p. 46.

The spatial changes caused by the modernisation process are all very much inter-related and have in themselves a cause-effect relationship to integration at the national group level. The modernisation process makes possible the nation's existence through the disintegration of traditional society and once set in motion, this on-going process gathers momentum thus enhancing integrative relationships.

But as the modernisation process continues, the nation can disintegrate as a social and political phenomena. For example, Karl Deutsch pointed out that modernisation, by socially mobilising large segments of the population, would increase the possibilities and tempo of their assimilation with other nations or groups within a given political area and that this can lead to the disintegration of the national group.[53] As an on-going process, modernisation does not necessarily dissolve loyalties to the nation. There is plenty of empirical evidence, particularly in the peripheral areas of Europe, to suggest that Deutsch is wrong in his assertion.[54] Indeed, in this study, it will be shown that the Latvian experience proves that a nation can continue to survive as a social entity even although in the contemporary period, it is part of a modernised society, with pressure on it to assimilate into a culture of a different national group.

However, there is little doubt that modernisation can, in some circumstances, question the existence of the nation in the context of its politically organised territory and that this can lead to the disintegration of the nation with loyalty and identity being transferred to

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53 K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.

54 If the modernisation processes led to a reduction in national group consciousness in favour of identification and loyalty to the state, then the number of contemporary polities troubled by national disharmony would be on the decline. Scottish and Welsh nationalism, the Bretons in France and the Basques in Spain illustrate that this is not necessarily the case.

the state or another, possibly larger, national group whose elite may well have a monopoly in implementing state decisions.

As part of the modernisation process, peoples of a given territory are re-allocated within space due to socio-economic changes. Contact between various peoples is thus enhanced and this in itself can lead either to further integration of the nation or disintegration can take place as assimilation between national groups may re-orientate the loyalties of one group toward another.

Increased contacts, for example, a result of modernisation, can produce disharmony rather than harmony or integration between peoples.[55]

> "Increased contacts tend to have one impact in a culture situation and quite a different impact in a variegated culture area."[56]

However, depending on circumstance, it can be postulated that the closer people live together geographically and the more they share in common territorial and group similarities, the greater the likelihood of integrative relationships taking place.

Having reviewed the processes which comprise modernisation and their integral link in the formation of the nation, a systematic analysis of factors which can lead to the integration of a national group now follows. It is important to view these factors within the context of modernisation and the spatial changes which take place.

Territoriality is one of the basic requirements to successful national group formation. As a specific geographical concept, the political region with which a potential national group inhabits gives

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55 Examples where modernisation has increased disharmony through greater contact is the present discord between the Estonians, Latvians, Georgians and Ukrainians over the Russians, the conflict between the Basques and Castilians and between the Czechs and Slovaks.

56 W. Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?', World Politics, vol.24, nr. 3, 1972, pp. 319-355, p. 347.

the nation a spatial dimension contributing and making possible a geographical explanation of such a social group.

Hertz suggests that a people without a territory will find it difficult to survive and exist.[57] He goes on to elucidate what he means by the relationship between territory and the nation.

> "By national territory is understood the country with which a nation by long tradition is so intimately connected that it regards it as the homeland and as an integral part of its whole existence."[58]

This region can play a role in determining the goals and aspirations of the nation. Thus if a territory is contiguous and the population that identify with that specific piece of space are distributed in a relatively even fashion and are numerically dominant within the area, then the more likelihood integration is of taking place.

Edward Soja lists three basic aspects of human territoriality. These are, a sense of spatial identity, a sense of exclusiveness and the compartmentalisation or channeling of human interaction in space.[59] Thus without the processes of modernisation, the importance of territory to the nation becomes meaningless. The Political Geographer, Burghardt, although not relating his theory on territoriality to modernisation, nevertheless presents a valid theoretical sequence of territorial awareness which can be partly applied to this study. He postulates that five stages can be identified with what he refers to as, "man-land pair bonding".[60]

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57 F. Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics, London, 1944, p. 146.

58 ibid., p. 146.

59 E. Soja, 'The Political Organisation of Space', Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography, Resource Paper Nr. 8., 1971, pp. 19-45.

60 A. Burghardt, 'The Bases of Territorial Claims', Geographical Review, vol.63, nr. 2, April 1973, pp. 225-245, p. 243.

According to Burghardt, the first stage is the very existence of a group residing in 'abstract space' where an obvious relationship exists between peoples and a given area but with no awareness or identity with particular points or areas. He defines his second stage thus:

> "The group has become rooted, implanted in a certain land, and that land is to be imprinted with the image of the group."[61]

The subsequent three stages are characterised by an evolved awareness and identity with a territory. Space is no longer abstract with members of the group coming to identify themselves with a particular unit. The group gradually view their territory not only in a definitive way but also in terms of its resources and economic possibilities.

Finally, Burghardt suggests that as time progresses, the importance of 'past memory' and shared experience within that defined territory becomes more apparent leading to an intense feeling of the right to ownership of that territory.

This model can therefore be seen as a process by which national group formation is linked to territoriality and the importance of socio-economic and spatial change in evolving an identity with a political region. Eventually the group sees themselves and their territory as integral to each other viewing that they have the right to succeed from the state to which it is a part.

The location of this territory within a political system can also determine national group formation. Thus a nation located on the periphery of a state's territory, the administrative and institutional functions usually centred in the core area of the state tends to have less control in the running of the state apparatus than do the populat-

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61 ibid., p. 243.

ion that inhabit the core area and act as the ruling state elite. Location near a state's boundaries can also lessen the influences of assimilation from the state and the ruling elite due to distance from the core area. A peripheral location can also contribute to a greater realisation by a national group that secession from the state is more feasible due to their geographical proximity to the borderland.

Non-contiguity in space can impede the processes of political integration within a nation but can enhance it when a national group, through distance, lack of accessibility, population discontinuities, etc., is separated from the state's decision making and power core and from the influence of other national groups.

Territory is intrinsically tied up with physical and social communication. The inter-relationships in space which are made easier by proximity, is what Gottman calls 'circulation', i.e. the movement of ideas, commodities and people and the relationship with accessibility within space.[62] Proximity and its relationship to territory has to be viewed as a function of economics and politics, regulated by innovation and the geographical distribution and density of the population.

With increased social communication and mobility within a territory, one would suspect that the cause-effect of these processes having an impact on the population would be partly accountable to a social homogeneity within that given political region. If a territory has a relatively similar population which expresses itself in various homogeneous terms, then social communication will be made easier and more accessible within that area.

The importance of homogeneity to state cohesion, has been outlined by Hartshorne,[63] and Jacob and Teune.[64] According to the former, homo-

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62 J. Gottmann, (1952), op.cit.

63 R. Hartshorne, 'The Morphology of the State Area', in C. Fisher (edit), Essays in Political Geography, London, 1968, pp. 27-32.

64 Jacob & Teune, 1964, op.cit., pp. 18-23.

geneous factors must outweigh heterogeneous population characteristics if a state is to function effectively.

> "...geographically, the purpose of the political organisation of a state is to establish coherent unity and a certain degree of homogeneity over areas without which the state organisation are more or less separate and heterogeneous."[65]

As with the state, the nation cannot function let alone come into being unless there is a similarity in its composition. Factors such as language, religion, social class, ethnic identification, education, perceived common goals and aspirations, values and attitudes, etc., can make communication easier within a territory.

Homogeneity can therefore be a direct or indirect aspect of the modernisation process and can in itself cause and enhance the communicative process.

No area is, however, spatially homogeneous. Indeed, with the impact of modernisation, a region will take on a more heterogeneous character as various social and economic forces differentiate people within that territory through, for example, social stratification, differing literacy and income levels, and spatial mobility of peoples. It is particularly the urban milieu which is a product of a faster rate of modernisation than the surrounding rural areas, becoming a mixture of various socio-economic, national and ethnic groups.

It is therefore dangerous to infer from homogeneity alone. Although a geographically contiguous people may have characteristics in common, it would be totally subjective to suggest that they are integrated and constitute some sort of national group. It would be deterministic to divide the world into separate homogeneous regions. Because a geographical area contains a people who speak the same

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65 R. Hartshorne, 1968, op.cit., p. 27.

language or practise a similar religious faith, it does not mean that they are integrated. As Jacob & Teune clarify:

> "This vital kind of understanding of motivating hopes and fears in human behaviour is fundamental to determining whether homogeneity is deeply grounded and real or merely a surface illusion beneath which people are not really alike at all."[66]

Modern nationalists have tended to play on their homogeneous characteristics in an attempt to put forward their case for statehood. This was particularly so in Eastern Europe where a number of nations were seeking independence under the principles of self-determination after 1918.[67] They sought for some invariable, positive, eternal symbol of the differences existing within space between them and other national groups. Influenced by the ideas of Herder, they saw in language, culture, race and religion a case for statehood which, according to the Romantic movement, was their 'natural right'. In Eastern Europe, belonging to a nation was something determined by birth, race and culture rather than by the polity in which this group resided. It was within the context of these group attributes that the case for political control over the territory they occupied, was made. Yet in many cases, although homogeneous geographical regions sometimes correlated with the

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66 Jacob & Teune, 1964, op.cit., pp. 20-1.

67 National self-determination was introduced into the Treaty of Versailles. It was based on Herder's notion of the nation evolving into a 'natural state'. The general philosophy was that every nation had a right to determine its own political future. But it is difficult to understand what kind of right was understood and to what national groups they could be attributed. It is therefore not surprising that Versailles was characterised by a failure to apply self-determination logically and systematically. See, H.S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations, London, 1967.

geography of race or language, the national groups were often not fully integrated within.

However, the role of homogeneous factors such as language, religion or race in the origins and growth of nations cannot be dismissed. There is little doubt that they have played an important and central role in national group formation. An attempt is therefore made to examine these group attributes within the context of other integrative processes, elucidating on their relationship with modernisation and the impact such spatial changes can have on the intertwined processes leading to national group formation.

The homogeneous factors outlined can be incorporated into a nation's culture.

> "A common culture is a common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men's attention and behaviour, as well as in their thoughts and feelings."[68]

Culture is based on a community of communication consisting of socially stereotyped patterns of behaviour including such factors as habits of language and thought and carried on through various forms of social learning.

In a superficial sense, it is usually easier for a people to communicate within the same culture than across cultural boundaries. In this respect, a culture group can be synonymous with a national group and all the criteria which define its culture can help define the nation.

The importance of language in contributing to a definition of culture and nation is stressed by most scholars. However, studies in the past, particularly by Geographers, have tended to overstress the role of language as a homogeneous phenomenon rather than its inter-related role with other factors in the communicative process. Deutsch has stressed

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68 K. Deutsch, 1966, op.cit., p. 62.

the significance of language in effecting communication within and between national groups.

> "A community of language is a community of information vehicles."[69]

Social boundaries within a community can become less significant if communication is made easier by language.

There has always been a general acceptance that language was an adequate test of the nation. The Romantics, Herder and Fichte, were seminal in developing the complimentary view that the mother tongue expressed a nation's soul or spirit.

> "Without its own language, a Volk is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms."[70]

Thus in Eastern Europe where nationalism was strongly related to the mother tongue and not necessarily with geographical boundaries or state territory, language and the nation were viewed as the same.

If a community speaks a unique language then this is a pre-condition in order to facilitate internal movement of ideas and other indirect economic, cultural and spatial results as well as to hinder external cultural forces from penetrating into a uniform language community. The very fact that a group speaks the same language or dialect also relates to a feeling of similarity which in itself appears as a sense of belonging to a community that shares the particular characteristics. It has thus important behavioural and identific attributes connected with it.

> "Modern mass nationalism goes beyond the objective, instrumental identification of community with language to the

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69 ibid, p. 25.

70 J.G. Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, vol.1, p. 147, as cited in J. Fishman, Language and Nationalism, Rowley, Mass., 1972, p. 48.

> identification of authenticity with a particular language which is experientally unique, and therefore, functional in a way that other languages cannot match, namely in safeguarding the sentimental and behavioural links between the speech community of today and its (real or imaginary) counterparts yesterday and in antiquity."[71]

The function of language is thus intricately tied up with other manifestations of the nation and by itself is an expression of that particular group.

Geographical language barriers are not necessarily rigid. There are a number of influences which tend to negate the importance of similar language regions. Other integrative factors can reduce the relevance of language. Regions that do possess homogeneity of vernacular can be split in their loyalties and can even be part of a nation with more than one language to its credit.

If a people are unaware of each other and have not amassed information about one another, then it is unlikely that integration will come about and manifest itself in the nation. In relation to homogeneous characteristics, if a people are unaware of their similarities and differences, either real or perceived, then the effect is lost as the uniqueness of the group cannot be envisaged.

It is therefore postulated that the characteristics of a people and their shared historical, economic and cultural traditions and past experiences have little effect on the integrative process within a group if they are not aware of each other. Mutual knowledge and understanding among people and groups of people is essential to their functioning together effectively as a nation with aspirations and goals toward the political and spatial change of the territory they occupy. Parochialism, political apathy and ignorance will not enhance a wider

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71 ibid., pp. 43-44.

national geographical group. An awareness with the overt behaviour patterns of a community and other communities is an important element in establishing a sense of group cohesiveness.

Knowledge of other communities can either have a positive or negative effect in establishing integrative relationships. Here such characteristics as ethnic uniqueness, religion, social background and class, etc. are the important indices. The stereotype images which a community have of other communities dominate. Although these stereotypes are strongly persistent in the mind of individuals they are not immune to change.

Mutual knowledge will therefore not contribute to integration unless it is accompanied by or linked to experiences or memories of experiences which have had a favourable and positive impact. An understanding of the past and past intra- and inter-group relationships is therefore vital.

With the impact of modernisation, the national group acquires a national image of itself and images of other communities and group which enhances the integrative process within the national entity alienating other groups from integrating with that group. It is therefore not how nations and communities exist in reality which people interpret. It is the environment seen as a mental conception in the individual on a subjective basis which dominates.

National groups perceive the world according to their cultural preferences and prejudices.

> "...for in the last analysis it is human consciousness which is the subject matter of history. The inter-relations, confusions and infections of human consciousness are, for history, reality itself."[72]

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72 M. Bloc, in H. Prince, 'Real, Imagined and Abstract Worlds of the Past', Progress in Geography, vol.3, 1971, pp. 1-86.

The subjective mental conception of the national group as it perceives itself and everything outwith this community, can lead to an analogy being drawn with Wright's dichotomy of the environment.[73] These are 'mental images' and 'true imaginative conceptions'. Mental images have been defined where the individual (and by extension a group), has had direct contact with the real or his immediate environment. In this sense, the 'mental image' would be of the national group and the region they occupy. The 'true imaginative conception' is defined by Wright as, "...images which are a construct of the mind."[74] Hence everything outside the learned cultural prejudices and preferences of the nation would be a terra incognita which would rely basically on the imagination of the individual (and the group) as acquired through his national beliefs, prejudices and aspirations.

These learned habits and beliefs enhance the integrative process in another sense. Dislike or fear of "foreigners" can aid nationalist tendencies. Xenophobia in a community is a result of the reality and perceptions of the circumstances in which the nation finds itself. It can be a hatred of an alien ruling elite in a colonial situation, other nations or neighbouring states. In traditional societies, religion sometimes played an important xenophobic role. Major religious divergence contributed to ethnic strangeness, since religion in earlier societies regulated so much of man's way of life that it inevitably became a major determinant of the future nationalities of some nations. Thus for example, two religions living side by side tended to augment xenophobic feelings and perpetuate differences by both the dominant and secondary groups.

Within a colonial situation where the ruling elite are divorced from the indigenous population through social, economic and often ethnolinguistic differences, national sentiment among the local population

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73 J.K. Wright, 'Terra Incognita - The Place of Imagination in Geography', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.37, 1947. 74 ibid

can be heightened through an awareness of their socio-economic and political position within colonial society.[75] In this respect, domination by "outsiders" is seen as "un-natural" with the indigenous population viewing the territory in which they reside as belonging to them and their poorer socio-economic position as a product of the exploitation by the ruling elite.

Thus, in Eastern Europe, nationalism was a struggle against the exploiting imperial landlords. The indigenous population of this region, whose bulk constituted the peasantry, became a struggle against foreign aggression becoming articulate when a comparatively small section of middle class intellectuals, themselves a product of capitalism and the modernisation process, began to voice their appeals on behalf of the national group centring their grievances against the ruling elite. As the main concern of the peasantry was land, the middle class voiced their nationalist appeals against that element in society, the foreign landowners, who could conveniently be used as a scapegoat and main focus of xenophobia for all classes in the indigenous community. Thus Tsarist Russian represented foreign political domination for the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles and the Hapsburg Empire for the Bohemians and Slovaks. The Baltic German Barons in the Baltic provinces represented the exploitation of the native Estonian and Latvian peasant population, the Polish landlords epitimised a similar relationship in Lithuania as did the Magyar landlords in Croatia and the Greek clergy in Bulgaria.

But nationalism is not just merely anti-colonialism. Resistance to foreign rule also occurred in the traditional feudal society. In the latter context, we cannot call this opposition, nationalism.

> "Men do not seek collective independence and build states simply because they react to a common enemy. For that would

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75 T. Kemp, Theories of Imperialism, London, 1967. For a Geographical view on imperialism see, J.M. Blaut, 'Imperialism: The Marxist Theory and its Evolution', Antipode, vol.7, nr. 1, February 1975, pp. 1-19.

> mean that the colonised only became aware of themselves as a unity, a 'social self', a distinct identity, in contrast to the coloniser...The former derive values and self-image dialectically in opposition to those of the colonisers, by a process of rule and value disassociation and comparison."[76]

Rejection of foreign rule does contribute to the growth of the national group but it has to be viewed as only one contributing factor in the integrative process. The perennial conflict between ruler and ruled for the scarse resources in the area of occupation can manifest itself in nationalist demands by the indigenous population while the ruling élite attempt to continue the status quo on the basis of coersion and force. Hence the importance of a shared tradition in the face of historical sequences of opportunity and threat aid in the integrative process of the nation.

The national group can gather in strength through struggling against these "foreign" forces which threaten the very existence of it. The reason for nationalism can thus take on an entirely different picture. It evolves because of a defensive motive, trying to preserve its institutions and culture and fighting for the scarse economic resources within the nation's territorial ambit. A nation thus may find in the state or colonial system to which it is politically a part, an enemy in the polities ruling elite. Through the political system's bureaucratic and centralised institutions and its relationship with the ruling national group, the threatened nation may see a continuing on-going attempt to assimilate it into the state or Empire to which it is a part. A nation that attempts to preserve only its cultural uniqueness may through subjection to alien rule find in its evolved nationalist movement a political force by which it can attain control over its own territory and resources thus achieving immunity against the state to

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76 A.D. Smith, 1971, op.cit., p. 66.

which it belonged.

> "Such experiences normally intensify the feeling of cohesion, of belonging to the group. The most articulate nations today have in some measure been moulded by pressures. The pressure may not always be an attempt by an outside power to thwart or destroy the nation; it may be merely an experience through which its members have passed."[77]

Although threat to their existence can unite peoples, when the common threat passes, integration can break down as there may no longer be a reason for remaining as a national group.

The role in which economic considerations play in a contributing force to integration has been an important theme put forward by a number of Marxists in studying andattempting to explain the nation and nationalist movements.[78] These works have been based on the premise that economics represent the determining force in society. The presumption has been that economic considerations contribute the primary force which shapes the basic ideas and attitudes of man. In the context of the nation, the position economics plays has tended to have been taken out of context in the overall process of integration. A class analysis in itself only contributes to helping explain the nation, it does not explain such a social and political phenomena by itself. It is therefore a valid criticism to suggest that a number of Marxist approaches to the nation have, because of their obsession with using class to explain all, led them up an academic cul-de-sac. However, as part of the modernisat-

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77 N. Pounds, Political Geography, New York, 1972, p. 10.

78 For a comprehensive history of the various Marxist approaches to the nation see, S.F. Bloom, The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in The Work of Karl Marx, New York, 1967; A.D. Low, Lenin on the Nationality Question, New York, 1958; H.B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labour Theories of Nationalism, London, 1967.

ion process, economics plays a seminal role in the national group formation.

Marx suggested that the geographical limits of the nation should be decided by the needs governing the operations of an advanced economy and not by historical, legal and traditional factors. He thus saw political integration of the nation as a phenomena only possible out-with the capitalist epoch of history. He viewed that it was a false abstraction to regard a capitalist nation as "...aggregate body working merely for the satisfaction of national wants."[79] The class analysis, although validly viewing the nation as a product of capitalism denies that as a social and political phenomena, the nation is integrated within this period. Lenin, for example, viewed nationalism as a temporary movement based upon the political designs of the bourgeoisie:

> "Since the leaders and masters of this process (the growth of exchange between regions, the growth of commodity circulation) were the merchant capitalists, the creation of these national ties was nothing but the creation of bourgeois ties."[80]

Although the bourgeoisie as a social group have their own narrow socio-economic and political interests to safeguard, playing also a seminal role in the spread of nationalism, it does not mean that the nation is not integrated. Although social classes have differing demands upon the system, the important fact is that they see themselves as part of a nation with real or perceived similarities with other members of that group. Thus other integrative factors do play a role in determining the nation besides economics.

It has also been held, for example, that a national minority in a state will not secede from a state if its living standards are improving

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79 K. Marx, Kapital, vol.3, Hamburg edition, 1922, p. 388, as cited in S. Bloom, 1967, op.cit. p. 58.

80 V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, vol.1, p. 73, as cited in A.D. Low, op.cit., 1958, p. 149.

both in real terms and relative to other areas and segments of the state's population. Such a suggestion as this under-estimates the importance of integration at the national level. There are a number of examples which prove this thesis to be wrong.[81]

The distribution of wealth and income, both socially and spatially, can therefore have an important impact on integrative relationships. Indeed, within a community, if there is participation at every level, with a similar distribution in standards of living, then class will not necessarily come in the way of national integration to the same degree if there were massive inequalities of wealth. Lenin observed that high wages tended to assimilate workers with their middle class compatriots.[82]

There is little doubt that economic and social inequalities existing within space and society may become an irritant reinforcing national consciousness with those most involved in the conflict presenting their case for attaining control over their territory on the basis of such geographical variations in economic resources and standards of living.

However, economic nationalism per se does not exist. It is nationalism based on the perceived inequalities in the spatial and social distribution of resources that can play a contributing factor toward the integrative process.

The nation thus comes into being through the process of political integration at the group level. In the East European nations which attained statehood only after national group formation, their national-

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81 Examples where minority nations have become more antagonistic toward the majority nation and as a result their nationalism was accentuated, include the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and the Flemish in Belgium. These national groups' feelings were heightened even although the socio-economic differences between them and the majority nation was becoming rapidly less. See W. Connor, (1972), op.cit., p. 342.

82 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York, 1939, pp. 105-8.

ism developed from an awareness of their identity to a political nationalism whereby their demands were centred on greater political control over their own territory.

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1.3 The Nation and its Relationship to the Multi-national State

After the nation is formed and comes into being as a social entity, it has to function within the constraints and limitations of a political system, be it a state of its own or within a multi-national state or Empire. To understand the processes of integration and disintegration, affecting the nation, it is therefore apparent that some consideration must be given to the relationship between the nation and the state of which it is geographically a part. A spatial approach to the study of the nation within the context of the state therefore should concentrate on examining the geographical causes and effects of the interactions, inter-relationships and assimilations between the nation, state and the state's territory.

The territory of the state is comprised of a compartmentalised space in which the state governs, exercising both legal and institutional control. The population of this polity is made up of a series of heterogeneous groups not necessarily reflecting a complimentary relationship with the state. No state or Empire is thus an absolute reflection of its inhabitants and vice versa.

The whole basis of the state relies on a cohesive support from its various communities and groups. When exercising political power over its territory, the state's ruling elite will attempt to incorporate and pursue policies of integration and unification. In theory, the goal of the state is therefore to reflect in its territory and peoples, a unified and cohesive structure pertaining to the general aims, values and aspirations of the state.

In nineteenth century Eastern Europe, the state or various Empires were usually ruled by the national group which inhabited and controlled the core area and were set apart by their political power and influence over the territory and national minorities within their political

boundaries. The relationship between the nation, its national minorities and the state is therefore dependent on the degree to which the nations identify with the state and the relationship between the state and the ruling national elite of that political unit. It is postulated that if the state does not take into consideration the uniqueness and recognise the individuality of the nations within its territory, delegating power or at least some form of cultural, political or geographical recognition to them as social entities, then either that nation is under threat of its continued existence and thus national group disintegration will take place or the state as a cohesive unit will be threatened by national group demands as the integrative process continues gathering momentum under threat of disintegration or lack of recognition.

Carr notes:

> "There is ... a close connection between the degree of unity in a state and the characteristics of the nationalism displayed by members of that state."[83]

This does not mean that the nation cannot survive without political control over its own state. If the benefits exceed the costs of political integration at the national group level, then the nation will continue to have a raison d'être. Within multi-national states, many nations will retain their national identity, functioning effectively even although they do not possess political control. Indeed, in many respects, it would be over-presumptious to suggest that some nations could function as independent political entities. The national demands, especially of smaller nations, would not necessarily be met by the granting of independence.

The ideal of every state is to embody a single nation, i.e. for

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83 E.H. Carr, et.al., (1939), op.cit., p. 277.

the state to be totally integrated and inter-related with the nation. Herder suggested that,

> "...the most natural state is one nationality with one national character. This it retains for ages."[84]

In a multi-national state this ideal is difficult to achieve.

In order to survive and progress, a state must continually justify itself to its population. This concept has been termed 'the state idea' and has been used frequently and developed by a number of Political Geographers.[85] Kristof defines the 'state idea' as:

> "...a philosophical and moral conception of the state's destiny and mission in terms of universal human teleology."[86]

The 'state idea' describes a set of distinctive purposes to which the majority of the population subscribe, a complex of shared historical traditions, experiences and objectives. The importance of the 'state idea' changes in both time and in political space.

The 'state idea' gives an image to the population of that political territory by linking the past with what its ruling elite want it to be - i.e. the state's destiny. The population of the state is therefore given an image of what they are as a political unit and what the state wants them to become. As this concept of the state and state identity evolves, there emerges a feeling of belonging to a distinctive and unique geographical and cultural group defined by political territoriality. However, in practice, the 'state idea' never totally coincides

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84 R. Ergang, Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism, New York, 1931, p. 243.

85 F. Ratzel, (1896), op.cit., was the first to introduce the concept of the 'staatsidee' into Political Geography. R. Hartshorne, 1950, op.cit., P.E. James, 'Some Fundamental Analysis of the Viability of States', in C. Fisher, 1968, op.cit., pp. 33-37.

86 L. Kristof, 'The Russian Image of Russia: An Applied Study in Geopolitical Methodology', in C. Fisher (editor), 1968, op.cit., pp. 345-87.

with the wishes of the nation or nations which comprise the state - i.e. the various 'national ideas'.

The 'national idea' is more an historically evolved social phenomenon, less political and more tradition bound. Kristof suggests that in contrast to the 'national idea', the 'state idea' is essentially political in nature, goal orientated and a protege, "...of a more or less sophisticated intellectual elite."[87] It would appear that Kristof is denying the importance of the intelligencia and middle class in tailoring a 'national idea' and under-estimating the political dimensions of the 'national idea'. The latter concept can be expressed through an eventual nationalist movement with concretely defined goals, aspirations and aims. Indeed, the difference between the 'state idea' and the 'national idea' is basically related to the raison d'être of these concepts. A national minority or ruling national elite does not necessarily have the same aspirations as that of the 'state idea'. However, even by accepting a 'state idea', many national minorities find expression for their 'national idea' through a political party or pressure group of their own.

The 'national idea' is therefore based on an integrated group born out of a consciousness and uniqueness felt by its members. It is more an expression of an emotional and subjective state of mind than an expression of a material state of objective facts. Thus for example, the city of Vilnius is an expression of the Lithuanian 'national idea' based on an emotive, religious and tradition bound feeling of past greatness. It is the 'Vilniaus Ausros Vartu Gailestingoji Dievo Motina',[88] because it stands for the national identity and sentiment for what was perceived as an historical Lithuanian nation. By the same token the

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87 ibid, p. 347.

88 Translated, "Most compassionate Mother of God of the dawn gate of Vilnius." It is an icon.

'national idea' of many Polish nationalists was also based on a similar connotation. To many Poles, the 'national idea' is based on a territorial expression, a geographical delimitation of what was Greater Poland, spreading from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Kristof also suggests that in theory, the nation need not justify its existence to the same degree as the state.[89] Although the raison d'être of the nation is more of a behavioural phenomena and is more an internal question of the nation itself, whereas in addition, the state's reason of and right to existence depends on a legality, the voluntary or involuntary consent of other polities, the political predominance of the state over the nation forces the national group to justify itself by constant regeneration. This it must do in order to avoid being labelled an anachronism, becoming a fossil or even disintegrating.

Tsarist Russia is an excellent example where there existed a sharp dichotomy between the 'state idea' and the 'national idea', i.e. the aims and ideals of the narod (people) differing from that of the gosudarstvo (state). Even the official term referring to the language of Russia illustrated this difference. The distinction is made between 'Russkaya' and 'Rossiiskaya', between what pertains to the Russian narod or national group and that to the Tsarist Empire. Lenin also wanted to make sure that the distinction between the two meanings was made clear from the outset when he referred to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in its foundation:

> "To dispel any idea of it being national in character, the Party called itself 'Rossiiskaya' and not 'Russkaya'.[90]

In the Tsarist Empire, the 'state idea', 'Rossiiskaya', implied the effective integration of all the peoples residing within the

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89 Kristof, 1968, op.cit., p. 348.

90 V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, vol.8, p.496; as cited in P.N. Fedoseyev, Leninism and the National Question, Moscow, 1977, pp. 332-3.

territorial bounds of the Empire and was to be achieved through Russification. Indeed, Russification saw its basis in Orthodoxy, not in 'Russianism'. Hence the Orthodox idea, not the Russian tongue or civilisation was the basis of Tsarism. Russia was first of all 'Holy', not Russian.

In contrast, the 'national idea', Russkaya, implied Russification in the sense that Slavophilism and Pan Slavism, the two moulds of the 'national idea', emphasised things and values Russian (or Slav), over and above the Tsarist 'state idea'. Therefore the national idea saw ethnic, not Orthodoxy ties, as the foundation of loyalty to the Tsarist state.

Where one nation dominates in size and in its role in the foundation of the state, its relationship with other nations within its politically organised space can have the effects of attempting to weld, in the name of the state and nation as one, the values, goals, attitudes and culture of that dominating Staatsvolk. In this respect, the 'state idea' can become an extension of the 'national idea'.

In East European states between the wars, where independence was the manifestation of the development of nationalism, the national ruling elite regarded the state as corresponding to their nation. Thus other minority groups were poorly treated and were viewed as an alien element within the state. These inter-war governments were strongly centralised regimes. The national minorities within these states could not accept the legitimacy of a regime ruling as a representative of the Staatsvolk and thus mutual distrusts re-inforced each other between the national

ruling élite and other minority nations.[91]

The majority nation with a polity may therefore perceive itself as "first among equals" and attempt to promote its group attributes on the national minorities. This leads to various forms of interactions between national groups.

If a minority nation voluntarily accepts everything pertaining to the majority nation or at least some of its basic group attributes, then various forms of assimilation will be the outcome and integration may take place. If the dominant nation attempts to dragoon the minority nation into accepting its culture and values then the minority nation may reject integration on the grounds of resentment or lack of mutual interests. There has therefore to be a degree of acceptance by the minority nation if integration is to take place between nations.

This latter process of integration can be referred to as assimilation.

> "Assimilation...is the adoption of a culture of another social group to such an extent that the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture."[92]

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91 In the 1930's, in every East European state including the three Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and with the exception of Czechoslovakia, national demands took precedence over the requirements of democracy. Nationalist governments and dictatorships functioned and were given mass support because they promised to protect the national interests of the dominant national group. They continued to promote nationalist fervour in order to justify their retention of power.

92 Z. Gitelman, 'The Jews', Problems of Communism, nr. 5, September/October 1967, pp. 92-101, p. 100.

It is therefore a voluntary process by which an individual switches his loyalty and frame of reference from one group to another.[93] Assimilation and effective integration usually operate only through toleration by the ruling élite, where favourable circumstances and an absence of discrimination produce a change in group identity. Integration at the political and economic level can follow or preceed this cultural re-orientation.

If complete assimilation in the form of a mono-ethnic state has not come about then the state has to take into consideration the nation or nations within its politically organised space if it is to be an effective political organisation. Through time, the state wants to keep its hold on areas not by force and coercion alone but also by intensifying the allegiance of its population. Some form of administrative, political or geographical de-centralisation through, for example, federalism, can contain the loyalty of a nation toward the state.

The nationalism of the majority nation therefore differs from the nationalism of the minority national group. Their relationships to the state also varies. Thus the integrative and disintegrative processes of

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93 It is often difficult to identify if assimilation has taken place or not. The Scottish and Welsh examples testify to this. Although having gone through a lengthy period of marked acculturation into a British 'national' identity, recent events illustrate that these groups have retained not only their social attributes but also through their nationalist movements, have added a political dimension. This 'secondary nationalism', as Nairn refers to it, is based on the retention of many of their respective group characteristics and to these have been added a further raison d'être thus accentuating their integration. In the case of the Scots, resources and the economy have given them a further basis for cohesion while the upsurge in Welsh nationalism is more to do with a threatened cultural identity. T. Nairn, 'Old Nationalism and New Nationalism', in G. Brown, (editor), The Red Paper on Scotland, Edinburgh, 1975, pp. 22-57.

the nation will be in accordance with their political and socio-economic position within the state. In attempting to explain the Latvian nation in its temporal totality, we are concerned with both national roles.

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1.4 Independence and the Nation

Johnson notes the importance of nationalism as a driving force in newly independent states:

> "It (nationalism) is the motivation of their formation, the key to their politics, and also, an objective of their development, in the sense that the cultivation of feelings of nationalism and of attachment to the nation is essential to the formative processes of, and a means for the integration of, the nation and the differentiation of it from other nations."[94]

The political integration of the nation takes on a completely different role and character when the nation has attained control over its own territory in the form of a state. Having attained control over the decision making processes in a given political region, the new ruling national élite will, at all costs, attempt to maintain the unity of the nation as the raison d'être of the state. The state is viewed by the nationalists as a result of the demands of the nation as voiced through their political nationalism. As far as they are concerned, the state is a product of their nation and the climax toward achieving political geographical expression.

Independence is therefore the creation of a new political structure from which the alienation of part of a state's territory has taken place due to a number of factors but of which the most dominant is based on a strong and articulate desire among the areas' inhabitants for separation from the state in question. Although external factors such as international politics can play an integral role in such a development, in most cases the process of secession has occurred when integration has either not worked or not taken place. By its very nature, secession is a work of destruction, destroying the status quo of a former political-

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94 H.G. Johnson, Economic Nationalism in Old and New States, London, 1968, p. 126.

territorial structure.

The secession of a nation from its former state apparatus was popularised and made acceptable, even fashionable, for East European nations with grievances following the outcome of the 1914-18 war. This struggle for a nation's independence was incorporated into the idea that any nation with a political grievance had the right to independence. This was justified through the principles of national self-determination which generally implied:

> "...the belief that each nation has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government."[95]

National self-determination upholds the idea that it is a democratic right for a peoples determined by their national group to control their own future.[96] Democratic theory claims that since the nation rests on the consent of the people it is sovereign and may determine its own status as a state. The end product, the state, is therefore viewed as the political and geographical expression of the democratic wishes of the people as well as the logical conclusion to their national aspirations.[97] In reality, national self-determination can only be applied with due regard to the political-geographical milieu in which an aspiring nation finds itself.

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95 A. Cobban, 1945, op.cit., p. 45.

96 H.S. Johnson, 1967, op.cit.,

97 National self-determination is deterministic in the sense that a nation is based on a peoples whose nationality is fixed by birth. There is therefore often little choice made by members to belong to a specific national group. Membership of a nation is as much a question of fact than choice. National self-determination is also based on the principle that man is national. It assumes that man will consent to be governed as a nation and the resulting state will meet both his and his national group's needs.

There are a number of conditions which have to be met under which a nation can effectively break away from the old political structure and function as a polity in its own right. Basic preconditions for such a process to become operational would include: the desire of the majority nation within a given geographical area to form a state, a numerically significant population base, geographically territory which is relatively contiguous, resources adequate to ensure a reasonable degree of political and economic independence and state viability. The consent of the state from which independence is sought is also an obvious pre-requisite. Such consent by the ruling elite of the old political framework will depend on a number of factors, not least of all, the importance and effects of territorial secession on the old state system.

> "In fact, all other things being equal, it may be taken as very probable at least that the more desirable a (region) is, the less likely it is to be relinquished without a very hard fight."[98]

The political region having broken away from the old state system has to find new values, goals and aspirations, in effect a new behavioural response to its political and economic milieu. It has to overcome the difficulty of adapting to a political structure of its own with its connections severed from its previous state. Economically, it has to develop a new economic system, re-orientating itself from being integrated or interacting, and thus relying, on the old system. Politically it has to find its own ground with little external influence.

To function effectively and to illustrate that the basis of the new state is the nation, there is an in-built desire by the nationalists to reflect in their newly independent polity, the nation. For the nationalist, statehood means a protective wall or shell for their nation and a basis for their political self-realisation. Many of the policies

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98 P. Calvert, 'On Attaining Sovereignty', in A.D. Smith, Nationalist Movements, London, 1976, pp. 134-49, p. 135.

they pursue will attempt to maintain the nation as the raison d'être of the state by promoting the group attributes of the nation thus further accentuating the integrative process at the national level.

Preston James suggests that the majority of newly independent states in the twentieth century begin statehood, "...with purely negative state ideas."[99] He stresses one aspect which before independence played a disproportionately important part in keeping the nation together:

> "The one purpose to which all citizens subscribe was the demand for freedom from colonial rule."[100]

With independence, the common external enemy in the old state or empire has gone. In its place, the new government must attempt to fulfil the aspirations of the national group through, for example, land reform, promoting the nation's language, establishing native political institutions. Without satisfying some of the demands of the members of the national group, disillusionment will set in and this can lead to disintegration. Regionalism, factionalism or even a desire for annexation with the state from which it has been newly separated may be the manifestation of not securing an adequate basis for a continued integrative relationship.

It is therefore imperative for the nation to find a new identity in the state. East European nations acquiring statehood during the inter-war period attempted to make nationalism, the attachment to the nation, and patriotism, the attachment to the state, hardly indistinguishable.

The structure of government in the newly acquired state plays a central role in determining the degree of integration and possible success of functioning which this territory and population will have.

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99 P. James, 1968, op.cit., p. 35.

100 ibid., p. 35.

The importance of organisation or arrangement of political processes eminating from a central decision making body and their impact on the total population within the new polity will set a context within which inter-relationships and reactions from the community toward various sub-groups and central government will evolve.

Jacob and Teune put an argument forward based on the idea that consent is a pre-requisite for the growth of a healthy and united political community.[101] According to this work, a political structure that permits wide participation in decision making should be conducive to cohesion, whereas one which is authoritarian should invite dissidence and in time disintegration as a result of pent-up frustrations exploding in violence.

Eastern Europe in the 1930's proves this postulation false. In the Baltic Republics, for example, authoritarian regimes were established in 1926 in Lithuania and in 1934 in Estonia and Latvia. With the ensuing disbandment of parliamentary processes, a nationalist leader took over in the respective states. By appealing to nationalist emotions and calling for 'national unity' in the face of economic depression and political uncertainty, these charistmatic leaders, themselves a symbol of Baltic nationalisms, functioned as cohesive and unifying pinnacles with the consent and support of the nation. Democracy was therefore sacrificed in the name of nationalism and justified on behalf of the nation.

Thus this assertion by Jacob and Teune is not applicable to the Baltic Republics. A structure of highly concentrated political authority, with strict limits on general participation, especially in voicing opposition, is almost a pre-condition of national community organisation in some inter-war East European states when they were under conditions of threat and socio-political change.

> "To maintain a minimal of political stability, it is crucial that the government be strong enough to deal with centrifugal

101 Jacob and Teune, 1964, op.cit., pp. 35-6.

forces that the drive for integration will activate."[102]

In many states this is certainly found to be the case. The party or political movement that called for nationalism within the imperial structure had the rallying cry of universal appeal. Because of this national unity, and the nationalist political movement having the additional advantage of being able to suppress any attempt to contest its claims to represent the nation, a single party system evolved in many states promoting nationalist policies through their authoritarianism and thus the integration of the members of the national group.[103]

It is also important that the national ruling elite promote a policy of identifying with the nation. Socio-economic and cultural gaps develop in newly independent entities and because of this it is necessary for effective integration that alienation does not occur because of this re-stratification.

Political elites must implement decisions which are distinctively popularistic, satisfying all members of the nation. This can be partly done by implementing some of the demands of the nationalist movement through, for example, the re-allocation of resources. The ruling elite should thus reflect a consensus of opinion taking into consideration the various interests of the majority within their society.

To integrate, the leaders must be innovators. They must attempt to not only introduce into their landscape and territory symbols and an iconography for the nation but also induce the people to accept new norms, goals and motivations. This iconography is developed by producing immediate and far reaching expression in, for example, landscape change by resurrecting past tribal boundaries as the basis of delimitation for the internal administrative system, and replacing colonial

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102 C. Ake, 'Political Integration and Political Stability', World Politics, vol.19, 1967, pp. 486-99, p. 489.

103 T. Hodgkin, African Political Parties, Baltimore, 1961, p. 22.

place names by their own. New symbols such as a constitution, flag, national anthem, a new capital city and a currency can help add to a national identity and extended iconography for the nation.

A facet of the nationalism of independence is the connection made by the elites between modernisation and the nation. Shils refers to this as the "will to be modern"[104] and the obsession by newly independent states in promoting all things which they perceive as being related and part of modernisation. To them, this means 'dynamic', 'concerned with the people', 'democratic', 'equalitarian', 'scientifically economically advanced', 'sovereign', and 'influential'. By advocating 'modern' policies, the nationalist leaders try to show that the nation can/and should have always constituted an independent entity and that as a viable economic proposition, it can effectively function as a unit.

Vital, Robinson and Benedict[105] give a number of examples where newly independent states in the twentieth century, although limited by their geographical size and small populations, are obsessed with proving their independent existence and economic viability. Modernisation is therefore seen as the panacea for solving their problems and in the process giving an image to the rest of the world of the supposed success of the nation and its state.

Marx stressed the importance that the successful operation of a people's economic system was a more important factor in guaranteeing national unity or the continuance of a national life than a common language, culture and historical conditions.[106] He outlined the

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104 E. Shils, Political Development in the New States, The Hague, 1966.

105 D. Vital, The Survival of Small States, London, 1971; E.A. Robinson, Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, London, 1963; B. Benedict (edit), Problems of Smaller Territories, London, 1967.

106 S. Bloom, 1967, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

importance of quantity of population, territory and resources within the framework of the need for an industrial economy to be organised effectively within the confines of the proposed political unit. To Marx and Engels, large industrial economies were essential to progress. Thus they supported nationalist movements and the right of nations to statehood in relation to the size and economic viability of the territory in which a national group resided.[107]

With specific reference to Eastern Europe, Janowsky observes that the peacemakers of 1919, "...sacrificed the values of economic unity"[108] by creating small states. The leaders of these new states perceived that they could both overcome their smallness and problems of economies of scale and limitations in labour and natural resources, and prove their independent existence by transforming their economy and territory toward a more modernised geography. Modernisation is therefore viewed by this elite as an index to both political and economic stability within the state structure and as proof to the external world that the nation's statehood has been successful.

The national development of the economic system is strongly politically motivated by nationalism and the desire to overcome economic geographical obstacles. Within the economy, an ideological preference is given to attaining a number of goals which are tied up with modernisation, proof of independence and economic viability.

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107 National movements were considered solely from the economic and revolutionary point of view. Some were supported, e.g. Polish independence was favoured as the Poles were numerous enough to establish an economically viable state; others were not, e.g. the Czechs and Croatians were seen as too small to establish viable, economic units.

108 O.I. Janowsky, 1945, op.cit., p. 11.

A study of the patterns of economic change, mainly in newly independent states in the Developing world, came to the conclusion that many of the policies and methods of economic planning that were implemented were economically irrational not reflecting the limitations imposed on these states by the geography of independence.[109] There was an observed bias toward 'prestige' and 'symbolic' industries which were seen by the ruling elite as an index of modernisation. The steel industry, for example, was developed even although massive capital outlay was needed, something which many of these states could not afford and certainly was not a rational socio-economic priority.

> "Economic planning, like many other useful things, can become the vehicle of compensatory fantasies. And a further economic vice is a disposition to concentrate upon symbols: the passion for steelworks, the empty Boeing 707 on the scheduled flight for a national airline, the skyscrapers in the desert. All of these vices are the results of sheer desperation, the passion that many nationalists have invested in the process of becoming a proper nation."[110]

Many new states also attempt to re-orientate toward an industrial-urban economy, neglecting their region's past agricultural-rural bias which is perceived by the new elite as 'traditional', 'un-western' and 'archaic'. In many of the East European states in the 1918-40 period, this was not the case. The strength and importance of the peasantry as the basis of support for the nationalist movements dictated that agriculture and the rural environment played a disproportionately important role in the economy. For example, in the Baltic Republics, agriculture and related rural industries were developed along modern lines, trying to encourage the continued support by the peasantry for the nationalist parties. Although there were attempts at constructing industries and

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109 H.G. Johnson, 'A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States', Political Science Quarterly, Vol.80, 1965, nr. 2, pp. 169-85, p. 170.

110 K.R. Minogue, Nationalism, London, 1967, p. 132.

ambitious economic schemes for prestigious reasons, many of the nationalists in Eastern Europe were more concerned with moving their respective countries toward as great a self-sufficiency as possible, in itself tinted with proving statehood viability.

Johnson observes that in new states there is often a preference for public enterprise and that frequently this seems to be dictated by nationalism rather than by socialist principles.[111] Breton postulates that there is a basic reason for this:

> "Economic significance of political nationalism arises from the fact that this type of nationalism generates and encourages demands for changes in the inter-national or ethnic distribution of property or ownership of the stock of wealth located in the territory where nationalism exists."[112]

Nationalisation is a means by which the nation can attain control over previously owned foreign enterprises. By so extending the government control over the territory and resources of the state, the nationalists are also viewed as enlarging upon the ownership of the nation's wealth. In many new states, a strong opposition to the investment of foreign capital is an obvious basis from which public control can be extended in the name and with the consent of the majority of the national group.

Eastern Europe in the 1930's was typical of such motives behind their nationalisation schemes. Not only was foreign investment in a number of sectors discouraged in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the decade before the Second World War but also many of the industries and commercial concerns owned by non-nationals in these three states were taken over by the government on behalf of the nation. Thus the role those outwith the national group had played in contributing to integration before independence was also extended into the period of

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111 H.G. Johnson, 1965, op.cit., pp. 170-71.

112 A. Breton, 'The Economics of Nationalism', Journal of Political Economy, vol.72, 1964, pp. 376-86, p. 377.

statehood as the premise from which nationalisation could be accepted by the nation and introduced into their state structure.

The policies pursued by the national group therefore can enhance the political integration of the nation further separating it from the minorities within the state. Although some Democratic states, notably Estonia and Latvia in the 1920's and Czechoslovakia, recognised the importance of safeguarding the rights of their national minorities, by so doing, they further differentiated between themselves and the group attributes of the minorities thus giving a legality to the differences of the national groups within their respective states. This was further accentuated by the political representation of national minority parties in the three state parliaments.

In conclusion, the central factors in furthering political integration during independence is the role and degree of control exercised by the national ruling élite in promoting the nation and nationalist policies through their conception of their abstract geography of the state and the spatial factors ensuing from the formation of a territorial entity.

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1.5 Toward a Spatial Explanation of the Latvian Nation

The object of this work is therefore to come to some understanding of what is the Latvian nation by empirically examining the processes of spatial change and their cause-effect on the integrative process. We are concerned with three main stages in the political development of this nation.

Firstly, the formation of the Latvian nation and the integrative processes leading to the rise of such a social group. The development of the nation into a political nationalist movement is examined as are its territorial designs and aspirations toward achieving control over its own political region.

Secondly, the nation during its short period of independence is considered with specific reference to the role political geography played in contributing to both the integration of the nation and its manifestations in the policies and political structure which followed independence.

Lastly, the Latvian nation within the Soviet Union is examined including the geographical effects of incorporation into a multi-national state, the spatial patterns of national group identification which continue and the degree to which national group disintegration has taken place.

Before enlarging on the proposed spatial approach to this case study, a resumé of the background to this political region and its inhabitants is necessary in order that an understanding of the Latvian nation can be fully comprehended.

The Latvian political region is the area in which the overwhelming majority of ethnic Latvian speakers have inhabited throughout history. The 1897 Tsarist Census, using native language criteria to define national groups, gives nearly 92 percent as the first reliable indication of the number of ethnic Latvian speakers inhabiting this

region in relation to the total number in the Tsarist Empire.[113] This percentage has remained relatively static through time. Thus the processes affecting the Latvian nation are inextricably inter-related with those affecting the Latvian political region.

The spatial proximity of the region to the Baltic coast has contributed greatly to its development and character through time. The region is coastal-orientated lying between Slavic Russia and the western-central European outlier of Eurasia. Like its neighbouring Estonian and Lithuanian political regions, this region is situated between converging cultures - a transition zone between Russia and western, central and Scandinavian Europe.

Throughout history they have been influenced by many forms of alien cultural, institutional and political behaviour. Its location and continued coastal contact with the West contributed to the region becoming one of the most 'westernised' areas of the Tsarist Empire. Even although this contact with the west has declined since 1940, because of historical legacy and geographical location, the region remains one of the most 'westernised' Soviet Republics of the USSR. Such is the influence of the West on Baltic history, that today the Soviets refer to the Soviet Baltic as Sovetskaya zagranitsa ('the Soviet abroad') or nash zagranitsa ('our foreign country').[114]

Through time, the Latvian political region has been a continued focus of occupation by foreign powers and a pawn in the international tensions of both Europe and the World. The Baltikum has represented a continued struggle between the German Drang nach Osten and the Russian obsession with an outlet to the seas. Because of its geographical location, the region has continually been in a 'geopolitical dilemma'.

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113 Tsentral'nyi statisticheskii komitet - Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda: St. Petersburg, 1897-1904.

114 The London Times, October 5th, 1964, p. 11.

This "political shatterbelt"[115] status has attracted various national and international situations in which the Latvians through numerical weakness have been unable to play any other than a passive role.

The Latvian political region has been subjected to varying political systems, superimposing, dividing and partitioning the region into various states, territories and administrations. The distribution of the Latvian peoples did not coincide with the framework of one political unity until recent times. Although the ethnic Latvian speaking peasantry were subjected to the authority of differing states, territories and administrations, their values, aspirations and problems were similar as they were organised within the framework of a feudal society where their peasant way of life dominated and reflected their total milieu.

The area, which today comprises of Estonia and Latvia, was invaded and consequently occupied by the German Teutonic Knights from the eleventh century for reasons of economic exploitation and Christianisation. In 1207, the principality of Terra Moriana or Livonia came into being.

> "If there was one formative event in the history of Latvia, it was the conquest of the territory by the German knights. The eastern and southern borders of Latvia were fundamentally determined by this conquest..."[116]

The principality included the old Latvian tribal kingdoms of Kurland, Semigalia, Selonia, Latgalia and Zemgalia. The northern part of Livonia was inhabited by the Estonian peoples. Thus the Livonian principality was predominantly Latvian and Estonian as defined by the German Teutonic knights who established the German feudal system in the area.

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115 The concept of a "political shatterbelt" is used in the sense outlined by the political geographer, S. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, London, 1973, pp. 85-89.

116 A. Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia, New York, 1974, p. 1.

This state of Livonia continued to exist as a political entity for over two hundred years until it was finally dismembered in the sixteenth century. In 1561, Livonia was partitioned and the provinces of Kurland, Semigalia and Selonia became a hereditary duchy under the suzerainity of the Polish monarchy. Hence the Duchy of Courland (Kurland) cam into being and lasted until 1795 as an independent and relatively successful trading entity.

The rest of Livonia in the mid-sixteenth century became a dependency of the Polish commonwealth. However, by 1622, Poland lost the majority of Livonia to Sweden retaining only Latgalia which remained part of Poland until 1773 when it was annexed to Russia. This area of Latgale, often referred to as 'Polish Livonia', developed customs, traditions and a religion similar to that of Poland and Lithuania.

In 1721, Livonia proper was annexed by Russia with the Kurish ruling elite opting to join Courland to the Tsarist Empire in 1795. Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Latvian political region was under the control of the Russian Empire.

Administratively, the Latvian political region was divided into three *gubernii*[117] - Liflandskaya, Kurlandskaya and Vitebskaya. The four southern *uyezdy* of Liflandskaya, the three norther *uyezdy* of Vitebskaya (ie Latgalia), and all of Kurlandskaya *guberniya*, constituted the Latvian political region. The northern part of Liflandskaya along with Estlandskaya *guberniya* was overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Estonian speakers while the rest of Vitebskaya outwith the Latgalian region, was inhabited by Russians. Thus within the Latvian political region, the ethnic Latvian speaking peasantry were overwhelmingly in the majority.

Irrespective of the changing political units and administrations of the region, the Baltic Germans, since their occupation, had secured a hegemony over the peasantry. The so-called Baltic provinces of

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117 A *guberniya* was a Russian administrative division below which were a number of minor civil units or *uyezdy* (sing. *uyezd*).

The Historical Evolution of the Latvian Political Region

1200

Latvian Tribes



1474

Livonian Order of Teutonic Knights

Bishoprics

City of Riga



1561 – 1629

1629 – 1721

1800's

Tsarist Gubernii

Date of annexation to Empire is indicated for each guberniya

1920 – 1940

The Latvian State

Apgabali (districts) are named.

Abrene area, ceded to RSFSR, 1945

Liflandskaya, Kurlandskaya and Estlandskaya were therefore very much under the control of the Baltic German landlords and nobility, the Ritterschaften ('order of the nobility'). Following the annexation of the Baltic provinces into the Russian Empire, the Baltic Germans secured special privileges over the region due to their favourable relationship with the Tsarist administration. This ruling élite thus administered the three Baltic gubernii through the provincial diets, the Landtag, giving a further legality to their position in the area.

The area of the Latvian political region to be outwith the control of the Baltic German Ritterschaften and local administration was Latgalia. Due to historical and geographical circumstance, this area was devoid of Baltic Germans and was politically and administratively dominated by the Russian and Polish nobility and landlords.

The ethnic Latvian peasantry had their own language and alphabet. Along with the neighbouring Estonian and Lithuanian peoples, the Latvians wrote in the Latin script as opposed to the Russians. However, these three Baltic peoples were linguistically unconnected with each of their languages being mutually unintelligible. The Estonians speak a Finno-Ugric language while the Latvians and Lithuanians belong to that group of languages of the Indo-European Baltic. The latter two vernaculars have developed to such an extent that communication between them is largely impossible.

A non-Russian influence in their earlier history had left the Latvian peasantry with the religion of the Baltic Germans, Lutheranism. In Latgalia, there were also a large number of the Latvian peasantry who practised the Roman Catholic faith as introduced by the Polish nobility.

In the modern period, all the peasantry in the Latvian political region have undergone parallel traumatic experiences. The effects of the nineteenth century agrarian reforms and the disintegration of the feudal system, urbanisation and industrial growth, affected all the

Latvian peasantry at roughly the same time in their history as did the growth and impact of the nationalist and socialist movements.

After the First World War, following the treaties of Brest Litovsk and Versailles, and the principles of national self-determination of nations, the Latvian nation along with the Estonians and Lithuanians, became independent of the new Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, with control over their own territories in the form of states. Thus in the period of statehood, which lasted from 1918 to 1940, the Latvian political region coincided with the Latvian state.

During the shortlived independence era, Latvia, although constructing its political system on the principles of a democratic constitution, was nevertheless dominated by a nationalist ruling élite made up of a number of political parties. By 1934, the country had produced a regime with power resting in the hands of one man, Karlis Ulmanis.

Finally in 1940, all three Baltic states witnessed both Fascist German and Soviet invasions culminating in the annexation of their territories into the Soviet Union in 1944. In the contemporary period, all three constitute Soviet Socialist Republics within the framework of the 'federal' structure of the Soviet Union. Thus the Latvian political region became the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

From its annexation, the Soviets imposed a massive drive toward collectivisation, industrial growth and urbanisation of the region. The policies of Moscow were designed to destroy any latent nationalist tendencies and included the modernisation of the Republic by means of bringing it politically, socio-economically, and geographically into a more integrated Soviet state.

Through time there is one consistent fact. Since the formation of the nation in the middle of the nineteenth century and the rise of a Latvian nationalist movement at the end of this last century, the Latvian nation has remained even although its basis for existence has been changed

and transformed to meet the political system of the moment.

The physical environment of the region has also played a significant role in moulding the settlement pattern and economy. Latvia is a country of low lying terrain. The predominance of plains is disturbed only by the uplands of the Platform of Latgale to the south-east of the region, the north-easterly located Central Uplands of Vidzeme or the Livonian Heights and in the west, the Platform of Eastern Kursa. No upland in Latvia exceeds 310 metres above sea level.[118](fig.2)

The rich agricultural areas of the region are located in the centre of the country, along the fertile plains of the Riga coast, the brown earth plain of Zemgale and the Platform of Eastern Kursa. This fertile region, referred to as 'Latvia's granary' during the period of independence, contrasts sharply with the physical limitations imposed on Eastern Latvia which in parts is drastically disturbed by glaciation with resulting poorly drained podzolic soils and an abundance of lakes and marshland. Indeed, the Maliena Plain, which runs from the north-east to the south-west of Eastern Latvia, separating the uplands of Latgale from the rest of Latvia, has in the past acted as a physical barrier to foreign penetrations from the coast into the interior of the region. Its well forested and marshy terrain has left this area functioning through history as a political frontier and a cultural divide between Baltic German supremacy and influence in the west and Polish and Russian domination in the east. Many of the socio-economic and demographic variations within the Latvian political region are therefore part of a legacy which, in the past, the physical environment has contributed to dividing the country between a west-central and eastern orientation.

The climate is mild by Russian standards with maritime influences

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118 A. Pūriņš, (editor), Latvijas PSR Ģeogrāfija, (A Geography of the Latvian SSR), Riga, 1971, pp. 27-39.

Fig. 2: Relief of the Latvian Region



predominating and precipitation exceeding evaporation throughout the area. The low dune coast plus greater climatic amelioration compared with the northern Baltic, contributes to giving this region a more or less ice free coast allowing access and emphasising the importance of the area's ports to the economies of the Tsarist Empire, the Latvian state and the Soviet Union. Indeed, even today, the Soviet Latvian ports of Riga, Liepāja and Ventspils handle more than 40 percent of Soviet foreign trade that travels via the Baltic.[119] The importance of access to the sea is also reflected in the extensive communication system, both rail and canal, which is disproportionate to the immediate economic needs of the region.

Although location and the relatively favourable topographical and climatic environment have contributed to making this political region conducive to both a wide variety of agricultural activity and as an outlet for trade, the rest of its economic potential has been limited. This is mainly due to a deficiency in raw materials. The commercial significance of its only mineral products, that of sand and sandstone, gypsum, dolomite and clay and a small peat industry,[120] is clearly of little importance to developing a balanced and relatively sufficient industrial base. Yet both in the last decades of Tsarist rule and in the contemporary Soviet period, Latvian urban centres have been in the forefront of the manufacturing industry in both polities. Geographical

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119 G. King, Economic Policies in Occupied Latvia - A Manpower Management Study, Nebraska, 1965, p. 17.

120 H.P. Nikitina, 'Latviyskaya SSR', in H.P. Nikitina, et.al., Ekonomicheskaya Geografiya SSR, Moscow 1974, pp. 129-38. Other resources which have been of considerable significance to the Latvian economy have included forestry, fishing and recently the utilisation of her major rivers for hydro-electric power production.

inertia has contributed to a legacy of industry favouring not only small scale light products with local skills and the influence of past western trade reflecting the commodities produced, but also heavy industry. Coastal location has been viewed by Tsarist and Soviet administrators and by foreign investors, as an important economic factor in establishing large scale industrial concerns in an area devoid of the type of raw materials associated with this economy.

The labour supply of this region is also limited as reflected in the small but densely compact population of the region. In 1897, the total population was 1,929 thousand. By 1977, it had reached only 2,512 thousand.[121] The smallness of this entity, both in the number of inhabitants and in areal extent, covering only 64 thousand square kilometres,[122] has in itself contributed to the many socio-economic and political problems which the region has faced in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Although the resources of this area are somewhat limited, the region and its population has emerged as one of the most important and wealthy areas in both the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union. In this respect it is rather ironic that the Latvian peoples do not owe their high standards of living to either regimes. The Latvians are more indebted to their contacts with the west for their well-developed institutions, culture and general material modes of life.

In attempting to develop a conceptual framework for the spatial study of the Latvian nation, consideration has therefore to be given to the locational and geographical development of the region and the impact various ruling groups and administrations have had in determining the socio-economic and political character of the region and its population.

An examination of spatial change in this region helps illustrate

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121 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Latviiskoi SSR; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1976 godu, Riga, 1977, p. 7.

122 V. Pūrinš, 1971, op.cit., p. 13.

and identify the main integrative and disintegrative factors which play a role in the formation, continuance and questioning of the nation. Political integration is viewed as the cause and effect of the Latvian national group, itself manifesting a varying impact in both time and within space. It is related to the structure of the political unit or polity in which the Latvian region forms a part. Integration at the national group level and the possible demise of such a socio-political phenomena, will vary depending on the political structure in which the region finds itself.

The Latvian nation is thus viewed within the context of two all-embracing concepts: modernisation and the political geographical structure and organisation of space of which the Latvian political region is a part. It is postulated that by taking such an approach as this, the integrative and disintegrative processes operating in the region and on the area's inhabitants at various periods of time and in space, will be better understood.

Both modernisation and the changing political units have obvious spatial connotations attached to them. From these two all-embracing concepts evolve more clearly the important geographical aspects of the nation and the study of its integrative process. They can help shed light on identifying the geographical factors which influence the formation, continuance and questioning of the nation; the geographical circumstances which have an impact upon the operation of policies pursued by the members of the nation and the polities which control the area they inhabit; and lastly, the geographical effects of various modernisation processes and policy implementations upon the territory and people of the Latvian political region.

By taking these two concepts which are not too definitive and thus not limiting the all-encompassing approach, the importance of examining the nation in its chronological entirety is made more explicit. A very false picture could emerge of what the Latvian nation is not if a study

were restricted to a particular historical period in its development. This approach therefore illustrates the changing raison d'être of a nation as it goes through various modernisation processes and political organisations, and thus varying manifestations of political integration and disintegration.

The first assumption is that modernisation is a pre-requisite for integration to take place at the national level. This political integration can be followed by suggesting that there is an intertwined relationship with the modernisation process. As the latter process becomes established within the region, re-allocating and putting new demands upon the population, so will the aspirations, goals and requirements of the nation grow. The nation thus develops a political movement to satisfy the new demands of the members of the nation and maintain its existence as a grouping.

If this assumption were carried to its logical conclusion on the basis that modernisation is an on-going process, then one might suggest that it would eventually lead to the threat of disintegration of the Latvian nation by integration between various groups that comprise the Soviet Union. Therefore modernisation in the contemporary period can question the existence of the Latvian nation as it more effectively interacts with other groupings and regions of the Soviet state. Yet modernisation has not completely destroyed the Latvian nation.

We can therefore enlarge upon this hypothesis. Although modernisation is necessary for integration to take place at the national level, making possible demands as voiced through its nationalist movement, as an on-going process it has threatened the continuance of the nation by promoting integration between nations and territories in the Soviet Union and also with the Soviet state. In this context, Soviet assimilationist policies have used modernisation as a vehicle by which national group disintegration can occur. However, this process has not destroyed the Latvian nation largely due to previous national integrative experiences

and the replacement by new symbols, goals and responses to Moscow rule.

The second concept, that of political geographical units and their organisation of space, postulates that the differing structures of political territories reflect the raison d'être of the Latvian nation in each period of political territorial change and that certain states, territories and administrations relate more to the integration or threat to the disintegration of the Latvian nation than do others.

Along with the Estonian and Lithuanian peoples, the Latvian nation offers a unique opportunity to study a nation as it goes through three differing manifestations of its nationalism. Firstly, the rise of nationalism within the framework of the Tsarist Empire; secondly, the attainment of independence and the formation of a state of its own; and lastly, loss of statehood and incorporation into a multi-national state forming an individual Soviet Socialist Republic with a defined political territory but with restricted political and administrative power.

Inherent in this second aspect to the framework of study is the importance attributed to both the policies pursued by the ruling élite of a given polity and the interactions and movement taking place within a defined political boundary.

The ideal political unit for the preservation of the Latvian nation is one where the Latvians themselves have control over their own people and territory, i.e. a protective shell in the form of a Latvian state which, to a limited degree, can regulate the movement of ideas, commodities and people to and from the political region and more importantly, can implement policies which are conducive to the political integration of the nation. A national group with power can, through control of the resources and activities of the state's territory, satisfy and reward the members of the nation thus further accentuating their integration. Through the very existence of their own state, the nation has therefore a greater opportunity to integrate within itself and with its newly created political unit.

The political units before and after independence were and are part of a larger societal system, ruled by a group not connected with the nation. Within the Russian Empire, the integrative process of the Latvian nation overshadowed factors working for the disintegration of this group once it was formed. The very fact that the socially and politically aware Latvians were part of a polity ruled by a group out-with the Latvian nation and dominated by a local Baltic German landowning class, promoted integration. In the contemporary period, similar factors are again operating with both anti-state and anti-Russian feelings contributing to the continuation of the nation.

As part of the Soviet multi-national state, the Latvian nation, with little political control, is more at threat to its disintegration due to policies pursued by Moscow. As with Tsarist rule, the impress of modernisation has a specific spatial pattern accentuating changing group alignments in some areas and with specific social groups, than others. The policies pursued by the states' ruling elites within both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes will therefore have a varying impact on the integrative and disintegrative processes depending on the degree of 'modernism' of the population and area and the strength of the population's national group identification.

Modernisation and the political unit are thus inter-related in their causation and effects upon the processes of integration of the nation. The spatial patterns eminating from these geographical changes and political organisations are an important aspect in understanding the processes affecting the nation.

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1.6 Limitations to the Study

A geographical study of the Latvian nation has to take into account a number of limitations when empirically examining the available source material. These can be categorised under three main headings: (a) subjective data relating to the study of this region; (b) the lack of materials on areal breakdowns; (c) the statistical and empirical methods employed by government sources and other authors in delimiting and defining what is the nation and nationality.

(a) subjective data: Due to the nature of the historical development of the Latvian region, there has evolved various partisan interpretations, a product of the numerous interest groups which have been concerned with the international and internal politics of the area. Ever since the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union, a somewhat polemical debate has ensued between Baltic émigre and Soviet authors who tend to emphasise and misconstrue whatever data best illustrates their point of view. The Latvian and Baltic German communities during the independence period have also added a further dimension to an interpretation of the region's political history. Therefore one principle which has been adhered to in this thesis is a critical approach to all the source material consulted. Wherever it has been at all possible, sources have been scrutinised for their objectivity and validity.

(b) areal interpretations: When statistical data is available on the administrative areas of the Latvian region it tends to be on the basis of large geographical units. In this respect, material is more readily available for the late nineteenth century period and the independence years than for contemporary Latvia. Census data provides the most comprehensive and reliable areal breakdowns. The 1897 Tsarist census, the 1925, 1930 and 1935 official Latvian censuses and yearbooks give some indication of spatial patterns. However, since incorporation into the Soviet Union there is a data vacuum particularly from 1944 until

1959. Regional breakdowns are given only for the republic as a whole, urban and rural areas and for the city of Riga. This material is only comprehensively available from the two Soviet censuses - 1959 and 1970. The Soviet yearly publications on the national economy, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, periodically gives data on spatial patterns within the Latvian republic but this is usually limited to statistics on agricultural production. Another Soviet statistical publication, Vestnik Statistiki (The Statistical Herald) occasionally provides limited data on population and demographic trends within the LSSR.

(c) Official definitions of the nation & nationality: Various statistical, primary and secondary sources employ the official definitions used by the given political system to determine what constitutes membership of the Latvian nation or nationality. In a study of this nature, it is of importance to scrutinise the often arbitrary methods employed by central governments in delimiting the nation. Such official definitions have often little to do with national group identification or a national consciousness. The Tsarist census, for example, employs native language as the criterion of nationality and national affiliation, a spurious definition from which many works on nationalism and the nation have taken as their base without questioning the validity of such a reliance on one factor. Most of the official census and statistical data during the independence period was based on information which openly asked individuals what ethnic, linguistic, religious and national group they belonged to, by far the most informative method of determining national identity and the nation's composition. The 1959 and 1970 census employed a legal concept, that of nationality to determine ethnic and national background, a method which lends itself to objective fact rather than emotive identification.

Chapter Two

The Formation of the Latvian Nation

2.1 Spatial Change and the Modernisation Process

The object of the present section is to examine the process of spatial change within the Latvian political region as a preliminary to an explanation of the formation of the Latvian nation. As has already been suggested, modernisation was a necessary pre-requisite for the political integration of the nation.

From the outset it is necessary to identify the homogenising factors from which the Latvian nation emerged. The main reason for this is the need to understand the context in which the Latvian nation was formed.

As a social grouping, the peasantry were overwhelmingly of ethnic Latvian origin and spoke the Latvian language. Because of the nature of the migrations from Germany, the Baltic Germans constituted a landed and commercial social élite. No German peasantry moved to the Baltikum. With the exception of a large number of Russians and Poles in the south-eastern part of the political region, Latgalia, the peasantry were more or less exclusively of ethnic Latvian origin with their own native language. It is possible, therefore, to view social structure, ethnic origin and language as being more or less synonymous and the context in which the framework of the Latvian nation emerged.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Latvian political region was dominated by a feudal system imposed on the region by a number of Baltic German landowners and nobility. It was only Latgalia which did not come under the control of the Ritterschaften. The peasantry were restricted to an agrarian society with few being found in the as yet small, pre-industrial urban centres. The beginnings of spatial change have therefore to be viewed within the context of an agrarian environment

and the characteristics pertaining to it which dominated the life and perceptions of the peasantry. Within this feudal milieu, the peasantry had no conception of a Latvian nation or identity.

Within feudalism, the traditional peasant economy was characterised by a restricted labour market limited to the surrounding area or community. Consumption determined production objectives, the latter being characterised by low rates of surplus and a very low level of specialisation with little division of labour. Their non-capitalistic economy was self-sufficient and parochial dominated by the underlying need to being able to feed the community of which they were a part and paying dues and taxes to the landowner. The past history of the community dominated and determined the development of the social entity with their ideas on traditional methods of un-optimisation of agriculture making them an acceptable part of the feudal status quo. Because they were geographically restricted to the community by the feudal system, there was little or no contact or interaction by exchange of commodities between peasant communities. They remained in their small communities unaware of the economic and social environment outwith their own.

The peasantry accepted the overlordship of the German nobility and landowners as a natural fact of their existence. By securing this deference amongst the peasants, the Baltic Germans could profit through an enserfed and constantly reliable labour force. They established a trading monopoly in the region and forbade the peasants to sell their produce directly to the German and Russian merchants in the towns.

The peasant community was very much an integrated community being an extension of the family unit. This is particularly reflected in the communal regulations governing various important aspects of economic life of this social entity.

The system of peasant communal land tenure which was characteristic of the Tsarist Empire, the mir, and the assembly which governed this form of holding, the skhod, did not exist in the German dominated

areas of the Latvian political region. Only Latgalia followed a similar pattern of land tenure as other rural areas of the Russian Empire. The estates that did exist in Latgale were small mainly due to the uneven terrain, poor soil conditions and extensive lakes, forests and marshland. The communal land was therefore left under the direct jurisdiction of the peasantry.

In Kurlandskaya and Liflandskaya, the rural settlements of the peasantry were administered as part of the feudal system and were under the direct auspices of the landlord's estate. Because of this, the peasants in Latgale had a greater degree of autonomy than that of the peasant communities in the Baltic provinces.

The peasant communities of this region, grouped together in accordance with which estate the settlements were located, differed also from the mir in spatial pattern. In Western Latvia, the basic settlement pattern was the individual farmstead, the mājas (pl., majās), as opposed to the nucleated settlement of the mir in Latgale (fig.3).

Hellman points out that the mājas was a consequence of the changing economic and demographic pressure being put on the western areas of the Latvian region.[1] To make room for larger fields in order that they could develop large scale grain production, the Baltic German landlords moved the peasants from their traditional village settlements dispersing them around the outer periphery of their feudal estates. Coupled with the increases in the size of the peasant population, the mājas became the basis of peasant rural settlement in Southern Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya while the Estlandskaya and Northern Liflandskaya, a similar development took place with the emergence of the Estonian equivalent of the mājas, the talu. The majority of the ethnic Latvian peasants therefore lived in the mājas.[2]

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1 M. Hellman, Das Lettenland im Mittelalter, Munster, 1954, p. 231.

2 R. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 1180-1918, Munich, 1954, pp. 152-66.

Fig 3: Eastern Latvia - Boundary of the Village Region



Source Based on, M Hellmann, Das Lettenland im Mittelalter, Münster, 1954

Although the mājas differed in spatial composition from that of the mir, there was still a number of community functions which the mājas performed. A number of these individual farmsteads would be lumped together functioning as a composite unit under the direct jurisdiction of the feudal estate to which they belonged. The common lands, for example, were administered on the basis that all members of a grouped together composite unit of majās were given access to this land. These common lands were also usually not planted with crops and re-partition and allotment to individual farmsteads or families did not take place. Although Kachorovsky[3] suggests that there were contrasts in methods used to organise community owned land in the mājas region compared with the mir, as current Soviet sources indicate, there is confusion as to the actual differences in the social and economic functions of these two settlement types.[4] It is therefore enough to conclude that the two differed in spatial pattern and in some of the organisations and functions that they performed.

It would be difficult to speculate that because the mājas was more of a scattered settlement, that the mir was characterised by a greater sense of community. However, such were the intrinsic economic and social relations amongst the members of this latter rural institution, that social and spatial change was more restricted whereas once the feudal system collapsed in the Baltikum and the feudal lord lost jurisdiction there was less social and economic obligations by members of the mājas to their community than in the mir. Social and spatial mobility were not so much directly hampered because of ties to the peasant community as they were in those areas under the direct administration of the Tsarist Empire.

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3 K.P. Kachorovsky, Russkaya Obshchina, Moscow, 1906; found no evidence of community owned land in Liflandskaya, Kurlandskaya and Estlandskaya in the 1890's.

4 I.P. Butkevičius, L.N. Terent'eva & N.V. Shygina, 'Krest'ianskie poseleniia Pribaltiki', Sovetskaya etnografiya, nr. 1, 1966, pp. 30-51.

The feudal structure within the Latvian political region was therefore a positive obstacle to the formation of the Latvian nation. Before it could come into existence as a social entity, the feudal structure had to disintegrate and the traditional spatial and societal structure of the region transformed into a modernising socio-economic area.

The agrarian reforms in Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya _gubernii_ set the conditions for spatial change and re-organisation in this region making way for various processes of modernisation to infiltrate the whole area. In Latgalia, as in the rest of the Tsarist Empire, emancipation and reform came later than in the Baltic provinces mainly due to their differing socio-economic structure.[5]

In 1804, the Liflandskaya _Landtag_ made the first effort to redefine the position of the peasantry. The 1804 law did not free the peasants from serfdom but it did allow them certain privileges such as the hereditary right to the use of their holdings. The peasantry could therefore not be sold without the land to which they were attached. Their obligations toward the German feudal lord were also defined in relation both to the quantity and quality of the land that the peasant occupied. This reform satisfied neither the wants of the German nobility nor the peasant and instead gave the feudal system a legal _status quo_.

The Kurlandskaya _Landtag_ did not follow on the lines of the neighbouring Liflandskaya diet. Instead the initiative for reform came from St. Petersburg who instructed a commission to examine the possibility of land reform. The result of these findings was given to the Kurlandskaya _Landtag_ being offered a choice of either implementing only slight modifications on the model of the inadequate Liflandskaya law or giving

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5 The Agrarian reforms are dealt with in the following sources: A. Švābe, _Latvijas Vēsture_ (A History of Latvia), Stockholm, 1958, pp. 226-333; K.Ya. Strazdin, _Istoriya Latviyskoi SSR_, vol. 1, Riga, 1952, pp. 470-527; R. Wittram, 1954, _op.cit._, p. 163, A. Spekke, _A History of Latvia_, Stockholm, 1951, pp. 289-92.

the serfs their freedom but without control or possession of land. The Kurlandskaya diet came out in favour of landless emancipation.

In 1817 this decision was made law in Kurlandskaya. Two years later an imperial decree by the Tsarist administration over-rode the 1804 reform in Liflandskaya, implementing landless emancipation. Thus by 1819, the peasants in Western and Central parts of the Latvian region had been given their personal freedom while the German landlord in compensation owned and had direct access to the land over the peasants including the right to do what he wished with the land. Due to this law, the peasantry also lost much of their common lands to the landlord. With the seizure of land, the traditional peasant community and its communal functions were thus put in threat of existence.

Over 900,000 peasants and their families were made landless in Kurlandskaya and Southern Liflandskaya as a direct result of these reforms. The agrarian environment was such that it operated more or less as a geographically closed system as the peasant still could not move to the towns or migrate outwith his uyezd of birth. He was spatially as well as socially restricted and therefore had to conform to the demands of the Ritterschaften.

The landlords further legalised the feudal order by setting up "free" contracts with the peasants who were compelled to accept any employment offered them because of the situation in which they found themselves. This contract encompassed statute work with the peasantry having to perform services for the estate. The peasantry were therefore forced to compete in an artificially restricted context with limited income from the poorer agrarian lands which the nobility allotted them.

The German landlords' need for labour was satisfied under this system of more or less compulsary contracts. As long as the peasantry were an integral part of the labour supply of the feudal order, the landlords hegemony continued over the region.

An English traveller of the time illustrates in his travelogue the

character of the landscape reflecting the powerful position of the Ritterschaften. Travelling through Kurlandskaya guberniya he observes:

> "All the land belongs to the great nobles, and nowhere do the free possessions of small proprietors, or the territories of independent cities, intersect these large domains. In England and Germany the variety of sub-divisions give the country the appearance of a fine diminutive mosaic. Here all is coarse, massive, in huge blocks. One great territory follows another, until at length, on the northernmost point of the peninsula (Kurlandskaya), the estate of Dondagen, like a gigantic keystone, crowns the edifice."[6]

In the 1820's, it has been estimated that approximately 1,200 German families owned practically all the land in the Baltic gubernii. Some of these landlords owned up to nine estates. Besides Dondagen (Dundaga) which covered an area of 60,000 hectares, other large estates included that of Pope (50,000) and Vilaka (49,000).[7]

Throughout the 1820's and 1830's, the continuation of the peasant three field system of farming and maintenance of labour services as the basis of peasant tenure became progressively more burdensome to the landowning class who now began to look toward more efficient methods of farming in order to compete for a greatly extended overseas market for their agricultural produce. Following a series of peasant revolts brought to a crescendo by a series of poor harvests in 1838-40 and 1844-6, combined with the fear of the 1848 Revolutions spreading to the Baltic provinces, the German diets in both gubernii finally decided that it was necessary to totally re-organise the rural environment which would not only benefit them but also pacify the peasantry.

An 1849 agrarian law was passed which was primarily meant to be a temporary measure and issued for only six years. It however became the

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6 J.G. Kohl, Russia: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Riga, Odessa, the German Provinces on the Baltic, London, 1842, p. 317.

7 J. Rutkis, Latvia, Country and People, Stockholm, 1967, p. 333.

basis from which Latvian agricultural society developed. The Latvian émigre historian, Švābe, points out that the 1849 law,

> "...became the foundation on which a prosperous class of Latvian and Estonian smallholders grew up."[8]

The law introduced two new categories of peasant property. Firstly, land belonging to the landlord but which had to be either leased to the peasants or purchased by them; i.e. vaku land. The second category consisted of quota lands which were to be given to manorial employees. The 1849 law therefore took the economic onus off the Baltic German landlord separating the manorial lands from the peasant economy and thus giving a legal basis for the creation of peasant owned farms.

The immediate effects of this reform were limited. The vast majority of the peasantry did not benefit and even by the 1860's only a handful of the peasants had secured ownership of a very limited amount of land (table 1). Special banks had been set up which issued loans to peasants to enable them to purchase land from their landlord. This opportunity to purchase land in freehold was therefore limited as few peasants could financially afford to take advantage of this scheme. Although the number of purchases increased greatly in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the morphology of the region altered little, the lot of the vast majority of the rural peasantry continuing very much on the lines of the pre-1849 reform period.

Those peasants that were fortunate enough to be able to take advantage of this reform, either through purchase or lease of property, tended to be offered the poorer agricultural land in areas not always where their mājas was located. The 1849 reform therefore heralded the beginning of a gradual disintegration of the traditional rural community.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the feudal system was gradually being replaced by a modern capitalist economy. With the diffusion of

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8 A. Švābe, The Story of Latvia, Stockholm, 1950, p. 21.

Table 1

Peasant Land Purchases in Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya, 1823-81[9]

Liflandskaya

year	No. of farmsteads purchased	area of land (in thousands of desyatines)*
1823-51	42	2.4
1852-56	137	8.5
1857-61	209	10.2
1862-66	2010	111.9
1867-71	4318	204.9
1872-76	5995	263.8
1877-81	3133	128.8
Total	15844	804.2

Kurlandskaya

year	No. of farmsteads purchased	area of land (in thousands of desyatines)
1864-66	931	38.6
1867-71	1461	57.5
1872-76	1702	66.5
1877-81	3129	144.7
Total	7223	307.3

(* a desyatine is equivalent to 1.09 hectares)

9 A.E. Tobin, Agrarnyy Stroy Materikovoy Chasti Liflandskoy Gubernii, Riga, 1906, p. 11; Ya.I. Ludmer, Kurlandskaya Guberniya, Mitau, 1888, p. 355; as cited in M.I. Kozina, Ocherki Ekonomicheskoi Istorii Latvii, 1860-1900, Riga, 1971, p. 34.

market relations, the increasing significance of exchange and the advent of a money economy, the traditional peasant rural areas were being encroached upon by all the manifestations of modernisation. As the process gathered momentum, the German landowner needed to obtain extra capital in order to compete in a more technologically orientated economy. He also wanted to be able to independently manage his estate as profitably as possible by using hired labour. To obtain extra capital, the landowner was therefore more willing to sell land to the peasantry at competitive prices.[10]

Although laws of 1865 (Kurlandskaya) and 1866 (Liflandskaya) ended the exclusive rights of nobles to hold estates, it can be seen that such was the socio-economic position of the Germans that they continued the monopoly over profitable capitalist farming, while the peasantry made minor in-roads into effectively owning small scale property. On the whole, the majority still remained landless serving as an abundant source for cheap agrarian labour.

Because of historical and geographical circumstances, Latgalia had a differing agrarian development to that of western-central Latvia. Here, the population was more heterogeneous, dominated by a Polish and Russian nobility with an overwhelmingly predominant ethnic Latvian speaking peasantry. There was also a sizeable number of Polish and Belorussian peasants.

The peasant organisation of farming in this area, the mir, was a rural institution which had developed in Latgalia as a result of geo-

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10 A further government decree of 1868 gave even greater accessibility for the peasant to purchase land. This law abandoned all service management of estates. Although the Ritterschaften needed to subsidise much of their previously cheap labour for hired labour, nevertheless even by the mid 1860's, over 75 percent of all the estates in Southern Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya were still managed by peasant service. Data from A. Spekke, 1951, op.cit., p. 294.

graphical conditions including limited acreage of productive arable land with extensive marshland and forest encouraging the population to agglomerate in specific areas. Serfdom, the scarcity of land for a numerically increasing population and the specific forms of taxation policies encouraged by the Polish and later Russian governments also contributed to the formation of this tightly knit rural organisation.

With the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the land was not granted to individual peasants as it was after the 1849 reforms in the Baltic provinces. Instead the land was given to the rural commune as a whole. By 1877, although 295,400 desyatines had been purchased by the peasantry, comparable to the areal extent of purchase in Kurlandskaya and Southern Liflandskaya, only 337 rural communes owned this land.[11] Of the land sold to the various miry, a third of these communes covered an area of less than 500 desyatines.

Two important geographical aspects emerged from land reform in Latgalia. Firstly, the 1861 reform did not destroy the mir, indeed in some respects it gave it an extended life-span. In comparison with the rest of the Latvian political region, spatial change due to the form of rural organisation and collective land ownership was slower. Secondly, the effects of the reform made it impossible for the increasing populations to live in communities characterised by an unproductive three field system and limited acreage of accessible arable land. Due to these environmental conditions, there emerged a large number of landless peasants who for economic reasons had to reject the strong and closely integrated community and social obligations of the mir and migrate outwith rural Latgalia. These two conflicting processes, the first preserving the traditional peasant community, the latter attempting to destroy it, were the salient characteristics which plagued rural Latgalia throughout the latter quarter of the nineteenth century and into

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11 M.I. Kozina, 1972, op.cit., p. 92.

the beginning of the twentieth century. The processes were also part of the socio-economic problems facing this area contributing to an economic backwardness.[12]

As part of the modernisation process, the population growth of the Latvian political region made new demands on the traditional socio-economic system particularly affecting rural areas with over population. Combined with the scarcity of economic resources within the rural environment, it was inevitable that an excess population from the land would emerge.

Table 2

Population Growth within the Latvian Region, 1800-1914[13]

year	Southern Liflandskaya	Kurlandskaya	Latgale	Total
1800	260,986	307,280	151,500	719,766
1820	-	-	-	695,000
1863	516,847	462,818	261,323	1,240,988
1897	753,730	674,038	501.623	1,929,387
1914	1,107,600	798,300	646,100	2,552,000

Thus as a result of the gradual disintegration of feudalism and as part of the modernisation process affecting the region, a large number of the peasant rural population became landless.

It is unclear as to exactly how many landless peasants there were in the region. Statistical sources vary in their interpretations of both what constituted 'landless' and the extent to which there was indeed a land problem.

A Latvian statistician, Skujenieks, spuriously suggests 61 percent of the rural population were landless.[14] He does not give his source of

12 The Stolypin reforms of 1909, affecting only the Latgalian area of the Latvian political region, continued the process of breaking up the rural communes.

13 A.G. Rashin (editor), Naselenie Rossii za 100 let; 1811-1913 gg; Statisticheskie Ocherki, Moscow, 1956, pp. 44-45.

14 M. Skujenieks, Latvija, zeme un iedzīvotāji (Latvia, Land and People),

reference nor does he attempt to indicate what he meant by landless. Rutkis gives the figure of 591,000 people (heads of households and dependents) without land in the rural districts of the region.[15] However by 1897, population movements, both to local urban centres and inter-guberniya migrations, distorts any interpretation of the rural situation in the 1860's and 1870's.

The most comprehensive account is given by Švābe who attempted to define what constituted landless and what did not.[16] Using the 1897 Tsarist Census as his basis of analysis, he suggests that a number of categories are discernible within the rural areas. Firstly, there are those peasant private smallholders and tenants who constituted 13 percent of the total peasant population. Secondly, he suggests that about 74,000 units or households of the rural inhabitants were not concerned with the land. This he postulates, included tradesmen, teachers, and persons who had migrated to the towns but were still registered in rural areas for taxation purposes. He estimates that the remaining population, the landless, constituted some 50,000 units or households, or 34 percent of the rural population.

Although Švābe's figures are based on the 1890's, his calculations tend to indicate that in the 1860's and 1870's somewhere in the region of 55 percent to 60 percent of the total peasantry were landless.[17]

It was this landless population that played a central role in the disintegration of the traditional society and the growth of the region's urban and industrial sector. The spatial re-organisation of the

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15 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 334

16 A. Švābe, 1958, op.cit., p. 549.

17 The figure is derived at by taking into consideration Švābe's evidence, estimates of figures on rural to urban migrations and land ownership between the 1850's and 1897 census and the number of ethnic Latvian speakers living in urban areas according to 1867 and 1881 estimates and the 1897 census.

population is therefore partly accountable to the nature of the agrarian reforms in the region and the environmental and economic limitations imposed on the rural areas.

By the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the Baltic German landowners still owned the largest percentage of land within the region but as a result of the disintegration of the feudal system, re-distribution of land had taken place with the peasantry purchasing nearly 40 percent of the total by the early 1900's. The ethnic Latvian peasantry in the rural areas had therefore evolved into socially stratified groups.

As is shown in Table 3, the re-distribution of land by the turn of the twentieth century indicates that within a period of less than fifty years, the rural economy had become transformed with the devolution of landed power introducing ethnic Latvian peasant smallholdings into the landscape of the region.

Many of the rural communities had been broken up by this socio-economic change and population re-distribution. By the 1900's, Latgalian rural organisations had been affected with many peasants in this area owning their own individual farming plots but still choosing to remain within the remnant shell of the mir, the village settlement. In the individual farmstead areas of western and central parts of the region, disintegration had continued on a faster and more widespread scale. This had been further helped by a St. Petersburg directive of 1866 which removed the guardianship of the landlord over the rural communities entrusting decision making powers over the local composite unit of majās into the hands of elders, councils and courts of the various uyezdy. Thus autonomy and the end of Baltic German hegemony over local peasant affairs was an important step in giving the peasantry a degree of control over their communities. However, it was too late in preserving a traditional community structure as change had resulted in the further development of scattered settlements and migrations from the local setting.

Table 3

The Distribution of Land in the Latvian Region, 1905[18]

area of holdings, in desyatines*	number of holdings	total area (in hectares)	percentage of the total area
up to 10	14,668	117,567	2
10-20	20,001	271,659	5
20-30	14,837	356,771	7
30-50	23,492	948,744	18
50-100	8,709	510,371	10
100-500	529	129,302	3
500-1,000	241	186,698	4
1,000-5,000	521	1,282,426	25
5,000-10,000	84	623,437	12
10,000 and over	35	730,915	14
Total	83,117	5,157,890	

* a desyatine is equivalent to 1.09 hectares.

18 A. Darbiņš and V. Vītiņs, Latvija Statistisks Pārskats (Statistical Review of Latvia), 1947, p. 35.

Paralleled with the changes affecting the spatial structure of the rural areas was the development of the urban centres within the region.

Before the nineteenth century, the larger towns of the region were more or less 'foreign islands', largely commercial in nature and not attracting large numbers of migrants from their respective rural hinterlands. With the exception of the coastal and trading towns of Riga and Libau (Liepāja) and the inland centre of Mitau (Jelgava), the urban economic base was undeveloped particularly in the eastern areas of the region. The remaining centres of population relied on their function as periodic fairs and markets or iarmarki in order to sustain a livelihood.

The location of the region between the Russian and western industrial markets has played a significant part in the industrial development of the area. However, in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, there were a number of factors working against the development of industry. Local labour was geographically restricted by the political and social order imposed on the region by feudalism and the Tsarist administration. German capital in the area was still directed toward agricultural concerns because of the near monopoly Western Europe had over international trade and industrial manufacturing activity. There was therefore a general lack of incentive to develop the industrial sector of the economy. Where growth did occur in the industrial sector it was restricted to artisan or cottage industries rather than in large scale concerns.[19]

With the development of manufacturing industry, local German landlords' and merchants' investment, along with foreign capital, were attracted to the area with many of the local nobility and landlords moving to urban centres. With the greater diversity and quantity of goods produced emerged an increased degree of economic specialisation and

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19 P.G. Ryndzyunsky, 'Goroda Latvii i Estonii', in P.G. Ryndzyunsky, Gorodskoye Grazhdanstvo Doreformennoye Rossii, Moscow, 1958, pp. 312-331.

Fig 4: The Latvian Region In The 19th Century



orientation toward specific areas within the Latvian political region. Specialisation of economic activities demanded a need for the accumulation of people within a specific locality. It was the town that provided such a nucleus for economic development.

The relative insignificance of manufacturing in the early nineteenth century economic development of the towns is reflected in the small number of industrial concerns and workers engaged in industry even in the largest city of the region, Riga.

Table 4

Industries and Workers in Riga, 1834-64 [20]

industry	number of industrial concerns			number of workers employed		
	1834	1854	1864	1834	1854	1864
textiles	8	24	21	780	1,997	2,162
timber process.	1	7	7	136	548	1,199
cork production	-	2	2	-	226	342
paper	2	3	not known	111	204	179
tobacco	4	15	8	148	1,030	960
leather	1	3	2	97	139	100
ceramics & glass	4	11	7	101	374	356
metal & machine	2	8	10	11	300	370
other industries	11	13	35	209	171	446
Total	33	84	90	1,593	4,763	5,772

In a visit to Riga in the 1830's, Kohl remarked:

"I know no city whose existence depends so entirely on its

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20 V.K. Yatsunskiy, 'Znachenie Ekonomicheskikh Svyazei c Rossiei dlya Khozyaistvennogo Razvitiya gorodov Pribaltiki v epokhu Kapitalizma', Istoricheskie Zapiski, vol. 45, 1954, pp. 105-147, p. 113.

river, which appears to be so entirely unconnected with it. Scarcely anything is to be seen of the town but an old wall."[21]

In 1836, Riga had a population of 56,000 rising to 77,400 by 1863. The number of workers employed in these industries were growing but small in relation to the overwhelmingly predominant rural population.

The coastal towns of Riga, Libau and Windau (Ventspils) were favourably located for the transaction and movement of goods between the Russian hinterland and the major industrial producers and markets of Germany, Britain and Scandinavia. The revival of a protectionist policy in 1877, imposing high tariffs on the import of manufactured goods entering the Tsarist Empire brought these ports into the forefront of the state's economy. Because it was more favourable for foreign industrialists to locate their industrial concerns within the Tsarist state, the Baltic coast emerged as the most profitable location. Here there was not only geographical accessibility to markets and producers but also an abundance of cheap labour which could be readily tapped. With the expansion of Russian foreign trade in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the position and industrial growth of the Latvian region's ports was further enhanced. By 1912, the combined value of exports passing through the ports of Riga, Libau and Windau was thrice that of St. Petersburg.[22]

The dramatic rise in industrial development in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century was partly manifested in the construction of a transportation network linking the Baltic ports to the Russian hinterland. Hitherto, the region had been characterised by a limited road network serving the feudal estates, their upkeep relying on the landlord. A canal network had already been established linking the main rivers of the Baltic, their function being that of moving timber for export from the ports. A rapid development in railway construction therefore linked the

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21 J.G. Kohl, 1842, op.cit., p. 326.

22 H.P. Kennard, The Russian Year Book of 1914, London, 1914.

region together giving a greater accessibility to the Russian industrial and agricultural interior to move commodities to the main Latvian ports.[23] The spatial structure of the rail network throughout the region reflected the east-west orientation of trade with this area emerging as a transit area, par excellence. Its coastal location therefore made this region one of the most developed industrial areas of the Tsarist Empire.

The growth of the transit trade through this region is illustrated by the increase of shipments from Riga to the Russian interior. Between 1860 and 1870, just over six million poods were shipped from Riga to the interior of the country. From 1896 to 1900, this figure had nearly trebled and by 1913, for the period of just that year, over 54 million poods passed through the city.[24] In the same year, this port alone accounted for 17 percent of the total trade to pass through Russian ports.[25]

The pattern of port evolution in the Latvian region had by the latter half of the nineteenth century, led to the centralisation of ports along the Latvian coast with Riga, Libau and Windau developing a monopoly over maritime transactions at the expense of the minor ports. A comprehensive railway development further accentuated this hierarchy. Railways also contributed to furthering the geographical dichotomy between the

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23 The Riga-Orlovskaya line through Dvinsk (Daugavpils) was completed by 1866 with a branch line connecting the inland town of Mitau (Jelgava) in 1868 and the latter centre with the main Libau-Romeskaya line by 1871. A network joining Vindau direct with Moscow was established between 1901-4 and another line from Riga to Northern Estonia via Walk (Valka) directly connected Liflandskaya with Estlandskaya in 1889. Ya.F. Bumber and P. Alampiev, (editors), Latviiskaya SSR - Ocherki Ekonomicheskoi Geografii, Riga, 1956, pp. 78-9. See also fig. 19.

24 Sixty poods is equivalent to a ton. Data on shipments through Riga from: Ya. Kalnberzin, Ten Years of Soviet Latvia, Moscow, 1951, p. 57.

25 Foreign Office, Historical Section, Courland, Livonia and Esthonia, 1941, p. 44.

spatial patterns of economic activity in Western Latvia compared with the region's interior.

Industrialisation demanded an abundant supply of labour for its developing large scale enterprises. It was the disintegration of the feudal system and the consequently large number of landless peasants which became the future labour supply of the towns. However, legal barriers to population movement played a particularly prominent role in discouraging rural to urban migrations, partly accounting for an early nineteenth century lack of industrial development.

Before the 1860's, the peasant population was limited in spatial mobility to the uyezd of their birth. An 1833 law in Kurlandskaya guberniya granted a limited right of migration to their peasants although they were still generally barred from settling in the towns. It was not until 1863 that a universal law was introduced in the Empire which gave the peasants the right to move freely from place to place once their obligations to the feudal lord had been satisfied and in some cases wavered by legislation. In the same decade, the system of internal passports was abolished making the towns more accessible to the population of the rural areas.

Intra-regional population movement predominated accounting for the numerical increase in urban growth in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This urban growth was therefore the urbanisation of a large percentage of the local peasantry which is characteristic of such a society in the earlier stages of modernisation.

Intra-regional rural to urban migrations also comprised of a large number of seasonal migrants who moved to the towns for employment during the winter months returning to their rural communities in the summer for harvesting. Both permanent and seasonal movements were therefore a consequence of industrial growth through greater economic specialisation and the accumulation of capital, and the changing traditional nature of rural society.

Socio-economic change also forced the various Baltic German dominated urban institutions to adapt to the demand for urban labour. The old privileged and élitist guilds of artisans and merchants which had a near monopoly over the cities' trades began to open their doors to the new industrial class. A law of 1866 had altered a situation whereby the guild system of craftsmen was not open to ethnic Latvian speakers unless they renounced their nationality and language. This lifting of restrictions to artisans which had impaired peasant urban immigrations made both social and spatial mobility easier.

The impact of population re-distribution within the Latvian region is illustrated in the cumulative percentage urban[26] increase throughout the nineteenth century (fig. 5). In 1811, the urban total was 64,004 increasing very steadily until the 1860's. This reflects limited immigration from the local rural areas with the natural increase of the urban population accounting for the largest percentage of the rise. From the 1860's onwards, there is a dramatic upsurge in the population of the towns as industrialisation gathers momentum with cheap labour constantly flowing into these centres as a result of the changing socio-economic structure of the area and the lifting of legislation restricting movement. The traumatic rate of urban growth in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century up until the beginning of the first world war is also accountable by natural increase connected with the general effects of modernisation and further in-migration particularly from surrounding rural areas. Further foreign and state investment in port, transport and

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26 In this thesis, the definition of 'urban' throughout the Tsarist period includes all settlements designated as goroda, posady or mestechka which had a population of over 2,000 people in 1910 and appeared in the majority of the enumerations and surveys undertaken by the Imperial government throughout the 1800 to 1914 period. This criterion was adopted because of the rather uncertain methods used by the state authorities in determining what was 'urban' in the Latvian political region.

Fig.5: Cumulative Percentage Urban Increase In The Latvian Region 1811-1910[27]



27. A. G. Rashin, (1956), op.cit., pp.44-45; Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, op.cit., vol.5, 19, 21; Tsentral'nyi statisticheskii komitet, Statistika Rossiiskoi Imperii, vol.1, Sbornik svednii po Rossii za 1884 - 1885 gg., St. Petersburg, 1887; P. Semenov, (editor), Geograficheskо-Statisticheskii slovar' Rossiiskoi Imperii, St. Petersburg, 1885; Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii komitet, Goroda Rossii v 1904 godu, St. Petersburg, 1906, & Goroda Rossii v 1910 godu, St. Petersburg, 1914.

industry gave a boost to rapid urbanisation in this period. Thus by 1914, well over a third of the population of the Latvian region lived in urban areas.

Table 5

Urban Growth within the Latvian Region, 1800 to 1914[28]

date	total population	urban population	% urban
1800	719,766	53,000	7.3
1863	1,240,988	178,800	14.8
1897	1,929,387	540,535	28.5
1914	2,552,000	939,000	38.0

Within the region there were spatial variations in the rate and impact of urban growth. In examining a number of surveys undertaken by the Tsarist government (fig. 6) the rate of urban increase between survey years illustrates that Southern Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya follow a similar pattern, their numerical significance having an impact in determining the statistical growth pattern for the Latvian region. Within Southern Liflandskaya and Kurlandskaya, the most dramatic increase between survey years was from 1870 to 1885 when the urban population in both areas increased by nearly 80 percent on the previous inter-survey period.

Latgalia differs markedly in its rate of urban increase between these surveys. This increase in this area is exceptionally traumatic although on a different numerical scale compared with the rest of the region. This is due to Latgalia entering the nineteenth century with a very low urban base. Growth rates in Latgalia are particularly high following a slightly different temporal pattern.

In 1811, the total population living in towns in Latgale was 2,603 or approximately 1.7 percent of the total population of the area. The

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28 A.G. Rashin, 1956, op.cit., pp. 44-45; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, Riga, 1974, p. 6.

Fig 6: Rate Of Urban Increase Between Survey Years In South Liflandskaya, Kurlandskaya & Latgale 1811-1910[29]



29. Ibid

only positive increase shown in the surveys came in the 1857-70 period which included the period when serfdom was abolished and laws restricting mobility were dropped from the statute book, and between 1897 to 1910 when industrial investment in the area and the impact of railways coupled with the disintegration of the mir and the changing rural economic climate began to have an effective impact in transforming the area.

Latgalia's slowness in economic development can therefore be partly attributed to its location, rural institutions, social composition of the population, physical environment and lack of raw materials. It is only with the development of a competent railway network in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century that this area benefits from its location between the Latvian coast and the Russian interior.

An examination of the percentage urban increase between survey years in the four largest growth centres within the Latvian region (Riga, Libau, Mitau and Dvinsk), highlights the important role of the Latvian ports in determining a spatial pattern of modernisation (table 6).

Table 6

Percentage Urban Increase in inter-survey years in the major growth centres within the Latvian Region, 1811 - 1910 [30]

centre	population in 1811	1811-25	1825-40	1840-56	1856-70	1870-85	1885-97	1897-1910
Riga	31,967	21.3	54.6	17.5	41.8	75.5	61.0	31.1
Libau	5,696	18.2	63.2	-24.2	29.2	175.7	117.2	40.7
Mitau	10,818	15.1	63.1	-16.8	15.8	35.4	17.0	-0.3
Dvinsk	1,843	56.3	294.3	- 2.2	165.3	134.3	1.0	57.4

Riga and Libau were the main port centres of industrial development attracting foreign investment and due to the 1877 tariffs on foreign

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30 ibid

imports of manufacturing goods, were favourable locations for the establishment of large scale factory concerns.

Riga's predominance within the region is unparalleled elsewhere in the Baltic. The city and its region are a classic example of a centre-periphery situation. Riga acted as a suction pump pulling in the more dynamic elements from the more static surrounding region. The rest of the Latvian region was negated to a secondary economic role because of the existence of Riga. A quasi-colonial relationship existed between the core area and its surrounding region, the latter experiencing net outflows of people, capital and resources which had a cumulative effect in the rapid growth of this urban centre at the expense of the periphery.

With a population of 31,967 in 1811 rising to 70,463 by 1857 and by 1897, 282,230, the city evolved into an obvious nucleus for industrial and commercial development constituting over 50 percent of the region's urban population at the turn of the century.[31]

By the late nineteenth century, the industrial structure of Riga reflected a wide variety of manufacturing industries including a proportionately high percentage of heavy industry even although raw materials had to be imported from either other industrial regions of the Empire or from Western Europe (table 7) A number of industries had also developed as a consequence of geographical inertia. The textile, paper, leather and timber processing industries had always been traditionally connected with the area, in the main utilising local resources of skilled labour and materials. Along with the injection of heavy industry, the city, by 1900, had 151 factories employing more than fifty workers per enterprise. By 1910, this had increased to 228 factories.[32]

Libau, as the second port of the region, owes much of its growth to its more southerly location. During the nineteenth century, the port

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31 ibid

32 A. Bilmanis, Latvia as an Independent State, Washington DC, 1947, p.122.

Table 7

Riga: The Number of Workers in Major Industries in 1913[33]

industry	number of workers	production (in thousands of roubles)
ceramics	6,406	8,165
metal & machine	28,343	53,550
chemical	4,533	27,128
textiles	10,335	22,401
paper	3,718	8,640
rubber	15,302	57,770
leather	866	3,625
timber process.	7,816	16,026
food & tobacco	6,037	19,222
other industry	4,252	3,763
Total	87,606	220,290

of Riga was ice-bound for approximately six months of the year while Libau was inaccessible for only a few weeks. In 1811, the town had a population of 5,696 which increased gradually until the 1840's. It was not until the latter quarter of the nineteenth century that the port began to expand as a consequence of industrial and commercial investment in the town. By 1897, it had a population of 64,489 with 8,492 workers employed in a wide array of industrial concerns.[34]

Mitau, centrally located within the region was the second largest town in 1811 with a population of 10,818. In contrast with the port towns, Mitau's growth throughout the nineteenth century was slow, its population actually declining in the 1897-1910 period when other major cities of the region were experiencing high rates of growth. By 1897,

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33 V.K. Yatsunskiy, 1954, op.cit., p. 119.

34 ibid, p. 110.

Mitau had a population of 35,131 with 4,584 persons employed in large scale industry.[35] Although the town attracted industry mainly due to its surrounding area and large numbers of Jewish merchants,[36] it suffered at the expense of Riga and Libau. It was only its importance as a route centre and as a feeder line to the region's main ports that it managed to attract a variety of manufacturing industries of which the metallurgical and textile industry were the most important.

Table 8

Mitau: The Number of Workers in Major Industries, 1879, 1900 and 1912[37]

industry	1879	1900	1912
metal	90	377	2,080
chemical	-	16	39
textiles	-	887	1,085
food	40	204	362
timber process.	-	264	212
leather	20	33	63
paper	-	70	104
Total	150	1,851	3,945

The urban growth of the Latgalian town of Dvinsk, the only centre of importance in this area, had a slow development until after the mid-nineteenth century reaching a population of only 11,106 by 1856. With the construction of a rail network in the mid 1860's connecting the town with the Baltic ports and the Russian interior, linked with a massive influx of labour from the local area by the late nineteenth century, the town reached a population of 109,689 by 1910. The capital in this town

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35 ibid, p. 110.

36 J.G. Kohl, 1842, op.cit., p. 319.

37 V.K. Yatsunskiy, 1954, op.cit., p. 132.

came chiefly from its function as a trading and commercial centre usually characterised by small trading firms. In 1897, Dvinsk employed only 6,000 workers in manufacturing industry out of a total population of 69,695.[38]

The only other urban centre to attract large scale manufacturing industry was the port of Windau even though its urban population was small compared with the above four. By 1897, Windau had a population of only 7,127 but had nearly 900 workers employed in manufacturing industry.[39]

With the exception of Mitau and Dvinsk, the other inland towns had attracted very little industry even although their urban growth was markedly higher after the 1880's. These smaller towns had developed into urban market centres serving their immediate surrounding rural areas.

Two important aspects emerge in the pattern of industrial activity in the Latvian region in the late nineteenth century. Firstly, large-scale industry is concentrated in four urban centres which contain over 80 percent of the total urban population.[40] Secondly, the predominance of Riga and the coastal area over Eastern Latvia in industrial activity. In 1879 for example, of the sixty-eight industrial enterprises in the region employing over fifty workers per enterprise, only four were located in Latgale, the latter area also employing only 4.7 percent of the region's total industrial labour force.[41]

Intrinsically related to this pattern of urban and industrial growth was the spatial and social mobility of the population. Although some statistical data on population movement and its consequences is available before the 1897 Tsarist Census, it is really this enumeration that provides the first possible analysis of the spatial re-organisation

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38 ibid, p. 110.

39 ibid, p. 110

40 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., op.cit., vols. 5, 19, 21.

41 M.I. Kozina, 1972, op.cit., p. 153.

of the population and gives a valuable indication of the actual scale of mobility.

Spatial mobility within the region can be measured by guberniya from place of birth data referring to the number of persons who, at the time of the census, lived in the uyezd or guberniya other than in the one in which they were born. From the place of birth data, the relative scale and direction of movement can be derived. This data has, however, certain limitations attached to it. The material gives only the net result of movement between the time of birth and the time of the enumeration. Hence the number of migrants in any given year cannot really be determined and migrants who have died or returned to their place of birth are not counted. There is also no accurate method of determining the intensity of movement within the uyezd itself although data is available for each of these administrative entities on the basis of rural and urban place of birth.

The percentage of the population that were born in the uyezd in which they resided in 1897 gives some indication of the nature and magnitude of in-migration, (fig. 7). Only Rizhskii, Grobinskii, Dobelskii and Dvinskii uyezdy are areas with a low percentage of non-natives, indicative of the urban pull which Riga, Libau, Mitau and Dvinsk have over the entire region. Elsewhere, there is little inter-uyezd movement into the remaining uyezdy with 80 to 90 percent of these inhabitants remaining in their uyezd of birth.

Figures relating to all the towns of the region indicate that in-migration is characteristic as opposed to their rural counterparts who record very little. In the smaller towns of the region, the non-native population comes from within their respective uyezdy. Depending on the location of the town and its numerical and economic importance, generally the percentage of those born in that urban centre will be less (table 9). On average, well over a third of the inhabitants of each town were not native. The smaller towns with less urban functions tended to be centres



Fig 7 : The Latvian Region Percentage Population Native to each Uyezd, 1897

Table 9

The Latvian Region - Place of Birth of the Population Residing in the Towns in 1897[42]

town	% native to town	percentage non-native: from other parts of the guberniya	from other parts of the Tsarist Empire	from outwith the Empire
Kurlandskaya				
Libava (Libau)	29.9	35.5	31.8	2.8
Mitava (Mitau)	36.6	39.3	23.0	1.1
Goldingen	69.5	25.0	4.9	0.6
Tukkum	69.6	22.1	8.0	0.3
Vindava (Windau)	78.3	15.3	5.4	1.0
Bausk	76.4	6.3	17.2	0.1
Jakobstadt	74.7	5.2	19.2	0.9
Friedrichstadt	76.0	6.2	17.6	0.2
Talsen	80.0	15.0	4.9	0.1
Illukst	81.8	2.0	15.8	0.4
Gazenpot	78.2	16.0	5.2	0.8
Grobin	65.6	25.1	8.2	1.1
Liflandskaya				
Riga	39.8	19.5	38.4	2.3
Valk (Walk)	52.3	35.9	11.5	0.3
Venden (Wenden)	55.8	26.9	16.8	0.5
Volmar (Wolmar)	70.0	21.0	8.4	0.6
Shlok (Schlock)	41.3	7.0	51.0	0.7
Vitebskaya				
Dvinsk	43.4	9.8	46.2	0.6
Rezhitsa	74.0	13.9	11.9	0.2
Liutsin	78.9	13.3	7.8	-

42 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5 (Vitebskaya), vol. 19 (Kurlandskaya), vol. 21 (Liflandskaya).

for local in-migration for their immediate areas while Riga and Libau attracted large numbers from within the Latvian region in general and also from the rest of the Tsarist Empire.

Rural in-migration was particularly high in Rizhskii, Grobinskii and Dobelskii uyezdy, a reflection of the proximity of these areas to large urban markets (Riga, Libau, Mitau) and the more conducive physical environment for agriculture particularly in Rizhskii and Dobelskii (fig. 8). The low percentage of rural immigrants into the Liflandskaya uyezdy of Valmierskii and Veidenskii and in Central Latgalia is more an effect of rural out-migration to more favourable geographical environments.

This mainly intra-regional rural to urban movement resulted in the urbanisation of a large number of ethnic Latvian speakers. As has already been mentioned, before the mid-nineteenth century few ethnic Latvian speakers were to be found in the towns. By the end of the century, the ethno-linguistic composition of the towns had been transformed with ethnic Latvian speakers constituting well over 40 percent of the total urban population by the 1890's.[43]

According to the various surveys and the 1897 census,[44] it was particularly Riga which attracted the largest number of ethno-linguistic Latvians. This is shown in the changing composition of the town from 1850 to 1913, (table 10). Thus of the 540,595 ethnic Latvian speakers residing in urban Latvia in 1897, over a fifth of them were living in Riga.[45]

The impact of ethnic Latvian in-migration can also be illustrated by taking the example of Libau which was in the earlier part of the nineteenth century an overwhelmingly Baltic German dominated town. In

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43 ibid

44 For sources on the various urban surveys, see note 27, p. 116.

45 ibid



Fig 8: The Latvian Region: Percentage In-Migrants Residing In Rural Areas, 1897

Table 10

Riga: Composition of the ethno-linguistic population, 1850-1913[46]

year	total population	total Latvians	percentage Latvian	German	Russian	other
1850	61,543	11,077	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1867	102,590	25,647	24	43	25	8
1881	169,329	50,798	30	39	19	12
1897	282,230	127,003	45	22	16	17
1913	517,522	217,359	42	13	19	26

(n.a. data not available)

1863 the Baltic Germans constituted 63 percent of the total population of the town compared with the ethnic Latvians 16%. By 1897 the Latvian in-migration resulted in nearly 39 percent of the town's population comprising ethnic Latvians. The German percentage had declined to less than 25 percent.[47]

It must also be noted that the changing numerical importance of the ethnic Latvians in the urban areas was partly accountable to a higher natural increase than that of the Germans. By the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the Baltic German population had declined by 27,913 between 1881 and 1897 whereas the combined Latvian and Estonian population within the Baltikum had increased by over 375,000 in the same time period.[48]

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46 E. Dunsdorfs, 'Rīgas Iedzivotaju skaita attīstība, 1547-1935' (Population Developments in Riga, 1547-1935), in H. Asaris (editor), Latvijas pilsetas (The Towns of Latvia), Riga, 1938, pp. 156-60; Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoii Imperii 1897 goda, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 21 (Liflandskaya); R. Pohle, 'Riga', Meereskunde, nr. 152, 1919, pp. 1-40, p. 17.

47 M. Skujenicks, Latvijas Statisticas Atlass (A Statistical Atlas of Latvia), Riga, 1938, p. 12.

48 R. Schulz, Der Deutsche Bauer im Baltikum, Berlin, 1938, p. 16.

In 1881 the birth-rate amongst Riga Germans was 35.2 per thousand population. Less than thirty years later it had fallen to 13.9 per thousand.[49] The process of modernisation had not only introduced the ethnic Latvian speaking community into an urban environment but also had strengthened its numerical significance through varying rates of natural population increase affecting different social and ethnic groups. The Baltic German community was therefore affected by the modernisation process, the impact on this group's natural increase having an effect before that of the less socially developed ethnic communities of the region.

It was only in the Latgalian towns of Dvinsk, Rezhitsa and Liutsin and in neighbouring Illukst that ethnic Latvian speakers made little impact on the urban population[50] (table 11). Although this eastern region was composed of a heterogeneous ethnic population, ethnic Latvians accounted for just over 50 percent of the total in Latgalia and 30 percent in Illukstskii uyezd[51]. It would therefore appear that the rural Latvian population of Dvinskii, Rezhintskii, Liutsinskii and Illukstskii either tended to remain more sedentary which would be partly a response to the communal functions and regulations governing the mir, or when they did migrate, moved into the cities and rural areas of western-central Latvia. Population increase in the Latgalian towns was therefore more a consequence of the movement of Russians and Poles into these centres either from the local rural area or from other parts of the Empire. By the turn of the century, the Jewish community in Liutsin, Rezhitsa and Dvinsk was by far the largest ethnic group, a result of past Tsarist policy restricting Jews to specific areas of the Empire, while the Russian community comprised the largest minority. In the town of Illukst, ethnic Poles were the largest group with a sizeable Jewish and Russian minority also represented.[52]

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49 R. Wittram, Geschichte der Baltischen Deutschen, Stuttgart, 1939, pp. 166-76.

50 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5, 19 & 21.

51 ibid, vol. 5.

52 ibid, vol. 19.

Table 11

The Number of Latvian speakers living in Urban Centres within the Latvian Region, 1897 [53]

Urban centre	total population	Number of Latvian speakers	% Latvians to total population
Kurlandskaya			
Libava (Libau)	64,489	24,918	38.6
Mitava (Mitau)	35,131	16,053	45.7
Goldingen	9,720	4,934	50.8
Tukkum	7,555	3,940	52.2
Vindava (Windau)	7,127	4,131	58.0
Bausk	6,544	2,987	45.6
Jakobstadt	5,829	1,883	32.3
Friedrichstadt	5,175	1,469	29.0
Talsen	4,200	2,088	49.7
Illukst	3,652	360	9.9
Gazenpot	3,340	1,580	47.3
Grobin	1,490	813	54.6
Liflandskaya			
Riga	282,230	127,046	45.0
Valk (Walk)	10,992	4,451	40.4
Venden (Wenden)	6,356	4,164	65.5
Volmar (Wolmar)	5,050	3,862	76.5
Shlok (schlock)	2,114	1,680	79.5
Vitebskaya			
Dvinsk	69,695	1,274	1.8
Rezhitsa	10,795	828	7.7
Liutsin	5,140	237	4.6

53 ibid

Within the rural areas of the Latvian region, the ethnic Latvian speaker, native to his uyezd of residence was the predominant characteristic of the rural population structure. The only exception to this was Illukstskii uyezd which had a large number of Russians and Poles in its rural population.[54] Even although migration in the west-central region was to local towns and was basically an ethno-linguistic Latvian movement, the vast majority of the rural population was still composed of the Latvian peasantry. With the exception of the Latgalian uyezdy and Illukstskii, well over 90 percent of the rural population were ethnic Latvian speakers in 1897.[55]

The consequence of the accelerated growth of the towns indicated not only a shift in the distribution of power from the landlords to an industrial-urban one but also it resulted in the appearance of entirely new groupings and roles for the newly constituted urban inhabitants. The peasant population moving into the larger towns became socially stratified some entering the professional classes, the vast majority becoming the industrial labour force of the cities. Thus movement into the city made possible the social mobility of a larger number of the population, a vital component of the modernisation process.

In the first half of the nineteenth century wherever such a rural to urban movement of the ethnic Latvian speaking population had occurred and where social mobility was possible, it had resulted in a change from rural peasant to an urban-commercial culture and language. The Latvian peasant moving to the towns in Western Latvia had become "Germanised" accepting the customs, values and way of life of the Baltic Germans. Social mobility into, for example, the professions meant abandoning the Latvian tongue and accepting the language and culture of the ruling urban group. With the process of modernisation and the sheer physical pre-

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54 ibid, vol. 5.

55 ibid, vol. 5, 19, 21.

dominance of ethnic Latvians within the urban areas coupled with their social mobility, a greater acceptance of the Latvian language and culture developed as the German predominance was undermined.[56] Industrialisation was thus contrary to the towns remaining overwhelmingly German.

With greater social mobility arose an enlightened middle class of peasant origin, a necessary precondition for the integration of the nation. This élite played the role of innovators highlighting salient characteristics, either real or imagined, which they perceived as giving the Latvian group a raison d'être. They emerged as the directing force of nationalism even although they themselves were the product of the modernisation process which made possible such a development.

The modernisation process gave the peasant migrants an urban environment which was alien to them. They had thus to re-orientate themselves into new roles, values and aspirations redirecting and channeling their primordial loyalties into a modernised environment.

> "If widespread and basic social disorganisation and reorganisation constituted the major need and opportunity systems to which nationalism was a response ... then urban centres were the primary arenas in which these needs, opportunities and responses encountered and magnified each other."[57]

The larger towns therefore became the vortex of social and economic change. Within the urban milieu, dislocation from the social structure and previous localism characteristic of the traditional areas was maximised as were the cumulative impact of occupational and educational change, the influence of new forms of information flows and the constant interaction of insecurity, conflict and competition.

Greater social mobility enhanced the communicative process within the region. Usually a product of the modernisation process, the Latvian

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56 This point is examined in more detail in the following section.

57 J.A. Fishman, 1972, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

and Estonian peasantry had reached a high degree of literacy before the advent of industrialisation and related socio-economic change. This was in contrast to most other East European and Russian peasantry of the time.

There is little doubt that the Lutheran religion in the region had a specific causal link with the high literacy amongst its adherents. The Reformation and its effects had important bearings on literacy as a form of communication amongst the indigenous peasantry. One of the major points of the Lutheran faith was that preaching should be in the mother tongue, the logic behind this policy being that this was the only way to make the gospel understood by the people themselves. It was thus the effects of the Reformation that made the Latvian tongue a literary language and the peasantry therefore being given the facility to become literate in their own vernacular.[58] By the end of the eighteenth century over sixty percent of all ethnic Latvians living within the region were recorded as being literate.[59]

The various reform laws of 1817-19 provided for the founding of elementary schools in rural areas of the region. These schools were to be appointed by the members of that community although their teachers were still chosen by the local Baltic landlord. However, due to financial limitations, the majority of communities could not afford such institutions.

The 1897 census records that on average, between 70 to 80 percent of ethnic Latvians were literate. There were, however, regional variations. Where the ethnic Latvian speakers predominated, the 1897

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58 An example of this attitude is illustrated by a Protestant sect, the Moravian Brethren (or Herrnhüter) who appeared in Southern Liflandskaya in 1732 believing in the full equality of all members of the parish. They believed that this equality could only be achieved through compulsary education.

59 A. Bilmanis, A History of Latvia, Washington DC, 1951, p. 237.

census records a high literacy rate. Thus in Valmierskii uyezd where 93.4 percent of the population were Latvian speakers, there was a total literacy rate of 80.3 percent in that administrative unit. In neighbouring Viendenskii with a similar ethnic composition, there was also a high literacy rate.[60] In the remaining uyezdy of western-central Latvia there is a similar although not quite so marked correlation (figs 9, 10 & 11).

The lower figures of literacy in Eastern Latvia (the Latgalian uyezdy and Illukstskii) are the result of two main factors. Firstly, like the Baltic German community, Protestantism did not penetrate into the region's interior. Eastern Latvia's differing history and past administrations gave the area Catholicism, a direct result of Polish rule and the continuation of the Polish landlord in the area. Thus the ethnic Latvian speaking peasantry, like the rest of its social group adopted the Catholic religion. Secondly, this area, with its more ethnically heterogeneous population also reflects varying religious groups which on the whole are synonymous with a particular ethno-linguistic community. The Russians, a relatively recent arrival in the area were more or less all either Orthodox or Old Believers while the Poles, Latvians, and Lithuanians were Catholic. The Jewish community had their own religion. In contrast to the Lutheran religion, there was not the same concern or facility for education and peasant literacy.

One would have expected that by the time of the 1897 census the socio-economic changes affecting the region would be reflected in literacy rates. Although there is little doubt that modernisation aided literacy, the rural areas that record high percentages of Latvian speakers and those practising the Protestant religion have higher literacy rates than their urban counterparts in language, ethnicity and religious terms.

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60 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, 1897-1904, op.cit., col. 21.



Fig. 9: The Latvian Region Percentage Literate; 1897



Fig:10 The Latvian Region: Percentage Native Latvian Speakers; 1897


Fig. 11 The Latvian Region : Percentage Protestant: 1897
Dvinsk
Wolmar
RIGA
Mitau
Windau
Libau
Boundaries
gubernia
uyezd
0
100 kms
percentage Protestant in each uyezd
over 80
60 - 80
less than 20

Usually one would expect to find higher literacy rates in urban areas compared to the countryside in the earlier stages of modernisation as the facility to communicate through the written word is made easier and more accessible to urban inhabitants.

Within this context, Latgalia suffered in a dual sense. Its non-Protestant influence and slowness to modernise compared with the western region meant that literacy contributed to continuing and even enhancing the gulf between the west and east in socio-economic terms.

Literacy amongst the ethnic Latvian speakers thus made communication possible and could incorporate a wider areal circulation of ideas and information which was not feasible by simple oral means. Information flow was conducted by means of the Latvian language thereby enabling the rural peasantry to communicate in their native tongue. The very fact that all communication was channeled into a specific vernacular enhanced the definition and further integration of the Latvian national group helping to divorce it from other forms of language communication. It also defined the spatial extent in which communication could effectively take place. This gave a regional homogeneity to the Latvian language which corresponded with the spatial distribution of ethnic Latvians and in turn to a defined piece of territory.

Modernisation thus resulted and was part of the spatial re-organisation of the region enhancing communication and mobility and the geographical proximity with any two locations within the region.

The emergence of a hierarchy of central places implied some degree of spatial inter-dependency with the macro-economic area competing with the micro-traditional-localized economies. Economic inter-dependency helped integrate urban space with traditional rural space and the result was interaction on a wider geographical scale which was previously impossible. There emerged a twin structure and functional

interaction of developing space with economic interaction penetrating the traditional (peasant) society by an urban-industrial way of life. Related to this modernisation and traditional milieu were characteristics of each. However, this does not necessarily imply that each were spatially unique and that there was not, for example, some innovation within more traditional geographical areas.

> "Progress and tradition may dwell in close spatial proximity by simply fastening on different human groups and economic activities that exist side by side."[61]

The transformation of the socio-economic structure of the region both caused and resulted from population re-distribution and change. With these spatial changes the larger towns developed wider and more advanced institutions such as educational estalishments, newspapers, services, etc. They acted as centres of innovation disseminating functions and information to the rural areas. Riga, with its larger population and related diversity of functions and institutions evolved as the core area of the region and the primate city, par excellence.

By its very process, modernisation created social and spatial inequalities. It enhanced the rift between East and West Latvia, ameliorated the social cleavages between various ethnic groups and created greater social inequalities within the Latvian ethno-linguistic community. Yet it was only within the framework of modernisation that the Latvian nation became a social entity with regional and class differences within the group coming secondary to identification with the national group.

From examining the chronological development of the nation, it is obvious that a parallel development can be drawn between the formation of the Latvian nation and the transition from a traditional to a

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61 A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, 1958, p. 184.

modernising society. Both processes are a product of the nineteenth century. As the socio-economic and spatial structure of the Latvian political region changes, so does the nation develop. It is this causal inter-relationship that sets the context for the integration of the group. All the other identifiable factors contributing to the formation of the Latvian nation are either directly or indirectly related to this multi-dimensional process of modernisation of the region.

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2.2 The Formation of the National Group

The increasing numerical predominance of the ethno-linguistic Latvian community within the Latvian political region throughout the nineteenth century and their contiguous distribution played an important role in the formation of the nation and the survival of a unique grouping even before the arousal of their national identity.

In 1897 ethnic Latvian speakers were concentrated in seventeen uyezdy which were contiguous and consisted of the defined Latvian political region. In each of these uyezdy, the native Latvian speakers constituted the largest ethnic and language group. It was only in Illukstskii and Dvinskii uyezdy that Latvian speakers comprised less than fifty percent of the total population. Elsewhere, the average was between seventy to eighty percent of the uyezd total,[62] (fig. 10).

In areas contiguous to this region, no significant number of Latvian speakers were found. The largest geographical concentration of Latvian speakers were located in the neighbouring ethno-linguistically dominated Estonian uyezd of Veroskii in Northern Liflandskaya. Here 3,000 Latvians lived mainly in rural communities strung along the Veroskii-Valkskii border.[63] Thus of the 112,322 Latvian speakers residing outwith the Latvian region, the vast majority were scattered throughout the Tsarist Empire on the whole far removed from the Latvian geographical nucleus of the Latvian region.[64] The majority of ethnic Latvian speakers were therefore confined to a specific and well-defined ethno-linguistic area in which they numerically predominated.

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62 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5, 19, 21.

63 ibid, vol. 21.

64 Of the 112,322 Latvian speakers living outwith the Latvian region, 87.6 percent resided in European Russia of which there were substantial Latvian communities in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 6 percent in Siberia, 4.5 percent in Poland, and the remaining 1.9 percent in Asiatic Russia. Latvian speakers emigrating abroad was insignificant until the 1900's. ibid.

By the turn of the nineteenth century the ethno-linguistic composition of the Latvian region comprised a large number of communities, one of the most striking features being that nearly seventy percent of the population spoke the Latvian language and could be identified as of ethnic Latvian origin. This was despite the fact that a Latvian national consciousness did not emerge until the latter quarter of the century and that the majority of Latvians were peasants who did not have political control over determining their language and culture. It would therefore appear that although there was not an awareness amongst ethnic Latvian speakers of a Latvian nation in the early nineteenth century that the numerical significance of this community along with other social and geographical factors contributed to the preservation of their group characteristics (e.g. language, ethnicity, culture, social background) making assimilation or even integration into a German or Russian national grouping unlikely. Size and geographical proximity within a specific area helped the continuance of such a community within the earlier period indirectly determining the relationships within the group, with the Baltic Germans and other minorities, and with the state authorities.

Table 12

Ethno-linguistic Composition of the Latvian Region, 1897[65]

	NUMBER	PERCENT
Latvians	1,318,112	68.3
Baltic Germans	120,191	6.2
Russians	232,204	12.0
Poles	65,056	3.4
Jews	142,315	7.4
Lithuanians	26,033	1.4
Estonians	17,990	0.9
others	7,486	0.4
Total	1,929,387	

65 ibid, vol. 5, 19, & 21.

In the western parts of the region before the advent of large scale modernisation, the peasantry were the ethno-linguistic Latvians. Feudalism rigidly divided the Baltic Germans as the landowning and urban-merchant classes from the rest of the rural community. Such were the ethnic differences and socio-economic structure of the region that integration and assimilation did not take place between these groups. Thus similarities in the community attributes of the Latvians can be identified before modernisation and nationalism, their uniqueness being a product of restriction to membership of one social class.

Within western urban Latvia, the major institutions, local government and economic and social activities had through the years become "Germanised". The favourable relationship the German Ritterschaften enjoyed with the Tsarist court and medieval privileges which had been bestowed upon them secured their hegemony over the Baltikum. They were content to remain an integral part of the Empire as long as their landowning class would continue to obtain income from their large estates and their merchants the monopoly over urban trade. Their political and cultural autonomy could only be retained by preventing the total destruction of the feudal order and their traditional institutions. By preventing radical socio-economic change, they attempted to discourage the peasantry from becoming socially mobile and as a conscious decision discouraged them as a group from adopting the German language and culture.

By wielding administrative and political power over their territorial ambit, the Baltic Germans through the Landtag and Board of Provincial Councillors in all three Baltic gubernii (Estlandskaya, Kurlandskaya and Liflandskaya) could to a large degree regulate the social and spatial movement of the peasantry, keeping the latter group aloof from themselves in language, ethnicity and social class without much interference from the Tsarist government. Even the Governor General, appointed for each of the three gubernii by St. Petersburg was nearly

always a post given to a member of the Ritterschaften.[66]

> "The so-called Russian Baltic provinces were thus quite non-Russian republics of the nobility."[67]

Although Baltic German hegemony over the Latvian peasantry relied on the existence of feudalism, they nevertheless encouraged the preservation and fostering of the Latvian language, culture and ethnic uniqueness, a policy which eventually led the Latvians to asserting themselves both culturally and politically and questioning the position of the ruling national group.

This policy of encouraging the development of the Latvian language and culture was influenced by the German conception of the nation as put forward by the Romantics. This movement not only eventually guided the Latvians into a sense of awareness of some of their group attributes but also helped define the relationship between the Baltic Germans and the Latvian peasantry and the former's attitude toward the latter's culture, language and economic backwardness.

The Baltic Germans were influenced by the importance of various aspects of a cultural past in determining the existence of a nation. They supported cultural autonomy and the principle of provincial and local government within the framework of the Empire. Neither were they for the annexation of their political community with Prussia or for the political independence of a Baltic German dominated Livonian state. A combination of the influences of rationalism and Lutheranism, the guiding influences of the Romantics, also contributed to determining the Baltic Germans' relationship to the indigenous peasantry and the latter's early development as a national group.

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66 Of the 15 Liflandskaya governors between 1790-1885, only one was not German while in Kurlandskaya in the 1795-1882 period, ten of the twelve were also German. A. Švābe, Latvijas tiesību vēsture (The History of Law in Latvia), Riga, 1932.

67 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 217.

From 1764 until 1769 Herder had lived and travelled around Liflandskaya. He wrote that he was particularly impressed by the feudal structure in the area particularly with regard to the peasant community organisation of society and the cultural and political autonomy exercised by the Ritterschaften. To him the organisation of society in the Baltikum contrasted markedly and more favourably with the centralised absolutism and bureaucracy which existed in his native Prussia. His beliefs were primarily based on communal products which he saw as the best illustration of the Volksgeist ('The Nation's spirit'). To Herder, the indigenous Latvian peasantry were a source of unspoiled spontaneity as expressed in their similar language, culture and especially folklore.[68] The Latvian language represented the heart of this 'nation':

> "The best culture of a people cannot be expressed through a foreign language; it thrives on the soil of a nation most beautifully and, I may say, it thrives only by means of the nation's inherited and inheritable dialect."[69]

The Baltic Germans adopted not only a policy of tolerance toward the Latvian peasantry but also helped foster and preserve the latter's cultural traditions and language. The more enlightened Baltic Germans viewed that to destroy a nation through assimilation or integration was sacrilege, that one language should be equal to another and that poetry was the original language of mankind. Thus a combination of the influence of the Reformation, the ideas of the Romantic School and the socio-economic position of this group determined the Baltic Germans' attitude toward the Latvian peasantry.

Throughout the latter quarter of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of Baltic Germans began to take a constructive interest in the Latvian language and culture. Their rather

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68 K. Stavenhagen, Herder in Riga, Riga, 1925.

69 J.G. Herder, Erster Brief zur Beforderung der Humanitat, Riga, 1793, as cited in C. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, New York, 1926, pp.53-54.

patronising attitude toward the Latvian peasantry was based on the socio-economic differences between the two communities. They viewed peasant language and folklore as suitable for research and an adequate vehicle for the needs of the peasantry but not for a highly civilised peoples. Thus although the Latvian peasants were idealised and romanticised by German intellectuals they were still generally regarded with disdain by Baltic German society as a whole. The peasant was seen as a creature apart, der dumme Bauer, which although viewed as having linguistic and cultural attributes did not constitute or could in the future become a nation. To argue that there was a Latvian nation would have contributed to destroying the powerful position of the Baltic German community in the area.

> "They, (Baltic Germans), attempted to plant firmly the notion that it was the natural destiny of the Latvians to continue to be a class of peasants but not to become a nation."[70]

In 1819 a conference held by a number of Baltic German nobles and clergy set up an organisation to foster interest in the Latvian culture and language. This organisation, Kurländische Gesellschaft für Literatur und Kunst (The Literary and Artistic Society of Kurland) and a later organisation, the Lettisch-literärische Gesellschaft (The Lettish Literary Society), established in 1824, put forward the need for a rational approach in interpreting the language, culture and folklore of the peasantry.[71] The earlier conference debated the importance of allowing the Latvian peasantry to develop their own culture and language and not 'Germanise' them as this, they felt, would impoverish rather than enrich

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70 A. Bilmanis, The Baltic States - Baltic Essays, Washington DC, 1945 p. 99.

71 J. von Hehn, 'Die lettisch-literärische Gesellschaft und das Lettentum', Osteuropa, 1938; W. Schlau, 'Die Kurländische Gesellschaft für Literatur und Kunst und das Kurlandische Provinzialmuseum zu Mitau', Baltische Hefte, vol. 14, 1968, pp. 5-107.

these indigenous peoples. They also felt that by keeping the two cultures apart they were preserving the Baltic German community in the region.[72]

Besides the Baltic German learned societies, a German sponsored newspaper, Latviešu Avīzes (The Latvian Newspaper) was also established in 1821 with the object of promoting the Latvian language and literacy amongst the peasantry. There followed a number of other German financed newspapers in the Latvian language including Tas Latviešu Laužu Draugs (The Latvian People's Friend), in 1832 and Mājas Viesis (House guest) with a similar object to that of Latviešu Avīzes.

It is therefore evident that the Baltic Germans had political motives for keeping themselves apart from the Latvian peasantry and preventing the latter's assimilation into the former's culture and language. The very existence of the Lithuanian gubernii between Prussia and the western area of the Latvian political region emphasised the non-contiguity of German cultural and linguistic space. The Baltic Germans therefore constituted a minority in the total population of the region. Numerically this community was also declining due to a rapidly falling birth rate. Influenced by the process of modernisation, this group became numerically less significant as the nineteenth century progressed and gradually they became threatened by extinction. They had to preserve their existence by rigidly sticking to the economic and social barriers between themselves and the numerically predominant Latvian and Estonian peasantry. One therefore cannot accept Hans Rothfels' over-simplification that:

"...with the Baltic Germans, nationality was a spiritual and

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72 Schlau, ibid, pp. 38-43 puts forward evidence that the 1819 conference was not united in their policy toward preserving a Latvian cultural identity. There was, for example, a large group in favour of dragooning Latvian speakers into accepting the language and culture of their feudal lords.

cultural rather than a political and logical fact."[73]

This policy of the Baltic Germans toward the peasantry encouraged the latter to develop their own cultural and linguistic forms of expression. It further enhanced the more linguistically and culturally aware Latvians into a realisation of their distinctiveness as a community and started a new kind of self-esteem for these indigenous peoples. This gave the emerging socially mobile sector of ethnic Latvian speakers a sense of awareness of their past giving them a reason for rejecting 'Germanisation' which in the past had been synonymous with social mobility and urban immigration. Valdemārs, for example, suggested that the rate of Germanisation by these Latvian speakers rejecting their language and speaking only German was in the 1820's, two thousand annually while by the 1860's the yearly figure had reached five thousand.[74] Considering the steady increase in social and spatial mobility amongst a large percentage of ethnic Latvians, Valdemārs' figures signify that very little assimilation was taking place as the years progressed. Social mobility and German linguistic and cultural assimilation were now not synonymous as the emerging indigenous middle class began to take a greater interest in developing their own national group attributes.

Social and spatial interaction between the second largest ethnic group, the Russians, was limited in potential to two main areas; the Eastern Latvian uyezdy of Liutsinskii, Rezhintskii, Dvinskii and Illukstskii, and Riga city. The Belorussian community had a similar

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73 H. Rothfels, 'The Baltic Provinces: Some Historic Aspects and Perspectives', Journal of Central European Affairs, July 1944, pp. 117-146, p. 128.

74 A. Vics, 'Ne Leģenda bet patiesība par Krišjāni Valdemāru' (The Truth and not the Legends about Krisjan Valdemārs), Izglītības Ministrijas Mēnešraksts, (Ministry of Education Monthly), vol.2, nr. 11, p. 455; as cited in A. Plakans, The National Awakening in Latvia, 1850-1900, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard 1969.

distribution (table 13). In Eastern Latvia the Russian community was a relatively recent phenomena. The Tsarist Demographer, Mikhail Lebedkin, using parish registers to compile data on ethnic, linguistic and religious groups found only 421 Russians in the three Latgalian uyezdy in 1861.[75] He also estimates there there were 39,989 Belorussians in this area. Thus ethnic Russians in this eastern region are a product of the 1880's and 1890's and numerically could not have had an impact in assimilating Latvians into their ethno-linguistic and cultural group until the turn of the century.

Table 13

Main Geographical Concentrations of Russians* in the Latvian Region, 1897[76]

area	No. of Russians	% of local area	% of total Russian Population
Latgalia	144,675	29.0	62.4
uyezd: Liutsinskii	35,490	27.7	15.3
Rezhintskii	40,065	29.4	17.3
Dvinskii	69,120	29.0	29.8
Illukstskii uyezd	21,625	32.5	9.3
Riga City	45,452	16.0	19.6
other areas	20,452	-	8.7
total Russian	232,204	12.0	100.0

(* Data also includes a sizeable Belorussian and small Ukrainian community)

It was only in Riga that a sizeable Russian community had become well established: an ethnic group composed of a large number of

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75 M. Lebedkin, '0 plemennom sostave narodonaseleniya Zapadnogo Kraya Rossiyskoy Imperii', Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva, St. Petersburg, 1861, pp. 131-160 as cited in K. Pakstas, 'Earliest Statistics of Nationalities and Religions in the Territories of Old Lithuania, 1861', Commentationes Balticae, vol. 4/5, 1956/7, pp. 169-211.

76 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., St. Petersburg, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5, 19, 21.

administrators and merchants. In 1867 there were 25,647 Russians (including Belorussians and Ukrainians) living in Riga.[77] The Russian community in the city tended to live in specific geographical communities not usually coming into contact with the new Latvian urban working class until the latter quarter of the nineteenth century.

The ethno-linguistic Latvians of Latgalia, numbering some 137,255 or 53 percent of the total population in 1861, constituted the bulk of the peasantry even although there were sizeable Belorussian and Polish communities.[78] In the same year Lebedkin estimated that there were only 48 Lithuanians in the area.[79] The Polish-Russian dominated feudal system neither encouraged nor discouraged the peasantry to develop their own languages and culture, the Poles only giving the ethnic Latvians the Roman Catholic faith. It was the settlement pattern of the area, the mir which tended to augment the continuation of such Latvian primordial characteristics as their language, folklore and culture. Unlike the rest of the region, social mobility amongst the Latvians in the mid-nineteenth century was more or less non-existent. The various peasant communities remained exclusively ethnic enclaves with little integration outside their own ethno-linguistic milieu.

The other major ethnic group, the Jews, tended to live in the larger cities of the western region, in Riga, Libau and Mitau, and in Latgalia. The large percentage of Jews in this eastern area, some 45 percent of the total ethnic community,[80] was due to immigration during the period of Polish domination when a number of periodic restrictions were

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77 E. Dunsdorfs, 1938, op.cit., pp. 156-60.

78 K. Pakstas, op.cit., pp. 169-211. According to P. Semenov (editor), 1863-1885, op.cit., p. 475, there were 139,028 Latvians in Vitebskaya guberniya.

79 ibid

80 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., St. Petersburg, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5, 19, 21.

imposed in Kurland and Riga limiting Jewish residency. This tightly-knit ethno-linguistic and religious group, a large number constituting the merchant class, rarely interacted with the Latvian peasantry, with inter-marriage non-existent.

The Latvian national group was thus partly defined on the basis of ethnic, linguistic and cultural criteria and in their socio-economic position within society. Although a framework of positive factors can be identified in the early nineteenth century, it would be wrong to infer from homogeneous criteria alone. This is due to three main reasons.

Firstly, the nation did not exist in the early nineteenth century and therefore although there were similarities, they did not result at this time in integration. Secondly, the process of modernisation resulted and was part of the differentiation of these early identifiable homogeneous factors through, for example, social stratification, differing literacy rates, urban and rural dwellers, etc. As modernisation develops, homogeneity becomes less of a feasible definition in identifying integrative criteria. It also illustrates that absolute homogeneity is an absurd and meaningless concept. Thirdly, although an ethnic Latvian peasant spoke the Latvian language as defined by the majority of surveys and the 1897 census, it does not mean that he would regard himself a member of a nation and identify positively with this group before integration took place.

Even the most enlightened Latvian middle class could not envisage a Latvian nation. To the more socially-aware Latvians they recognised only the linguistic and cultural differences between themselves and other groupings. Although in the 1860's a number of ethnic Latvian speakers in the cities decided to identify themselves as 'Latvians' the meaning of the term was vague and far from clear in their own minds. Their desperate and somewhat impossible task of attempting to familiarise rural Latvians with that concept testifies to the weakness and insecurity at this point in time and the lack of awareness of what a 'Latvian national identity' was.

The newly-established middle class of ethnic Latvian speakers were influenced by the Romantic movements' notion of the nation and accordingly began to search for a cultural, linguistic and historical basis for their peoples. By so doing, they promoted a framework from which the socio-economic and political circumstances in the region would eventually contribute to the integration of the nation and manifest itself in a Latvian political nationalism. This awareness came to the fore in the search for a common Latvian history, culture and ethno-linguistic uniqueness.

The ethnic Latvians had been regarded as a 'people without history' mainly because their past had either been rarely documented or when it had was written by Baltic Germans or 'foreigners'. The discovery and use of a common history constituted one of the most fundamental goals of the Latvians in their search for an identity. The Latvian middle class attempted to meet the cultural needs of authenticity searching for either a real or perceived past through common historical experiences, myths of origins, thus making a case for their peoples having a territorial link throughout history with a particular area.

They constructed their own past highlighting a common ethnographic basis and their continued subjection to foreign rule. The importance of a rich cultural heritage was stressed. Before the development of a literary language, an oral tradition of vernacular had existed and expressed in folksongs, the dainas, which played an important function before national awakening. These dainas along with folklore and ancient rituals and customs were collected and collated by the intelligentsia and recorded within the framework of the native language.

The Latvian middle class viewed the ethnic Latvian speaking peasantry as the source and central focus of their history and culture which would eventually give the nation an authenticity. The peasantry were seen as unique and unspoiled by the progress of modernisation mainly due to their isolation from foreign and alien influences as compared with their newly

constituted urban counterparts. The rural peasantry had, through apathy and local traditions, preserved their past as opposed to other social and ethnic groups within the region.

The process of modernisation can both transform traditional societies and also can contribute to the peasant and his primordial loyalties either being changed into a modern form of national identification or it can destroy nationalism in the first instance. As the Latvian, E. Blanks pointed out, the focus of attention in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the Latvian middle class was that the Latvian peasantry were the central object of study and that they would constitute the nucleus of any Latvian nation or independent state.[81] Thus by re-discovering the history of the peasantry it was felt that the historical characteristics of the nation would emerge and that this would serve as giving the national group, the tauta, a raison d'être through history.

> "The ideology of nationalism is anti-urban only in that it locates the origins of broader unity and authenticity in the pre-urban past ... it (nationalism) then seeks to make the values, beliefs and behaviours stemming from this source available to, acceptable to and incumbent upon those living in modern urban settings."[82]

It can be further argued that various kinds of traditionalism seek to return to a preservation of the genuine and real past while nationalism seeks to:

> "...render the present a rational continuation of the past."[83]

By so doing the Latvian middle class sought to identify those characteristics of their peoples past which gave them as a group a common historical background and use this past as important images to give their

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81 E. Blanks, Latviešu Tautas Atmoda (The Latvian National Awakening), Riga, 1927.

82 J.A. Fishman, 1972, op.cit., p. 20.

83 M. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation, New York, 1956.

nation a uniqueness. Peoples with a common historical past can therefore have a mutual interest which they thought could be extended into the future.

It was apparent to the Latvian urban intelligentsia that although they had a common historical background with the rural peasantry that the process of modernisation had produced a dichotomy within the ethnic Latvian population between a rural peasantry and an urban Latvian population whose interests and demands differed from each other and within their respective geographical and social settings. As early as the 1870's Kronvalds pointed out that the Latvian peoples were a product of the changing socio-economic climate of the region and therefore could not, in themselves, determine the outcome of this process.[84] It was apparent that the very characteristics the early nationalists sought in providing an identity and uniqueness for a Latvian nation were being destroyed by modernisation of which the Latvian nation was a product. Not only was modernisation liquidating this traditionalism but also changing the values and demands of the ethnic Latvian peoples at different stages in their economic development. Thus the rural peasantry could identify better with the authentification of the past customs and traditions than could the newly established Latvian intelligentsia.

Latvian writers, Blanks, Arnis and Bandrevics claimed that the culture of the peasantry became that of the Latvian nation.[85] This could not have been the case. With the impact of modernisation the Latvian culture took on a different and more modern form of expression. It appears that these writers were trying to suggest that the peasantry were the nationalists. Instead everything that was characteristic of the rural

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84 A. Kronvalds, Nationale Bestrebungen, Riga 1872 as cited in A. Plakans, 1969, op.cit.

85 E. Blanks, 1927, op.cit., E. Arnis, Latvju Tautas politiskā atmoda, (The Political Awakening of the Latvian Nation), Riga, 1934; A. Bandrevics, Notikumi latviešu atmošanās laikmetā (Events of the Latvian National Awakening), Riga, 1931.

peasantry (feudal, primordial, deferential, tradition bound, etc.) evolved into a different type of Latvian (urban, industrial, educated, differing values and customs, etc.). Blanks was therefore trying to over emphasise the existence and continuity of the Latvian culture through time instead of suggesting that it and the vehicle of nationalism, the middle class, were a product of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The middle class thus changed and redirected the culture and other characteristics of the peasantry. The urban intelligentsia had to create a more sophisticated literary language which hitherto could not express objects, events and concepts which a more technologically orientated environment demanded.[86] The modern late nineteenth century culture of the Latvians was therefore an intellectual culture which was not a product of the Latvian peasantry. The importance of a past language and culture in the communicative process was negated due to the differing socio-economic demands made upon the Latvians in their various social and geographical milieux. Even although the Latvian peasant and his traditional way of life was viewed as a hindrance toward national group formation, the middle class still used them as the central focus of concern and expression of the tauta.

The Latvian middle class also became aware that their culture and traditions were in threat of erosion due to the socio-economic changes and the character of the Baltic German and Tsarist state machinery. They attempted to put forward demands as a threatened peoples unable to express themselves in their own language and culture through the various institutions in the region making out a case that their existence was continually being questioned due to the nature of the social and political structure and economic pressures affecting their territory.

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86 The Latvian nationalist newspaper of the 1860's, Petersburgas Avizes (The St. Petersburg Newspaper) devoted a page to introducing new words into the Latvian vocabulary.

They saw a threat to their existence in the assimilation of their culture and language into that of the German and Russian ruling élites. Although figures on the assimilation of ethnic Latvian speakers becoming 'Germanised' indicates that this process was not affecting many socially mobile Latvians by the latter half of the nineteenth century,[87] the Latvian nationalists saw in the German monopoly of the Baltikum's institutions and in their linguistic control of the upper echelons of society, a sense of grievance. The Kārklu vācieši ('osier' or 'willowy' Germans), i.e. those Latvian speakers who copied German language and customs were widely criticised by the Latvian nationalists. It was in the urban areas that the newly constituted socially mobile Latvians were susceptible to the identification and acceptance of the Germans. As Kohl had observed from personal experience in Mitau in the 1830's:

> "The lower classes ... are almost all Letts. And those who raise themselves from their lower station by the help of their masters are so Germanized that a stranger would hardly know them from Germans."[88]

Because of their social and spatial proximity to the Baltic German middle class many continued to find an identification with them and copy their group attributes rather than with their peasant past or the contemporary urban industrial workers or rural peasantry. Their socio-economic similarities with the German middle class thus gave them an identity with that particular social grouping and not with their ethnic Latvian speaking peasant background or contemporaries.

One of the earliest groups to organise themselves and recognise the existence of not only the characteristics of the tauta as based on Herder's concept of the Volk but also to put forward specific demands for the nation in general was the Young Latvian Movement. This organisation

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87 See the evidence on the assimilation of Latvians into the German middle class from Valdemārs on page 149.

88 J.G. Kohl, 1842, op.cit., p. 320.

was founded in the 1860's by a number of Latvian urban intellectuals centring their activities around the first Latvian sponsored newspaper Petersburgas Avizes (The St. Petersburg Newspaper).[89] They defined their membership as:

> "He who, knowing German, wanted to speak Latvian to others versed in both, was a Young Latvian; he who said that a Latvian must know more than just enough to guide a plough or cultivator, was a Young Latvian; he who said that Latvians must acquire a consciousness of his nationality rather than identify himself with some labouring class was a Young Latvian."[90]

This group called for a greater useage of the Latvian language in the region's institutions (schools, courts, universities, etc.). As a political movement its prime aim was to counteract and publicise the socio-economic oppression practised by the Baltic Germans against both urban and rural Latvians. The Young Latvians called for an end to the privileges of the Ritterschaften and the introduction of some form of radical peasant self-government in local areas.

This organisation was therefore one of the first attempts to form a movement with the common purpose of promoting the nation not only on the basis of ethnic uniqueness, territory, language and culture but also on social background. They attempted to come to grips with the contemporary socio-economic problems commonly facing all Latvians. To this end, Baltic German supremacy in both the rural and newly constituted urban environment became a convenient focus of grievance. The Young Latvians also attempted to upgrade the perceptions by other ethnic groups of their people by endevouring to sever the link between what the Baltic Germans regarded as the synonymity between what was 'Latvian' and what pertained to the 'peasant' and that the attributes of the Latvians, such as their

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89 K.Ya. Strazdin, et.al., Istoriya Latviyskoi SSR, Riga, 1954, vol. 2, p. 211.

90 K. Matiss, Atminas no tautiska laikmeta (Recollections from the Nationalist Era), as cited in A. Švābe, 1958, op.cit., p. 366.

language, was nothing more than a peasant attribute.

An inter-relationship between the cultural and linguistic uniqueness of the ethnic Latvian speakers and their position within the region's society began to mould and determine not only the direction in which the nation was developing but also enhanced the community of interest amongst the Latvians furthering their integration through knowledge of a perceived common past and present.

The very presence of the Baltic Germans in the western parts of the region and the domineering socio-economic and political position they held over the bulk of the Latvian peoples directly and indirectly contributed to fostering an economic and social grievance on national lines with which the socially stratified Latvians of this area could commonly identify.

> "To the land-hungry Latvian or Estonian of the rural areas ... the German noble was an object of as much envy and distaste as the German capitalist was to the peasant's cousin in the city. Social greivances and tensions were the same as in the rest of Russia, but the opposing classes were separated and distinguished by a national difference which facilitated propaganda."[91]

Garlieb Merkel's colourful account of The Conditions of the Latvian Serfs in Livonia, published in German in 1796 and from 1802 translated into Latvian, outlined the relationship between the Ritterschaften and the Latvian peasantry and the former's inhumanity to the indigenous population.[92] He had called for the Baltic Germans to give the Latvians

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91 C.L. Lundin, 'From Tsar to Kaiser: Changing Loyalties of the Baltic Germans, 1905-14', Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. 10, 1950, p. 231.

92 G. Merkel, Die Letten, vorzüglich in Liefland am Ende des philosophischen Jahrhunderts, Leipzig, 1796; as cited in the basis of an article by E.W. Jennison, 'Christian Garve and Garlieb Merkel: Two Theorists of Peasant Emancipation During the Ages of Enlightenment and Revolution', Journal of Baltic Studies, vol.4, nr.3, pp. 344-363.

concessions with regard to land, stressing the national hatred the Latvian serfs had for their masters. He went on to point out that in his opinion it was inevitable that the rise of the Latvian nation would come about, particularly since the annexation of Courland to the Russian Empire. He felt that this reaction by the Latvians to the Baltic Germans would be fueled by both a class and national hatred.

Merkel's account of late eighteenth century Livonia provided the nationally and socially aware Latvians with evidence of a continued hatred for Baltic Germans seeing their domination of the Latvian peoples as 'un-natural' and their monopoly of land, commerce, industrial activity and urban institutions as preventing the development of a Latvian nation and as the causation of the hardships in which they found themselves.

Bowman suggests that the main cause in the upsurge of Latvian nationalism was in fact based on this exploitation by the Baltic Germans:

> "Their (Estonians' and Latvians') claims spring from the desire of the mass of the people to avoid that exploitation which has been their lot for centuries."[93]

Thus for each social group that had developed within the socially stratified ethnic Latvian speaking community, the nation and its political nationalist movement became a useful weapon which could be directed against the principle obstacle to the ambitions of all of them - the Baltic Germans.

In the rural areas, the landless peasantry and agricultural labourers saw in German hegemony the cause of their poverty. The small class of peasant smallholders resented that they had been allocated the poorer agricultural lands which the Baltic Germans had allowed them to purchase. They complained of the limitations on the size of their farms and found it hard to compete in a capitalist economy with large scale production by the

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93 I. Bowman, 'Land Tenure and Trade Outlets in Esthonia and Latvia', in I. Bowman, The New World, London, 1923, pp. 362-69.

Germans dominating the local urban and international markets.

In the cities, the owners of the large scale industrial and commercial enterprises were predominantly German and hence the old ethnic and social tensions which were an accepted way of life in the rural setting had spilled over into the urban centres with the Latvian industrial workers coming into conflict with their employers.

The newly established Latvian middle class resented the German domination over Baltic administration, institutions, local government, commerce and industry. It had only been after the 1860's that Latvians were given permission to enter Baltic German controlled local universities without a number of restrictions applying to them. Even between 1891 to 1900, only 565 Latvians attended universities in the region.[94]

In the past, the peasantry had never referred to the local Germans as 'Balts'. The more nationally aware Latvians now viewed them as intruders and not natives to the Baltic. In some of the earlier Latvian literature, the Baltic Germans were referred to as '_vaci_', a name allegedly derived from a tribe of Germans. They thus began to see themselves along with the Estonians and Lithuanians as the only true Balts and the territory they inhabited belonging to them rather than to the _Ritterschaften_ and urban industrialists.

One of the most important events in the evolution from a Latvian cultural nationalism and social grievance against the local Germans to a political nationalism was the move by the Russian state to centralise

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94 A. Švābe, 1950, _op.cit._, p. 21, gives the following data on the number of Latvian speaking students attending local universities in the earlier period: 1803-50, 33; 1851-60, 41. Although a large number of ethnic Latvians attending these institutions but not claiming Latvian as their native language would have increased these figures, it is apparent that with social mobility, German became the language of the élite thus encouraging assimilation.

administration and bring uniformity of language and culture to the Empire. Before the nineteenth century, the Tsarist state apparatus was content to leave the administration of the Baltikum in the hands of the local German Ritterschaften.

> "...the Baltic provinces did not become completely Russian because there was no tendency, latent or active, to make them politically German."[95]

It was only Latgalia where the population was subjected to the direct influence of the Empire and to a differing ruling feudal ethnic group. Although the Latvians in both western Latvia and Latgalia faced similar socio-economic problems with regard to their 'foreign' overlords, their ruling groups differed in ethnic composition, a factor which had to be overcome if a Latvian regional unity was to be achieved and subjection to colonial domination was to contribute to the integrative process.

At the end of the seventeenth century a number of Old Believers had moved to the Latgalian area and Illukstskii uyezd to escape religious persecution. By 1897, this religious community numbered 66,724 in this eastern region, nearly half of which were located in Rezhintskii uyezd.[96] The settlements of the religious group was consequently used as an excuse for subsequent Russification.

It was not until the 1860's that the Latgalian community were subjected to Russification drives. The Russian state began to encourage the forced conversion of the local Roman Catholic ethnic Latvians of Latgalia to the Russian Orthodox faith. A number of Latvian Catholic churches in Liutsinskii uyezd were closed down as a direct result of this policy.[97] In 1864 the use of the Latin alphabet, the basis of the Latvian literary language, was prohibited and the cyrillic alphabet was forcefully

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95 H. Rothfels, 1944, op.cit., p. 129.

96 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., St. Petersburg, 1897-1904, vol. 5 & 21.

97 P.S. Sakharov, Pravoslavnaya tserkov v Latgalii, Riga, 1939, p. 107.

used in all publications in the area. The Latgalians therefore could not print books in their native language.

The contiguity of this area of Vitebskaya guberniya with the heartland of the Greater Russians and its ethnic foothold in Latgalia thus gave the Tsarist administration a validity in Russifying the region imposing all that pertained to the Russian nation in language, religion and culture upon the area's peoples. The ethnic Latvians were in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century particularly vulnerable to assimilation and loss of their identity compared with their ethno-linguistic compatriots in Kurlandskaya and Southern Liflandskaya.

To further strengthen the Slavic element in Latgale, the government encouraged the emigration of Latvians to Siberia. Some 20,000 to 30,000 Latvians migrated from Liutsinskii uyezd alone.[98] The Russian authorities also purchased a number of estates of the Polish nobility, subsequently settling Russians on these acquired lands. Thus by the time of the 1897 census, the Russian population of the region had increased substantially constituting well over a quarter of the Latgalian community.[99] This was in contrast to the 1860's when they numbered only a few hundred.[100]

It is difficult to assess the impact of Russification on the ethnic Latvian speaking population of Latgalia. On religious affinity, the 1897 census records only 22.6 percent of the Latgalian community registered as Russian Orthodox or Old Believers compared with 57 percent Catholics. It is apparent from these statistics that the religious persecutions of those practising the Catholic faith had little impact amongst the 253,792 Latvian speakers of the area.[101]

The direct interference in this area by the Russians thus played an

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98 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 285.

99 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda, St. Petersburg, 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5.

100 Pakstas, 1956/57, op.cit., pp. 169-211.

101 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 5.

important part in integrating the local ethnic Latvian speakers against a 'foreign' culture and language which was impinging upon them. The Latgalians began to see in the socio-economic and cultural-linguistic dominance of the Russians what the Latvians in other parts of the Latvian political region could see in the Baltic German hegemony. It also further enhanced the common interests and identity of the Latgalians with the Latvians in the neighbouring gubernii.

With economic expansionism and the increased call by the Slavophiles for political centralisation and the search for a Slavic identity, the Tsarist state machinery began to expand its decision-making powers into the western and central areas of the region.

The Slavophile and Russian Pan-Slav movements were influenced by the ideas of the Romantics. They called for the political integration of all Slavic peoples which they perceived was a natural evolution governed by the fact that these peoples were bound together through a linguistic affinity. Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism enriched a national consciousness and Russian identity amongst the middle class and ruling élite of Russia calling for the rejection of western ideas and instead looking towards the Slavic past in order to enrich the Slavic peoples. They saw in the 'westernisation' of Russia, the corruption of Russian culture and way of life. Their struggle was thus seen as a fight against foreign interference as this was perceived as being synonymous with 'westernisation.'

The development of this nationalism led the Greater Russians in the direction of exclusiveness and chauvinism resulting in a Russian messianism perceiving themselves as the natural leaders of the Slavs. Everything that pertained to the Russian people - their culture, religion, language, unique institutions - were injected into the non-Russian border areas of the Empire, thus Russifying the Russian Empire.

The crystallisation of this Russian 'national idea' resulted in a drive toward the Russification of the Baltic provinces in the latter

quarter of the nineteenth century. There was an attempt to make this Baltikum Russian and expel the influences exerted by the Baltic Germans over the region.

Economic expansionism had helped integrate the Baltic into the Russian economy stressing the economic and geographical importance of this region to the Empire. It was imperative to the Imperial Government that this area should remain part of an integrated economic unit and that the population remain loyal and an integral part of the Tsarist state system.

Before the 1860's there had been only minor sporadic attempts at Russification. In the 1840's, the Tsarist government had encouraged the conversion of Lutheran practising Latvian and Estonian peasantry to Orthodoxy with promises of land.

It was the Baltic Germans that were the primary target in this Russification programme. They were openly criticised by the Slavophiles who advocated the centralisation of government and the demise of the Baltic German position within the Baltic provinces. This culminated in Iurii Samarin's Okrainy Rossii (Borderlands of Russia) which in a volume entitled, Russkoe Baltiiskoe Pomor'e (The Russian Baltic Coast) which personally attacked the Baltic Germans calling for a reduction in the administrative and cultural autonomy practised by this ethnic élite with power to be returned to St. Petersburg.[102]

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102 Samarin accused the administration of excessive tolerance for the privileges of the Ritterschaften, of reluctance to carry through the total assimilation of the German minority, lack of concern for the Latvian peasantry who were being exploited by the Germans, and, by default, neglect of the latter's Russification. I. Samarin, Okrainy Rossii; Russkoe Baltiskoe Pomor'e, 6 vols, 1, Berlin, 1868-76; A. Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, Oxford, 1975, pp. 474-479; M.H. Haltzel, 'The Russification of the Baltic Germans: A Dysfunctional Aspect of Imperial Modernisation', in A. Ziedonis, W.L. Winter, M. Valgemae, Baltic History, Columbus, 1974, pp. 143-52.

The rapid demographic increase in the Latvians and Estonians and their social mobility was seen by the Russian nationalists as an important element in the future political power of the Baltikum between themselves and the Germans. They contended that this large number of peoples would be either absorbed into a German or Russian sphere of cultural and political influence. The Tsarist government would thus not allow the Latvians to become 'Germanised' viewing that by assimilating ethnic Latvians into the Russian culture and language, German influence over these indigenous peoples would be weakened.

Although the Russification drives of the 1880's were primarily directed against the Baltic Germans, the Latvians due to their socio-economic development were also seen as a progressive force which had to be curtailed. The Tsarist regime was therefore determined:

> "...to put a quietus on the democratic and nationalist seethings of all the subject peoples on her western borders."[103]

The programme of Russification included the forced useage of the Russian language in a number of institutions with Russian becoming compulsary in all schools after 1885. The Lutheran religion was openly attacked and Russian Orthodoxy encouraged. Russian migration into the Baltic was also promoted with incentive schemes set up by the central authorities. Even a number of towns in the region were re-named and given Russian place names, (e.g. Dünaburg became Dvinsk).

The introduction of the Russian form of city government in 1877 further questioned the political power of the Baltic Germans with both Russians and Latvians being given a minimal degree of participation in decisions affecting city affairs.

Russification not only questioned the position of the Ritterschaften and the Baltic German urban middle class but also gave the Latvian peoples a sense of grievance against the state of which they were a part.

> "Of all the factors involved in the formation of nationalist movements, the state and its bureaucratic structure is

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103 A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p.247.

perhaps the single most decisive agent and framework."[104]

They saw through Russification not only the demise of Baltic German hegemony over the western region but also an inextricably interrelated relationship between the state and the Russians. Everything that pertained to the Russian people both within and outwith the region was seen by the nationalists as identifiable with the Tsarist state with the migrations of Russians into the Latvian area as encroaching upon the territory and uniqueness of the Latvian nation.

Russian interference thus illustrated to the Latvians that they were fighting both Russians and Baltic Germans as opposed to the past when the latter group were the focus of grievance for these peoples of the western areas. A regional unity was therefore beginning to evolve with Latvians having a common repulsion against Russification. This Tsarist policy brought to the attention of the Latvians, Russian autocracy and the political geographical position of the tauta within the Tsarist Empire.

> "The blow of Russification had another important consequence. It gave what had been a cultural movement a definitive political character."[105]

Anti-Russian and anti-state feeling was necessary for the Latvians to conceive of the development of their nation and the conception of state sovereignty.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the Latvian peoples had become more aware of their similarities, either real or perceived. Through a common vernacular, the idea of the nation was channeled and was made more accessible to the Latvians by their high rates of literacy. Thus of the 3,000 books published in the Latvian language before 1866,

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104 A.D. Smith, 1976, op.cit., p. 13

105 G. Carson, (editor), Latvia: An Areal Study, Chicago, 1956, p. 52

85 percent were published between 1863 and 1865.[106] By 1869, 53 percent of all the books published in the Baltic provinces were in the Latvian language.[107]

By the turn of the century, the ethnic Latvians had sufficient integrative experience in order to be identified both by themselves and those outwith the group, as a nation. The modernisation process, and societal and spatial re-organisation made possible a re-orientation in the demands, goals and aspirations of the population in the Latvian political region with one of the notable manifestations of this process being the identity with a national group in order to satisfy some of the abstract ideals of the indigenous population. The nation was therefore one of the most realistic and accessible groupings to put forward and articulate the needs and requirements of its members. It was its political nationalist movement that voiced the nation's demands and attempted to satisfy the aspirations of its members.

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106 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 523.

107 A. Švābe, 1958, op.cit., p. 444. Švābe presents evidence that in 1844, 3 percent of the total publications in the Baltic provinces were in the Latvian language. By 1858 this figure had increased to only 6 percent.

2.3 Political Aspirations of the National Group

The Latvian nation progressed from a social entity into a political body with articulated demands encompassing the wishes of the majority of the national group. This section examines the political integrative process within the context of a developing Latvian nationalism highlighting the geographical circumstances which contributed to the formation of the territorial and political demands of such a movement.

For each member and sub-group within the nation, the nationalist movement became a vehicle by which various goals could be expressed thus furthering the nation's integrative process through common aims, ideals and achievements. The nationalist movement emerged as a focus of identification, the interests of the Latvian peoples converging in order that their socio-economic and political needs could be satisfied.

Central to the development of the tauta was the aspiration of control over its own political territory in the form of some degree of political autonomy. Later this developed into a nationalist demand for succession from the Empire and the creation of an independent and sovereign Latvian state. The nation saw in pressing for autonomy the greater likelihood of preserving and expanding their group attributes thus satisfying the various demands for which its nationalism stood.

To achieve any degree of control over their own affairs, the political and administrative structure of the region had to be societally and spatially re-organised if the tauta was to have any geographical or cultural expression and evolve into a political entity with at least some degree of control over its members and territory.

The Latvian region was administratively fragmented dividing the tauta into a number of administrative units. The Estonians and Latvians in Liflandskaya guberniya were under the political auspices of the Landtag in Riga while Latgalia comprised part of Vitebskaya guberniya administered first from Polotsk and later, in the nineteenth century,

from Vitebsk. It was only in Kurlandskaya guberniya that the Latvians predominated and could possibly have identified with an administratively defined piece of territory. Thus the Latvian peoples were subjected to varying administrations, the impact of such structures contributing to areal differences and negating a political regional unity encompassing the spatial distribution of the nation.

Before such a political geographical entity could come into being, the Latvians had to go through the processes of achieving some sort of local power base. In so doing, demands were made for more political representation by the Latvians on behalf of their group. This not only stimulated nationalism but also questioned the societal framework of the region to the detriment of the Baltic Germans and Tsarist state.

The peasantry were denied access to decision-making in the gubernii. The zemstvo system, which were representative assemblies of landlords, townsmen, and peasants had been introduced into the ethnic Russian areas of the Empire in 1864. This first step toward local government gave decision-making powers to the zemstvo over a wide array of uyezd local services. However, it was not introduced into the Baltic region as the Ritterschaften had successfully opposed giving Latvian and Estonian smallholders and rural communities political representation. Instead the 1866 law on rural local government introduced into the Baltic area, gave a limited degree of autonomy to the rural communities over peasant affairs. This law did not go as far as the zemstvo system and later became one of the earlier demands of the Latvians and a point of grievance as the peasantry were denied access to decision-making within the framework of their uyezd.

In the urban areas, the introduction of the Russian form of city government in 1877 broke the Baltic German monopoly over decision-making in the towns with the Latvians and Estonians given a limited access for participation in municipal government. In part, the rapid demographic increase of Riga, Libau and Mitau and the changing ethnic and social

composition of the towns made reform necessary.

This law of 1877 implemented elected assemblies with all males over twenty five years of age who paid taxes on either property or trade being given the right to vote. The electorate were arranged into three classes of voting according to each individual's annual taxes. Each electoral class had the same number of representatives although the third class had a proportionately larger number of voters. The first and second voting lists were dominated by Baltic Germans while the third voting list was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Latvian speakers with the majority of Russians in the two lower sections.

An examination of the voting population in Riga in 1877-78 illustrates that although the Latvian community were given electoral representation, the Germans still continued a near monopoly over decision-making. As can be seen from table 10, the Baltic German community comprised 39 percent of the Riga population or 63,998 persons in 1881. In the same year, the Latvian peoples numbered 50,798 or 30 percent while the figures for the Russians in the city amounted to 31,976 or 12 percent. In all, there were only 5,212 persons with a voting qualification in 1877. Wittram suggests the following breakdown on the voting population for Riga.

Table 14

The Voting Population of Riga, 1877[108]

class of voter	number of voters	estimated ethnic numbers		
		Germans	Latvians	Russians
class 1	173	140	2 (plus 6 with German names)	24
class 2	629	400	n.a.	120
class 3	4,410	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

(n.a. Data not available)

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108 R. Wittram, Meinungskämpfe im baltischen Deutschtum während der Reformepoche des 19 Jahrhunderts, Riga, 1934, p. 109.

Because social class and ethnic background were more or less synonymous, the Latvian representatives fought for specific issues which reflected the socio-economic and cultural-linguistic problems which they faced as a community. The delimitation of voters on the basis of economic criteria contributed to the urban Latvians becoming more aware of their social and ethno-linguistic similarities even although the classes of the voting population were not defined on the basis of ethnicity, per se.

This class system operated for only fifteen years. In 1892, the Tsarist government abolished this tripartite division throughout the Empire re-introducing higher property qualifications. It was the Baltic Germans with their declining urban population who benefited from this conservative measure to the detriment of the Latvians. However, such was the impact of the changing demographic structure of the region's cities that by 1897, the Latvians were in control of their first municipal government in Wolmar (Volmar). In that year they comprised 76.5 percent of the cities' population.[109] The following year they secured Tukkum (Tuckum) and in 1906, Wenden (Venden).

To develop as a nationalist movement, the Latvians had to evolve into a more cohesive organisation reflecting a territorial unity and pressing for specific Latvian socio-economic and political goals. Even as late as the 1880's, those Latvians who identified themselves as nationalists had little conception as to what degree of control the tauta should have over their population and territory. Because of the nature of the evolved social structure and various geographical settings in which the Latvian population found themselves, a number of politically organised parties developed along both national and social lines of affiliation. There is however one consistent theme running through the basis of all the Latvian political movements. This was the desire for recognition of the tauta and the demand for at least some degree of

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109 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g., 1897-1904, op.cit., vol. 19.

autonomy for the Latvian peoples. It is within this context that the political aspirations of the nation have to be viewed and the degree to which this furthered the integration of the tauta.

The Latvian middle class had to voice their nationalist appeals on behalf of the nation. As a social class they were weak numerically. It was therefore imperative that they seek the support of a number of groups of which the peasantry were the largest and the most important. The nationalist movement could therefore draw on the agrarian question as an effective socio-economic grievance with which all Latvians could commonly identify as the majority of the population were rural and the urban Latvians were usually either first or second generation inhabitants of the towns. Land and its distribution caused the peasants to be interested in politics and it was the prospect of agrarian reform which partly explains peasant support for the nationalist movement.

It was not until the 1880's that political movements were organised in the region. The emergence of Jaunā Strāva, the 'New Current', with its newspaper, Dienas Lapa (The Daily Journal), was in the beginning composed largely of a small group of Latvian intellectuals who had been influenced by the ideas of the Young Latvian Movement. Jaunā Strāva took a more negative position in regard to the nation advocating only some degree of autonomy for the Latvian political region. Their movement, influenced by the ideas of the German Socialists, eventually evolved into the Latvian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) in 1901. Yet although their prime concern was not the interests of all members of the tauta, it was out of the LSDP that was born the main vehicle of the nation, the Latvian nationalist movement.

It was in the first years of the twentieth century that a number of these Latvian Social Democrats moulded together some ideas of a nationalist ideology which would feasibly reflect both the wishes of the nation and the geographical circumstances of the region and its

peoples.[110] If some form of autonomy were to be granted to the tauta, it was clear that the ethnic heterogeneity and geographical distribution of the region's population made impossible the delimiting of a political-territorial structure in which only the Latvian peoples were a part. A solution had to be found whereby the Latvians were given some form of cultural expression and political autonomy which would take into consideration the ethnic minorities of the region. A territorial basis for this in the form of a federal state within the Tsarist Empire would therefore not satisfy the Latvian nation per se as their region would include a large number of Russians, Poles, Baltic Germans, Jews and Lithuanians. Nor could leaving Latgalia outwith such a territorial unit solve the problem. Although the exclusion of this eastern region would have drastically reduced the number of ethnic minorities, it would have also divided the tauta thus negating the whole basis of a federalism based on national criteria. The Latvian Social Democrats therefore saw one solution to this problem in the ideas of the Austrian Socialists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and their conception of a 'territorial national-cultural autonomy' for nations.[111]

Renner and Bauer had attempted to modify the view adopted by the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) who held the conviction that the development of economic forces impelled the horizontal (i.e. class) principle of social organisation to take precedence over the vertical, spatial (national) one. Early Marxists and their followers of the 1889 International gave little consideration directly to the nation and the nationalist movements. Bauer and Renner were however more aware of the unique circumstances in Eastern Europe where the late advent

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110 M. Valters, Mūsu tautības jautājums, Domas par Latvijas tagadni un nākotni, (The Question of our Nationality, Thoughts on the Present and Future of Latvia), Riga, 1914, pp. 48-49; E. Arnis, 1934, op.cit., pp. 12-14.

111 O. Bauer, Die NationalitÄtenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Vienna, 1907, cited in H.B. Davis, 1967, pp. 149-63, op.cit.

of a national awareness and of nationalism complicated the more simplistic views on the subject as put forward by Marx and Engels.

The Bruenn Congress of the Austrian Socialist Democrats in 1889, proposed the division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into ethnically homogeneous regions. They suggested that these provinces should be granted cultural and linguistic jurisdiction. The Congress recognised the needs of different nations on a structural and geographical basis and rejected any ideas of a national élite emerging in the case of an ethno-linguistically larger and/or more politically powerful nation or state language.

The proposals of the Bruenn Congress were developed by Bauer and Renner and the concept of 'territorial national-cultural autonomy' emerged. Renner emphasised the importance of a consciousness of belonging to a given people as the decisive factor for the definition of the nation and he viewed that this consciousness must be given geographical and social expression.[112] This idea was also extended to take into consideration extra-territorial populations with national affiliations who were not geographically synonymous with the territory which had been delimited on national criteria. The position of the Czechs in Vienna was cited.

The programme of the Latvian Social Democrats, formulated in a 1903 conference at Berne, was based on the framework of national and democratic demands, centred on the interests of the industrial and rural workers whose cultural enlightenments, they pointed out, could only be achieved through a system of education. They viewed that Russia should be transformed into a federation of democratic states with the principles of Bauer's and Renner's 'territorial national cultural autonomy' being the basis of a defined Latvian nation and coinciding with a federated

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112 I. Zenushkina, Soviet Nationalities Policy and Bourgeois Historians, Moscow, 1976, pp. 108-109.

political unit. The extra territorial rights of minorities would also be guaranteed. The resolution passed at Berne was:

> "All lands inhabited by Latvians; Kurzeme, or Kurland, Vidzeme or Livonia proper and Latgale, must be united in a self-governing unity to be called Latvia which must enjoy the rights of self-determination. In Latvia the rights of self-determination belong to all citizens without distinction of birth, race or creed. The self-determination of Latvia must include an independent parliament and autonomous legislation."[113]

If this federation proved impossible then they suggested that the only solution to a Latvian nation with democratic principles evolving would be secession of the tauta and its territory and the setting up of an independent state, completely autonomous from Russia.[114] In this light any discussion of Latvia and federalism must assume also a Democratic Russia.

The nation is however only one response to the modernisation process and the development of capitalism. Various forms of group loyalties can subordinate the evolution of a national cause and in this context a working class consciousness can develop viewing the importance of class and negating that of the nation. A Russian writer, K. Zalevskiy, describing Latvian conditions in 1905 stated:

> "... in no single part of (Russia) did class antagonism reach the degree of development that they attained in the Lettish region ... the section most intensively industrialised."[115]

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113 Laukstradnieks (The Farm Labourer), nr. 2, 1906, cited in A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p. 262.

114 Proletārietis (The Proletarian), nr. 11, 1903, cited in E. Arnis, 1934, op.cit., pp. 34-36.

115 L. Martov, et.al., Obscestvennoe dvizenie v Rossii v nacale XXgo veka, vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 271, cited in S.W. Page, 'Social and National Currents in Latvia 1860-1917', The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 8, 1949, pp. 25-36, p. 27.

Because of the conflicting opinions on the role of the national group and the type and degree of autonomy the Latvian political region should be given, the Latvian Social Democratic Party split into two main factions in 1903 with a number of more dogmatic Marxists rejecting the principles behind the Berne conference asking only for more democratic participation at the local government level for the region and supporting the right of the tauta to develop its own cultural and linguistic uniqueness with its own institutions. This Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party (LSDWP) allied itself with the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) in 1906 rejecting any affiliation with the Latvian bourgeoisie putting forward the primary issues of the Latvian working class as being social and economic rather than national.

The other members of the Latvian Social Democratic Party formed the Latvian Social Democratic Union (LSDU) and continued to publish periodicals, Proletārietis, (The Proletarian), Laukstradnieks, (The Farm Labourer) and Revolucionārā Baltija, (Revolutionary Baltic), further formulating their ideas on Latvian political nationalism as put forward at the Berne conference and calling for a greater degree of autonomy for the Latvian nation on the basis of Bauer's and Renner's conception of the nation.

The 1905 Revolution was especially traumatic in this region and played an important role in the development of both national and social awareness of the differences existing within the population of the territory. The Latvian émigre, Kalniņš, claims that the 1905 Revolution was,

> "...in Latvia ... a nationalist revolution, a Latvian revolution against Russian and German oppression."[116]

Page, however suggests that it was purely a social revolution,

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116 B. Kalniņš, 'The Social Democratic Movement in Latvia', A. and I. Robinowitsch, Revolution and Politics in Russia, London, 1972, pp. 134-56, p. 137.
For a Soviet view of the events of 1905 in Latvia, A.A. Drizula, Istoriya Latviiskoi SSR, Riga, 1971, pp. 275-309.

"...international in spirit and never separatist."[117]

There is little doubt that the strikes, demonstrations and demands were based on social and class differences and although beginning as a labour movement with general political as well as more specific working class demands, it turned into an agrarian revolution aimed at the elimination of the hegemony of the Ritterschaften.

Because social structure and national awareness and identity were more or less synonymous, the 1905 Revolution was both national and social in context.

> "In an historical sense it (1905) was a bourgeois and national revolution, for the entire nation fought the national and social oppressors."[118]

If there had been a German peasantry in the region and the Latvian peoples had been more socially stratified, Latvian nationalism may have been curtailed with Latvian politics taking on a more Marxist character than it did.

The demands of the Latvians were thus national as well as social calling for some degree of autonomy and for widespread social reform. Even a number of the members of the LSDWP demanded,

> "...autonomy for all separate nationalities within a democratic Russian Empire."[119]

The 1905 Revolution in the Latvian political region gave the Latvian population a sense of liberation and realisation that as a national group some of their demands could become a reality. The savage suppression of the Revolution by the Baltic Germans and the Russian central authorities[120] further enhanced the integrative process at both

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117 S.W. Page, 1949, op.cit., p. 28.

118 A. Spekke, 1951, op.cit., p. 311.

119 The Second Congress of the LSDWP in June 1905. Cited in E.O.F. Ames, The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia, London, 1907, p.12.

120 ibid, pp. 25-26.

the national and social level with all political parties, both socialist and nationalist alike, demanding a greater degree of autonomy for the Latvian nation, centring their grievances on the Russian state and bureaucratic structure, Russification, the continuing socio-economic position of the Baltic Germans and the latter's changing political alignment and developing Pan-German ideas.[121]

Within both the LSDWP and the LSDU there was a continued search for the formation of constructive ideas which could be implemented in order to justify the existence and unique problems of the Latvian nation

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121 With the 1905 Revolution, the Baltic Germans realised the implications of the national and social movements of the Latvians and they saw in Russification the blame for such an upheaval. Thus many Baltic Germans began to look toward Germany for their political future. They openly discussed greater economic and cultural co-operation with the country and the possible secession of the Baltic provinces from the Tsarist Empire and annexation to Germany.
To preserve their position in the 1900's, they attempted fresh drives at the 'Germanisation' of the Baltic gubernii. This included a plan to encourage German colonists in Southern Russia and in the Volga region to move to the provinces in an attempt to make the region predominantly German thus preserving their socio-economic position. (Due to a Tsarist decree of 1895, foreigners had been forbidden to acquire land in the western borders of the Empire and so attracting German peasantry from Germany was illegal.) Carson, 1956, op.cit., p. 53, estimates that some 20,000 Germans migrated to the Latvian region at the request of the Baltic Germans.
This Pan Germanism and proposals to annexe the Baltikum to Germany further alienated not only the Latvian peasantry and urban workers but also the Latvian middle class from the Baltic Germans thus enhancing the integrative process amongst the members of the tauta.

and to give this entity some form of political and geographical expression.

A. Priedkalns, a Latvian member of the Third Duma, worked out a plan for local government reform for the Latvian region.[122] He suggested that Kurlandskaya guberniya should be united with the ethnic Latvian speaking area of Southern Liflandskaya thus forming a single administrative unit. This 1912 plan failed to gather any support amongst Latvian nationalists mainly because it did not include Latgalia and also did not structurally define in any great detail what fuctions this entity would be able to perform. The Duma were also against devolving power to the Baltic area on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria. A previous plan, formulated by a liberal Baltic German administrator in the 1880's, suggested not only a Kurlandskaya-Southern Liflandskaya administrative area but also an Estlandskaya-Northern Liflandskaya entity which would reflect the spatial distribution of the Estonian peasantry, was also rejected.[123] The central authorities as well as the Baltic German community were against defining administrative territory on the basis of the distribution of the Latvian and Estonian peoples. They felt that the implementation of such proposals would enhance the nationalist movements.

Skujenieks[124] went further than Priedkalns' demands calling for a single administrative unit for Latvia as defined on the basis of the geographical distribution of Latvian inhabitants, thus including Latgalia. He also called for extensive rights of local government criticising the Latvian middle class for their narrow-mindedness and economic selfishness, and the attitudes of some socialists who he suggested, ignored the continuing Russification and threat of assimilation of Latvians into a

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122 M. Skujenieks, Vietējā Pašvaldība Baltija, (Local Government in the Baltic), Moscow, 1916, pp. 142-3.

123 A.A. Drizula, 1971, op.cit., pp. 232-3.

124 M. Skujenieks, 1916, op.cit.

Russian language and culture. Skujenieks appears to have viewed that by uniting the tauta into an administrative unit that its new function would give it a protective shell and a basis from which the Latvians would have a greater control over their own affairs besides an areal expression for their nationalism.

Valters' works on the Latvian national question[125] played an important role in separating the attitudes of some Social Democrats who although recognising the existence of the tauta on the basis of ethnicity, language and historical background, did not believe in forming ideas on an autonomous political unit for the region; and those Social Democrats and middle class liberals who recognised not only the existence of the nation as a political entity but also believed that it should be given its rightful democratic expression in some form of territorial autonomy. His contribution made more explicit that either class or national issues had to come first. He helped divorce political thinking in the region between the general principles behind that of the LSDWP and that of the LSDU, the latter being concerned with the general demands of all the Latvian peoples placing national aspirations before social issues.

With the backing of parties and various political organisations, Latvian nationalism gathered momentum amongst the members of the tauta. With the establishment of two newspapers, Dzimtenes Atbalss (The Fatherland Echo) and Līdums (or Lihdums, Pioneers Land), the latter publication concerned more with the ethnic Latvian rural population, the major national issues confronting the population were outlined, thus contributing to educating Latvians into an ideology of nationalism with which

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125 M. Valters, Latviešu Kultūrdemokrātija vinas uzdevumi un vinas speki, (Latvian Cultural Democracy - Its Duties and its Powers), Riga, 1913, Mūsu tautības jautājums, Domas par Latvijas tagadni un nākotai (The Question of Our Nationality, Ideas on the Present and Future of Latvia), Riga, 1914; as cited in H. Dopkewitsch, Die Entwicklung des Lettlandischen Staatsgedankens bis 1918, Berlin, 1936, pp. 37-39.

they could readily identify.

Before 1914 there was no formulated or structured uniform goal and demand to which the Latvian nation aspired. The various political movements reflected differing shades of political opinion as to what form the tauta should take in a political-territorial context. There was no call for an independent state as such with the majority of Latvian nationalists viewing the development of their nation within the structure of a reformed and democratic Russia with autonomy and some sort of political definition given to the Latvian political region. There was therefore no consistent demand to which the Latvian nation adhered to as a unified political movement. The cohesiveness of Latvian nationalism was therefore being threatened as no common territorial goal had been formulated.

The war played an important part in building up a national consciousness amongst the Latvians resulting in the speeding up of the process of formulating common goals and the realisation that both the tauta and its region could benefit from the effects of this European conflict.

During the war, two Latvian deputies in the Duma, Goldmanis and Zālītis, continued to press for the introduction of the zemstvo form of communal self-government and also for administrative limitations to be placed on the Baltic Germans mainly for geopolitical reasons. Zālītis saw the introduction of the zemstvo as part of a gradual process toward securing political autonomy for the region.

> "...here (Baltic provinces) the Zemstvo institutions must be introduced without further delay ... as a first step toward wider self-government."[126]

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126 J. Zālītis' speech to the Duma, February 1916, Līdums 5th February 1916, as cited in U. Gērmanis, 'The Idea of Independent Latvia and its Development in 1917', A. Sprudzs and A. Rusis, (editors), Res Baltica, Leyden, 1968, pp. 27-85, p. 31.

Thus even by 1916, political representatives were still not officially calling for some form of concrete political autonomy for the region as a whole. Gērmanis[127] suggests that it was not feasible to ask for such a political re-organisation due to the knowledge that the authorities would be fervently opposed to such a scheme. At a conference held on Latvian autonomy in St. Petersburg in 1916, Zālīte[128] presented his thesis on devolving territorial power to the tauta. The basis of his plans had already been formulated in the 1890's but had met with little enthusiasm. Zālīte advocated that a Democratic Russia should be restructured on a federal basis with the territory inhabited by the Latvian peoples forming a territorial component. His ideas were endorsed by the St. Petersburg conference.

Zālīte and other advocates of a political autonomy for the Latvian nation therefore put forward their demands within the framework of a federalist argument viewing that the Russian Empire, because of its vast area and heterogeneous population should reflect the national and geographical expressions of its people. Federalism, with its precondition in a uniformity and contiguity of national, cultural and linguistic groups was seen as the only feasible alternative to a unitary state structure. In federalism the nationalists saw a possibility of an attempt to solve a certain type of problem of political organisation which had been earlier pointed out by Bauer and Renner. It was viewed as the most realistic solution of the moment to meeting the requirements of the tauta. Their ideas were, however, based on the assumption that the Empire would somehow become Democratic. 'A free Latvia in a free Russia' had become the slogan of the Social Democrats.

Writing in Līdums in June 1915, J. Lapiņš criticised the lack of

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127 ibid, p. 31.

128 P. Zālīte, Latviesu tautas dvēsele (The Soul of the Latvian Nation), Riga, 1932, pp. 38-42.

involvement of the Latvian peoples toward putting forward demands for a national policy.

> "Has there ever been a Pole who has not dreamt of a Polish kingdom or is there a Czech, Croate or Serb who does not desire the independence of his own nation? But these peoples are much less developed than the Latvian peoples who should have much greater right to a political independence. But who has ever heard of Latvians talking about their own state?"[129]

Lapiņš thus sums up the position to 1917. The further the nationalist movement could envisage was a federal structure for a democratic Russia in which the Latvian nation would be an integral part.

The first attempts at putting forward proposals for the secession of the Latvian political region from the Empire was based on the idea of an independent Latvian-Lithuanian state.[130]

Šliūpas, a Lithuanian, saw such a state as politically independent of Russia based on a federal framework similar to that of Switzerland.[131]

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129 Līdums, 28th June 1915, cited in U. Gērmanis, 1968, op.cit., p. 32.

130 Besides a Latvian-Lithuanian state, a number of economic and political unions were also considered but failed to gather support amongst nationalists. Ideas on which countries were to be included varied but at one time or another, the Scandinavian states, Poland, Ukraine as well as the three Baltic nations were considered by Baltic statesmen. For general discussions on such unions see: V. Sidzikauskas, 'Our Tradition of Co-operation', The Baltic Review, nr. 1, December 1953, pp. 35-44, pp. 35-7; B. Kaslas, The Baltic Nations - The Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty, Pittston, Pa., 1976, pp. 118-26; A. Piip, 'The Baltic States as a Regional Unity', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 168, 1933, pp. 171-7, p. 172.

131 J. Šliūpas, Revue Baltique, Paris, January 1919. His ideas on such a federation were put forward in his book, Lietuvių-latvių respublika ir Šiaurės tautų sąjunga, (The Lithuanian-Latvian Republic and the Union of Northern Nations), Stockholm, 1918.

He argued that a Latvian-Lithuanian state was possible and could function effectively based on the fact that the two peoples had similar racial origins and spoke languages which were not unalike. He also stressed the common historical background of the two nations particularly in medieval times blaming colonialism for splitting Latvians and Lithuanians into two separate ethno-linguistic groups. Although over-emphasising national stereotypes and characteristics, Šliūpas felt that these peoples complimented each other in a number of ways. Economically, he suggested:

> "Latvians have more a gift for industry and maritime ventures while Lithuanians devote themselves to tilling the soil."[132]

He appears to have overlooked the fact that this 'gift' was more a product of the contrasting impact of modernisation and the geographical environments.

Another Lithuanian, Šalkauskis,[133] advocated a similar line of thought to that of Šliūpas. He also put forward the concept of an independent Latvian-Lithuanian state with two federal units within it reflecting the spatial distribution of the Latvian and Lithuanian nations. Šalkauskis suggested that such an arrangement would prove more economically and politically viable than an individual Latvian or Lithuanian state.

> "The alliance between Lithuania and Latvia would unite the entire Latvian-Lithuanian stock in a common purpose of establishing a local equilibrium between the Germanic and Slavic worlds ... the union of these two sister nations, uncomplicated by any accute rivalry between them, would serve to increase both the importance and strength of each."[134]

He continued by suggesting that such a union,

> "...would weaken the dominant influence exercised by the Poles in Lithuania and by the German element in Latvia."[135]

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132 ibid

133 S. Šalkauskis, Sur les Confins de deux Mondes, Geneva, 1917.

134 ibid

135 ibid

A Latvian and Social Democrat, Rainis, also advocated a Latvian-Lithuanian sovereign state similar to the proposals outlined by Šliūpas and Šalkauskis.

Although some suggestions for closer unity and interaction between Latvians and Lithuanians did have general support amongst nationalists, based on the similar circumstances in which the two nations found themselves, their nationalist emotions dictated that the only territorial unit in which they were prepared to tolerate was one in which their respective nations predominated. Thus the idea of a Latvian-Lithuanian state was discussed by the Latvian provisional national council at Valka on December 1917 and duly rejected.[136]

Another permutation was also attempted. An organisation was formed in 1917 to examine the possibility of politically re-organising the territory that had once comprised the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (thus including parts of the Latvian region).[137] In their only conference in May 1918, this 'Commission of the East' proposed that a state be based on this territory and that within it the individual national groups would be given a federal basis of autonomy. Thus the Latvians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Poles and Ukrainians would come under the jurisdiction of such a state yet function as political autonomous units. The head of the Commission, Edmund Privat wanted to secure the democratic rights of these nations by creating such a state completely independent of both Russian and German influence.

The Commission was totally unsuccessful as the participants had little common interest to which they were prepared to devote in order that such a political unit could come about. Their own nationalisms prevented the creation of such a state.

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136 A.E. Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, New York, 1959, p. 22.

137 R.E. Heath & A.E. Senn, 'Edmund Privat and the Commission of the East in 1918', Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 6, nr. 1, 1975, pp. 9-16.

The feasibility of even a Latvian-Lithuanian state was doomed from the start. The contiguity and accessibility between the two regions and the development of their respective nations and political nationalisms did play a role in the thinking behind the plans of Rainis, Šliūpas and Šalkauskis. It appears that their main consideration was to create an effective and viable political and economic entity which would have a greater chance of remaining outwith the influence of the Russians and Baltic Germans.

The threat of a common enemy does not necessarily in itself unite regions and peoples or even lead to future integration. Their arguments of a common history, culture and similarity for language communication were not concrete enough to warrant the unification of two such regions. Both national groups had developed quite different awarenesses of their uniqueness and there had been little geographical contact between the two peoples with the exception of a few Lithuanian peasants who inhabited the southern area of Latgalia. The Latvian-Lithuanian ethno-linguistic border was clearly defined.

The Lithuanian _gubernii_ were also still very much entrenched in the very early stages of modernisation whereas the Latvian political region had developed at a far faster economic rate. A number of Latvians felt that such a federation with Lithuania would hinder the development of their region. Celiēns suggested that the very nature of the Lithuanian people and Region - its rurality, Catholic background and lack of any sound industrial base - would hinder the economic development of the Latvian region.[138]

In February 1917, _Dzimtenes Atbalss_ made the first conscious attempt at putting forward structured demands for the political autonomy of the Latvian nation. It was also the first time that the idea of

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138 F. Ceilēns, _Laikmetu mainā_, (The Change of the Period), Lidingo, 1961, p. 406.

devolving power to the tauta as a composite unit was openly declared.[139]

The article, 'The Basic Principles of Latvian Unity', called for a democratically elected legislature in the form of an Assembly and an autonomous constitution for the Latvian political region as defined on the basis of the distribution of ethno-linguistic Latvians and to include all peoples, irrespective of national affiliations, who fell within the framework of this bounded space. As the ethno-linguistic Latvians constituted the vast majority of the region, the article suggested that the territory was therefore "Latvian" and hence the administration of the region should be in the hands of the Latvians and all business therein should be conducted in the Latvian language.

After the February Revolution, Dzimtenes Atbalss suggested that Russia should now be transformed into a federation of Democratic Republics taking into consideration the demands and aspirations of various national groups.[140] The paper pointed out that without the implementation of these proposals, there would be no survival of a Latvian nation.

This was thus the first comprehensive attempt at a concise plan for the political autonomy of Latvia within a Federal and Democratic Russia. The article also acknowledged the unique relationship between nation and territory.

By 1914, the Latvian Bolsheviks, with Peter Stučka (Stuchka) as their leader, were successful in bringing under their influence the entire LSDWP. Their newspaper, Cina (Struggle) and party apparatus became less directly involved in the national question and instead became more integrated with the policies adopted by the RSDWP. Previous to this, the LSDWP had functioned as an autonomous territorial organisation with complete independence in determining programme and tactics within its own region. They thus enjoyed a similar relationship with

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139 Dzimtenes Atbalss, 21st February, 1917, cited in U. Germanis, 1968, op.cit., p. 35.

140 Dzimtenes Atbalss, 21st March, 1917, ibid.

the RSDWP as did the Jewish Bund and the Polish and Lithuanian Social Democrats (SDKPiL).

Taking a strictly theoretical viewpoint, the Marxists considered socialism and nationalism as diametrically opposed, seeing nationalism as part of the capitalist super-structure. Their class analysis of the nation had led them on the road to a scholastic cul-de-sac unable to formulate concrete ideas on the position of the Latvian national group. It was this lack of clarity on the national question which led the LSDWP to continually change and revise their policy towards Latvian national autonomy.

The RSDWP position on the national question, which the Bolshevik wing of the LSDWP generally adhered to, supported the principle behind the Self-determination of Nations which had been adopted by the RSDWP in 1903. Lenin and the Bolsheviks, however, did not favour self-determination as an absolute principle. The general principle, "the absolute right" for which Lenin was contending was thus not any "natural right" of self-determination but the right to resist oppression which always coincided with the interests of the workers in their struggle for freedom and socialism.[141]

At the Second Congress of the LSDWP in June 1905, under the influence of the Mensheviks, they demanded "wide political and economic autonomy" for the Latvian nation and the introduction of the Latvian language in the region's institutions. It is probable that they envisaged autonomy for the nation and the territory which it occupied within a Democratic Russia.

Bauer's and Renner's ideas for 'territorial national cultural autonomy' found general support amongst the Mensheviks in the LSDWP. Lenin had rejected their proposals as a "bourgeois device" which would

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141 V.I. Lenin, 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', (1913), Sochineniya, vol. 20, Moscow, 1964, (English edition), pp. 17-51.

tend to split the workers.[142] However, he was in favour of:

> "far reaching self-government and autonomy of the several regions, which among other things should have boundaries according with nationality principles."[143]

What he appears to have implied was cultural autonomy which would not hamper the economic development of Russia as a whole.

In 1913, the LSDWP rejected Lenin's draft which he suggested should be used at their Fourth Party Congress of the Central Committee. His suggested resolution was that:

> "...we are against any national culture which we consider to be one of the slogans of bourgeois nationalism. The Congress has to reject the slogan of cultural autonomy and the federative principle."[144]

Thus the social heterogeneity within the Latvian nation hampered its political nationalist movement being given general support by the Bolshevik wing.

Peter Stučka appeared to be against self-determination for the Latvian nation. In a resolution passed at the Thirteenth Conference of the LSDWP in 1917 he pointed out:

> "The task of the proletariat is to oppose Latvia's federative separation from democratic Russia."[145]

Stučka suggested that in the interests of the class struggle, large territories and political units should continue.

However by the July of 1917, Stučka was again changing his position as well as were the rest of the LSDWP. They did not mention Lenin's principles of self-determination but instead demanded an:

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142 H. Davis, 1967, op.cit., p. 191.

143 Draft Programme for the Convention of the SDWP of Latvia, ibid, p.191.

144 B. Kalniņš, 1972, op.cit., p. 150.

145 A. Ezergailis, (1974), op.cit., p. 85.

"undivided Latvia" and "political autonomy".[146]

It appears by the latter that the Latvian Bolsheviks in the LSDWP did not advocate federalism but instead a milder form of territorial autonomy.

> "No, we do not see a Free Latvia as separate from Free Russia and we find that it is a play on words to speak of free Latvia within a free Russia... It will be united with Russia as much as possible and yet independent as much as possible."[147]

It is probable that Lenin's meaning of political self-determination and that of Stučka's autonomy had a similar meaning in that both were for "democratic centralism" with the recognised need to delegate within the political structure minor responsibilities (and thus a degree of autonomy) to specific localities (possibly on national criteria) or some geographical sub-division.[148]

By the April of 1917, a political organisation, The Latvian Peasant Union (LPU), had formed around the nationalist newspaper, Līdums, its adherents calling for wider political autonomy. This party, led by Karlis Ulmanis, was composed of a large section of the middle classes of both the urban and rural environment and who saw in the realisation of their demands and goals, the interests of the nation. In the same month the Latvian National Democratic Party (LNDP) was founded centred again around a nationalist newspaper, Dzimtenes Atbalss. The LNDP also called for an autonomous Latvian state within a Russian federation with the promotion of a Latvian national culture being one of the main tasks of a Latvian decision-making body:

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146 ibid, p. 85

147 P. Stučka in Cina, 28th/29th July, 1917, ibid, p. 85.

148 P. Stučka, V Bor'be za Oktyabr', Riga, 1960, pp. 90-99. Writing in the 1920's, Stučka suggests that he and his colleagues had implied by Latvian autonomy, "the right of a broadly democratic self-governing base above which is placed the constitution of Russia and and all-Russian laws." p.90 in V Bor'be za Oktyabr'.

> "Autonomy means a state, Latvia will also be a state within Russia. Therefore instead of local government let us demand statehood."[149]

As a consequence of the February Revolution, the region's political-administrative structure had been spatially re-organised with the ethno-linguistic Latvians becoming the dominant group to the exclusion of the Baltic German and Russian bureaucrats in all city and rural institutions. These elected institutions, which replaced some of the appointed ones, thus gave the Latvian nationalists a sense of reality that they could attain control over their own politically organised territory in the form of a federal state.

The events of February had also resulted in Liflandskaya guberniya being divided on the basis of the geographical distribution of Estonian and Latvian speakers. Northern Liflandskaya was united with Estlandskaya guberniya thus forming a political region which reflected the distribution of the Estonian nation. This territorial unit obtained an autonomous constitution on April 12th with the approval of the Kerensky government.[150]

With the establishment of an Estonian political unit, Liflandskaya reflected a political and administrative divide which was synonymous with an ethno-linguistic boundary. Southern Liflandskaya (Vidzeme) and its inhabitants now looked toward Kurlandskaya and Latgalia for some form of territorial expression for their region and the tauta.

The newly created Vidzeme Land Assembly, meeting in March 1917, passed a resolution calling for:

> "...an autonomous administrative unit to be called Latvia out of portions of the gubernii of Livonia, Vitebsk and Courland inhabited by the Letts."[151]

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149 Dzimtenes Atbalss, 31st March 1917, cited in U. Gērmanis, 1968, op.cit., p. 41.

150 V. Raud, Estonia, New York, 1953, p. 23.

151 The Manchester Guardian, March 31st 1917, p. 5 and April 10th, 1917, p. 5.

Dzimtenes Atbalss criticised the decision of the Vidzeme Land Assembly for not advocating a greater degree of autonomy in the form of a federal state instead of a province. This criticism was also endorsed by the Kurzeme Land Assembly.

The question of Latgalia remained a problem for the autonomists. The Latgale Land Assembly had also passed resolutions calling for a union within this Latvian political region as long as the special rights and uniqueness of Latgalia would be recognised in the retention of some self-government for this area within a Latvian entity. In June, an assembly convened at Rezhitsa by Russian inhabitants of Latgalia, reached a totally different decision. They rejected the proposals of the Latgale Land Assembly calling instead for the continuation of Latgale to remain an integral part of Vitebskaya guberniya.[152]

It would therefore appear that the only section of the ethnic population of the Latvian political region who favoured autonomy on the basis of the distribution of the tauta were the members of the Latvian nation. A large number of the Russian population of Latgalia did not identify or perceive themselves as similar enough to join in union with the Latvians in Vidzeme, Kurzeme (Kurlandskaya) or Latgalia and instead saw their political unit solidly within the framework of a Democratic and ethnic Russia. A handful of Latgalians, of all ethnic groups, even supported an independent Latgalian state.[153]

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152 G. Von Rauch, The Baltic States, London, 1970, p. 28

153 Evidence for this appears in the Latvian newspaper, Jaunais Laiks (New Times), 31st July - 3rd August, 1917. The leader of this small group of 'Latgalian nationalists' was Francis Kemps. The movement attended the Latgalian Land Assembly meeting of May 1917 and numbered only 29 delegates, all opposing the resolution adopted at the conference. Jaunais Laiks article reproduced by A. Ezergailis, 'The Latvian "Autonomy" Conference of 30 July 1917', Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 8, nr. 2, 1977, pp. 162-171.

The Kerensky government was still adamently opposed to the demands put forward by the three Land Assemblies. As Walters suggests, autonomous administration for the region was totally unacceptable to the Russian authorities.[154] However, on June 5th, the central government did approve provincial local government for Vidzeme but demanded that the official language of the governmental institutions of this administrative unit continue in Russian.[155] They also forbade any future union between Vidzeme and Latgale.

The nationalist political parties were offended by such a decree and this further enhanced the nationalist cause and demand for some form of continuity of goals and aspirations of the various political movements in relation to political autonomy.

The LSDWP and the Riga Iskorad (Council for Workers Deputies) held their own conference and under the influence of the Mensheviks in the party, passed a resolution endorsing the demands put forward by the Kurzeme and Latgalian Land Assemblies.

Previously, the majority of the LSDWP had tended to take the line adopted by Lenin on the self-determination principle for all peoples of Russia. They were however unclear if the Latvian people (the conscious proletariat) wanted to exercise this right and exactly what this right meant and implied. In 1917 when Lenin openly claimed that a small independent state such as Latvia would be a disadvantage in the class struggle, the LSDWP passed a radical resolution at their July 22nd Conference, 1917, calling for political autonomy.

> "In its concern for the interests of the Latvian proletariat, the Congress stands most firmly for a united, indivisible Latvia and vigorously demands political autonomy for Latvia,

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154 M. Walters, Lettenland: Seine Entwicklung zum Staat und die baltischen Fragen, Riga, 1923, pp. 330-31.

155 A. Bilmanis, Latvian-Russian Relations, Collected Documents, Washington DC, 1944, pp. 39-41.

> i.e. all local power in the economic, political, administrative areas....All communications with the central power of Russia are carried on through a Latvian parliament which hosts an emissary of the central (federal) parliament."[156]

Due to a general concensus of opinion between the major nationalist and socialist parties and organisations on their demands for a federal structure for Russia, a conference was held in Riga on July 30th. The conference unanimously adopted a series of resolutions calling for the right of self-determination for the Latvian peoples and the territory they occupied which they proposed would function within a federal and Democratic Russia.[157]

> "The peoples of Latvia have, like all other peoples, the right to self-determination ... Latvia constitutes a politically autonomous unit in the Democratic Republic of Latvia."[158]

They also proposed that:

> "Latgale as a distinct part of Latvia must have independent local self-governing powers in matters of language, schools and church."[159]

The political-geographical structure of the Empire and its relationship with the various heterogeneous characteristics within the state was continually being pointed out as a feasible and necessary reason for administrative re-organisation. The Latvian nationalists tended to view the Empire as an arbitrary reflection of the differing socio-economic, political and geographical needs of the various populations within its territory. E. Blanks, a National Democrat wrote:

> "...contemporary Russia is an un-natural, quite by chance and

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156 Latvijas kommunistiskā partija oktobra revolūcijā 1917, (The Latvian Communist Party in the October Revolution of 1917), Riga, 1957, pp. 191-3; cited in U. Gērmanis, 1968, op.cit., p. 49.

157 M.W. Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Baltic States, Vol.3, 'Latvia', Berkeley, 1941, pp. 399-550.

158 M. Walters, 1923, op.cit., pp. 338-339; Jaunais Laiks, 31st July - 3rd August, 1917, op.cit.

159 ibid.

> mechanically created conglomeration ... the division of Russia is necessary. Latvia has to be the least concerned with the unity of Russia ... this unity has outlived its epoch."[160]

Many nationalists were now coming round to the view that the Latvian nation could only achieve some of its group demands and aspirations by complete secession from the Russian state. However, it was obvious that if secession did take place, an independent Latvian state would inherit socio-economic, political and geographical problems of viability within the context of not only its own internal political unit but also in relation to Germany and Russia and the continuing war being fought in the Baltic.

To partly combat these problems and give a greater feasibility to secession, the question of a Latvian-Lithuanian independent Repbulic was again raised. By July, the LNDP were demanding a completely independent Latvian state viewing a Latvian-Lithuanian federation as second best and negating the idea of a federal Russia of which Latvia would be a component:

> "There is nothing in common between the culture of Russia and Latvia. Latvia has been annexed to Russia relatively recently and therefore it would not be too difficult to separate it from Russia ... a federation with Russia is not our ideal but only a compromise. Our ideal is a sovereign Latvia ... The second step down is a Latvian-Lithuanian Republic and the third step, an even lower, is a federation with Russia. Anything less than that would mean Latvia's suicide. But in a ceaseless struggle we can, at least, win a Latvian-Lithuanian Republic."[161]

It therefore appears that the LNDP saw a Latvian-Lithuanian Republic as feasible and out of which a possible Latvian state could

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160 Dzimtenes Atbalss, 31st May 1917, cited in U. Gērmanis, op.cit., p.52.

161 Dzimtenes Atbalss, 21st July 1917, ibid, p. 53.

eventually come into being.

Another LNDP member, K. Uptis, wrote in an August edition of Dzimtenes Atbalss:

> "Russia now faces total anarchy and bankruptcy. Therefore it is better that we try to separate the fate of Latvia from that of Russia ... And Latvia, like Poland and Lithuania is sufficiently large that it can ask from other European major powers a guarantee as a completely independent republic ... the realisation of this idea might be closer at hand than the chance of gaining autonomy within a Russian federal Republic. Besides that, culturally we have much greater affinity with Western Europe than with dark Russia ... there is no reason why we should give up the idea of forming a completely sovereign Latvian state."[162]

This mention of a political orientation toward the west played an important part in nationalist thinking within the ensuing eighteen months. Secession from the Empire was therefore viewed as more palatable with centrifugal tendencies orientating the focus of attention of the tauta toward the west for the attainment and realisation of their goals. This re-orientation was made more acceptable and pronounced by the very nature of the Latvian economy and its location on the periphery of the Empire with the focus of attention on the core area of Riga rather than on the interior.

By August 1917, Latvian nationalism had reached its peak having arrived at the idea of an independent state which the members saw as a reality rather than a dream to which the tauta could aspire to in the near future. By October, the Riga Democratic Bloc, which had been formed after the collapse of the Russian army, representing all political factions except the Bolshevik wing of the LSDWP, passed a resolution demanding full independence and a neutral state of Latvia. At the same time, the Iskorad of Riga passed a similar conference decision.

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162 ibid, p. 53.

With the October Revolution, it appeared that the Bolshevik concept of national self-determination was indeed abstract. By taking control of the Vidzeme Land Assembly and forming the Iskolat (Executive Committee of the Council of Workers, Soldiers and Landless of Latvia) and holding a conference in December 1917, the Bolsheviks declared Latvia a political-administrative unit on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria and an entity which would have a degree of autonomy within a Democratic Russia.[163]

Meanwhile the Riga Democratic Bloc had formed a Latvian Provincial National Council made up of representatives of the Vidzeme and Kurzeme Land Assemblies, the Latgalian Revolutionary Council and various political parties including the Agrarians, Democrats, National Democrats and Radical Democrats. On November 18th 1917, they declared Latvia independent.[164] As M.W. Graham remarked, the Latvian National Council became:

> "...the principles agency for the constructive expression of Latvian nationalism."[165]

It was therefore a conflict of interest between those within the national group who favoured secession and an economic and political orientation toward the west and others who wanted to remain part of the new Marxist-Leninist state with some degree of autonomy over their own national and territorial affairs.

> "From this point on, fate in the form of the Russian Civil War and intervention (western), took a hand in determining the outcome of the struggle."[166]

With the exception of the brief establishment of a Latvian

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163 A.N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1918-1940, Notre Dame, 1959.

164 A. Bilmanis, 1944, op.cit., pp. 42-43.

165 M.W. Graham, 1941, op.cit., p. 403.

166 S.W. Page, 1949, op.cit., p. 35.

(Bolshevik) Soviet Republic in 1919, the Latvian state came into being as a politically independent entity receiving de facto recognition by the western powers and eventually the Soviet Union.[167]

The integrative process by which the Latvian nation came into being with group attributes and an evolved goal in the attainment and control over its own politically organised territory and resources was completed. However, although the tauta had attained independence through its nationalist demands, it does not mean that it was either fully integrated as a group or that all its members wanted a sovereign Latvian state. It can be suggested that enough integration had taken place in order that the Latvian nation could achieve control over its own political system.

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167 S.W. Page, 'Lenin, the National Question and the Baltic States, 1917-19', American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 7, nr. 1, 1948, pp. 15-31.

Chapter Three

The Latvian Nation During Independence

The object of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, to determine to what degree the existence of a Latvian state aided the integrative process of the nation and the political geographical circumstances which contributed to such a process. Secondly, to illustrate how the Latvian nation and its governing élite reacted to gaining control over its own territory. The role the latter played in the integrative process will be of particular concern.

The first section surveys the relationship between the various ethnic groups, their political and social attributes and the extent to which political-geographical factors both contributed to the integration of the tauta and to an understanding of this national group's seminal role within the state.

The second section illustrates how and why nationalism manifested itself during the independence period by examining the re-allocation of resources and the re-organisation of the economy and society.

The final section assesses the contribution statehood had on both the territorial and national integration of the region and the effects of such a spatial re-organisation on the population.

Central to an understanding of the integrative process of the nation between 1920 and 1940 was the role decision-makers played within the state. It was the leaders of the nationalist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who became the governing élite of Latvia:

> "Most Baltic politicians (referring to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), whatever their political commitment, were peasants' sons, the first educational generation of their

families and thus symbols of the recent unlocking of their nation's reserves of talent."[1]

Latvian nationalist demands were not simply met by the granting of independence. Having attained statehood, the Latvian middle class who became the governing élite, re-organised the resources, population and territory of the state in order to accommodate the aspirations and goals of the nation. From their predominantly agrarian and ethnic Latvian background, these decision-makers had evolved emotional attitudes toward the tauta and tailored their political decisions accordingly on this subjective basis. The policies they put forward can therefore be partly attributed by their attachment to the nation and the socio-economic, political and geographical position of this group within the state.

As R.L. Merritt points out:

"...decision-makers may seek to determine what policies are more or less likely to lead to the end state of integration and govern their own behaviour accordingly."[2]

This pre-war generation of nationalists politically dominated the shortlived period of independence. Time restricted a younger generation from being given a chance to govern. Accordingly, the national ruling élite, with the prestige as national leaders before 1918, themselves emerged as symbols of the Latvian nation and a focus of identification and support by their national members.

The power over the internal affairs of the state exercised by this governing élite had implications which illustrates the role nationalism can play as a force in the implementation of specific types of policies. The location, resources, distribution of the population and the geographical character of the state set the parameters in which the range

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1 J Rothschild, 'On the Periphery of East-Central Europe: The Baltic States', in J. Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, Seattle, 1974, pp. 367-381, p. 372.

2 R.L. Merritt, 1974, op.cit., p. 188.

of policy decisions were formulated. The result of these decisions had spatial connotations which contributed to the political integration of the nation.

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3.1 The Integrative Structure, the Tauta, and the State's Population

The new state encompassed the Latvian political region reflecting the extent of the territorial demands as put forward by the Lativan nationalists. The bounded territorial space of Latvia more or less coincided with the old Tsarist administrative units. The state included all of Kurlandskaya and the southern half of Liflandskaya guberniya, (fig. 12). The former guberniya was divided into two provinces or apgabali[3] of Kurzeme and Zemgale. The ethno-linguistic Latvian area of Liflandskaya was renamed Vidzeme apgabals. The eastern part of the new state comprised the old Tsarist administrative uyezdy of Liutsin, Rezhitsa and Dvinsk. Also included within the boundaries of the new state was a small area to the north-east of the region which had previously been part of Pskov guberniya. This area, generally referred to as the Abrene district was just over 1,000 square kilometres in extent with a population of around 40,000, a percentage of which were ethnic Latvians.[4] The Abrene district became part of the aprinkis of Jaunlatgales and was included with Ludzas (Liutsin), Daugavpils (Dvinsk) and Rezeknes (Rēzhitsa) in Latgale apgabals.

The geographical boundaries of the state were synonymous with the geographical expanse of the Latvian nation. Article 1 of the Declaration of the Latvian State Council in establishing a provincial government of Latvia in November 1918 began:

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3 Under an Act of 1924, Latvia was divided into 19 aprinki (sing., aprinkis) which had local government rights. These administrative districts were included in four provinces or apgabali (sing., apgabals) of Latgale, Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Zemgale. The latter had no administrative functions but, along with Riga city, were treated as separate in official statistics and in state elections.

4 Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Trešā tautas skaitišana Latvija 1930 gadā, (The State Statistics Department, The Third Population Census for Latvia), Riga, 1931, pp. 132-133.

Fig 12: Latvia - Political And Administrative Divisions; 1920-40



> "Latvia, united in its ethnographic limits, is a self-governing independent Democratic Republic..."[5]

The spatial distribution and boundaries of the ethnic Latvians was therefore to be the framework and focus on which the Latvian state was to be organised.

The basis of the boundary delimitation was, as S.W. Boggs would classify,[6] anthropo-geographic, being related to the features of the societies through which the boundary passes. The criteria for delimitation was therefore clearly based on the numerical predominance of ethnic Latvian speakers.

Central to the continuing process of the political integration of the Latvian nation was the numerical and spatial predominance of this majority group within the territory of the state. As long as Latvia continued as a sovereign political entity with decision-making powers in the possession of the majority nation's elite, then the nation would be more secure and continue as a group attribute.

Throughout the period of Latvian independence, the tauta consistently accounted for nearly three quarters of the state's population. In 1920, ethnic Latvians totalled 72.6 percent of the region's total gradually rising to 75.5 percent by 1935. The non-ethnic Latvian population, composed of a large number of ethnic minorities, the

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5 A. Bilmanis, 1944, op.cit, p.59.

6 S.W. Boggs, International Boundaries, A Study in Boundary Functions and Problems, New York, 1940, p. 25. Under Boggs' scheme four major boundary types are distinguished: (a) physical types, i.e. boundaries conforming to some physical geographical features; (b) geometrical, i.e. straight lines, etc. which disregard both the physical and human geography of the area being divided; (c) complex or compound types, such as comprise lines adjusted to take into consideration a wide array of geographical factors; (d) anthropo-geographic, i.e. where the political boundaries conform to ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural characteristics of the populations through whom they pass.

largest being the Greater Russians, Jews and Baltic Germans, never exceeded 28 percent.[7]

The natural increase of the state's population remained low throughout this period. As a consequence of civil and international war, its population in 1920 was only 1.6 million in comparison with nearly 2.6 million in 1914.[8] As shown in table 15, the rate of natural increase fell throughout the period.

Table 15

The Natural Increase of the Population of Latvia Between Selected Years[9]

Year	Percentage Increase (per thousand people)
1897-1903	10.2
1921-25	7.3
1926-30	6.0
1931-35	4.4
1936-40	4.1

This fall in the rate of natural increase varied within the state, reflecting regional, ethnic and social disparities.

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7 Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Latvijas statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1920 (The State Statistics Department, The Latvian Statistical Yearbook, 1920), Riga, 1921; Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Latvijas statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, (The Latvian Statistical Yearbook, 1930), Riga, 1931; Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Ceturtā Tautas Skaitīšana Latvijā 1935 gadā, (The Fourth Population Census for Latvia, 1935), Riga, 1936.

8 ibid.

9 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 299.

Table 16

Birth Rates per thousand inhabitants by ethnic Group in 1925[10]

ethnic group	B.R. / Thousand
Latvian	20.81
German	14.33
Russian	34.88
Jewish	18.34
Poles	23.27
Lithuanian	18.71

The ethnic composition of the population remained relatively static throughout independence (table 17). The ethnic Latvians had fallen in numbers from less than 1.2 million by 1920 from over 1.3 million at the time of the 1897 enumeration.[11] With the return of war-time refugees, the 1925 Census registered an increase amongst the Latvian nation. From 1925 onwards, the population increase amongst the Latvian nation is solely accountable by natural increase as there was little migration to and from this state by this ethnic group.

The national minorities never posed a numerical threat to the Latvian nation. As a consequence of the war and migrations from the region, the Baltic German population was halved between 1897 and 1920. In the earlier years of independence, due to their decline in socio-economic and political status, a large number emigrated to Germany. The Baltic German community which remained declined in number as a result of a much reduced birth rate and aging population.

After an initial heavy demographic loss and transfers of population, the Greater Russians regained in numerical strength mainly due to a high birth rate as a consequence of being composed of a large number of peasantry. Their numbers increased between 1920 and 1925 when a

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10 Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1925, (The Latvian Statistical Yearbook, 1925), Riga, 1926.

11 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g., St. Petersburg, 1897-1904, vols. 5, 19, 21; Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1920, op.cit.

Internal Copy

Thesis

Errata

p.205 ~~insert note 5. A. Bilmanis, 1944, op.cit., p.59~~

208 total number of the population for Latvia in 1935 should be I,950,502

~~339 19th Party Congress should read 9th Party Congress~~

ethnic group								
Latvians								
Baltic Germans								
Russians								
Belorussians								
Jews								
Poles								
Lithuanians							22,913	1.2
Others	65,817	4.0	18,047	1.0	17,779	0.9	17,039	0.8
Total	1,596,131		~~1,844,805~~ 1,950,502		1,900,045		1,900,502	

12 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1920, op.cit., 1925, op.cit., 1930, op.cit., p. 3, 1936, op.cit, pp.8-9.

large number were allowed to return to Latvia from the Soviet Union. Their numbers increased steadily throughout independence but never exceeded more than 11 percent of the state's population.

The other larger minorities in the country, the Jews, Belorussians, and Poles, fluctuated in number generally declining as a percentage of the total population as time progressed.

The spatial distribution of the Latvian nation reflected the geographical extent of the state. The contiguity and even distribution of the tauta throughout the territory coupled with the irregular distribution of other ethnic groups, gave a cohesiveness and degree of ethnic homogeneity throughout the region which enhanced the territory remaining an integral part of the state and the Latvian nation as the valid claimant to the political unit of Latvia on the basis of national self-determination.

The even distribution of the Latvian nation is reflected in the density of the tauta in each apgabals.

Table 18

Density of ethnic Latvians and Total Population of the State in 1935[13]

(Density per Square Kilometre)

apgabali	Area of Province	total population of province	Inhabitants of the state, per Km^2	Latvian ethnic group, per Km^2
Vidzeme*	23,280	791,310	34.0	26.8
Kurzeme	13,209	292,659	22.2	19.2
Zemgale	13,621	299,369	22.0	18.2
Latgale	15,679	567,164	36.2	22.2
Latvia	65,791	950,502	29.6	22.4

* Including the city of Riga.

The ethnic Latvians also dominated as a total percentage of the

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13 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 6, 8, 9.

inhabitants in each aprinkis. There were, however, marked regional variations. The most ethnic Latvian aprinki were in Vidzeme where throughout independence, they constituted over 90 percent of the population, (fig. 13).

In Kurzeme and Zemgale, with the exception of Illūkstes aprinkis, ethnic Latvians consisted of at least 75 percent of the aprinkis population.

Outwith Latgale and Illūkstes, the rural areas were overwhelmingly ethnic Latvian with only small pockets of ethnic minorities. In the larger towns of Riga, Liepāja, Jelgava, and Ventspils, the ethnic Latvians constituted sizeable majorities, (table 19). The smaller towns of this area, varying in size from 2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, were even more markedly ethnic Latvian. This was particularly the case in the urban centres of Vidzeme where the seven largest ethnic Latvian urban majorities were located. In each of these seven towns, this group constituted between 90 to 95 percent of the population.[14]

It was in Eastern Latvia that the ethnic Latvian population was less dominant. In the Latgalian aprinki of Daugavpils, Rēzeknes, Ludzas, Jaunlatgales and the adjoining Zemgalian aprinkis of Illūkstes, the ethnic Latvian population generally varied from between 50 to 60 percent of the population. The lowest percentage of ethnic Latvians in any aprinkis was recorded in 1925 in Illūkstes when only 43.7 percent of the population belonged to this group.[15] Even in the larger urban areas of this apgabals, ethnic Latvians totalled only a third of the population of Daugavpils, Rēzekne and Ludza.

In general, there were three specific geographical areas in which the various ethnic minorities were located. These were, the larger towns, particularly Riga; rural Latgalia and Illūkstes; and to a lesser degree, the border areas of the state.

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14 The seven towns were Valmiera, Valka, Madona, Cēsis, Limbaži, Rujiena and Smiltene, (see fig. 12).

15 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1925, op.cit.



Fig. 13: Percentage Ethnic Latvian In Each Aprinkis 1925

The Russians were concentrated in the rural areas of Latgale and Illūkstes, (fig. 14). In Jaunlatgales, which had the largest number of ethnic Russians, they totalled 45 percent of the population in 1925. In the remaining areas of Eastern Latvia, between 15 to 35 percent of each aprinkis were Russian. In the rest of Latvia, only the city of Riga had a considerable number of ethnic Russians. In 1925, they totalled 8.2 percent of the cities' population falling to around 7 percent by the 1930's.[16]

Table 19

Latvia: Ethnic Composition of Towns over 10,000 inhabitants in 1930[17]

		- - - - - - percentage - - - - - -							
Town	Population	Lat-vian	Russ.	Balt. Ger.	Jews	Belo-russ.	Lith.	Pole	oth
Riga	377,912	60.3	7.4	11.7	11.2	1.3	1.8	4.4	1.
Liepāja	57,238	64.6	2.9	9.9	13.8	0.6	3.2	4.3	0.
Daugavpils	43,226	27.0	19.5	1.3	26.9	2.3	0.6	20.8	1.
Jelgava	33,048	77.8	3.6	7.8	6.0	0.8	1.9	1.5	0.
Ventspils	17.253	82.6	1.2	6.3	7.4	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.
Rēzekne	12,680	36.3	23.5	0.7	28.2	1.4	0.1	9.5	0.

The other ethnic minorities, which in 1935 totalled less than 6 percent of the population, were generally located in Latgale and Illūkstes. The predominantly rural Belorussians constituted nearly 12 percent of the population of Illūkstes while in the adjoining aprinki of Daugavpils and Ludzas they were also similarly well represented. The Polish minority were also concentrated in Illūkstes and Daugavpils. However this group, some 60 percent of them, lived in urban Latvia constituting over 20 percent of the population in the south-eastern Latvian towns of Daugavpils, Griva and Krāslava. The predominantly rural Lithuanians resided in the rural areas of Zemgale, particularly in Illūkstes.[18]

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16 ibid

17 K. Apīnis, Latvijas pilsetu vēsture (A History of Latvian Towns), Riga, 1931, pp. 96-99.

18 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9.



Fig. 14: Percentage Ethnic Russian In Each Aprinkis 1925

An important feature in the demographic structure of Latvia was that few ethnic minorities were absorbed into the state. The border areas also reiterated this phenomenon. A number of Lithuanians, Poles, Estonians and Russians were located on the periphery of the state and adjacent to states in which their ethnic group predominated. However, their heterogeneous distribution within the Latvian political region meant that any claims by states bordering Latvia to territory on ethnic criteria would only be on the basis of absorbing very small tracts of land and people. Annexing an entire ethnic group could only feasibly be achieved by the disintegration of the Latvian state.

The Latvian-Lithuanian border which ran for some 570 kilometres was defined on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria generally following the old Tsarist administrative boundaries between Kurlandskaya and Vilna _gubernii_.[19] As early as 1920, the Latvian and Lithuanian governments accepted an initial boundary line.[20] In 1921, an independent commission led by J.W. Simpson, drew up the exact location of this boundary which was duly accepted by both regimes.[21]

Of the 25,533 Lithuanians residing in the Latvian political region in 1920, nearly a third were located in Riga. The rest of this ethnic minority were located in the rural border areas of Zemgale where the boundary was difficult to define due to the inter-mixing of rural communities.

The number of Poles living in the territory of Latvia was more a product of the historical connection of Latgalia with Poland rather than a poorly drawn boundary line between these two respective states.[23] This border was contiguous with the _aprinki_ of Illūkstes and Daugavpils, where in the former 13 percent of the total population were Polish. The

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19 I.G. Ring, _Latviya_, Leningrad, 1936, p. 52.

20 Border Treaty of September 25th, 1920.

21 Protocol of March 20th, 1921. Lithuania received small portions of the Rucavu commune, access to the Baltic Sea by gaining possession of the Polangen area and small tracts of the Missa and upper Venta Rivers.

22 _Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1920_, _op.cit_.

23 Ring, _op.cit_., p. 52.

majority of Poles did not live in this border area. A third of all Poles were located in Riga while just over 16 percent of them resided in the towns of Liepāja and 18 percent in Daugavpils.[24]

In Autumn 1919, the Latvian and Estonian governments had appointed a commission to define their common 375 kilometre boundary.[25] With the exception of the border town of Valka, the findings of the detailed report were accepted. Throughout the period of Latvian independence, the Estonian community in the country numbered only 7,000 persons.[26] Of this total, nearly a third lived in Riga, the remaining majority residing in the northern rural areas of Valmieras and Valkas aprinki.

Considering that the vast majority of the population living in the location of the Estonian-Latvian border were rural and that no formal boundary between the two ethnic communities had existed in the recent past, the ease by which a boundary could be delimited on the grounds of ethno-linguistic criteria was remarkable. It was only in the rural settlements of Ainazi and Ape that over 15 percent of the population were Estonian, the overwhelming majority being Latvian.[27]

The town of Valka[28] lay directly on the proposed border line. It was this town that became the main source of contention between the two countries and the only major boundary dispute in which the Latvian state was involved.

In 1897, Valka had a population of nearly 11,000 evenly inhabited by both Latvians and Estonians.[29] The town was claimed by both regimes on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria, economic and locational

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24 K. Apinis, op.cit., pp. 96-99, pp. 146-147, 183-185, & p. 244.

25 Ring, op.cit., p. 52.

26 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., pp. 4-5; 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

27 K. Apinis, op.cit., pp. 96-97.

28 The town of Valk (Russian) was referred to as Walk by the Baltic German community, and was re-named Valga by the Estonians and Valka by the Latvians.

29 Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g,

situation and through recent events in the area. The Estonians claimed the town on the basis that it was an important railway junction serving Estonia and that this urban centre was economically dependent on their country. They pointed out that on both historical and geographical criteria, it was linked to Northern Liflandskaya and that it was separated from Vidzeme by marshland. The Estonians had also recently won the town back from the Bolshevik Army. The Latvian government pointed out the indispensability of this market town to the large ethnic Latvian farming community.

On the 24th of December 1919, the Estonian military authorities had served a notice on the Latvian command in Valka requiring all Latvian government and local authorities to be clear of the town by the 29th of December, 1919.[30] Action on this ultimatum was delayed by the advice of the Western powers and eventually an independent commission under Tallents was appointed to arbitrate in the matter.

As a result of Tallents' recommendations, Valka was eventually divided on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria, a slightly larger area of the town going to Estonia.[31] As a result of this division, there were serious disagreements, the Latvian and Estonian governments resigning over the decision but both quickly took office again.[32]

In 1925, the Latvian town of Valka had only 2.4 percent of its 3,339 inhabitants Estonian while over 94 percent were ethnic Latvian.[33] By the late 1920's and early 1930's, the towns division eventually resulted in the re-orientation of both the Valka and Valga communities toward their respective countries.[34]

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30 S. Tallents, Man and Boy, London, 1934, pp. 371-79.

31 ibid, p. 377.

32 ibid, p. 377.

33 K. Apīnis, op.cit., pp. 96-97.

34 Tallents, op.cit., p. 378.

Much of the border between Russia and Latvia ran through marshy stretches that marked the eastern confines of the European plateau. The Latgalian border areas, with the exception of the Abrene district, were ceded to Latvia on the basis of ethno-linguistic predominance of Latvians. This area included 142,526 Russians or 26.4 percent of the total population of Latgale. In the rest of the Latvian political region, there were 51,122 ethnic Russians of which 27,648 resided in Riga.[35]

The Abrene district which became part of Jaunlatgales aprinkis contained a number of ethnic Latvians but with an overwhelming Russian majority. Historical maps illustrate that this area belonged to Russia proper for centuries, administered in recent times as part of Pskov guberniya.[36]

The 1930 Latvian Census gives the first indication of the actual breakdown by ethnic group for specific areas within Jaunlatgales. Data is given for each of the thirteen pagasti.[37] The five eastern pagasti of Kacēnu, Linavas, Purvmalas, Augšpils and Gauru constitute part of the previous area of Pskov guberniya. As can be seen from table 20, these pagasti all have sizeable Russian majorities in a relatively isolated and overwhelmingly rural area of Latvia. Less than 4,000 ethnic Latvians were located in this area (fig. 12). The remaining eight western pagasti and the small town of Balvu had large Latvian majorities.

The inclusion of the Abrene district into Latvia is therefore the only major anomaly in the boundary definition of the state. This situation was rectified in 1940 when with the absorption of the Latvian political region into the Soviet Union and the subsequent creation of a

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35 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., pp. 4-5

36 Glavnoe Upravlenie geodezii i kartografii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Atlas Pskovskoi Oblasti, Moscow, 1969.

37 A pagasts was a small rural district below an aprinkis in the administrative hierarchy. There were 517 of these pagasti in Latvia.

Table 20

The Ethnic Composition of the Pagasti in Jaunlatgales Aprinkis, 1930[38]

Abrene District	Population	percentage Latvian	Russian	other
Augspils pagasts	8,846	7.0	90.7	2.3
Gauru "	11,249	3.7	93.5	2.8
Kacēnu "	10,337	17.6	81.5	0.9
Linavas "	6,713	3.7	95.7	0.6
Purvmalas "	6,579	11.6	87.4	1.0
Western Jaunlatgale				
Balvu (town)	1,589	62.9	8.9	28.2
Baltinavas pagasts	12,189	80.8	16.2	3.0
Balvu "	10,510	75.3	14.9	8.8
Bērzpils "	6,246	97.8	0.3	1.9
Liepnas "	4,405	86.3	7.8	5.9
Rugāju "	7,111	84.0	4.8	10.2
Tilzas "	6,184	93.2	3.8	3.0
Vilakas "	12,396	89.8	3.9	6.3

Latvian Soviet Republic, the Abrene district was ceded into the R.S.F.S.R. The inclusion of this small Latvian minority into the Latvian state did however help keep alive and foster a Latvian identity for the few ethnic Latvians of Abrene. The criteria of the boundaries of the Latvian state therefore rested on the existence of the Latvian nation.

The territorial and numerical distribution of the ethnic Latvians and their spatial relationship to the various national minorities had important political geographical repercussions. Firstly, the spatial pattern and numerical supremacy of the tauta in relation to the various ethnic groups contributes toward an understanding of the continuing process of integration at the national level. Secondly, security in number and distribution partly accounts for the decision-makers' policy

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38 Trešā Tautas Skaitisana Latvija 1930 gadā, op.cit., pp. 132-133.

toward the ethnic minorities and the form this took. The remaining part of this section examines these two points.

A spatial analysis of some of the factors which both contribute toward a Latvian national identity illustrate the importance political-geographical circumstances had on the integration of the nation.

Language continued to play a central role in the integrative process of the tauta. The Latvian language was recognised as the official language of the state. By so doing, the communicative process was enhanced amongst the Latvian speakers which not only made information flow more easily within this linguistic community but also strengthened the concept of the Latvian peoples' notion of individuality which they saw as residing in their language and a symbol of their nation.

As has already been pointed out in the previous chapter, the language groups in the region were more or less synonymous with the ethnic groups not only in terms of actual numbers but also in spatial distribution. The 1930 Latvian Census gives the first concrete empirical evidence of this relationship between ethnic group and language.

Table 21

The Percentage of Ethnic Groups in the total State Population compared with the percentage of the Population using corresponding language within the Family[39]

ethnic group	% of ethnic group in the state	% of population using a corresponding language within family
Latvians	73.54	73.35
Russians	10.63	13.29
Belorussians	1.89	1.05
Baltic Germans	3.68	4.29
Jews	4.95	4.10
Poles	3.11	2.60
Estonians	0.40	0.23
Lithuanians	1.36	0.82
Other	0.44	0.27

39 ibid, pp. 453-458

This data indicates that although there is a close inter-relationship between ethnic group and language spoken that there were a few anomalies. In the case of there being a larger number of linguistic Russians than ethnic Russians, it would appear that particularly in Latgale, a number of ethnic Latvians, Jews, Poles and ethnic Belorussians spoke Russian.

In comparing the 1925 census with the 1930 census, a considerable change in the relationship of language to ethnic group is shown. From the data in table 22 it can be seen that the most linguistically and ethnically integrated group were the Latvians followed by the Russians, Germans and Jews. At the time of the 1930 census, the remaining percentages of families who did not use the language of their ethnic group are shown below. This large percentage in some ethnic groups using another language other than that of their ethnic language is partly accountable by the spatial distribution of the individual ethnic groups. The majority of ethnic Latvians who used another language other than their own ethnic language lived in Latgale and Illūkstes aprinkis where the pressure to communicate in Russian was greater than elsewhere in the region.

Table 22

The Percentage of Families Using Ethnic Language in the Family, 1925 & 1930[40]

Ethnic Group	1925	1930	1925 - 1930 % change
Latvians	97.39	97.53	+ 0.14
Russians	95.87	96.54	+ 0.67
Belorussians	92.76	46.33	-46.43
Germans	88.95	89.68	+ 0.73
Jews	84.85	82.71	- 2.14
Poles	69.60	68.65	- 0.95
Estonians	55.16	54.13	- 1.03
Lithuanians	52.64	57.13	+ 4.49

40 ibid, pp. 453-58.

Table 23

Second Dominant Language in the Ethnic Groups as a Percentage of the Total language Spoken within that Ethnic Group[41]

Ethnic Group	Second Language		Third Language	
Latvians	Russian	1.35%	-	
Russians	Latvian	2.87%	-	
Belorussians	Russian	46.06%	Latvian	4.66%
Baltic Germans	Latvian	8.07%	-	
Jews	German	10.45%	-	
Poles	Russian	20.03%	Latvian	8.19%
Estonians	Latvian	34.12%	-	
Lithuanians	Latvian	31.78%	-	

In the case of the Baltic Germans, there was greater pressure to speak Latvian in Northern Kurzeme and North-West Vidzeme where more or less all the population were ethnic Latvian speakers. Likewise the Russians were more likely to communicate in Latvian in the areas where Latvians overwhelmingly predominated.

The other minority groups were under even greater pressure to communicate in a language other than that of their ethno-linguistic group. The Poles in all of Latvia with the exception of Liepāja and Illūkstes, the Jews in Riga, Kurzeme and Zemgale, the Lithuanians in Vidzeme and the Belorussians throughout Latvia with the exception of Ludzas aprinkis, all tended to speak the language of another ethnic group which was usually Russian in Eastern Latvia and Latvian in the rest of the country.

Although there is a relationship between ethnic group and language, it is less marked with the minorities than it is with the ethnic Latvians. The role language played within the general organisation of the state also helps explain this phenomena besides just simply the numerical and spatial predominance of ethnic Latvian speakers.

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41 ibid, pp. 453-58.

Although other languages were recognised in schools, law courts and in the general running of the country, the official status accorded to the Latvian language throughout the independence period meant that this vernacular became the language of social mobility. Ornstein points out that the Latvians as well as the Estonians and Lithuanians, were within one generation able to adapt their language for the:

"...multifarious purposes of a modern, technological society."[42]

There were three main dialects of Latvian. In the western parts of Latvia, there was the tāmnieki dialect, in central Latvia another dialect and in eastern Latvia a dialect referred to as 'High Latvian' or Augšzeme dialect. The difference amongst these dialects was not enough to constitute an obstacle to communication between them.

With the Latvian language traumatically becoming the central means of communication within the region, coupled with the continuing process of modernisation characterised by the standardisation of the literary language, increased spatial and social mobility of ethnic Latvians and the development of mass communication, a gradual modification of these dialects came about. Independence thus speeded up the process toward a common Latvian language.

As the language of social mobility and of the Latvian nation, the Latvian language developed in importance within the territory. In 1925, it was spoken by 83.6 percent of the population. Within the region there were variations. It was spoken by the vast majority in Vidzeme (97.4%) and by the fewest in Latgale (61.2%). In the towns the percentages were higher. This was particularly the case in Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Zemgale where over 95 percent spoke Latvian in Cēsis, Jelgava, Tukums, Ventspils, Kuldiga, and Bauska. In the larger towns of Riga and Liepāja, between

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42 J. Ornstein, 'Patterns of Language Planning in the New States', World Politics, vol. 17, nr. 1, 1964, pp. 40-49.

85 to 90 percent could speak Latvian. In contrast, in the Latgalian towns of Rēzekne, Ludza, and Daugavpils, with their more ethnically mixed population, only 35 percent to just over 50 percent of the population could speak the official language of the state.[43]

Knowledge of the Latvian language amongst the various ethnic groups further illustrates the impact statehood had on the population. In 1925, just over 60 percent of ethnic Latvians had knowledge of another language. The percentage of ethnic Latvians knowing no other language besides their native ethnic tongue was related to the spatial distribution of minorities within the state. In Riga, only 35 percent of ethnic Latvian speakers knew no other language while in Latgale the figure was 49 percent. In the more ethnically Latvian areas of Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Western Zemgale, the knowledge of another language amongst this ethno-linguistic group was even lower. This was despite literacy rates amongst the population of these areas being higher than elsewhere in the state. In Zemgale, 63.5 percent of ethnic Latvians of that apgabals had no knowledge of another language while in Vidzeme the corresponding figure was 70.6 percent and in Kurzeme, 75.6 percent.[44]

Bilingualism or even trilingualism was therefore more frequent in the ethnically heterogeneous areas of the country. In Latgale, knowledge of at least a second language was due to a large number of ethnic groups living within the same community and teaching of a second language in a number of schools in the area.

There was some pressure placed on the national minorities and ethnic Latvians residing in ethnically mixed areas of the state to communicate in at least another tongue. However, due to their numerical predominance, the official status of the Latvian language and their relatively even distribution throughout the state, the ethnic Latvians

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43 Tresā Tautas Skaitisana Latvija 1930 gadā, op.cit., pp. 453-458.

44 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1925, op.cit., pp. 381-384.

had the second largest percentage of persons who could speak only their native tongue. The ethnic Russians, with their lower literacy rates and spatial concentration in specific areas of the country, had the largest percentage of their group, over 50 percent, who could only speak their native tongue.

With time, the population of the state became more aware of the necessity and importance of communication in Latvian. Even between such a short period from 1925 to 1930, knowledge of Latvian increased dramatically amongst the various ethnic groups. Amongst the more socially mobile and literate ethnic groups such as the Baltic Germans and Jews, knowledge of Latvian increased from 74.1 percent to 80.5 percent and from 46.2 percent to 59.2 percent respectively. Knowledge of Latvian amongst the Russians increased by only 3 percent in this five year period reaching nearly 16 percent in 1930. The smaller ethnic groups, who tended to be more spatially mobile within the country, also increased their knowledge of Latvian. From 1925 to 1930, the Lithuanians increased their knowledge of Latvian from 72.9 percent to 81.7 percent while 29.4 percent of the Polish community could speak Latvian compared with 42.5 percent in 1930.[45]

The pressure placed on the national minorities to communicate in the Latvian language and the resulting increase of knowledge of that language amongst these ethnic groups does not mean that linguistic assimilation took place. Indeed from the statistical evidence presented, it is apparent that the ethnic groups retained their native language.

Integral to the communication process amongst the ethnic Latvian linguistic group was the importance of education and literacy. As Gellner stresses:

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45 ibid, pp. 381-384; Trešā Tautas Skaitišana Latvija 1930 gada, op.cit.

"Modern loyalties are centred on political units whose boundaries are defined by language...of an educational system."[46]

As with neighbouring Estonia, literacy in Latvia was exceptionally high for this period in time as it had been in the late nineteenth century. The spatial distribution of literacy within the region was therefore directly related to the impact of historical antecedence in the form of the Lutheran church and the Baltic German influence.

Throughout the independence era, literacy rates were particularly high; over 90 percent in Vidzeme, in the northern aprinki of Kurzeme and in Jelgavas, (fig. 15). In Eastern Latvia, with its non-Lutheran population, literacy rates were markedly lower. Literacy was slightly higher in the Latgalian urban centres compared to the surrounding rural areas. This was mainly due to a large percentage of literate Jews in the more ethnically mixed populations of Daugavpils, Rēzekne and Ludza. Elsewhere in the Latvian political region, there was little difference between literacy in the urban and rural areas.

Table 24

The Percentage Literate by Ethnic Group in each Apgabals, 1930*[47]

	Riga city	Vidzeme	Kurzeme	Zemgale	Latgale	Latvia
Latvian	94.4	92.5	85.9	85.8	57.5	83.8
Baltic German	98.4	93.9	92.0	92.3	96.7	96.4
Russian	84.9	68.1	81.8	61.7	55.2	61.5
Belorussian	78.1	68.7	74.8	58.7	54.2	59.7
Jews	92.8	85.3	89.0	83.1	81.5	88.0
Poles	81.2	77.0	81.5	66.9	65.6	71.7
Lithuanians	71.9	73.8	67.5	62.5	60.7	66.3
Estonians	95.8	90.5	88.0	91.7	89.0	92.1
Total Population	92.8	91.7	87.5	82.6	58.7	81.2

* over the age of 10 years

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46 E. Gellner, Thought and Change, London, 1964, p. 163.

47 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 10-13.

Fig 15: The Average Percentage Literate In Each Aprinkis 1920-1935*



* Literacy data based on total population over 10 years of age.

Source: I. G. Ring, Latviya, Leningrad, 1936.

The degree of literacy amongst the ethno-linguistic Latvians was also related to their location within the region. Over 80 percent of this group were literate. With the exception of Latgale and Illūkstes, literacy rates amongst the ethnic Latvians exceeded 80 percent in each aprinkis. In the remaining five eastern aprinki, literacy amongst this community varied from between 64.8 percent in Illūkstes to 56 percent in Ludza.[48]

At the time of the 1930 census, the highest literacy rates were recorded amongst the Baltic Germans, Jews and Estonians with the Russians and Belorussians having the lowest. The latter two groups that resided in Latgale and Illūkstes had particularly low levels of literacy.

The ability to read and write was especially high amongst all the ethnic groups in Riga compared with their respective ethnic averages for the whole of the Political Region.

This evidently high level of literacy amongst the majority of ethnic Latvians and the rest of the population was in itself part of the continuation of the modernisation process. Throughout independence, literacy rates increased in all areas of the state. Increases were particularly dramatic in Latgale. In 1920, 50 percent of this apgabals' population were literate. Between 1920 and 1925, this figure increased by over 10 percent. By 1935, around 75 percent of the population of Latgale over the age of ten could both read and write.[49]

Vernacular literacy plus a vernacular education were therefore essential in order to maintain and secure support for the nation. The importance accorded to the Latvian language and its integral connection with the numerical and spatial distribution of the tauta meant that statehood contributed both to the preservation and expansion of this group's native tongue and as a symbol of its unity and uniqueness.

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48 ibid, pp. 10-13

49 M. Skujenieks, 1938, op.cit., p. 14.

In contrast to language, religion was not a mainstay of Latvian nationalism. From the outset, the state declared that there was to be no state religion and made no provision for compulsary religious instruction in education. In part, this decision was related to the heterogeneity of religious affiliation in Latvia which cut across ethno-linguistic groupings. In 1930, 56.6 percent of the state's population declared themselves as Lutherans while the corresponding figures for Roman Catholics were 23.7 percent and 8.9 percent for Russian Orthodoxy.[50]

The Latvian nation continued to be divided on religious identification. The majority were Lutheran but with a substantial Roman Catholic minority. The majority of the latter Latvians were located in Latgalia and Illūkstes _aprinkis_ where it can be assumed that both historical antecedence and the continued contact between local communities

Table 25

Religious Affiliation by Percentage of Ethnic Group, 1935[51]

Religion	Latvians	Russians	Jews	Baltic Germans	Poles	Belo-russians	Lithuan-ians
Lutheran	68.3	0.3	-	94.8	0.9	0.4	2.2
Roman Catholic	26.3	1.0	-	2.0	97.0	52.7	95.8
Orthodox	3.9	50.1	-	0.9	1.6	31.7	0.7
Old Believers	0.2	48.3	-	-	0.3	15.0	0.3
Jewish	0.0	0.0	99.7	0.1	0.1	-	-
Others	1.3	0.3	0.3	2.2	0.4	0.2	1.0

enhanced the pressure on specific ethnic groups to adopt and continue the predominant religion of that area. In Latgalia, 57.5 percent of its total population were Roman Catholic with the remainder being either Orthodox or Old Believers.[52] (fig. 16) In the rest of the political region, the

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50 _Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930_, _op.cit._, pp. 8-9.

51 _Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936_, _op.cit._, pp. 8-9.

52 _ibid_, pp. 8-9.

Fig. 16: Percentage Protestant In Each Aprinkis 1930



Source: Based on data in, Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

area was predominantly Protestant particularly in rural Vidzeme and Kurzeme where the vast majority of the population were ethno-linguistic Latvians.

As with the Roman Catholic adherents, the eastern areas of the state had the highest percentage of Russian Orthodox and Old Believers. The largest number of Old Believers were found in the south-eastern aprinki of Daugavpils, Rēzekne and Illūkstes while the majority of Russian Orthodox were located in Jaunlatgales where they comprised nearly 50 percent of the total population and in adjoining Ludzas and Madonas their respective adherents totalled 23.8 percent and 17.9 percent of the aprinkis' total in 1930.[53]

With some of the ethnic groups, notably the Jews, Baltic Germans and Lithuanians, religion played a more significant role in group identification.

There is little doubt that geographical circumstances did play a function in determining religious affiliation. In the case of the ethnic Latvians, there was greater pressure to identify with Catholicism in Latgale than elsewhere in the region. Non-Lutheran Germans were also found in Latgale and Illūkstes while the same was the case with non-Roman Catholic Poles and Lithuanians in Vidzeme and Kurzeme.

By recognising the Lutheran religion as either the official state religion or as the only religion of the ethnic Latvians, the Roman Catholic Latvians would have become even more alienated from the vast majority of Latvians. By granting the various churches of Latvia autonomy from the state and by signing a Concordat with the Vatican in May 30th, 1922,[54] thus recognising the Catholic church as a corporate body, the ethnic Latvian Roman Catholic community in Latgale were not divorced from

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53 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

54 League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 17 (1923), No.443, Concordat between the Holy See and the Latvian Government, p. 367.
In 1934, the Ulmanis Dictatorship passed a law which imposed a certain degree of state control over the churches.

the rest of the ethnic Latvians on religious grounds. Religion therefore did not become an important integrative factor in the continuance of the Latvian nation nor did it emerge as a divisive element toward destroying the unity and group cohesiveness of the tauta.

An indication of the importance such factors as ethnic background, language, and religion played in defining the members of the tauta is illustrated by the number of marriages within and between the various ethnic groups. In the case of the ethnic Latvians, there was very little inter-ethnic marriage. Very few Latvians married ethnic Russians and it can be assumed that the number of Latvian-Russian marriages would derive mainly from the Latgalian area.

The ethno-linguistic Latvians absorbed very few other ethnic groups through marriage due to the numerical and spatial predominance of the Latvians and the tendency of the larger minorities, particularly the Russians and the Jews, also to marry within their ethno-linguistic groupings.

Table 26

Inter and intra ethnic Marriages, 1935[55]

(% of total Marriages within group)

ethnic group (males)	ethnic group (females)							
	Latvian	Balt. German	Russian	Jews	Poles	Lith.	Eston.	Others
Latvian	97.3	24.5	17.9	0.9	35.8	48.0	64.0	16.7
Balt. German	1.0	66.4	1.2	0.2	1.7	1.4	6.4	4.1
Russian	2.6	4.0	74.3	0.4	14.8	7.5	4.9	8.1
Jews	-	0.8	0.1	98.0	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.2
Poles	1.4	1.8	4.6	0.2	41.3	6.7	0.4	1.8
Lithuanians	0.9	0.8	1.2	0.1	5.7	35.5	0.4	0.4
Estonians	0.2	0.3	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	22.8	0.4
Others	0.2	1.4	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.7	67.3

55 A. Darbiņš, & V. Vītiņš, 1947, op.cit., p. 17.

Influenced by the idea that it is a democratic right for peoples determined by their national group to control their own destiny, the Latvian government granted a degree of autonomy to the larger ethnic minorities. From the outset, it was clear that the various ethnic groups could not be given territorial autonomy based on the majority group of a particular area. Any form of federalism defined on an ethno-linguistic basis was impossible due to the spatial predominance of the ethnic Latvians throughout the country and the heterogeneous distribution of the national minorities.

The only palatable solution was therefore to grant the larger ethnic minorities personal autonomy based not on territory but around the political, social, and cultural institutions which were integral to the continuation of these ethnic groups. In this respect, the ideas of Bauer and Renner on 'territorial national-cultural autonomy' were integral to granting the ethnic minorities an identity and sense of community based on language, religion, and education.

By promoting this policy of non-assimilation between ethnic groups, the government secured a degree of support and loyalty amongst the ethnic minorities for the continuation of the Latvian state. It also enhanced the Latvian nationalist goal of striving toward separativeness and distinctiveness amongst nations.

Cultural autonomy was granted to the Russians, Baltic Germans, Jews, Belorussians and Poles with power over their own linguistic, cultural, and educational spheres. The ethnic groups were given the right to form councils which received a specific quota from the state budget for educational purposes. They could open and operate their own schools, organise social, economic and cultural associations, and print and

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circulate their own newspapers and books.[56] The rights of the ethnic minorities were further secured by Latvia's successful application to join the League of Nations in September 21st, 1921. Eighteen months later, in a declaration to the League of Nations, the Latvian government agreed to respect the rights of minorities as laid down by the League.[57]

The electoral system, introduced into the Latvian constitution in June 1922, also favoured the minorities. It guaranteed them representation in the Latvian parliament, the Saeima. Based on a complicated system of proportional representation with any five persons being able to register as a political party, this ultra-liberal law resulted in a large number of political groupings seeking representation to the one hundred strong membership of the Saeima.[58] In the 1922 elections, twenty-two political parties were represented in the Saeima with the number of parties in the subsequent second (1925-28), third (1928-31) and fourth (1931-34) parliaments varying between twenty-four and twenty-seven. An average of between forty to forty-five political organisations stood for election in this 1922-34 period.

Having formed their own political bloc in the Saeima, the ethnic minority parties were directly concerned with promoting the socio-economic, cultural and political interests of their various groups as a counter-blast to the larger political parties who were often more concerned with promoting the wishes and aspirations of the Latvian nation.

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56 A Law of December 9th 1919, provided that Latvian should also be the language of the Law Courts and permitted the use of Russian and German where necessary. On December 18th, 1919, scholastic autonomy was made law. Royal Institute of International Affairs Report, The Baltic States, London, 1938, pp. 33-35.

57 Declaration of the 7th of July, 1923. League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 4, November 1923, p. 1275.

58 There were five electoral districts in Latvia; Riga city, Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale and Latgale. Representation to the Saeima was in direct proportion to the percentage of total vote each political party obtained.

The minorities tended to vote in the Saeima in accordance with whichever party or bloc had the most to offer them. The Latvian émigre historian, Bilmanis, claims that this state of affairs was related to the ethnic minorities, "economic ambitions" and "lack of interest in Latvian national unity."[59]

Political parties were formed out of the larger ethnic minority groups. Some of these national minorities, such as the Russians and the Jews, had several political parties reflecting a wide array of socio-economic, regional and ideological interests within their ethnic group.

Table 27

Election Results and Representation to the Saeima, 1922-1934[60]

	Percentage of Total Vote			
Political grouping	1st Saeima 1922	2nd Saeima 1925	3rd Saeima 1928	4th Saeima 1931
Left Wing	37.13 (38)*	35.67 (37)	34.89 (36)	27.14 (28)
Agrarian bloc	16.17 (17)	15.03 (16)	14.97 (16)	12.25 (14)
Latgalian parties	12.76 (13)	12.91 (12)	12.46 (12)	13.68 (13)
Centre Group	9.20 (9)	9.18 (11)	9.15 (9)	16.75 (19)
Right Wing	7.90 (8)	8.71 (8)	8.52 (8)	5.52 (5)
Minorities	14.96 (15)	16.64 (15)	16.85 (18)	18.13 (17)
others	1.28 (-)	1.86 (1)	3.36 (1)	6.55 (4)

* Data in brackets refers to the number of party representatives to each Saeima.

A spatial examination of the voting patterns at the 1925 Saeima elections[61] gives some indication of political alignments, where the

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59 A. Bilmanis, (1951), op.cit., p. 346.

60 Valsts Statistikā Pārvalde, Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1922 gadā, (The State Statistics Department, The Latvian Republic Parliamentary Elections, 1922), Riga, 1923; Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, Riga, 1926; Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas gadā 1931, Riga, 1932; Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1928 gada, Riga, 1929.

61 A study of the election results during Latvian independence indicates similar spatial trends and voting patterns. The 1925 election will therefore be taken to illustrate electoral support.

major parties drew their support - ethnically, geographically, socially and economically - and the degree to which ethnic cleavages helped maintain the integration of the tauta. Such a study also helps illustrate the importance of ethnicity in defining various political parties and the dominating influence national identities had on the politics of the state.

The largest of the ethnic minority parties was the Baltic German party (Latvijas vācu baltiešu partijas). In the 1925 elections, it obtained over 5 percent of the total state vote. As an ethnic group it was united in its representation to the Saeima reflecting the homogeneous interests of this minority. It obtained more or less all the political support of the Baltic Germans in addition to votes from a small number of Riga 'Germanised' Jews who spoke German and had adopted the customs and culture of this community.

The political interests of this group were now centred within an urban environment. Support for this party was particularly strong in the cities of Riga, Liepāja, and Jelgava and in some of the smaller towns of Kurzeme. The Baltic German community was a middle class ethnic group. The majority of the 27 percent of this group occupied in industry were either employers or held managerial posts. A further 20 percent of Baltic Germans were employed in commerce, while in 1930, over 12 percent were in the professions.[62]

The existence of only one Baltic German party and the united support given exclusively by this community to this party, is partly accountable to their numerical and political demise, and their socio-economic, religious, and ethno-linguistic homogeneity.

The large number of ethnic Russian parties reflected various socio-economic and religious affiliations, the majority centred in Latgale where nearly three-quarters of the total number of this ethno-linguistic community lived.

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62 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

The largest of the Russian parties, The Old Believers, (Vecticībnieku Kandidatu Saraksts), which obtained 2.5 percent of the electoral vote in 1925, stood candidates in Riga city, Zemgale and Latgale. This party was particularly strong in the Latgalian rural areas of Rēzeknes, where they obtained just over 14 percent of the aprinkis vote, in Daugavpils (8.2 percent), and in adjoining Illūkstes where they secured over 10 percent of electoral support.[63]

As a party based on religious affiliation, the Old Believers attracted support on the basis of religious identity particularly in those south-eastern rural areas where the vast majority of this religious group were located. In contrast, support for a smaller party, the Russian Orthodox Workers, (Pareizticigo vēlētāju un Krievu apvienoto organizāciju bloks), which stood candidates in all the electoral districts except Vidzeme, secured most of their limited support in the north-eastern Latvian Orthodox strongholds of Jaunlatgales and Ludzas, obtaining 4.2 percent and 4.3 percent of the aprinkis vote respectively.[64]

The Union of Russian Municipal Employees Party, (Krievu pagastu un sabiedriskie darbinieku apvīeniba saraksts), relied mainly on support from agrarian ethnic Russian workers who did not put religious affiliation first but the importance of eradicating the poor socio-economic base of the Russian community. In Jaunlatgales, this party was particularly strong obtaining just over 17 percent of the aprinkis vote. However, the combined total success of this party was limited to just over 1 percent of the electoral vote.[65]

The fourth and by far the smallest Russian party was the Russian National Workers Party, (Krievu tautas darba partija). It stood candidates only in Kurzeme with the hope of attracting support amongst the

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63 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-1.

64 ibid., pp. 30-31.

65 ibid., pp. 30-31.

very few ethnic Russian industrial working class of that area. Its only limited success was in Liepājas where it obtained less than 0.3 percent of the aprinkis vote.[66]

From a demographic and spatial analysis, it is apparent that the ethnic Russian political parties did not attract support from all of their potential ethno-linguistic group. The complication with the existence of a number of Latgalian parties, which will be discussed below, and a number of Russian Jews supporting Jewish parties, also contributed to the less significant importance of the Russian parties.

Religion played a divisive role within this community as manifested in the Old Believers and Russian Orthodox parties. However, in social structure and geographical background, the Russians were very much a uniform group. As a rural ethnic community, nearly 80 percent of their total were employed in agriculture.[67] The majority in this rural environment, particularly in Latgale, were peasants and impoverished small farmers. Coupled with a low level of political group awareness partly as a result of low literacy and poor economic base, a large number of these peoples were more concerned with local land issues rather than with ethnic minority rights. This may therefore partly account for a large percentage of support for the various regional Latgalian parties and the Latvian Social Democratic Party, (Latvijas sociāldemokrātu strādnieku partija). The former parties were generally concerned with local issues pertaining to Latgale, the latter with the general social equality of all ethnic populations, particularly with raising the living standards of the landless peasantry.

Support for the L.S.D.P. was dominant amongst a large number of the ethnic Russian industrial working class of Riga. The L.S.D.P. and its left wing allied parties, were the only group consistently advocating the

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66 ibid., pp. 30-31.

67 Latvijas Statistikā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

large scale industrialisation of the country and improving the lot of the industrial working class.

Like the Russians, the Jews were represented by more than one political party. 'Agudas Jisroel', the largest of the Jewsish parties, obtained most of its 1.6 percent of the total electoral vote from the urban areas of Riga, where it secured 3.4 percent of the city's vote, and in Daugavpils aprinkis. The Zionist organisation, 'Mizrachi', was also strongest in Riga where it had the support of 1.8 percent of the electorate and in Liepājas with 6 percent of the aprinkis' total. This party made little impact amongst the Jewish electorate of Latgale. The third largest Jewish party, with less than 1 percent of the electoral vote, stood candidates only in Latgale and Riga, their major successes being in the urban centres in Daugavpils, Rezeknes and Ludzas aprinki.[68] The other Jewish parties, the Jewish National Democratic Party, (Ebreju nacional demokrātiska partija) and the 'Histradrut Hacionit', both had insignificant electoral successes.

Unlike the Russian parties, the Jewish political organisations attracted support from all but a handful of their ethnic group. The Jews were very much an integrated group. Over 90 percent lived in the urban areas with nearly half this number residing in Riga, the majority of the remainder living in the urban centres of Latgale. The Jewish political parties therefore represented the urban interests particularly commercial as nearly half of this group were employed in this sector of the economy. Just over 1 percent of all Jews were employed in agriculture.[69] Their homogeneity was also reflected in a strong awareness of their ethno-linguistic and religious ties, politically expressed through their own ethnic parties.

The smaller ethnic groups also had their own parties. The Belo-

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68 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

69 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

russian Landless Peasants and Small Farmers Union, (Latvijas baltkrievu bezzemnieku strādnieku un mazzemnieku pilsonu apvienība saraksts), obtained less than 0.3 percent of electoral support standing candidates in Zemgale and Latgale. They had limited successes in Daugavpils and Illūkstes aprinki where a large number of Belorussians were located.

The Poles had their own political party, the Polish Catholic and Latvian Poles Union, (Polu-Katolu Latvijas polu savieniba), which obtained over 2 percent of the vote in the 1925 election. The large electoral support for this party is accountable to votes from a large number of Catholic Lithuanians who did not have a politically organised group of their own finding enough common ground with the Poles to put forward joint representation and demands. In Illūkstes, this party obtained nearly 26 percent of the vote and also had substantial successes in adjoining Daugavpils and Ludzas where they obtained 7.8 percent and 2.6 percent of the aprinki vote, respectively.[70]

The only other ethnic political party was the Estonian National Party, (Igauni nacionāla vēlētāju grupa). This insignificant party, standing candidates in Vidzeme, had its largest success in Valkas aprinkis where it obtained 1.4 percent of the vote.[71]

The electoral system therefore enhanced the identification of the national minorities along political lines of representation. Although there was no ethnic or regional parties calling for outright secession from Latvia, their very existence helped promote the identity of their corresponding ethnic groups assuring that they remained aloof from any attempts at assimilation by the Latvian national ruling élite.

As Claude Ake suggests,[72] if support for political groups is based on ethnic or a regional interest, then the political integration of the

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70 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēsānas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

71 ibid., pp. 30-31.

72 C. Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, Illinois, 1967, p. 10.

state may well be in question. If there is loyalty to the nation within the state area or the two identities are inter-changeable, then divisive interests will be subordinated in favour of group cohesiveness.

In the case of Latvia, the 'national-idea' of, for example, the majority of Baltic Germans was based on the acceptance and inevitability of the continuation of the Latvian state. The major Baltic German political theorist, editor of the leading Baltic German newspaper, Rigasche Rundschau,(Riga Review), and leader of his ethnic political party, Paul Schieman, was responsible for aiding in the decline of the so-called 'alt Baltisch' influence, i.e. the traditional feudal role of the Baltic Germans within the region. In an article, Volksgemeinschaft und Staatsgemeinschaft, (The National and State Community), he rejected the materialist conception of the sovereign state, state centralisation and 'national' uniformity.[73] To him, the nation and the state were separate entities which had coincided in some cases but did not necessarily always do so. He pointed out that the Latvian tauta and the state were not necessarily synonymous and that there was a place and role for the ethnic minorities within Latvia. To him, the disintegration or questioning of the Latvian state would not come about provided that the ethnic minorities were given political, economic, and cultural rights. Schieman pointed out that it was irrelevant to suggest that because a peoples were not contiguous and that they therefore could not be granted territorial autonomy that they should not be granted some form of personal autonomy. It was on the basis of Bauer and Renner's solution to the problem of a multi-national state, based on a geographically mixed population that the Baltic German community saw their future secure within a Latvian state.[74]

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73 P. Schieman, 'Volksgemeinschaft und Staatsgemeinschaft', Staat und Nation, September 1927.

74 With the rise of Nazism in the 1930's, a number of Baltic Germans looked toward the Third Reich, advocating the disintegration of the Latvian state and the annexation of the Baltikum to Germany.

In contrast, the members of the Latvian nation saw the state as a product of their nationalism and the territory they occupied as integral to their group attributes and identity. By granting a degree of autonomy to the ethnic minorities and giving them access to participation in the Saeima, the ethnic Latvians separated themselves politically as well as culturally from the rest of the population. It is therefore postulated that the remaining and largest political parties attracted support from ethnic Latvians and that some of these parties owed their allegiance to promoting the demands and wishes of the Latvian nation.

The Agrarian bloc, which politically dominated the politics and government of Latvia during this twenty year period, was centred around the largest party in this grouping, the Latvian Peasant Union, (Zemnieku Savieniba). This party formed the majority of governments in the 1922-34 period supplying thirteen of the eighteen Premiers of Latvia.

The Latvian Peasant Union, (L.P.U.), was a right wing party and a movement of Latvian nationalism, its support being centred on the agrarian population. This party attempted to meet the needs of the rural ethnic Latvians promoting policies popular to that sector of society which comprised the vast majority of the nation. Throughout this period, around 70 percent of all ethnic Latvians lived in rural areas with just over 70 percent of this ethnic group employed in agriculture.[75] This party received support from the various co-operative and agricultural associations which had been set-up from the outset of statehood.

An analysis of the spatial patterns of voting in the 1925 General Election shows that the overwhelming support of this party came from the more rural ethnic Latvian homogeneous areas of the state. The L.P.U. obtained just over 15 percent of the entire electoral vote.[76] The party

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75 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-11.

76 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

was particularly strong in the Vidzeme aprinki of Valmieras, Valkas, and Madonas and in Bauskas, all of which had between 80 to 95 percent of their respective populations living in rural areas.[77] (fig. 17). The L.P.U. had between 25 to 30 percent of electoral support in the remaining aprinki of Vidzeme, in the central Kurzeme aprinki of Kuldigas and Talsu and in the Eastern Zemgalian administrative unit of Jekabpils.[78] In the majority of these areas there were well over ninety percent of the population comprised of ethnic Latvians.[79] In the remaining areas of Western and Central Latvia, support for the L.P.U. was more limited. In Riga city and in the aprinki of Liepājas, Ventspils and Jelgavas, there were sizeable urban centres, where, with the obvious exception of Riga, between 40 to 65 percent of the aprinkis' total lived in the towns.[80] This accounts for the much reduced support for the L.P.U. In the city of Riga, this party obtained only just over 3 percent of the city's vote.[81]

In Latgalia and Illūkstes, the ethnic heterogeneity of the population and the existence of a number of Latgalian regional parties, complicates the study of electoral voting patterns. Although this area of Eastern Latvia was overwhelmingly rural ranging from 98.5 percent of the population in Jaunlatgales to 72.5 percent in Daugavpils,[82] support for the L.P.U. was more or less non-existent except in Jaunlatgales and Illūkstes. In these two aprinki, it is possible that the rural ethnic Latvian population, which constituted the smallest percentage of its

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77 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936, op.cit. p. 2.

78 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

79 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

80 ibid., p. 1.

81 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

82 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., p. 2.

Fig. 17: Percentage Electorate Voting L.P.U., 1925



Percentage voting L.P.U. in each aprinkis

30 – 36
25 – 30
20 – 25
15 – 20
10 – 15
less than 10

BOUNDARIES :
— — — APGABALI
- - - - - APRINKI

0 150 kms

Source: Based on electoral data in; Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

national group than in any other aprinkis, felt more threatened numerically and could therefore identify more readily with the L.P.U. as the political vehicle and mainstay of Latvian nationalism. Mass support for the central policies of the L.P.U., agrarian reform and the promotion of agriculture and related industrial products, was integral to the lives of the population of these rural, predominantly ethnic Latvian areas.

The L.P.U. as the party of nationalism and anti-Baltic German landowners, also had support in the Saeima from the third largest party, the Catholic and Christian Farmers Party, (Katolu un Kristīgo zemnieku partijas). Support for this agrarian party came overwhelmingly from Latgalian ethnic Latvian Catholic farmers and peasants.

The stronghold areas of this party were the Latgalian aprinki of Ludzas, Rēzeknes and Daugavpils where they obtained between 16 to 19 percent of the vote.[83] These areas were also the centres of Catholicism where over fifty percent of the population adhered to this religion.[84] The Catholic and Christian Farmers Party also obtained sizeable support in neighbouring Jaunlatgales, with nearly 14 percent of the aprinkis' vote, and in Illūkstes with 9.9 percent of the vote. In the former area, there was a less sizeable Catholic population, in the latter a large number of Catholics with varying ethno-linguistic characteristics.[85] Support for this party was also extended to those areas outwith Eastern Latvia where there were ethnic Latvian Catholic rural communities. This was the case in Aizputes where they obtained 11.6 percent of the aprinkis' vote and in Bauskas where they registered 6.2 percent.[86]

The other major ethnic Latvian party in the agrarian bloc was the Latvian New Farmers Party, (Jaunzemnieku savienība), which had been formed in 1925 around a number of politicians in the L.P.U. This party was not satisfied with agrarian reform and the limited geographical

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83 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

84 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

85 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

86 ibid

extent of a large percentage of the new agricultural holdings which had been created. Obtaining just over 2 percent of the entire electoral vote, support for this party was relatively evenly distributed throughout the more predominantly ethnic Latvian rural areas of Vidzeme, Kurzeme, and western Zemgale.[87]

Although this agrarian bloc reflected various socio-economic and regional support, their ruling élites were united by a desire to promote the tauta. In return they secured votes from the ethnic Latvian agrarian population whose interests their leaders interpreted as inter-changeable with the development and progress of the state and the Latvian nation.

On the extreme right of the Agrarian bloc and organised in the Saeima into a right wing alliance were a number of political parties which were consistently more blatantly nationalist in their politics than were the Agrarians.

The two largest parties in this group were the Latvian National Union, (Nacionālā apvienibā) and the Christian Nationalists, (Krīstigā nacionalā savieniba). Between them they succeeded in gaining over 5 percent of the vote in the 1925 election.[88] Their electoral successes represented and catered for the more conservative interests of some of the professional and business middle classes with the Christian Nationalists particular concern being the promotion of the Lutheran religion. Their main support therefore came from the urban areas of western and central Latvia. In Riga city they obtained over 8 percent of the electoral vote. In Latgale and Illūkstes, support was more or less non-existent reflecting the few Protestant adherents.

A slightly larger and more important bloc, was the so-called Democratic Centre, (Demokrātiskais centrs), which was made up of three main parties: The Democratic Party, the Radical Democrats and the Peoples Party.

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87 ibid

88 ibid., pp. 30-31, for the results of the 1925 election. See A.A. Drizula, Ocherki Istorii Rabochego Dvizheniya v Latvii, 1920-40gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 63, for the support of the Christian Nationalists in Riga.

In the earlier years of independence, the main support of this party came from urban liberals who called for the eradication of class conflict and socio-economic and regional inequalities within the country. Their main areas of electoral support came from Riga and urban centres in Vidzeme, Kurzeme and western Zemgale.

By the late 1920's, this bloc had developed a narrow nationalistic line based primarily on anti-minority feelings amongst the ethnic Latvian urban population. In 1929, the Right Wing Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Margers Skujenieks, abandoned their affiliation with the Left Wing bloc and joined the Democratic Centre. Under his leadership, the Democratic Centre formed a Nationalist Coalition Government between 1931 and 1933 further promoting zenophobia within the country. With their newspaper, Jaunsakas Zinas, which had the largest newspaper circulation in Latvia, the nationalist policies of this bloc exerted considerable influence on Latvian public life. In the 1931 General Election, this grouping doubled their previous electoral representatives to the Saeima.

The Left Wing group, led by the most successful electoral party in Latvia, the Latvian Social Democratic Party, (L.S.D.P.), was an urban based organisation. Its support in the Saeima came primarily from two small parties, the Latgalian Social Democrats, (Latgales demokrātu partija), and the Socialist Jewish Bund, (Latvijas ebreju sociāldemokrātiska strādnieku organizācija, 'Bunds').

With the largest number of seats in the Saeima, the importance of this left wing alliance eventually declined. The L.S.D.P. never formed any of the governments of Latvia except in the 1926-28 administration when a few of their members were given ministerial positions.[89] The Social Democrats therefore never played a central role in the decision-making process despite having the support of well over 27 percent of the electorate at each of the four parliamentary elections.

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89 A.A. Drizula, Ocherki Istorii Rabochego Dvizheniya v Latvii, 1920-40gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 63.

Although the L.S.D.P. was a party of non-sectarian ethnic politics having its foundations in Menshevik origins, it nevertheless tended to attract mass support only from ethnic Latvians and a handful of Russians.

The L.S.D.P. were particularly strong in Riga, Vidzeme and the larger towns in Liepāja, Ventspils, and Jelgava, (fig. 18). The Latgalian Social Democrats attracted nearly 10 percent of the total vote of their region while the Socialist Jewish Bund, standing candidates only in Latgale and the city of Riga, obtained only a limited percentage of the vote, the majority of which was amongst the urban Jews of Daugavpils.[90]

Although the L.S.D.P. was primarily a party of the industrial workers, favouring the industrial development of the country, they nevertheless had widespread appeal particularly amongst the landless peasants. As a number of the latter social grouping benefited from land reform, the Social Democrats lost much of their support in the agrarian sector. With the onslaught of nationalist slogans in the 1930's, a large percentage of ethnic Latvian industrial workers also abandoned them. By 1931, the L.S.D.P. had support of only 19.2 percent of the electorate compared with 38.7 percent in 1920.[91] As a party not based on anti-minority feeling, they did not have the widespread appeal of the agrarian nationalists.

The existence of a number of political parties in Latgale which were usually affiliated to larger "sister" parties in the rest of the political region, further complicates a study of electoral voting on the basis of socio-economic, ethno-linguistic and religious criteria. Including the Catholic and Christian Farmers Party, there were nine

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90 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

91 Latviju Enciklopēdija, edited by A. Švābe, 3 vols, Stockholm, 1955, p. 1989.

Fig. 18: Percentage Electorate Voting L.S.D.P., 1925



Source: Based on data in; Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Vēlēšanas 1925 gadā, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

Latgalian parties organised on a regional basis in 1925.[92] In total, they constituted less than 14 percent of the entire electoral vote but in Latgale they were the largest group of parties in all four aprinki, (table 28). Support for these Latgalian parties was overwhelmingly from the ethnic Latvian population and a number of Russians.

Although the various Latgalian parties were not united as a political group, there was nevertheless a consensus of opinion amongst these regional organisations to highlight in the Saeima the peculiar localist characteristics and problems pertaining to, and affecting, the population of this area.

Latgalia was the economic backwater of Latvia. In 1930, 86 percent of the actively employed in Latgale were in agriculture compared with the

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92 The Agrarian interests of the Latgalians were supported by the Latgalian Workers Party, (Apvienotais Latgales darba partijas, Latgales mazzemniek un bezzemnieku savienības kandidātu saraksts), who were particularly interested in promoting the lot of the smallholders and landless peasants, and the Latgalian Peasant Party, (Latgales zemnieku partija). The Latgalian Social Democratic Party, (Latgales demokrātu partija) aligned itself with the L.S.D.P. The remaining and electorally insignificant Latgalian parties were: the Latgalian Independent Union, (Latgales bezpartejiskā savieniba), Latgalian Small Farmers, Landless, and Ploughmen's Register, (Latgales mazsaimnieku, bezzemnieku, un zemes arāju saraksts), Union of Latgalian workers, small farmers and working intelligentsia, (Latgales apvieniba strādnieku un darba inteligences saraksts), Latgalian Workers Group, (Latgales darba laužu grupa), Latgalian Independent Group, (Latgales neatkarīgā bezpartejiskā grupa).

Table 28

The 1925 Election Results in the Five Aprinki of Eastern Latvia.[93]

(% of total vote)

	Illūkstes	Daugavpils	Rēzeknes	Ludzas	Jaunlatgales
ethnic Russian parties					
Old Believers	10.1	8.2	14.1	2.1	0.4
Union of Russ.Municip.Emply.	0.3	1.2	1.1	3.7	17.1
Russian Orthodox workers	2.5	1.3	0.8	4.3	4.2
Russ. National Workers Party	-	-	-	-	-
Jewish parties					
Socialist Jewish Bund	-	3.0	3.0	2.1	1.4
Agudas Jisroel	-	4.7	1.6	1.6	1.0
Mizrachi	1.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1
Ceire-Cion	-	3.0	2.1	1.4	0.2
Jewish National Democrats	0.4	0.1	0.1	-	-
Histradrut Hacionst	-	0.3	-	0.7	0.1
Belorussian party	1.1	1.5	-	0.8	-
Polish Catholic Party	25.9	7.8	1.9	2.6	0.5
Latgalian Parties	0.7	24.1	39.9	28.5	24.3
Catholic & Christian Farmers	9.9	15.9	18.1	18.0	13.5
L.P.U.	14.8	3.0	0.9	0.9	13.6
L.S.D.P.	12.9	19.1	14.6	31.3	18.7
other parties	20.1	6.4	2.4	2.6	6.1

93 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas vēlēšanas 1925 gadā. op.cit., pp. 30-31.

state average of 66.2 percent.[94] This rural environment was characterised by limited soil fertility, inefficient farming methods, the continuing legacy of the mir and all its economic deficiencies, high density population and consequently the largest percentage of landless peasants in Latvia. As a result, many Latgalians were forced to migrate to other parts of the Latvian political region.

With the loss of the Russian market coupled with the decline in importance of the Latgalian transit trade and even more emphasis given to orientating industry and commerce toward the Latvian seaboard, this area further declined in significance, becoming geographically remote from the main centres of economic activity. By 1930, only 15 percent of Latgalians were living in urban centres, compared with the state average of 36.5 percent.[95]

Although independence politically united the ethnic Latvians of Latgale with other members of their national group, there was, nevertheless, resentment by this group against the policies of the Riga governments. The introduction of a uniform Latvian literary language into the schools and churches of Latgale was resented by many of the regional parties. They called for the retention of the Latgalian dialect. These parties also demanded special privileges for the Catholic church which was granted to them, full social equality with the rest of the Latvian political region and a programme of massive economic aid for the area.

The ruling élite attempted to incorporate the Latgalians into a common Latvian culture and eliminate the existing socio-economic and cultural differences. This was attempted through a policy of Latvianizing Latgale which included the disintegration of the mir and the introduction of the typically Latvian individual farmstead as the basic agrarian unit

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94 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

95 ibid, p.6. At the 1936 census, 500 people constituted an urban settlement.

of the country. There is therefore little doubt that the various Latgalian parties were both a response to this state of affairs and a product of the uniqueness of their area.

At this juncture in the analysis, it is enough to say that the so-called 'Latgalian question' was very much a central problem to the continuance of the tauta. Although Soviet observers interpret Latgalian activities as branching on autonomism and even a western Geographer, Shabad,[96] misleadingly treats them as an independent ethnic group, the ethnic Latvian population of the area had enough common experiences with the rest of the national group and mutual identity with the Latvian state, that territorial secession was not demanded by any of the major politically organised regional groups. Nor does the declaration in a 1935 census by a number of Latgalians (both Latvians and non-Latvians), who spoke a number of languages, declaring themselves as luteisije ('locals'), when asked about their nationality, merit the assumption that Latgalia was not integrated with the state or nation.[97] However, it is obvious that amongst those declaring themselves as 'locals' that there was little national consciousness.

The decision by a number of ethnic Latvian Latgalians to put their local area before the nation at the polls does not necessarily indicate that there was not an identity with the tauta. It would appear that regional discontent was more an expression of localist feelings rather than a possible lack of mutual identity with the nation.

Within Latvia there was therefore a contrast between the west and the five eastern aprinki. The population of Latgalia and Illūkstes differed in its socio-economic and political geography. This eastern region was characterised by a mixed ethnic, linguistic and religious structure. In contrast, the western areas of the country were more or

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96 T. Shabad, Geography of the USSR, New York, 1951, pp. 480-485.

97 Ceturtā Tautas Skaitīšana Latvija 1935 gadā, op.cit.

less homogeneous as defined by some of the criteria on which the majority of the group attributes of the Latvian nation were based.

Also linked to this areal differentiation was the spatial impress of the modernisation process which further accentuated a 'core-periphery' situation. Compared with the west, Eastern Latvia was economically more depressed with few towns, little industry, sparse system of communications and a reliance on backward methods of agriculture which was itself partly influenced by local circumstance in the form of the type of settlement, high density rural population and physical environment. The population had a markedly lower rate of literacy and standard of living.

One can therefore generalise and infer that two differing geographies had developed within Latvia and that these local environments had political geographical connotations attached to them. In the east, the political and social response had been the continuation of ethno-linguistic and religious groups, regional particularism and the formation of Latgalian political organisations. The socio-economic structure of Eastern Latvia reflected a large percentage of the total population, both ethnic Latvian and non-ethnic Latvian, not integrated into the tauta. Their political affiliations were therefore directed toward alternative communities of interest.

Historical antecedence, ethnic, linguistic and cultural attributes all account for this lack of identity by a large number of the population with the tauta. The continuation of the legacy of the mir probably also provided a basis by which traditional loyalties either remained tied to the local community or hampered integration into a modern society.

It is therefore possible to infer that there was a relationship between the political integration of the nation and location within the Latvian political region. The population of western Latvia, influenced

by the proximity to the coast, were more affected by the modernisation process. The predominance of the group attributes of the tauta had given the population of this area more likelihood and facility to integrate and identify with the Latvian nation through group pressure and political awareness than elsewhere in the state.

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3.2 Central Authority and Nationalism

Referring to the newly independent states formed after World War One, Macartney observed that:

> "All new states...are more or less consciously the national state of the single nation which forms the majority of their population."[98]

Governed by their emotive attitudes toward the nation and viewing the tauta as the raison d'être of the Latvian state, the ruling élite extended nationalism into the independence era through the re-allocation and re-organisation of resources, people and territory in order that the national group would benefit. Central authority functioned as a cohesive force integrating the tauta through rewarding its members' ideals and material well-being.

The aspirations of the nationalists therefore included the striving for national unity encompassing the political, socio-economic and cultural aspects of Latvian life. In so doing, they attempted to further strengthen their nation as a unique social and political entity with separate and distinctive group attributes. This included, the promotion of the Latvian language, the destruction of past 'foreign' institutions and the creation and promotion of such symbols for the nation with which the mass of the community could commonly identify. Such symbols were, for example, the Latvian constitution, flag and anthem, the establishment of the lat as the monetary unit, the individual farmstead or mājas as the basis of the rural settlement pattern, the creation of Riga as the capital city and, after 1934, Karlis Ulmanis as the charismatic leader of the state.

This 'nation-building' involved what Derwent Whittlesey has referred to as:

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98 C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, London, 1934, p. 209.

> "...the impress of effective central authority upon the landscape."[99]

The new provinces of the country were based on the resurrection of tribal kingdoms which had been in existence before the arrival of what the nationalists saw as "foreign intrusion" in the region. Thus the creation of Kurzeme, meaning land of the Kurs, Zemgale, which had been latinised to Semigalia corresponding with the tribal Zemgalian area, and Latgale which had been the tribal domain of the Latgalians, were part of the nationalist search to authentically symbolise the Latvian past in the present landscape.

The establishment of the nineteen aprinki, centred around the largest town after which they were normally named, and the subsequent division of these aprinki into 517 pagasti, not only altered the administrative hierarchy of the country but also introduced into the state rural units of the ethnic Latvian peasant past. Bilmanis referred to these pagasti as:

> "...the last strongholds of Latvian independence during centuries of foreign domination."[100]

During the feudal period, a rural unit, which was composed of a number of individual farmsteads, usually corresponded with all the peasant settlements within the domain of one feudal estate.[101] With independence, the function of these pagasti was that of agricultural co-operative units, their largest town evolving as a communication node within that administrative area. Each pagasts was also given a number of political and social functions including the collection of taxes and supervision over education and local services. They were administered directly by an elected board of local Councillors.

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99 D. Whittlesey, 'The Impress of Central Authority Upon the Landscape', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 25, 1935, pp. 85-97.

100 A. Bilmanis, (1951), op.cit., pp. 15-16.

101 A. Švābe, Grundriss der Agrargeschichte Lettlands, Riga, 1928, p. 8.

The new government also eliminated the existing form of Russian boroughs raising their status to that of a city. Sixty of these pilsētas were established and given a degree of local autonomy forming prefectures with district rights. The original names of these Latvian towns were revived replacing the Russian and Baltic German place names.[102]

The national ruling élite therefore put forward policies which they viewed as central to the existence and continuation of the majority nation.

The economic policies of the Latvian government were partly dictated to by the nature and character of the social and geographical distribution of the population. The ruling élite were reliant on the support of that group within the nation which was most homogeneous and comprised the nexus and raison d'être of the state. The whole basis of the tauta and consequently the state, relied on the continued support of the agrarian community which dominated Latvian politics and accounted for the peculiar rural character of Latvian nationalism. The re-allocation of land through agrarian reform therefore became one of the first and most vital priorities for the newly independent state.

The redistribution of land satisfied two of the nationalist demands. Due to the nature of land ownership and the numerical predominance of ethnic Latvians in the countryside, it was evident that large-scale re-distribution would benefit the members of the Latvian national group. Reform was also designed to destroy the political and economic influence exerted by the Baltic German landowners and foreign upper classes. One of the most effective ways of undermining their position and thus satisfy and reward the Latvian nation was through the re-allocation of land resources. This also helped satisfy the continuing nationalist aspiration

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102 Some of the more important place-name changes were: (a) from German to Latvian; Libau to Liēpaja, Wolmar to Valmiera, Jacobstadt to Jekabpils, Mitau to Jelgava. (b) from German and Russian to Latvian; Dünaburg and Dvinsk to Daugavpils, Windau and Vindava to Ventspils, Wenden and Venden to Cesis. Some other geographical features were also re-named. (see appendix 1)

for national freedom and independence from colonial domination and interference.

This re-allocation had the object of not only stabilising the social order of the new political entity through equal land distribution but also of re-aligning the population of the Latvian political region who looked toward the Soviet Russian method of expropriating land and re-distributing it to the agrarian population. By granting a large percentage of the land to the peasantry and other social groupings, the Latvian state secured support from both the members of the Latvian nation and the peasantry and smallholders in general.

Agriculture and rural economy played a disproportionately important role in the structure of the new state. In 1920, 74.7 percent of the total population resided in the countryside while nearly eighty percent of the entire work force of the state were employed in agriculture.[103] The rural environment was also integral to the economic development of the Latvian nation. Throughout independence, over 65 percent of all ethnic Latvians resided in rural Latvia. Of the total rural population over 80 percent were ethnic Latvian.[104] It was therefore evident that the character of agrarian reform would be central to the success and continuance of the integrative process of the nation.

Immediately after Independence and the formation of the Saeima, three of the four parts of the Agrarian Reform Bill were submitted and passed in September 1920 despite various objections and compromises suggested by the Baltic German estate owners.[105]

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103 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., p. 6.

104 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1920, op.cit.; 1925, op.cit.; 1930, op.cit.; 1935, op.cit.

105 The four parts of the Agrarian Reform and their dates of implementation were; Part 1, State Land Fund, (Sept. 1920); Part 4, Land Planning Committee, (Sept. 1920); Part 2, Allotment of Land, (Dec. 1920); Part 3, Consolidation of the Agrarian Reform, (April 1922); Valsts Statistiskā Pārvalde, Lauksaimniecibas skaitisana Latvija, 1939, gada, (The Statistics of Latvian Agriculture, 1939), Riga, 1940; Latvijas lauksaimnieciba, 1920-25 gada, (Latvian Agriculture, 1920-25), 2 vols, Riga, 1926.

The first and most important part of the reform was based on a survey undertaken in January 1919 which gave some indication of the number of rural landless in the state. Of the 43,092 landless registered in 442 parishes and 29 boroughs and towns, 55.09 percent were landless and tenants, 34.26 percent were labourers, 5.56 percent were artisans with the remaining 5.09 percent in other vocations.[106]

As a result of this survey, it was decided by the government to establish a State Land Fund which after expropriation would consist mainly of the private estates which exceeded five hundred hectares in area and belonged mainly to the Baltic German nobility, other large landowners, and Crown Lands. The number of holdings which exceeded one hundred hectares in size were to be reduced and the expropriated land also put into the Land Fund.

The object of the Fund was therefore to reallocate the resources of the land to those sections of Latvian society who either had not previously owned land or whose small-holdings were not large enough to operate economically.

Table 29

Composition of the State Land Fund in 1920[107]

	Area in hectares	% of total land expropriated
Former Private Estates	2,668,540	78
Crown Lands	664,098	19
Other Lands	64,177	3
Total Land Expropriated	3,396,815	

The State Fund gave over 140,000 persons land including 39,720 long-term tenants, 33,654 veterans of the war of independence, and 71,307 persons that had not been previously connected or had no

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106 A. Zalts, The Latvian Political Economy, Riga, 1931, p. 100.

107 Lauksaimniecibas skaitisana, op.cit., Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 335.

land.[108]

As a result of this reform, 1,300 estate owners were dispossessed of their property with nearly 3.4 million hectares of land changing hands.[109] Over three million hectares of land remained private property with over 81 percent of the total of this area remaining in the hands of mainly ethnic Latvian small-holders.[110]

By abolishing all holdings over 500 hectares, reducing the number of holdings that exceeded 100 hectares and by stringently allocating land from the Land Fund in batches of 22 hectares of arable land per farmer,[111] the rural landscape of the state was transformed into a country of small-holders. The traumatic result of reform can be seen by contrasting the situation in existence immediately before independence, (table 30).

In contrast to 1905 when 58 percent of the entire agricultural land was owned by individuals with holdings exceeding 100 desyatines in size, the agrarian reform resulted in 61 percent of all farms forming individual holdings of between 10 to 50 desyatines. During independence, the owners of land were overwhelmingly smallholders of ethnic Latvian peasant origin, whereas immediately before independence, almost one half of the entire area was concentrated in the hands of a few Baltic Germans.[112]

The agrarian reforms were successful in helping to establish the political, economic and social hegemony of the tauta within the state. The need for social change and the redistribution of wealth was primarily put forward in the name of the Latvian nation as the reforms purposely and conveniently satisfied and met some of the requirements of the mass of the population, i.e. the Latvian nation.[112]

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108 Rutkis, ibid, p. 334; Rutkis estimates that 144,681 persons were given land through the State Land Fund.

109 Lauksaimnieciba, 1920-1925g., op.cit., vol. 1.

110 Rutkis, op.cit., p. 336.

111 Part One, State Land Fund, para.28; A. Zalts, 1931, op.cit., p.104.

112 The beneficiaries of the Reform were the ethnic Latvians as few, if any, had previously owned large estates which could have been expropriated. The Royal Institute of International Affairs Report, 1938, op.cit., p. 29, suggests that only 50 ethnic Latvian landowners had portions of their property expropriated.

Table 30

Size of Farm Holdings for 1905 and 1929 in the Latvian Political Region[113]

	1905			1929		
Area in Desyatines*	number of holdings	total area in hectares	% of total area	number of holdings	total area in hectares	% of total area
up to 10	14,668	117,567	2	79,291	394,607	9
10-20	20,001	271,657	5	68,523	1,028,874	24
20-30	14,837	356,771	7	29,689	699,776	17
30-50	23,492	948,744	18	21,164	838,144	20
50-100	8,709	510,371	10	16,335	1,076,527	26
100-500	529	129,302	3	1,307	156,645	4
500-1,000	241	186,698	4			
1,000-5,000	521	1,282,426	25			
5,000-10,000	84	623,437	12			
10,000 plus	35	730,915	14			
TOTAL	83,117	5,157,890		216,309	4,194,575	

* 1 desyatine = 1.09 hectares

113 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., p. 35.

Table 31

Agricultural Property in Latvia - 1913 and 1935[114]

	1913		1935	
	in thousands of hectares	%	in thousands of hectares	%
Private Estates	3,015	48.1	-	-
Farmers Land	2,467	39.4	2,817	45.1
State Property	627	10.0	1,746	28.0
State Land Fund	-	-	1,550	24.8
Other Land	156	2.5	129	2.1

Zalts, a Latvian economist of the time, suggested that the reform was necessary,

"...for the purposes of public welfare and culture."[115]

Another Latvian, Švābe, points out that:

> "...the agrarian reform was a wise and farsighted measure. The old established farms of the smallholders, who were the backbone of the national renaissance in the nineteenth century, were not touched but all the big estates were re-distributed among the Latvian veterans and landless peasants. This created social content and economic prosperity."[116]

The Latvian nationalists claimed that reform was socially beneficial to the mass of the agrarian population being synonymous with modernisation, economic development and consequently a factor of stability in their newly constituted state.

Reform therefore became inter-changeable with depriving the Baltic Germans of their political and socio-economic position within the state. M. Samuel, the Latvian Minister of Agriculture, made explicit the object of Reform:

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114 ibid., p. 35.

115 Z. Zalts, 1931, op.cit., p. 102.

116 A. Švābe, Latvia and Her Neighbours, Edinburgh, 1940, p.42.

"...the complete annihilation of the large Baltic landed properties and the suppression of an alien influence in the country."[117]

The liquidation of the powerful economic position of the Baltic Germans in the countryside was taken a step further by a law passed in April 1924 which provided no indemnity for expropriated land.[118] This differed from the similar Estonian agrarian reforms which took place at the same time and where compensation was given to landowners on the basis of 1901 land values. Despite a League of Nations petition by the national minorities against reform, objecting to the nationalist excesses of the majority nation, it was rejected by the League on the grounds that land reform constituted a social and not just a national minority question.[119]

The reform left the Baltic Germans tracts of land below 50 hectares which due to rather arbitrary methods of re-allocation of land left their owners with very uneconomically shaped "residual estates". These Restgüter, although far larger than the majority of newly constitued farms, were often abandoned by their Baltic German owners in favour of the towns.

The impact of agrarian reform therefore altered the ethnic composition of the rural areas. By 1935, 82.2 percent of all Baltic Germans were living in urban areas with 62 percent of the total of this national minority residing in Riga.[120]

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117 A. Heyking, 'The Main Issues Confronting the Minorities of Latvia and Estonia', 1922, reprinted in Seeds of Conflict Series, Nendeln, 1973, pp. 13-45, p. 36.

118 In 1922, the Latvian Government promised that compensation would be given to landowners whose land had been expropriated. However, by 1924 they had changed their minds. The London Times, 24th May, 1922, p. 21.

119 Petition to the League of Nations, Legal Committee, April 6th, 1925.

120 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

The socio-economic structure of the rural population now included a new class of relatively prosperous ethnic Latvian farmers whose lands had not been directly affected by the re-distribution. They were the owners of the vast majority of so-called 'old farms' which now took on the leading role in Latvian agriculture. In relation to the jaunsaimniecibas or 'new farms', which had been created as a result of land redistribution, the 'old farms' were located in the richer agricultural areas of Western Zemgale, Central Kurzeme and Vidzeme. They dominated numerically, in farm size and in production levels. The 'old farms' constituted 66 percent of all farms, occupied 73 percent of all the arable land, 75 percent of the pasture land and 71 percent of the meadows. The average area of these 'old farms' was 22 hectares compared with 15 hectares of the land owned by the new farmers, the jaunsaimnieki.[121]

Contemporary Soviet writers such as Gulyan[122] conclude that the Latvian agrarian reform was a 'kulak' reform benefiting the wealthier ethnic Latvian farmers. This inequality of farm size appears to be the case. Although redistribution had annihilated major contrasts in farm sizes,[123] the agrarian law did prohibit land owned by one individual to exceed 50 hectares. Yet, even by 1929, some 1,307 farms totalling over 4 percent of the entire agricultural area exceeded this amount.[124] Although the majority of this group included a considerable number of farms which were publicly owned, there was still a smaller number predominantly in the possession of individual Latvian farmers.

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121 Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 336 and 338; Lauksaimniecibas Skaitisana Latvija, 1939 g., op.cit.; J. Bokalders, Latvijas ekonomiskie-geografiskie pamati (The Economic Geographic Structure of Latvia), Stockholm, 1947, pp. 48-49.

122 P.V. Gulyan, Latviya v Sisteme Narodnogo Khozyaistva SSSR, Riga, 1967, p. 15.

123 R. Taagepera, 'Inequality Indices for Baltic Farm Size Distribution, 1929-40', Journal of Baltic Studies, vol.3, nr.1, 1972, pp. 26-34.

124 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., p. 35; R.O.G. Urch, Latvia, Country and People, London, 1938, p. 132.

The large number of small farms, particularly in Latgale, lends further evidence to the argument that there were marked inequalities in farm size and this was reflected amongst the ethnic populations and in the geography of the country. Also, although the number of landless had declined markedly as a consequence of redistribution, Gulyan claims that a large percentage of peasants, particularly in Latgale, had not been given direct access to the Land Fund.[125] A recent First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party sums up his impressions of the contribution agrarian reform had on the Latgalian population:

> "The broad masses of the Latgalian poor peasants were finally reduced to utter ruin by the reactionary agrarian reform that was carried through. The common lands were divided up into homesteads owned by the kulak village sharks who served as a strong support for the anti-people's government...30,000 peasants were left landless or with insufficient land, and all their attempts to acquire land proved futile."[126]

Although Soviet sources take a partisan view of agrarian reform, there is little doubt that they are not inaccurate in stressing that there were spatial and socio-economic inequalities within the rural environment which were partly an effect of reform. To some degree, the ethnic composition of Latvia reflected these variations.

Table 32

Landless Peasants in the Latvian Region, 1897, 1925 and 1930*[127]

Year	Number of landless	% of total rural population
1897	660,467	61.2
1925	327,445	29.1
1930	260,000	20.9

* including dependents

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125 P.V. Gulyan, 1967, op.cit., p. 15

126 Ya. Kalnberzin, 1951, op.cit., p. 165.

127 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., p. 35.

The regional inequalities in farm size is illustrated in the following two tables.

Table 33

Farm Size by Apgabali, 1920 & 1929 [128]

Percentage of Farms by Size of Holding

farm size in hectares	Vidzeme 1920	Vidzeme 1929	Kurzeme 1920*	Kurzeme 1929	Zemgale 1920*	Zemgale 1929	Latgale 1920	Latgale 1929	Latvia 1920	Latvia 1929
less than 10	22.2	25.4	36.9	30.8	36.9	28.0	75.7	53.4	53.8	38.6
10 to 20	8.8	22.6	12.5	30.9	12.5	32.7	16.9	34.3	13.6	30.5
20 to 100	69.0	52.0	50.6	38.3	50.6	38.3	7.4	12.3	32.6	30.9

(* The 1920 data for Zemgale and Kurzeme is given together.)

The number of farm holdings of less than ten hectares tended to be concentrated in Latgale while in Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Zemgale, the majority of farms were between twenty to one hundred hectares in size. By 1929, this situation had been slightly modified but still only 12.3 percent of farms in Latgalia were between twenty to one hundred hectares.

As is indicated by the percentage of agricultural land held by the various sizes of holdings in table 34 below, Latgalian agricultural small-holders whose land was less than ten hectares, tend to dominate their area while in the rest of the state, there were few of these small farms.

Table 34

Farm Size by Apgabali, 1920 & 1929 [129]

Percentage of Land by Size of Holdings

farm size in hectares	Vidzeme 1920	Vidzeme 1929	Kurzeme 1920*	Kurzeme 1929	Zemgale 1920*	Zemgale 1929	Latgale 1920	Latgale 1929	Latvia 1920	Latvia 1929
less than 10	2.0	2.2	5.1	3.1	5.1	3.3	42.5	21.1	12.3	7.0
10 to 20	3.8	9.4	7.1	13.5	7.1	15.8	27.5	33.6	10.4	17.1
20 to 100	94.2	88.4	87.8	83.9	87.8	80.9	30.0	45.3	77.3	75.9

(* The 1920 data for Zemgale and Kurzeme is given together.)

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128 K.Ya. Strazdin, et.al., Istoriya Latviiskoi SSR, vol. 3, Riga, 1958, pp. 259-61.

129 ibid, pp. 260-1.

The anomaly of farm size in Latgalia can be attributed to the limitations imposed on farming by the physical environment, the high density of the rural population and a history of the local importance of the institution of the mir in the rural economy of this area.

As Bokalders pointed out:

> "The main object of agrarian reform in Latgale is the enlargement of small holdings and the establishement of individual farmsteads."[130]

As a consequence of the Stolypin Reforms and the resultant division of the mir into small-holdings,[131] the Latgalian countryside had already been partly transformed before independence. However, the village still existed as the basis of rural settlement in this area and it was the annihilation of this nucleated settlement that the nationalist authors of the agrarian reform demanded.

The reasoning behind the desire to liquidate the village as the basis of rural settlement in Latgale was based on a misguided historical argument which put forward the thesis that the mājas was part of the 'national character' of the Latvian peoples. It was suggested that the village had never existed in the Latvian political region except in Latgale where they surmised that it was a product not of the Latvian people but of foreign influence.

Hellman proves that the mājas was not synonymous with the Latvian political region through time and that the village or nucleated settlement did exist.[132] However, villages when they did exist in the region were smaller than they were in other parts of the Tsarist Empire and Eastern Europe mainly as a response to the physical environment where it was difficult to penetrate the thickly-forested countryside and also having to locate their settlements on high ground due to periodic flooding.

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130 Ekonomists, 1928, edited by J. Bokalders, Riga, 1928, p. 89.

131 K.Ya. Strazdin, et.al., 1958, op.cit., pp. 260-261.

132 M. Hellman, 1954, op.cit., pp. 68-111.

In attempting to relate the village to foreign instrusion, the Latgalian area was cited where a high percentage of the population were non-Latvian and the mir being characteristic of rural settlement. This convenient nationalist belief was however not the case. The examples of the coastal villages of Kurzeme illustrate the role the Latvians played in building village communities. In these areas, the local Latvian fishermen required an agglomerated settlement in order that they could efficiently co-operate with one another in their occupation. In Latgale, the main reason for the village is as much to do with the physical environment of the area coupled with the absence of the German feudal system, as it is with the peculiar Russian institution of the mir. It was the specific types of feudal estates which developed in Kurlandskaya and Liflandskaya which account for the disintegration of the Latvian village.[133]

The Latvian nationalist arguments were therefore conveniently based on evidence from the contemporary rural landscape and the absence of the villages in Kurzeme, Vidzeme and Zemgale.[134] From these limited observations, the nationalists convinced themselves that this situation had always been the case and that Latvia was a unique region having its own distinct 'national character' in its rural settlement pattern. Some Latvians even went so far as to suggest that it was:

> "...a product and expression of the eternal strife of the Latvian nation toward independence and self-determination."[135]

Agrarian reform therefore made the final disintegration of the remnants of the mir, the Latgalian village, one of its main priorities Assistance was given to the peasants to move out of their previous village settlements re-allocating them in individual farmsteads in the middle of

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133 ibid., p. 231.

134 This argument was, for example, put forward by A. Švābe, 1928, op.cit.

135 G. Carson, 1956, op.cit., p. 110.

their fields. Between 1920 and 1926, 903 villages were partitioned creating 16,368 individual farms. By 1927 alone, 591 villages were subdivided into 9,794 majās in that year. By 1930, this had increased to 791 villages being transformed into 11,784 farmsteads in one year.[136] Some 4,526 villages within Latvia were affected by this re-settlement policy by June 1937. Of that total, 4,447 of the villages were in Latgale, the majority of the remainder being in Illūkstes aprinkis. This in turn created 70,218 individual farms in Latvia, 69,256 of them being in Latgale. A total of 698,580 hectares were affected by this change of which 687,348 hectares were in Latgale.[137] Encouragement was also given to Latgalians to move out of their village settlements by promises of land in Kurzeme and Vidzeme.

Although this policy had a degree of success, there were a number of obstacles to its implementation. Due to the individual land allotments in Latgalia being considerably smaller than in the rest of the country, the small-holder could easily walk from his village to the new fields. A number of farmers therefore resided within the village their ancestors had lived in for centuries. The official statistics for Latvia in 1935 show that 81.7 percent of the Latgalian population still lived in their old farms and only 11.3 percent of them moved to the new farmhouses while the rest inhabited other types of old dwellings.[138]

Due to the nationalism connection with the mājas, very few villages were found in the landscape of independent Latvia in the 1930's. However, the 1935 Latvian Census still recorded 145 ciema (villages) ranging in population from 26 to 1,582 persons.[139]

The government had attempted to implant on the Latgalian landscape a symbol of their nationalism and nation's individualism thus attempting

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136 .Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., p. 143.

137 Lauksaimniecibas Skaitīšana Latvijā, 1939 g., op.cit.; J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 336.

138 Ceturtā tautas skaitīšana Latvijā 1935 gadā, op.cit., pp. 114-5

139 ibid.

to give the country a uniformity throughout space. This 'Latvianization' of rural settlement was generally resented amongst the residents of rural Latgale. In particular, the Russians regarded the mir as part of their ethnic group's uniqueness and identity within the Latvian state. Coupled with the general underdevelopment of agriculture and the peasant economy in the area, it was evident that dissatisfaction would grow amongst the Latgalians. With by far the largest number of rural inhabitants of any of the four apgabali, and the highest percentage of landless in the country, Latgale became an area of emigration. Indeed, in the five years prior to the loss of independence, 26,000 Latgalian small-holders sold their land mainly because of the poor soil conditions, deplorable methods of farming, and uneconomic size of their farms.[140]

It had been the Agrarian bloc led by the Latvian Peasant Union who had been responsible for the implementation of this land reform and the creation of the independent family farms.[141] Their policy was based on the belief that agriculture and the rural economy had been the backbone of Latvian economic life and that it should continue to be so in the future.

> "National Unity, based on the keying of other interests to those of agriculture should be the predominant aim of the Latvian state."[142]

The Agrarian bloc never made serious in-roads into attracting support from the urban areas. This was due to their obsession with promoting agriculture and agrarian interests at the expense of the industrial manufacturing sector and the urban population. One of the main reasons for this policy of actively discouraging the industrial development of the country is summed up in a Latvian state newspaper,

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140 P. Farr, Soviet Russia and the Baltic Republics, London, 1944, p.37.

141 A. Klive, 'Latvian Peasant Political Parties', Baltic Review, no.11, 1957, pp. 16-33, p. 22.

142 A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p. 344.

Rigasche Nachrichten, (Riga News):

> "If we consider that the main policy of our country is to uplift a healthy peasantry and to avoid the growth of a factory proletariat, we realise that it does not lie in interest of Latvia to extend big industry but rather only to facilitate such branches as are necessary for local requirements."[143]

The emphasis on agriculture as opposed to industry had important spatial implications throughout the independence period. Due to the effects of civil and international war and the loss of the Russian hinterland, the urban-economic base of Latvia had markedly declined by 1920.

As Wanklyn observed,

> "Here (Baltic Republics) were great urban settlements whose reason for existence had largely disappeared; behind them trailed a network of rail communications to the east so cut by frontiers as to assume an absurd and meaningless appearance... The case of Riga was desperate. Her activities were reduced to a fraction of their former scope."[144]

In 1914, 38 percent of the population of the Latvian political region lived in urban areas. By 1920, this figure had depreciated to 25.3 percent. Although the urban population increased by 57 percent between 1920 and 1925, it nevertheless remained relatively static from 1925 to 1940 at around 35 percent.[145]

Despite the overall faster urban growth rate compared with the rural data, it is apparent the land reform and the government's focus on agriculture did have an effect in 'agrarianising' the population. If agrarian reform had not been implemented on such a radical scale as it

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143 Rigasche Nachrichten, 1923: as cited and translated in, D. Kirby, 'Aspects of British Commercial Policy toward the Baltic States', Second Conference on Baltic Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 3, 1973, Stockholm, pp. 146-158; p. 153.

144 H. Wanklyn, The Eastern Marchlands of Europe, London, 1941, p. 87.

145 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1925, op.cit.; 1930, op.cit.; 1936, op.cit.

had been, the rural areas of Latvia could not have absorbed such a large scale population as it was able to do in the 1930's. Thus although there was a population influx into the urban areas, particularly amongst the landless peasants and peoples of Latgalia, it was not as marked as it could have been if industrialisation had been the prime goal of the nationalists and the re-distribution of land had not been so fundamental.

Table 35

Percentage Demographic Increase between Survey years in Latvia, 1914-35[146]

Population	1914 Population (thousands)	1914-20	1920-25	1925-30	1930-35
urban	939	-57.0	+57.0	+ 9.5	+ 2.4
rural	1554	-23.2	+ 1.5	- 0.4	+ 2.8
Latvia	2493	-36.0	+15.6	+ 3.0	+ 2.6

Gulyan and Vask suggest that this apparent lack of concern for industry had important political geographical connotations attached to it.[147] They point out that agrarian reform was partly designed to prevent any political unrest amongst the peasantry and by giving little attention to promoting industry, a potentially large and revolutionary urban proletariat

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146 ibid; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoii SSR v 1973 gody, op.cit., p. 6.

147 Gulyan, 1970, op.cit., p. 15 & pp. 24-25; A. Vask, 'Rabochii klass Estonii i pervye sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniya v respublike v 1940-41 godakh', in Z. Astapovich & K. Gusev, (eds), Razvitiya rabochego klassa v natsional'nykh respublikakh SSSR, Moscow, 1962, pp. 64-102.

was not created.[148]

By remaining mainly an agrarian country, the nation as a group attribute was also more secure. With a policy of industrialisation, the various ethnic minorities which comprised the larger cities of Latvia, may have become more aware of their socio-economic class similarities rather than their national differences. In this context, industrialisation could have resulted in the switching of group loyalties from national interests to a class consciousness.

The national minorities were generally in favour of the industrial development of the country. The nationalist excesses of the Agrarians had alienated the ethnic minorities, the latter being united against '_latviskojums_', (Latvianization or Lettonization), which they viewed as synonymous with the agrarian policies and the general 'agrarianisation' of the population and territory of the state.

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148 There is little doubt that the successive governments of Latvia feared the development of an urban working class. Indeed, much of the mistrust over the 1927 Commercial Treaty between Latvia and the Soviet Union was based on a Latvian paranoia that by rebuilding their industries to supply the Soviet market they would not only become economically dependent on the Soviet Union, but also would result in the massive increase of an urban population.
E. Anderson, 'The USSR trades with Latvia: the Treaty of 1927', _Slavic Review_, vol. 21, no. 2, (1962), pp. 296-321, p. 302, & pp. 320-21.
Soviet authors such as Strazdin, et.al., (1958), _op.cit._, pp. 314-55, frankly admit that the goals of the Soviet Union in Latvia included the numerical increase of the urban industrial labour supply in order to create a potentially revolutionary situation.

The Russian, Belorussian and Polish political parties tended to support the Latvian Social Democrats in pursuing policies of industrial growth even although the socio-economic interests of these ethnic groups lay in the agrarian sector. It was not that these ethnic groups were totally committed to industrial growth. It was as much a vote registered against Latvian policies in agriculture to which they objected. The vast majority of these ethnic groups resided in rural Latgalia and Illūkstes and had witnessed the 'Latvianization' of rural settlement and the creation of small uneconomic farmsteads.

The Baltic Germans and the Jewish communities were understandably in favour of industrial growth. Their commercial and economic interests were tied up in the industrial sector and urban areas of the country.

Many of the Latgalian political parties, who were overwhelmingly supported by ethno-linguistic Latvians, were also opposed to the 'Latvianization' of rural Latgale and particularly the destruction of the village communities. Indeed, as 'Latvianization' continued, the Latgalian parties who opposed this particular form of assimilation and nationalist policy, increased their vote at the Saeima elections at the expense of the Agrarians in the area.

The economic base of Latvia was therefore agriculture par excellence. Its main branches included grain cultivation, stock-raising, dairy farming, poultry breeding, horticulture and fruit growing. In general, this agrarian economy was relatively successful until the years of the inter-war Depression. Agricultural production eventually increased on pre-war figures while the amount of land under cultivation had increased to 2,113,684 hectares or 33.9 percent of the total state area by 1935 in contrast with 1,729,828 hectares or 28.3 percent in 1914.[149] Agriculture, as the basis of the export trade, supplied about 50 percent of the total

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149 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, (1947), op.cit., p. 37.

value of export commodities.[150]

With pre-war figures of crop production being nearly met and a particularly successful dairying industry, the agrarian dominated governments were guaranteed support from a large section of the ethnic Latvian population.

Table 36

Agricultural Development in Latvia[151]

Crop	Area under crop annual average (in th.hectares)			Production annual average (in th. of quintals)		
	1909-13	1921-25	1926-30	1909-13	1921-25	1926-30
rye	351	252	254	3,254	2,422	2,471
oats	306	300	297	2,790	2,642	2,561
barley	191	167	176	1,728	1.519	1,570
wheat	33	36	61	384	388	731
potatoes	80	72	85	6,385	6,707	8,458
flax*	70	53	61	302	213	196

(* flax and hemp, 1909-13)

Throughout this twenty year period, industry remained weak although it did become economically more significant after the early 1930's Depression.[152] However, there were geographical limitations imposed on the possible development of some branches of manufacturing industry. Government policy toward the economy was partly determined by geographical circumstance.

The Russian market, the basis of the manufacturing industry in the Latvian political region, had been lost with the establishment of independence. The indispensable raw materials could no longer be imported on such a scale as was possible before 1914. Coupled with the loss of its manufacturing base as a result of war and the limited territory and

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150 H.A. Hobson, H.M.S.O. Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Latvia, London, 1938.

151 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., pp. 38-43; R.I.I.A. Report, 1938, op.cit., pp. 110-112.

152 Gulyan, 1967, op.cit., pp. 24-25.

population of the state, the policy of the successive governments from 1920 to 1934 was to develop those industries which were essential to local requirements and which could exist without the Russian market.[153]

The lack of importance and slow development of the manufacturing sector to both the population and the state is given in the table below.

Table 37

The Number of Persons Employed in Latvian Industry, 1897-1935 [154]

year	(A) total number of persons employed in industry	(B) % of total employed	(C) number of industrial concerns employing over 5 people	(D) number of workers employed (Col. C)
1897	147,793	17.9	-	-
1910	-	-	782	93,343
1920	61,054	7.1	1,430	21,212
1925	124,920	12.5	2,839	49,905
1930	163,922	16.2	3,013	62,581
1935	185,682	16.5	5,312	78,206

153 After 1926, Latvia made an attempt to regain for her manufacturing industries some part in the Soviet market, but her success in this venture was shortlived; E. Anderson, 1962, op.cit.

154 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11; S.R. Schraum 'L'Union Sovietique et Les Etats Baltes', in Les Frontières Europeenes de l'U.R.S.S., 1917-41, edited by J.B. Duroselle, Paris, 1957, pp. 25-168, p. 59. M. Skujenieks, 1938, op.cit., p. 35; Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., pp. 48.

Schraum differentiated between the number of persons employed in industr and the number of industrial workers. Both the 1935 Latvian census and 1937 state statistics did not give the number of workers but instead gav statistics which tallied with the total number of people employed in industry, (i.e. professional, managerial, etc.). It is possible that by confusing the number of people employed in industry with the number of industrial workers, the Ulmanis administration wanted to give the impression that manufacturing industry was more important to Latvia than it actually was and that the country was developing at a faster economic rate. By attempting to prove the economic viability of the state, the nationalists possibly wanted to overcome the stigma attached to the newness and size of the country.

The number of industrial workers increased slowly from 1920 onwards. It was only by 1937 that the number of industrial workers reached 1910 parallels when 94,186 workers were employed by 5,717 industrial concerns.[155] The ratio of workers to enterprises also became even less compared with the immediate pre-independence period. Latvian industry was therefore characterised by small industrial concerns with limited capital supplying some of the needs of the domestic market.

An indication of the most important branches of manufacturing industry is given in table 38. From this 1930 data, it is apparent that the loss of markets and means of purchasing raw materials determined to a large extent the limitations the geography of independence imposed on the country.

It is therefore self-evident that a large percentage of the industrial population were employed in rural industries which tapped the somewhat limited natural resources of the state. By 1937, 32.5 percent of the 5,717 industrial enterprises processed raw materials produced by agriculture.[156]

The importance accredited to the timber industry was made explicit from the outset of independence when nearly 85 percent of all forest land was nationalised. By 1935, of the 1.75 million hectares of forests in Latvia, 1.39 million hectares came under state control.[158] As the most important branch of manufacturing industry and covering 28 percent of the entire area of Latvia, the timber industry was geared to the export market with related paper and pulping branches as well as cellulose being of importance.[159]

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155 Darbiņš & Vītiņs, 1947, op.cit., p. 48-49.

156 A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p. 363.

158 Valsts Statistikā Pārvalde, Latvijas mežu statistika (Statistics of Latvia's forestry), Riga, 1938, p. 5. The forest resources of Latvia were concentrated in three main locations; in the Latgalian district, the coastal area around the Gulf of Riga, and the western peninsula of Kurzeme. In the former two areas, the forest vegetation had been undisturbed mainly because of the poor sandy soils.

159 ibid., 1925 data.

Table 38

Manufacturing Industries in Latvia, 1930 [157]

industry	Number of Industrial Concerns	Number of Persons Employed	Number of Workers
Extractive	5	218	207
Ceramics	103	4,569	4,243
Metallurgical	301	12,225	10,699
Chemical	104	5,206	4,448
hides, skins, etc.	52	1,109	942
Textiles	245	9,606	8,673
Timber	311	13,291	12,211
Paper & Printing	162	6,197	5,386
food processing	1,416	12,589	9,864
Clothing	139	3,834	3,382
Construction	81	1,510	1,349
other industries	94	1,745	1,177
Total	3,013	72,100	62,581

157 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., p. 256-60.

As with the textile industry, metallurgy was severely affected by independence, with the heavy engineering and shipbuilding industrial centres of Riga, Liepāja and Ventspils never reaching pre-1914 levels of production. An attempt was even made to gear the metallurgical industry toward agriculture by manufacturing such goods as agricultural machinery for the local domestic market but the success of this venture was limited.

Although the Latvian economy was not a 'planned economy', the economic goals pursued by the governments were nevertheless clear. By structuring manufacturing industry to service an agrarian economy and highlighting such branches as food processing, textiles, leather and forestry, the nationalist ruling élite attempted to prove the economic viability and self-sufficiency of the Latvian state. Plagued by an obsession with economic autarchy, the governments considered that their nation and state would be made more secure as a political unit by linking the various economic activities of the political region together, thus reducing reliance on foreign trade and discouraging foreign firms from independent activities within the country. Their measures were therefore designed to illustrate the uniqueness and independence of a state whose areal extent, population size, limited natural resources and geopolitical location questioned the economic, political and social viability of such a political-geographical entity.

The concern of the ruling élite with land reform and the importance of agriculture and related rural industries to the state economy, had left much of the large scale industrial concerns in the domain and under the private ownership of non-ethnic Latvians. Thus the ethnic Latvians did not exercise uniform power throughout space. The whole basis of the urban economy relied more on a handful of the national minorities who partly determined what industries were to be produced.

The concentration of capital and industrial ownership in the hands of a number of non-Latvians was in part a continuum of the process which

had existed before independence. With the migration of a large number of Baltic Germans from the countryside to the towns as a consequence of land reform, they transferred what capital they had left and invested it in a number of additional industrial concerns. These enterprises served both the domestic and foreign markets, the German market being of particular significance where contact between this community and Germany had already been well established long before the creation of a Latvian state.

With independence, a number of western-industrial enterprises had also continued to invest in Latvian industry as capital was short in the country and the various Latvian governments had at first welcomed investment. The British and German industrialists were particularly active in the country throughout the 1920's.[160]

The urban milieu therefore differed markedly from the countryside in the socio-economic position held by the ethnic Latvians. Demographically, they were less numerically significant than in the rural areas. With the exception of the Russians, the Latvians were the least urbanised as a percentage of their total number with just over 30 percent of them living in the towns. In contrast, the Jews and Baltic Germans respectively had 92.6 percent and 82.2 percent of their group living in urban Latvia while 64.4 percent of all Poles and 40.2 percent of the Lithuanian minority resided in the towns in 1935.[161]

The ethnic Latvians constituted the largest group in the cities, yet although they were the majority community employed in industry, in commerce the Jews and Baltic Germans played a more commanding role which was out of all proportion to their actual population size in the towns.

Much of the ownership of the large urban industrial concerns was in

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160 A.Ya. Varslavan, Angliiskii Kapital v Burzhuaznoi Latvii, 1920-29, Riga, 1972, pp. 20-35.

161 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

Table 39

Employment in the Industrial & Commercial Sectors by Ethnic Group in relation to the Ethnic Composition of the Urban Population, 1930 [162]

ethnic group	total employed in industry (%)	total employed in commerce (%)	total urban population (%)
Latvians	70.4	47.3	65.1
Balt. Germans	6.0	11.5	7.2
Russians	7.0	4.5	7.2
Belorussians	1.4	0.4	1.2
Jews	7.2	31.8	12.2
Poles	5.0	2.2	4.4
others	3.0	2.3	2.7
Total	163,922	63,635	694,002

the hands of Baltic Germans, Jews, Russians and non-Latvian citizens. As the table below shows, the vast majority of individual industrial enterprises were owned by Latvians.

Table 40

Industrial Enterprises owned by Individual Proprietors by ethnic group [163]

	no. of undertakings	% of total enterprises
Latvians	35,416	73.9
Jews	4,983	10.4
Russians	3,306	6.9
Baltic Germans	2,012	4.2
Others	2,204	4.6

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162 ibid., pp. 10-11; Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., p. 6.

163 'Ekonomists',1937, (Riga), pp. 73-88, p. 79.

Although ethnic Latvians owned the majority of individual industrial enterprises, their concerns were small scale compared to that of other ethnic groups. Thus, for example, in the important leather and tanning industries, of the 660 enterprises, 525 were owned by ethnic Latvians but employed only 248 people. The remaining 135 concerns were owned by Jews who employed a labour force of 616. Non-ethnic Latvians also owned the larger enterprises in the other key sectors of industry which included the textile, clothing, footwear manufacturing industries.[164]

Again in the private sector of those firms which operated as partnerships, limited liabilities and joint stock companies, the vast majority were owned by Latvians yet the larger enterprises and production outputs were that of non-ethnic Latvians.[165] Thus, within this private sector, Latvian manufacturers occupied third place after the Baltic Germans and Jewish company enterprises. In specific company owned enterprises of the industrial sector, ethnic Latvians accounted for the following percentage of ownership.

Table 41

Company Enterprises owned by Ethnic Latvians in specific branches of Industry[166]

	% owned by Latvians	% of Gross Product
foodstuffs	39.2	43.9
textiles	16.4	13.5
metallurgy	13.6	59.1
chemical	6.4	13.8
timber	6.2	19.1
mining and stone quarrying	0.1	2.3

164 L. Krotoski, 'Nationalisation of the Economic Structure of Latvia', Baltic and Scandinavian Countries, Gydnia, Vol. 3, 1937, No. 3, pp. 458-64, p. 459.

165 517 of these enterprises were owned by Latvians producing 24.3 percent of the total output. The Germans produced 36.7 percent of this total with only 146 enterprises while the Jews had 213 enterprises and produced 35.6 percent of the total output: ibid, p. 460.

166 ibid., p. 460.

Within these key branches of the Latvian economy, ownership of production tended to be in the hands of non-ethnic Latvians, particularly Baltic Germans and Jews.

In commercial trading enterprises a similar picture emerges. In 1935, 57.1 percent of the total number of commercial undertakings were owned by Latvians while Jews and Baltic Germans owned 28.4 percent and 4.7 percent respectively.[167] However, in the larger trading organisations of those with an annual turnover in 1936 of between 100,000 to 200,000 lats, Latvians owned only 30 percent of the enterprises while Jews owned 47.9 percent and Baltic Germans, 16.3 percent. Thus, 64.2 percent of trading firms returning over 100,000 lats were owned by Jews and Baltic Germans.[168]

After the re-allocation of land had been largely completed, the Latvian government of Skujenieks (1931-33), Blodnieks (1933-34) and the Ulmanis dictatorship turned toward industry in order to satisfy their ideological goals. The call for 'Latvia for the Latvians in trade and industry' went out.

As Krotoski pointed out:

> "The aim of the new policy is to restore the ethnic Latvian element to its due position in these branches of the economy in a manner to nationalise them by restricting private initiative and by greatly extending the scope of state ownership and state intervention."[169]

The nationalists viewed their state as a product of their nation. They were numerically the largest ethnic group within the territory and urban-industrial centres of Latvia. The economic and political organisation and activities within Latvian territory should, according to them, be within their control and ownership and not in the possession of

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167 ibid., p. 460

168 Ekonomists 1937, op.cit., p. 85.

169 Krotoski, 1937, op.cit., p. 461.

peoples outwith this in-group, be they other ethnic groups within Latvia or foreign industrialists. The whole basis of industry not being controlled by ethnic Latvians was alien to their concept of the 'state idea'. The national ruling élite therefore attempted to re-structure industry in such a fashion that the territorial industrial activities of the state were more directly under their jurisdiction and complied with the nationalist wishes of the tauta. The desired effect was to benefit the nation at the expense of those outwith this group thus furthering the integration and goals of the Latvian people.

Due to its geographical size, reliance on agriculture and the importance of foreign trade as the lifeline of the new state, the economic crisis of the early 1930's severely affected Latvia. Nationalisation may well have been a logical step in such a situation. However, the ruling élite used the Depression and high unemployment in the country as a reason to forward some of their nationalist goals. They claimed that such industries as the predominantly Jewish owned tobacco manufacturing and exclusively Russian ceramics industries which tended to employ non-Latvian labour, were responsible for much of the general state of Latvian industry.[170] The economic situation was conveniently used to promote 'national unity' by using the minorities as scapegoats.

As Johnson observes:

> "...nationalism seeks to extend the property owned by nationals so as to gratify the taste for nationalism."[171]

The national ruling élite used nationalisation as an instrument for the purpose of increasing the share of assets in the territory owned by the ethnic Latvians of that territory. In this sense, nationalisation was a nationalist measure with the industrial capital owned by non-ethnic Latvians being reduced.

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170 A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p. 353.

171 H.G. Johnson, 1965, op.cit., p. 179.

The public sector of industry was extended to include such Baltic German owned firms as Vairogs, a metallurgical concern, Ogle Trading Company, an enterprise organised for supplying the local market with coal and coke, Igeciema Alusa Daitavus Ltd., a brewery concern, and Liepajas Drāsu fabrika, heavy industries.

Other state monopolies were established over those industrial branches which were viewed as central to the greater economic self-sufficiency of the political unit, thus lessening reliance on foreign capital.[172] Domestic ownership was also further enhanced by tariff revisions of 1931 and subsequent years. These protectionist measures were designed to enforce a monopoly of Latvian trade over Latvian territory and to increase Latvian exports, particularly agrarian products.[173]

By discouraging foreign firms from independent activities within the state, and by creating a number of state monopolies over key industrial sectors of the economy, an attempt was made to link territorial organisation and control of industrial activity toward the ethnic Latvians.

This 'Latvianization' of industrial activity was implemented in the name of national unity. Referring to these economic measures, Karlis Ulmanis stated that the primary aim of the authorities was to increase the prosperity of the nation:

> "...only that class of the population which forms the heart and soul of the state is to govern and manage the economy of the country."[174]

The whole basis of the Ulmanis dictatorship rested on the belief that the ethnic minorities should conform in all things to the behaviour and wishes of the majority nation. The means by which this would be

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172 Other state monopolies created included such industries as the Adu un Vilnas Centrale (Central Hides, Skins & Wool Co.Ltd.), production of bricks, (Kiegelnieks Co.Ltd.) and lime (Kalkis Co.Ltd.) which had the object of making the home market self-sufficient as regards building materials.

173 Ekonomists 1937, pp. 10-11

implemented would be through the 'Latvianization' of the economy, culture and institutions of Latvia.

Although the earlier governments had pursued a policy of toleration toward the ethnic minorities, the underlying nationalist belief was always based on the idea that the territory of Latvia was ethnic Latvian territory. As early as the 1920's, the Baltic German historian, Heyking, had suggested that much of the basis of unity within the Latvian nation rested on a common anti-minority feeling connected with a subjective acceptance that the Latvian nation was the only legitimate ethnic group to occupy and politically control the territory of Latvia.

> "The nationalist press proclaim that only Letts can be considered as citizens. Jews are looked upon as citizens of Palestine, Russians of Soviet Russia, Germans of Germany and the like."[175]

Heyking suggests that the main reason for this attitude toward the minorities and the Latvian political region relied on the nationalist argument that the Latvians saw themselves as historically the first arrivals in the area and thus they should merit a privileged position in comparison with other ethnic groups within the region.[176] To them, the territory of Latvia was therefore ethnic Latvian territory *par excellence*.

Through the coercion of the minorities to accept various aspects of the attributes which defined the Latvian nation, the national ruling élite attempted to make the state, population and its geographical space that of the nation. The Skujenieks nationalist coalition government of 1931 openly attacked the rights of the national minorities. The use of the German and Russian languages in the *Saeima*,[177] the educational rights

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175 Heyking, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

176 *ibid.*, p. 17.

177 Proposals to make the Latvian language compulsary in the *Saeima* was rejected by a majority of its members.

of the Poles,[178] the religious freedoms of the Baltic German community in Riga,[179] and in 1933 the introduction of a Bill aimed at cutting off government subsidies to all minority aided schools,[180] heralded the beginning of a nationalist policy,

> "determined to Latvianise the economic, educational and cultural life of the country."[181]

At a Democratic Centre Party Congress in 1932, A. Kalniņš, the Minister of Education, declared that Latvia must have only a Latvian culture with no other being allowed to exist.[182]

The establishment of the authoritarian regime of Ulmanis,[183]

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178 In Autumn 1931, six Polish minority schools were closed and a Polish newspaper suppressed while two leading Polish Associations, the Polish League of Catholic Youth and the Association of the Latgalian Poles were suspended or dissolved. In March 1932, cultural autonomy was returned to the Poles but this was shortlived with the establishment of the Ulmanis' dictatorship.

179 In October 1931, the Skujenieks' cabinet expropriated Riga Cathedral from the Baltic Germans who had exclusively owned and used it for over seven centuries. The religious and national pride of the Baltic Germans was drastically affected by this measure.

180 This Bill was also aimed at introducing the Latvian language as the vernacular of instruction in all state supported educational institutions. On February 3rd, 1933, Skujenieks' proposals were defeated in the Saeima and the following day his cabinet resigned.

181 Rauch, 1970, op.cit., p. 156.

182 J. Von Hehn, Lettland zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur; zur Geschichte des Lettländischen Staatsstreichs von 15 Mai 1934; Munich, 1957, p.17.

183 After the peaceful coup d'etat, Ulmanis dissolved the Saeima and all political parties thus depriving the ethnic minorities of their most effective means of defense. The ultra-liberal electoral system was seen in itself by Ulmanis as responsible for the lack of implementation of sound economic policies and the decline in living standards of the population; ibid, pp. 19-20.

significantly called the 'Government of National Unity', was based on the premise that the socio-economic and political problems of Latvia could be resolved by both uniting the state in a common culture and by appealing to the nationalist emotions of the ethnic Latvians to rally around and support the Dictatorship. The tools used by the government to guarantee such support were those symbols which had helped integrate the nation in the past.

The Ulmanis dictatorship justified denying the minorities any distinctive privileges based on the changing international system in which Latvia needed to be strong and united, "...to protect her independence."[184]

In a June 1934 decree, the authoritarian regime altered the method of determining ethnic nationality. If either parent of a child was Latvian, the child was considered Latvian and was sent to a Latvian language school.[185] By implementing this measure, the 1935 Census recorded a dramatic increase in the number of ethnic Latvians. Referring to this traumatic increase in the number of ethnic Latvians in relation to the 1930 Census, nationalist Statisticians, Geographers and Historians justify the increase with reference to remnants of 'Germanisation', 'Russification', and 'Polonisation' of ethnic Latvians in previous times. This rather convenient nationalist observation was based on the belief that the increase in the number of Latvians was due to the fact that they had been ethnic Latvian all along.[186] By legitimising more the numerical

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184 J. Rogainis, 'The Emergence of an Authoritarian Regime in Latvia, 1932-34'; Lituanus, vol. 17 (1971), No. 3, pp. 61-85, p. 80.

185 R.I.I.A. Report, 1938, op.cit., p. 35.

186 The 1935 Census and Annual Statistics for that year gives a detailed breakdown of ethnic groups, language, and nationality so it is possible to examine more objectively the actual ethnic and linguistic affiliations of each group. Throughout this chapter, the data used was not that as defined by the Ulmanis Law of 1934 but by the declared ethnic, linguistic and nationality affiliations of the population.

predominance of the ethnic Latvian group than it actually was, it was easier for the nationalist to equate the total population of the state with that of the tauta thus giving the impression that the country was more of a Staatsvolk.

Another decree of June 1934 made Latvian the only language to be used in all state and communal services with the exception of those aprinki where at least half of the population spoke another language in the family or daily life as recorded in the 1935 Census. This in effect meant that even at the aprinki level, Latvian was to be the language as by 1934, even in Illūkstes aprinkis, which had 52.3 percent, the lowest recorded percentage of Latvian speakers, the language of the tauta was to be the official vernacular of communication.[187] In the Spring of 1936, all economic undertakings, both public and private, were ordered to conduct all their correspondence and functions in Latvian.

This 'Latvianization' of the state and its population was made in the name of national unity. The policies of the Ulmanis regime were justified in the name of the nation with this group attribute being the basis by which the rulers attempted to integrate the members of the tauta by using it as a universal rallying point. Ulmanis,

"...emphasised national unity as the foundation of the state."[188]

Although an attempt was made to dragoon and coax the minorities into conforming with some of the group attributes of the tauta, they did not identify nor were they integrated with this group. Statehood was also too short to determine the long term success or failure such a process might have had on the national minorities.

Ulmanis conveniently confused the national interest with the state interest. This had the desired affect of further developing an inter-related identity amongst the members of the tauta between what was the

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187 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

188 Rogainis, 1971, op.cit., p. 81.

'national idea' and what was the 'state idea'.

The Ulmanis government was also accutely aware of the regional particularism which had been fostered amongst the population of Latgale. In July 1936, the regime proposed the de-centralisation of industry from Riga and the larger seaboard towns in favour of the more deprived areas of the state.

In 1924, nearly 40 percent of the total number of industrial concerns were located in Riga city. By 1935, this concentration of industrial activity had not changed. In that year, less than 10 percent of the total number of industrial undertakings in Latvia were located in Latgale, the most heavily populated apgabals.[189] As part of the 'Latvianization' programme, the regime therefore attempted to break away from this large industrial agglomeration in and around the capital city, and where raw materials allowed, to distribute small enterprises more evenly throughout the state.[190] Re-deploying industry toward the interior was made easier due to public ownership of a large number of economic concerns. By promoting the industrial development and raising the standards of living in Latgale, the goals of the government in developing this policy was to integrate the ethnic Latvians and overall population of Latgale into the nation and state.

To the nationalists, the continuance of the tauta was therefore the basis on which the raison d'être of the state rested. They saw by proving the economic, political and geographical viability of the state that the further integration and prestige of the nation would be enhanced. Thus the geopolitical location and international situation existing between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia and their respective future designs for the

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189 P. Meyer, Latvia's Economic Life, Riga, 1925, p. 119; Valsts Statistiskā Parvalde, Latvijas Amatniecība un rūpniecība 1935 gada, (The Trade and Industry of Latvia 1935), 2 vols, Riga, 1938, p. 54.

190 H. Wanklyn, (1941), op.cit., p. 106.

Baltikum, united the nation through a common fear of losing their territory, wealth, group cohesiveness and identity.[191] The location of both Russians and Baltic Germans within Latvia further united the Latvian nation against those outwith this in-group.

> "Real or contrived external danger may be the only way to re-direct the public consciousness and temporarily re-kindle a spirit of national unity."[192]

The Valka boundary dispute highlighted the importance to the Latvian government of the time to use this situation to keep the Latvian nation together as a political entity. As the independent arbitrator in the boundary dispute pointed out during the proceedings, neither Latvia or Estonia, "dare make concessions" as national sentiment was running so high in both countries.[193] Thus during the early 1920's period of internal social and economic change, the national ruling élite looked toward the Latvian state boundaries as a geographical expression of their statehood in order to find relief against any internal conflict, therefore helping to further enhance the unity of the nation.

The nationalists also saw the integrity and political independence of the nation and state secure by their early 1930's policy of rejecting foreign investment in Latvian territory, by attempting to protect the Latvian economy through the introduction of high import tariffs and by developing those industries that would give the country less of an economic reliance on countries and industrialists outwith Latvia.

The failure of moves by a number of Baltic statesmen, designed to establish a Baltic Union, at first encompassing all the Scandinavian

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191 The lack of opposition by the Latvians and their government to the mass migration of Baltic Germans as a result of a German initiated treaty between Latvia and Germany on October 30th, 1939, illustrates the fear amongst the population of the annexation by Germany on the premise that large numbers of their fellow aryans resided in Latvia. E.C. Helmreich, 'The Return of the Baltic Germans', American Political Science Review, August 1942, pp. 711-17, p. 711.

192 V. Shaudys, 1962, op.cit., p. 17. 193 S. Tallents, 1943, op.cit.,p.27

countries, Finland, the three Baltic Republics and Poland,[194] and later limited to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, help illustrate the role nationalism played in determining the socio-economic and political development of the Latvian state. Although a defensive alliance was signed between Latvia and Estonia in 1923,[195] and along with Lithuania a Baltic Entente established in 1934,[196] there was no positive or realistic move toward an integrated economic and political union by the three Baltic governments. The Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Finns and Poles were too concerned with their own nation-building and too immature as states to consider an effective Baltic Union which would not only have enhanced the economic viability of the territory and population of this area but also strengthened and united the region against possible future Soviet or German aggression.

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194 As already mentioned in Chapter Two, there were a number of plans put forward in the years preceeding statehood to establish either a federation of Baltic States or some form of political and economic union of independent political entities outwith Russia. After the establishment of Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian states, the idea of some sort of federation lost its pre-1918 zeal. Scandinavian isolationism, Finland's fear of upsetting the USSR and Lithuania's anguish over the loss of her historical capital, Vilna (Vilnius), by Polish annexation, all contributed to any feasible economic, political and military co-operation with Latvia being limited to Estonia and Lithuania. V. Sidzikauskas, 1953, op.cit., pp. 36-40; A. Piip, 1933, op.cit., pp. 172-75; B.J. Kaslas, 1976, op.cit.

195 V. Sidzikauskas, 1953, op.cit., p. 39.

196 E. Anderson, 'Toward the Baltic Union, 1927-34, Lituanus, vol. 13, 1967, nr. 1, pp. 5-28. The Baltic Entente was signed on the 12th September, 1934. The aims of the treaty were to establish collaboration between the three countries and to promote understanding, maintain peace and to co-ordinate foreign policy.

The proximity and location of the three Baltic States, their similar historical development, small populations and limited territory, and their mutual fear of both Germany and the Soviet Union was not enough to unite let alone integrate them into a common political and/or economic entity. Their differing languages and religions, competitive rather than complementary economies and lack of any co-operative experience in the past, resulted in the three states having to content themselves with limited defensive alliances and minor economic and social pacts. All three were obsessed with preserving their absolute independence and the political importance of power over their own territory.

The control which central authority had over the territory under its jurisdiction and the subjective feelings which this Latvian middle class had with regard to their nation, played a central role in promoting the integration of the tauta. Through the implementation of these policies, the various governments transformed the social, economic and political geography of the state giving nationalism an areal expression which was not possible prior to independence.

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3.3 Spatial Re-organisation and the Integrative Experience

The territorial integration of Latvian space was made possible by independence and the continuation of the modernisation process. As distinct from national integration, regional or territorial integration refers to the objective control which Latvian central authority had over the entire territory under its jurisdiction. This differs from national integration which is concerned with the subjective and emotional feelings which individuals belonging to different social groups have toward the nation.[197] However, by its very definition, greater inter-action within the territory and spatial attributes of the state's area will play a central and continuing role in contributing toward the integration of both the state and the nation.

An understanding of the spatial arrangement and organisation of Latvian territory and state's population is integral in assessing the validity and importance the geography of independence had on national integration.

> "Once an area has been authoritatively established as a political unit, the processes of political organisation tend to develop forces of inertia to maintain the territorial organisation even in spite of drastic revolutions in form of government."[198]

During the short period of control over their territory, the Latvian ruling élite were aided in their goal of integrating the nation by the geographical make-up of the Latvian political region. They themselves through the implementation of state policies also contributed to the integration of the territory by spatially re-organising the Latvian region in such a fashion so as to accommodate and enhance the processes of national, state and territorial inter-action.

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197 M. Weiner attempts to separate the concepts of national (state) and territorial integration. M. Weiner, 'Political Integration and Political Development', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol. 358, March 1965, pp. 52-64, p. 53.

198 R. Hartshore, 1968, op.cit., p. 30.

The territory of Latvia covered an area of only 65,791 square kms.[199] With the low-lying terrain and the general lack of physical geographical obstacles, communication and movement made more accessible any two locations within the area of the state. The continuity and relatively even distribution of the population throughout the country and the lack of areas devoid of population enhanced contact and the dissemination of ideas, commodities and people. The nature and form the geography of the state took contributed to a territorial unity making possible the greater exchange of transactions and social communications over an area which was limited in its political extent.

The boundaries of the state functioned as limitations to geographical mobility. As a legal demarcation separating different political systems, the Latvian boundaries interfered with movement. Thus nationalism, which by its very nature kept alive the importance of the political bounded space of Latvia through tariff restrictions, regulations on the movement and exchange of goods and people, etc., also aided in developing an internal economic, political and social organisation which was unique only to Latvian territory for the first time in the region's history. By imposing such restrictions on mobility, the boundary aided in the areal unity of the Latvian state.

The Latvian political region became an internal geographical system. Internal trade developed and outweighed the international movement of goods and services. The domestic market, although limited due to the smallness of the country both in areal extent and labour resources, was rapidly expanded absorbing a high percentage of local agricultural produce and the limited industrial goods which were made within the country.

With independence, the communications system was nationalised,[200] emphasising the importance of such a network to the future prosperity of

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199 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., p. 1.

200 A. Bilmanis, 1951, op.cit., p. 335.

the Latvian economy. A completely revised system of internal communications was needed. Until 1918, the orientated transit 'east-west' trade connecting the Latvian ports of Riga, Liepāja and Ventspils with the rich economic areas of the Russian hinterland had been the basis on which the region's communication network had been constructed. The legacy of this well-equipped rail network played an even more important role during independence for the local area. The existence of a rail system emphasising the past importance of long distance traffic was therefore out of all proportion to the local needs of the population and had to be re-orientated in such a fashion that the major towns and port outlets of Latvia could be connected with their local agricultural regions by branch lines. Figure 19 illustrates the more comprehensive development of an internal rail system in contrast to the 1914 situation.

By 1921/2, 83 percent of all traffic conveyed in Latvian railways was inland traffic,[201] with such agricultural produce as timber, grain and flour, artificial manure and flax dominating the type of goods being transported.[202] Although Soviet Russia's transit trade through Latvia again gradually increased from 1922 until 1932, the internal exchange and movement of commodities predominated.[203]

With independence, the importance of the ports and harbour facilities diminished considerably.[204] However, they still played a central role as a focus and vital link with Western Europe for the export of agriculture and related industrial concerns and as a main centre for the import of heavy industry. They were now orientated toward serving the Latvian market and producers even although they were of immense importance to the continuing transit trade of Russia.

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201 Ekonomists 1928, (Riga, 1928), J. Rungis, pp. 68-82, p. 71.

202 ibid., p. 71.

203 According to the Statistical Yearbooks of Latvia.

204 By 1927, goods arriving by rail to Riga for dispatch by sea had declined by 40 percent on the 1913 figure. Corresponding declines in the same period for Liepāja and Ventspils were 17 and 49 percent respectively. Ekonomists 1928, op.cit., p. 72.

Fig 19: Latvia: Rail Network in 1914 and 1938



Source: M. Skujenieks, Latvijas Statisticas Atlass, (A Statistical Atlas of Latvia), Riga, 1938, p.44.

From 1920, a network of roads was constructed to carry motorised vehicles. Hitherto, such a network had been hardly developed. Thus Latvian roads were completely orientated toward serving the framework of the region.

Population movement also became an internal phenomena for the Latvian political region. From the limited data available, it would appear that international immigration more or less ceased after 1925 with little if any emigration until the Baltic German mass exodus in 1939. When state immigration did exist, it was mainly seasonal attracting Polish and Lithuanian agricultural workers during the summer months. In 1931, for example, it was estimated that just over 24,000 foreign farm labourers were employed in Latvia on a temporary basis. By 1937, this figure had reached nearly 48,000.[205] In contrast, the 1935 Census estimates that between 1925 and 1930, Latvia had a net mechanical decrease in its population of 2,132. Corresponding data for the 1930 to 1935 period registers an increase of only 4,052 persons.[206] It is therefore apparent from the limited material available that inter-state migrations to and from Latvia were mainly seasonal. The nature of the political systems in the states neighbouring Latvia and the seemingly lack of motivation to leave a newly independent state partly explains the more or less total lack of international movement in the Baltic region during the 1925-39 period.

Communication through the geographical mobility and the consequent interaction and contact between residents within the state was more intense than with peoples from outwith the region. This in itself helped enhance the conditions for a common awareness amongst the state's population of their political, economic and social similarities and differences.

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205 Ekonomists 1938, (Riga, 1938), p. 50.

206 Ceturtā Tautas Skaītīšana Latvija, 1935. gadā, op.cit., pp. 16 & 27.

Population movement within the state was limited mainly due to the nature of government policy. Their lack of concern with industry and the stress put on the rural economy contributed to limited intra-regional migrations which is not typical of a modernising society.

The main trend in movement during this period was immigration from Latgalia into the richer agricultural areas of Central Latvia and the city of Riga. The net mechanical increase and decrease by aprinki (fig. 20) gives some indication of this main population trend. Eastern Latvia, particularly the Latgalian aprinki of Daugavpils, Rēzeknes and Ludzas, were areas of marked out-migration serving the central and western districts of the country with their reservoir of excess labour. The rich agricultural area of Tukuma-Jelgavas, and the city of Riga were the main destination points from this predominantly east to west movement of the population.

Table 42

Net Increase and Decrease of the Population Due to Migration[207]

By Apgabali

Apgabali	1925 - 1930	1930 - 1935
Riga	+38,792	+ 6,674
Vidzeme	- 3,815	- 647
Kurzeme	- 5,152	+ 628
Zemgale	+ 5,002	+ 6,701
Latgale	-36,959	- 9,302

Within Latvia, the modernisation process had therefore a varying impact upon the population and territory. Modernisation attracted people to certain areas in space. In specific areas of the state, notably Latgalia, there was less contact and circulation of people and commodities due mainly to its general underdeveloped economy. As an area of

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207 ibid., pp. 16 and 27.

Fig. 20: Latvia: Net Mechanical Population Increase & Decrease: 1930-35



Source: Ceturtā Tautas Skaitīšana Latvijā 1935 gadā, op.cit., p. 27.

emigration, the population of Latgalia were on the whole characterised by little geographical mobility, tradition-bound ideas and an economy and society backward compared with the rest of the political region. Figure 21 illustrates the high percentage of the population of Latgale which were born in their present aprinkis of residence. This contrasted sharply with other districts of the state where population movement had been more marked in the past thus characterising a less sedentary society.[208]

However, a positive factor aiding in the integration of the Latgalians with the rest of the state was Latgalian immigration into other areas of the country. In so doing, the migrants were introduced into a more modernised society with all its varying demands and aspirations.

The modernisation process continued throughout independence enhancing the social communication of the peoples within the state. As part of the on-going process by which Latvian nationalism came about, during the post-independence period it helped consolidate mutual awareness and identity thus strengthening the political integration of the peoples of the state.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which independence and the politics of the élites hampered the modernisation process. With the completed transfer of power from traditional to modernising leaders, Latvian society undertook to adapt its political and social institutions to modern functions following the example of the West. They introduced. into their state structure political institutions which they viewed as 'modern' and 'democratic'. On the social front, with pressure particularly

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208 Data on the number of persons born in their present town of residence in 1930 also indicates that the urban centres of Latgale had a high percentage of their total native to that town. Thus in Rēzekne and Ludza, over 50 percent of their residents were native. Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1930, op.cit., p. 493.

Fig. 21: Latvia: Percentage Population Native: 1930



BOUNDARIES:
— — — APGABALI
- - - - - APRINKI

Percentage population native to each aprinkis

over 70
60 – 70
50 – 60
40 – 50
30 – 40

0 150 kms

Source: Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., p.494.

from the L.S.D.P. and the demands of the national group,[209] they acted as innovators in public health, education and social services in general. They attempted and were relatively successful in increasing the standard of living of the majority of the population bringing them into a modern type of society characterised by low birth and death rates, greater life expectancy, reasonable wage levels and greater educational opportunity.[210]

However, there were a number of factors which would suggest that Latvian society had not shaken off the shackles of being tradition-bound and that the nationalist policies pursued by the Latvian governments contributed to a halting of the modernisation process.

The state policies of the successive governments were very much governed by traditional affiliations of the past as seen through their nationalism. C.E. Black comments on the relationship between nationalism and modernisation within economically developing societies:

> "Although nationalism was only a means to an end - self-determination to permit societies to modernise free from the discriminating rule of alien peoples - it became for several generations an end in itself."[211]

Thus obsessed by promoting the nation and their political and cultural nationalism, the Latvian ruling élite interpreted their desire to modernise within the subjective and emotional framework of the tauta.

The 'agrarianisation' of the population could be interpreted as a retrograde step toward modernisation. Urbanisation and industrial growth, indices usually of a continually modernising society, were not encouraged. However, although the governing élite were obsessed with agriculture and the land question, they nevertheless cannot be accused of directly

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209 Kalniņš, 1972, op.cit., p. 155 stresses the influence of the L.S.D.P. and its large following in pressing for social reform.

210 Data on the standard of living, educational facilities, wage levels, public health services, etc., are given in the various yearly statistics and also in Darbins & Vitins, 1947, op.cit., pp. 62-65.

211 C. Black, 1967, op.cit., p. 116.

inhibiting the modernisation process. Latvian agriculture was brought into a twentieth century setting. It was highly commercial, mechanised and the most modern methods of farming were practised in most districts. Agricultural co-operatives had been organised on the successful Danish model mainly in order to negate the inefficiencies characteristic of small family sized farming units. In this context although agriculture dominated the economy, society and politics of independence, it had been transformed from what had existed prior to the war.

The creation of a small political unit of Latvia in some respects also inhibited the modernisation process. As a small country, Latvia faced a number of socio-economic problems which were related to her areal and labour limitations. The territory had to be re-organised in such a fashion as to adapt to the new circumstances in which a small state finds itself. The devastating effects of the war coupled with the secession of the region from Russia had a tremendous impact on the spatial and economic arrangement of the Latvian region. The loss of the Russian market, the traditional outlet for Latvian industrial products, meant that the country had to re-orientate and use its geographical accessibility to the Baltic and Western-Central Europe to its best advantage. With the complete devastation of capital equipment and production facilities, the government had to decide the economic priorities of the country and the most expedient way to build an economic infra-structure which would help Latvia function as an economic entity and be acceptable to the central focus of the state, the nation. They were also faced with a capital shortage, a total lack of raw materials and a limited internal market in which to sell their produce. The whole basis of the economies of scale was limited by the size of the state.

It could therefore be suggested that modernisation as an on-going process had been partly destroyed or hampered by Latvian nationalism as the latter movement demanded control over their own territory. The

modernisation process was partly in danger of stagnation due to the geographical form of the Latvian state.

Although some of the central policies pursued by the Latvian government and the limitations imposed on the territory of the state did create a number of economic limitations to modernisation, the process did continue to have an important impact on the integration at both the national and state level. The continuation and speeding up of the creation of a larger urban middle class played an important part in both promoting modernisation, of which they themselves were a product, and nation-building. The increased higher levels of literacy, especially amongst the Latgalian population, meant that modern ideas were more easily disseminated through the population. The abundance of various forms of communication, including newspapers, books and radio also enhanced the modernisation process. Thus a high level of communication represented a capacity of the Latvian nation and government with the ability to mobilise their population and to instil certain objectives.

The urban centres of Latvia represented important nodes of communication and of modernisation. Although a large number of towns of the region did not exceed 2,000 people, the vast majority of the urban residents of the state resided in four main centres - Riga, Liepāja, Daugavpils and Jelgava. In the context of this independence period, it is more accurate to view these larger cities as an index of modernisation as they could support a wide array of political and economic institutions and services which were not present in the smaller and some of the medium sized towns. Thus the vast majority of the designated 'urban' population lived in centres which could perform a variety of modern functions.

Table 43

The Urban Hierarchy of Latvia in 1935[212]

size of town (no. of persons)	total population	% of total urban	No. of towns
500-1000	5,482	0.8	7
1000 - 2000	29,795	4.2	20
2000 - 3000	11,870	1.7	5
3000 - 4000	24,764	3.5	7
4000 - 5000	31,079	4.4	7
5000 - 10,000	57,335	8.0	8
10.000 - 20,000	28,810	4.0	2
20,000 - 60,000	136,357	19.2	3
over 60,000	385,063	54.2	1
Total	710,555	100.0	60

The creation of a Latvian state also enhanced the development of a central place system, a settlement pattern whose nodes functioned as collection and distribution points for the surrounding rural areas. Various functions and demands developed within these urban centres of the state thus forming a hierarchy of towns integrating the territory of the country into a more uniform and inter-related area. Within this urban hierarchy, Riga, as the core area and primate city of the state played a central and decisive role in the territorial and national integration of the region. In 1930, the city was six times larger than the second city of Latvia, Liepāja. It contained nearly 55 percent of the total urban population and 20 percent of the state's inhabitants.[213]

Its numerical predominance reflected its distinctiveness and consolidation of economic, political and cultural strength in this territorial centre. Nearly three quarters of all industrial enterprises employing over twenty workers were located in Riga.[214] The spatial

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212 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936, op.cit., p. 7.

213 ibid., p. 7.

214 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., p. 277.

inequalities of modernisation in the region enhanced the powerful position Riga held within the state. Its location on the Baltic, coupled with it being a node for new ideas and innovations coming from the west contributed to it being the area most affected by modernisation. From this centre, economic, political and administrative decisions were disseminated to the peripheral areas of the region. Its accessibility to all parts of the state made it a natural focus for the surrounding districts and its dominance enhanced the political centralism and functioning of the form Latvian governments took. As the centre of both the state and the nation, and its wide array of cultural and educational institutions, it became itself a symbol of Latvian nationalism and a focus of expression for the national consciousness of the Latvians. The very presence of Riga negated the importance of urban centres such as Daugavpils becoming a focus of regionalism. The core area of Riga therefore contributed a unity to both the Latvian state and nation.

The spatial re-organisation of the territory and people of this Latvian political region and the impress of the continuing modernisation process within a defined political area, transformed and consolidated the region and population into a more cohesive whole. Political independence therefore strengthened the facility for a greater degree of political integration than was possible before 1918.

Latvian independence contributed to the greater interaction of all members of the state. In this respect, greater territorial integration could have over-ridden the importance of national integration. Yet although the majority of the ethnic minorities did identify with a Latvian state, the political, and socio-economic position held by the tauta and its ruling élite within the state structure, and the perceptions this group had of their integral relationship to the territory of Latvia, meant that they remained apart from the minorities as a social and

political grouping. The 'state-idea' of the Latvian nationalists differed from that of the other ethnic groups. The former, particularly in the 1930's, began to see a mono-ethnic Latvian state as their 'national-idea' and inter-changeable with their identification with a Latvian state. The 'state-idea' of the majority of the ethnic minorities was that of a pluralistic society based on the democratic and liberal ideas as put forward and partly implemented in the 1920's. Thus although the modernisation process enhanced contact and communication within the region, the attributes of the members of the tauta and their perceptions and consciousness of their differences between them and other groups within the region meant that the nation continued and was enhanced by independence.

The very existence of a Latvian state played a central role in the integrative process of the nation. With a life-span of only twenty years, it is difficult to assess the real impact such a phenomena could have had on the integrative process. However, the very fact that the Latvians had gone through such a process, had experienced managing their own political, economic and social affairs with a degree of success, contributed to an integrative experience which is of central importance in the continuation of a national identity and attributes in the contemporary period.

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Chapter Four

The Latvian Nation within the Soviet State

Loss of statehood and incorporation into the Soviet multi-national state resulted in the spatial and societal re-organisation of the Latvian region and its peoples. Inherent in this revolutionary transformation was the re-orientation of the members of the tauta from a polity where the decision-making powers were in part a response to the nation and were designed to accommodate the values and aims of the national group, to a political system which envisaged the annihilation of Latvian nationalism and the demise of the tauta. Therefore in order to understand Moscow's attitude toward the Latvian nation, a brief resumé of Soviet nationality policy and its implications is necessary.

Moscow viewed that to destroy Latvian nationalism and re-organise the peoples of the region toward accepting the Soviet state, the region had to be industrially developed, its societal structure radically transformed and its people socialised into accepting this new central authority as the focus of decision-making. A policy of modernisation was therefore seen as a rational method of dislodging Latvians from their traditional roles and affiliations with the nation. Soviet modernisation policy, which entailed rapid industrial and urban growth, the collectivisation of agriculture and social change and mobility was designed in such a way that the socio-economic and political framework for disintegration at the national level would be set.

A number of Western writers have referred to such a process as 'Sovietisation'.[1] Kolarz suggests that it is the introduction of:

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1 See for example, V. Aspaturian, 'The Non-Russian Nationalities', A. Kossof, (ed), Prospects for Soviet Society, New York, 1968, pp. 143-198.

> "...a political and ideological system which originated as Marxism was taken over by the Bolsheviks and transformed into Marxist Leninism."[2]

This rather simplistic definition of a complicated process is not untypical of writers using this term. It would be more accurate and relevant to this study to suggest that if such a term is to be used that it connotates not only a policy of modernisation stemming from Moscow but also is part of the Soviet interpretation of Marxism and their particular view of the role of the state and its bureaucratic structure in the organisation of the territory, resources and people of their polity. Such decisions eminating from Moscow have not been immune to change. Stalin's interpretation of the nation and his policy toward the non-Russian borderlands differs from that pursued by Brezhnev in the contemporary period.

Although this 'state idea' is concerned with the development of nations or the nationalities (natsional'nosti) into one all embracing Soviet socialist peoples and that it is envisaged by Moscow that national isolationism and distinctiveness will eventually disappear, it is accepted that the nation does exist as a social phenomenon. Fedoseyev remarked:

> "The national form of society continues under socialism as well, but the transition from capitalism to socialism radically alters the social essence of nations and national relations."[3]

Stalin defined the nation by stating that, "...common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up"[4] were the four basic attributes of the nation. He stressed the role the bourgeoisie played in the formation of the nation and nationalist movements. To Stalin,

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2 W. Kolarz, Communism and Colonialism, New York, 1964.

3 P.N. Fedoseyev, 1977, op.cit., p. 330.

4 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, London, 1936, p. 8.

nationalism was bourgeois by nature and its extremes could not be tolerated within a socialist society.

Stalin's slogan, "national in form, socialist in content", which expressed the division of responsibility between central authority and local nationalities became in practice all but innocuous expressions of national desires within the purview of Moscow content rather than of national form. His policy toward the national minorities and his interpretation of the nation remained more or less the basis of Soviet thought until the early 1960's. Within the Soviet Union, the nation was acceptable only in as far as it existed as a cultural phenomenon, its general social and political attributes not tolerated. Stalin also viewed that in order to create a uniform and totally integrated Soviet state that the group attributes of the various nations would become less important to the members of the nations as socialism developed.

In the early years of Soviet rule in the Baltic, Kolarz remarked:

> "Soviet policy in the Baltic States can be characterised not only by the familiar slogan, 'national in form, socialist in content' but also by the formula, 'Baltic in form, Russian in essence'."[5]

Stalin's nationality policy toward the borderlands also implied Russification, not only in language but in culture. This 'national chauvinism' expressed itself in a number of ways. At this point in the analysis it is enough to say that Russification was apparently viewed by Stalin as a convenient and somewhat logical method of integrating the non-Russian nations into one people, (narod).

Since the mid 1960's, the official view of the nation has been amended. With the continuation in the Soviet Union of the nation as more than just simply a cultural phenomenon, an explanation of its survival

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5 W. Kolarz, 'The Baltic Soviet Republics', in W. Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, London, 1952, pp. 104-123, p. 109.

had to be sought. It was apparent that the nation was not just simply a bourgeois concept.

A number of historians writing in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History)[6] criticised Stalin's nationality policy and interpretation of the nation. Dzhunusov, for example, criticised Stalin's approach for simply reducing the nation to a 'bourgeois phenomenon'. He suggested that nations are forms of social development intrinsic not only to capitalism but also socialist society. Dzhunusov also viewed that Stalin's policy of coercing nations into accepting alien languages, culture, etc. was not only morally wrong within a socialist society and would lead not to integration or assimilation but instead would enhance nationalist sentiment and identity.

Fedoseyev attempts to clarify the position of the contemporary nation within the Soviet state:

> "There are two extremes in interpreting the concept, 'Soviet people'. One of them is that the 'Soviet people' possesses all the requisite properties of a nation; it has a common economy, territory, a language of communication, and a spiritual identity. By implication, it would be just as right to name it 'Soviet nation'. The other opinion is that the 'Soviet people' represents no more than a political, state entity. But both these views are wrong. The fact that Soviet people are acquiring more all-Soviet, international features does not mean that the population of the USSR has become a new nation. Although the Soviet people does have properties resembling those of a nation... warranting the use of such concepts as 'all-national pride of the Soviet man' and 'national interests of the Soviet state', it is not a new nation. It constitutes a higher,

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6 M.S. Dzhunusov, 'Natsiya kak sotsial'noe etnicheskaya obshchnost' lyudei', Voprosy Istorii, nr. 4, 1966, pp. 16-30; P.M. Rogachev & M.A. Sverdlen, '0 ponyatii natsiya', Voprosy Istorii, nr. 1, 1966, pp. 33-48; N.A. Tavakalyan, 'Nekotorye voprosy ponyatiya natsiya', Voprosy Istorii, nr. 2, 1967, pp. 115-123; M.O. Mnatsakanyan, 'Natsiya i natsional'naya gosudarstvennost', Voprosy Istorii, nr. 9, 1966, pp. 27-36.

> international community, the unity of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR."[7]

According to the above writer, the nation can exist within the Soviet Union but by the same token, through the integration of all nations, has become less of an important group attribute. Thus it would appear that a milder attitude toward the various nationalities is proposed. It would seem that the desired goal is a pluralistic integration of nations within a firmly unified multi-national community rather than their amalgamation or assimilation into a single ethnically undifferentiated whole.

This chapter therefore sets out to determine the degree to which the political disintegration of the nation has taken place. As in the latter quarter of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the modernisation process had an integral relationship with the development of the tauta, so in the contemporary Soviet period, such socio-economic and geographical re-organisations have left their imprint upon the region and its peoples. Rakowska-Harmstone comments:

> "...rather than fostering national integration, the impact of modernisation has given new impetus to the growth and crystallization of minority nationalisms."[8]

Restructuring the Latvian region through rapid urban-industrial growth and social re-stratification has more or less destroyed Latvian nationalism but has failed to lead to the demise of the nation as a social entity. The first section of this chapter examines the impact of this modernisation policy which although not having the desired effect of weakening the overall group attributes of the nation has nevertheless radically altered the geography of the region by attempting to set a

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7 P.N. Fedoseyev, 1977, op.cit., p. 335.

8 T. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'The Study of Ethnic Politics in the U.S.S.R.', in G.W. Simmonds, editor, Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Detroit, 1977, pp. 20-36, p. 26.

context in which disintegration could occur. These processes and their societal and spatial implications in the region illustrate that modernisation does not necessarily lead to the demise of the nation.

The second section examines an important aspect and central support factor in the continuation of the tauta, the creation of an administrative-territorial unit, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) which coincides with the Latvian political region. It is postulated that territoriality and the ensuing functions of the LSSR help partly explain why the nation and a Latvian national identity still exists in the Soviet period. The importance accredited to various attempts at re-organising this administrative region are assessed, and their impact upon dividing and superimposing various geographical units which may lead to the disintegration of the region are studied.

The remaining sections examine the important themes of modernisation and territoriality as they affect the tauta's integration and possible disintegration. Section Three scrutinises the group attributes of the tauta, the main factors which are affecting its disintegration and the emergent spatial patterns in such a process. The concluding section takes stock of the varying processes affecting the region, attempting to argue that specific issues and a geographical milieu are responsible for the existence of the nation, and that such integrative processes still tend to counteract factors questioning the nation as a group phenomenon.

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4.1 The Impact of Modernisation and Spatial Transformation

As agriculture and the rural population was to the Latvian nationalist middle class the bulwark and main support of their state, so it was viewed by Moscow that the urban workers would emerge as the main support for and the continuation of Soviet rule in Latvia. To achieve such a favourable situation, it was necessary to reorganise the economic structure of the region as quickly as possible. As I.K. Lebedev pointed out, the aim of the Soviet state was, "...the transformation of Latvia from an agrarian country to a highly developed industrial-agrarian Soviet Republic."[9]

Rapid industrialisation of the area was seen by Stalin as the most effective method of not only developing the economy of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) but also of eroding and stamping out nationalist sympathies. By fully integrating the region into the Soviet state, through an accent on dramatic industrial growth, the socio-economic and spatial manifestations resulting from such a process would help reduce resistance and change political attitudes toward Moscow.

Local geographical circumstances played their part in the decision to concentrate on the industrialisation of the country at the expense of agriculture. It was in the larger towns that the Soviet government had its main support and less opposition to their rule. Fewer Latvians were also concentrated in the cities compared with the rural areas. Moscow therefore had more of a substantial political base in urban Latvia from which they could build up communism and disseminate their power to the whole of the LSSR.

The location of the LSSR and the role its coastal towns had played in the industrial development of the late nineteenth century Tsarist Russia also influenced the economic policy decisions of Moscow. The

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9 I.K. Lebedev, Bol'sheviki Latvii v bor'be za razvitie promyshlennosti, Moscow, 1949, p. 12.

geographical proximity of the major Latvian cities to the large and important production centres of Leningrad, the Central Industrial Region of Moscow and the Eastern Ukraine favoured the region's industrial development. The necessary raw materials, semi-processed goods and machinery, could be relatively easily and cheaply supplied to local Latvian industrial centres, while Latvian finished products processed and manufactured in the region could be transported to the large consumption centres in European Russia. The existence of a west-east orientated transport network and the accessibility of Riga, Liepāja and Ventspils was of additional economic advantage to the Soviet state for the production of goods destined primarily for export.

Although the lack of raw materials in Latvia did not favour the development of heavy industry, there were natural resources in the area which could be tapped and which could directly contribute to the post-war economic reconstruction of the region. The importance accredited to the peat, timber and utilisation of local construction materials in the independence period and, in the 1930's the development of hydro-electric power utilising the water resources of Latvia, meant that a local contribution could be made comparatively easily and advantageously channeled into promoting industrial growth, and also serving other areas of the Soviet Union after the widespread upheaval caused by war.

The Latvian region also offered a relatively abundant supply of labour in the towns and even larger excess pool in the rural areas which, with industrialisation, could potentially be directed into local urban-industrial centres. Historical antecedents and the impact of modernisation on the people and area of the LSSR had also resulted in a highly skilled labour force which could be geared toward producing a wide array of industrial products.

The framework around which the industrial reorganisation of the region was to develop was already well established in the 1940-41 period with the nationalisation of the vast majority of economic enterprises.

Unlike the agricultural sector of the economy, the Nazi occupation of Latvia had continued to control industry keeping intact direct ownership by the state. Thus by 1945, the groundwork on which Latvian industry was to develop had already been formulated.[10]

The post-war five-year plan (1946-1950) was geared toward reconstructing industry in the Republic and reorganising it in such a way that the area would be geographically and economically re-orientated toward becoming an integral part of the Soviet Union. Massive capital investment was injected into various sectors of industry. It was particularly heavy industry which received attention along with the necessary and integral establishment of a more effective and comprehensive rail network. The limited energy resources of the area were also given special priority.

From the outset, an emphasis on heavy industry had a particularly far-reaching effect on the economic interdependence of the area with the rest of the state. The development of local fuels, mainly geared toward supplying the needs of the metallurgical and machine construction industries were totally inadequate in meeting some of the demands of heavy industry. Even all-Union resources could not keep pace with the speed by which heavy industrial enterprises were developed. Lebedev mentions that of the 443 industrial enterprises which had been reconstructed by 1945, 129 of them could not produce due to the lack of electric power.[11]

The importance accredited to heavy industry and the development of local fuel resources is well illustrated by the success these sectors had obtained at the time of the completion of the five-year plan, (table 44). This was despite the fact that heavy industrial activity did not reflect the necessary local raw material base. It was however the basis on which

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10 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., pp. 484-501.

11 I.K. Lebedev, 1949, op.cit., p.38.

large numbers of people could be incorporated into an urban-industrial milieu.

Table 44

Gross Industrial Production in the LSSR, 1940-1950[12]

(% of 1940 where 1940 = 100%)

industrial branch	1950
all industry	303
peat industry	577
chemical	691
metal working & machine construction	1157
machinery construction	2405
food processing	125

The rapid growth of industrial production achieved in this five-year plan period exceeded the planned objectives as set down by the government. The bias toward heavy industry did have repercussions in other sectors. The light industrial products in food processing, textiles and footwear, important components of the economy during the independence era, had, according to Sovetskaya Latviya (Soviet Latvia), not reached their plan potential.[13]

Throughout the 1950's, the industrial pattern set in the 1946-50 period continued.[14] By mid 1955, the metal working and machine industries had reached 63 percent of the LSSR's total industrial production.[15] Hydro electric power stations continued to be built utilising local water resources including a 120,000 kw plant at Plavinas on the Daugava.[16] Peat resources were also developed. Food processing, the textile industry operating largely on the import of raw materials, lumber and wood products

12 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Pri Sovete Ministrov Latviiskoi SSR; Ekonomika i Kultura Sovetskoi Latvii, Riga, 1966, p. 55.

13 Sovetskaya Latviya, 20th January, 1956.

14 A.A. Drizula, 1971, op.cit., pp. 715-724.

15 Sovetskaya Latviya, 19th July, 1955.

16 V. Pūriņš, 1971, op.cit., pp. 270-273.

using the extensive local resources, and the chemical industry were, after heavy industry, the most important branches of the economy. An emphasis was also placed on those branches of industry which required little imported raw materials and could tap the highly skilled labour force. Thus radio, telephone, and communications equipment along with railway car production were expanded.

By the late 1950's, the Latvian economy had moved toward a specialisation of production in heavy engineering and expansion of its limited resources. This trend has continued into the 1970's. Prospecting for oil and gas resources has continued since the 1960's with a few limited offshore discoveries, the most favourable being in 1971 on the Laduskin oil field near Kaliningrad. A rich oil field has also been discovered near Kuldiga in western Latvia. Its economic potential has not yet been fully realised but its discovery is important particularly in view of the completion of a new oil terminal at Ventspils only thirty kilometres away, (fig. 22). Thus the limited energy resources of Latvia have been fully expanded in order that a local contribution can be made to an economic base which is reliant on the import of raw materials.

The obsession with developing heavy industry, concentrating on the means of production as opposed to the objects of consumption,[17] is the most marked and prevalent trend of the Latvian economy in these post-war years. The rate of growth of gross industrial production in the metal and machine industries, fuel and chemical industries was generally at the expense of investment in the traditional light and rural industries which had been characteristic of the economy during its period of statehood. Table 45 illustrates the rapid and continued growth of the heavy

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17 Soviet industry and industrial statistics are divided into two basic types of production referred to as group A and B. Group A represents the production of the means of production and the latter the production of consumer goods. For a fuller explanation of the logic behind this division see: K. Marx, Kapital, vol. 1, Penguin edition, London, 1976, pp. 289-291.

Fig.22: LSSR: Energy Resources: 1976



Sources: V. Pūriņš, 1971, op.cit., pp. 268-275; A. D. Danilova, et.al. Ekonomicheskaya Geografiya SSSR, Moscow, 1976, pp. 443-447.

Table 45

Rate of Growth of the Means of Production & Objects of Consumption, LSSR, 1960 - 1976[18]

(% of 1960 where 1960 = 100%)

	total industrial growth	group A (means of production)	group B (objects of consumption)
1965	158	170	149
1970	248	287	217
1975	338	411	277
1976	354	433	289

Table 46

Rate of Growth of Gross Industrial Production in the LSSR, 1940-1976[19]

(% of 1940 where 1940 = 100%)

industry	1950	1960	1970	1975	1976
all industry	303	1099	2726	3713	3895
thermal & electric power	236	883	1942	2191	2077
metal & machine	1159	6593	26129	40374	44573
timber, cellulose & related industries	265	529	951	991	1004
construction materials	263	1117	2931	4245	4190
glass porcelain & ceramics	417	991	1983	3452	3718
light industries	205	714	1323	1655	1696
food processing	125	443	922	1189	1224
printing & publishing	388	965	2503	3507	3622
chemical industry	683	4335	29393	40877	44843

18 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe upravleni pri Sovete ministrov Latviiskoi SSR; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1976 godu, Riga, 1977, p.51; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, Riga, 1974, p. 104.

19 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1976 godu, op.cit., pp. 53-54. Taking 1940 as a base year tends to obscure the actual scale of industrial production compared with the independence period. However it does give an indication of the development of industry in the Soviet period.

industrial sector while light industry, although still developing, is in comparison more sluggish in its growth. In relation to the rest of the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR's), since 1970, the LSSR ranks last of all out of the fifteen in its rate of growth in group B industries.[20]

An indication of this transformation throughout the whole of the Latvian region is illustrated in the number of workers employed in heavy industry in the largest urban centres. Hitherto, heavy industry had been more or less confined to Riga and its surrounding area. Although this core area still predominates, the orientation toward heavy industry, particularly in the Latgalian centres of Daugavpils and Rēzekne, shows the extent to which the industrial geography of the region has been changed and tailored toward absorbing a large percentage of the area's population into a modernised environment.

Table 47

The Percentage of Workers Employed in Leading Industrial Sectors in the Largest Centres of the LSSR, 1972[21]

urban centre	metal & machine	light industry	food processing	chemical	other
Riga	41.7	26.9	9.1	4.7	17.6
Daugavpils	35.3	14.9	10.7	22.9	16.2
Liepāja	19.8	16.5	28.4	-	35.3
Jelgava	24.0	41.9	15.0	-	19.1
Jūrmala	7.2	39.2	8.3	-	45.3*
Ventspils	18.5	9.3	40.3	-	31.9
Rēzekne	45.5	9.2	26.7	-	18.6

(* 33.4 percent of total employed in timber and related industries)

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20 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR; Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, Moscow, 1977, pp. 178-179.

21 Narodnoe khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., pp. 120-121.

Between 1940 and 1977, the LSSR ranked fourth after the Lithuanian, Moldavian and Estonian SSR's in its rate of growth of industrial production.[22] This was despite the region entering the Soviet Union with a far higher industrial base than the vast majority of Republics. As a consequence of developing at such a fast pace, the whole socio-economic and geographical framework of the Latvian region has been transformed into a reliance on a labour-intensive economy reflecting the establishment of a large industrial work force, which Moscow hoped would be more receptive to accepting Soviet rule. Through industrialisation and the 'proletarianisation' of the local population, a more effective and favourable base for the Sovietisation of the LSSR has been created. As the urban-industrial environment served as the nucleus of the nationalist movement and modernisation in the late nineteenth century, so it was hoped that by absorbing large numbers of the local population into a similar milieu that the disintegration of the nation would come about, and loyalties would switch from a national to a class consciousness based on an identity with the Soviet state.

In the rural areas, the task of transforming the economic-geographical framework was more difficult, being intertwined with traditionalism and greater opposition to social change. The rural economy and overwhelmingly ethnic Latvian population of the countryside did not at first experience the abrupt incorporation into the Soviet form of planned economy that was taking place in the urban-industrial areas. As the mainstay of Latvian nationalism, the peasantry and rural population had to be handled with more care, their agricultural environment being only gradually reorganised. Indeed, Stalin was well aware of the connection between rurality and nationalism. He regarded rural Latvia as, "the guardian of nationality".[23]

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22 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, 1977, op.cit., p. 177.

23 J. Stalin, 1936, op.cit., p. 110.

The land reforms introduced as a consequence of the first Soviet invasion and adopted by the National Diet of Latvia in July 1940 made land available to the peasantry through the establishment of a State Land Fund which comprised 875,252 hectares creating around 50,000 new farmsteads.[24] Thirty hectares were established as the maximum extent of farmland which could be owned by one individual. The landless peasants and smallholders, particularly in Latgale, became the main beneficiaries. However, the Nazi occupation destroyed Soviet initial attempts to liquidate social and regional disparities which in part had been a legacy of the independence period. German invasion resulted in land being, "...returned to their former owners, the kulaks."[25]

With the re-instatement of Soviet rule, the 1940-41 motions of land reform were again enacted but with more stringency toward the limit an individual could farm. The September 1944 reform created a larger state land fund, potentially making more land available for distribution amongst the farm labourers and small-holders.

Table 48

The 1944 State Land Fund[26]

category of land	No. of units	area in hectares
land cut off from existing farms	30,981	738,849
land expropriated from 'enemies of the people'	8,434	273,294
abandoned land	14,207	368,538
land voluntarily ceded to the state	6,441	92,625
state & other land	2,750	44,059
Total	62,813	1,517,365

24 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., pp. 503-505.

25 Ya. Kalnberzin, 1951, op.cit., pp. 167.

26 J. Rutkis, 1967, op.cit., p. 345.

Land was then re-distributed to the landless farm labourers and small-holders at approximately ten hectares each.[27] The major recipients of the land were as follows:

Table 49

The Re-distribution of Land from the 1944 State Land Fund[28]

beneficiary	no. of units	area in hectares
new farmers	48,783	606,142
old small-holders (additions to their holdings)	20,897	90,189
state	-	821,189
Total		1,517,365

In contrast with the independence period, there were less inequalities in farm size. However, there still remained a large number of farms which due to their limited areal extent could not possibly function as viable and private economic entities. Table 50 illustrates the contrasts between the 1920-40 period and the situation as it was in January 1946.

Table 50

The Latvian Region: Distribution of the Land - 1939 and 1946[29]

(in percent of total)

Size of farm (in hectares)	farm units		area of land (in hectares)	
	1939	1946	1939	1946
less than 1 hectare	4.2	2.8	0.1	0.1
1 - 5	11.7	10.8	1.7	3.2
5 - 10	17.4	21.1	6.8	11.6
10 - 15	16.6	32.3	10.7	31.6
15 - 20	16.4	15.1	14.7	19.9
20 - 30	15.9	17.9	19.6	33.6
30 - 50	10.9	-	21.6	-
50 - 100	6.4	-	21.5	-
over 100 hectares	0.5	-	3.3	-

27 ibid., pp. 345-346.
28 ibid., p. 345.
29 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., p. 597.

There appears to be a number of reasons why the immediate post-war Latvian rural economy was not fully nationalised and why private enterprises remained the prerogative of not only the peasants but also those small-holders and previously larger landowning farmers who had been the main political support of the previously agrarian - nationalist governments of the independence era. The Soviet government did not want to antagonise the Latvian peasantry. Although it would have been more logical to keep intact the larger farms for collectivisation or state farming, as Tolstoi suggested,[30] it was important to respond to the age-old longing of the peasantry for land by expropriating the wealth of the larger farms and dividing this land, benefiting the peasantry as a social group. Lenin had observed:

> "This is how the peasant thinks: 'If there is a large-scale farm, that means I am again a farm labourer.' This is of course incorrect. But the peasant mind connects the conception of a large-scale farm with hatred, with his recollections of how the landlords had oppressed the people. This feeling is still there. It has not died out yet."[31]

The mājas also remained the basic settlement pattern of the Latvian region keeping intact the traditional way of peasant life and an institution which had served as a focus of national identity during statehood.

The very nature of rurality was in itself a major obstacle to Soviet administration and the establishment of a political power base. The discontinuity of settlement, the scattered nature of the rural population and the relative success which agriculture had played during the independence period, all contributed to geographical environment which, because of its traditionalism and conservatism, would be unlikely

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30 P. Tolstoi, 'Land Nationalisation in the New Western Republics and Provinces', in R. Schlesinger, (editor), The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration, London, 1956, pp. 262-279, p. 271.

31 V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, vol. 24, third edition, pp. 167-168.

to accept a spatial and societal re-organisation. This would be seen, particularly by the peasantry as returning to a quasi-feudal type of situation where they perceived themselves without land.

In an attempt to administer rural Latvia, Moscow had introduced the selsovet (village soviet) into the republic in the latter half of 1945.[32] The establishment of this village soviet marked the introduction of the lowest form of administrative unit in the hierarchy, below the retained 19 aprinki and 510 pagasti and was designed to be a 'grassroots' form of political power and a central node from which the state could effectively function and communicate with the surrounding population. From the outset it was self-evident that in a region characterised by scattered individual farmsteads and total absence of nucleated rural settlements, that to rely on such a form of administrative organisation of this fashion was inappropriate.

As part of the Soviet Union, the LSSR could hardly have been deemed a success while allowing the bulk of the Latvian population to remain in a 'capitalist' rural setting. Nor could the state afford politically to disregard the enormous potential of the peasantry and the rural population as a central source of nationalist opposition without devising some method of control.

To collectivise the rural population forcefully into kolkhoz (collective) farms and sovkhoz (state) farms had already involved great hazards as Stalin had observed in the late 1920's and early 1930's. There was a need to reorganise the rural population in such a way that they could be brought into collective-modernised farming without causing a nationalist backlash and strengthening of traditional affiliations with the nation.

During the implementation of land reform in the first two years after re-occupation, Moscow had created the beginnings of the socialist

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32 Sovetskaya Latviya, 21st April, 1946.

sector through the establishment of sovkhozy, Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) and Machine Horse Renting Points (MKPP). By the end of 1945, there were 41 sovkhozy in the LSSR covering an area of 37,216 hectares and 445 MKPP and 50 MTS.[33]

The functions of these Soviet rural institutions were not only designed to serve the local population and to illustrate the success economic co-operation and large scale concerns could have within the LSSR, but also to establish the beginnings of an infrastructure through which the collectivisation of the various peasant farms would be more readily acceptable and could be quickly implemented.

It was not until the Spring of 1947 that the first kolkhoz farm came into being in the LSSR. In order that collectivisation could be achieved as soon as possible the Soviet authorities introduced a number of incentives and education schemes designed to entice greater co-operation between farming communities which would eventually lead to full collectivisation of Latvian agriculture in the form of kolkhozy, sovkhozy and auxiliary specialised units (i.e. MTS, MKPP.)

For a large number of the peasantry who had acquired land through the state land fund, the geographical limitations of their farm unit provided enough incentive in opting to join the collective. As the evidence from Strazdin's indicates (table 50), there were still 7,000 farmsteads which covered an area of less than one hectare with nearly 14 percent of the total number of farm units below five hectares in area. The socio-economic consequences and turmoil caused by war and the state land fund had thus contributed to the creation of an economic climate which tended to make the formation of collectives more lucrative to the poorer peasants.

From the limited evidence available it seems that there were three main factors which served to augment the development of collectivisation

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33 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1957, Riga, 1957, p. 67.

within areas of the LSSR. Firstly, collectivisation tended to be an economic attraction in those areas where there was a large number of small economic farm units. Secondly, the acceptance of the collective was related to those areas in space where the modernisation process had the greatest impact and where more modern large scale methods of farming were more acceptable to the local population. Lastly, and very much related to the impact of modernisation, collectivisation tended to proceed faster in those areas where the imprint of Soviet rule had been more acceptable and where the local population were more sympathetic to the benefits which could accrue from incorporation into the Soviet Union. Political socialisation and the local selsovet and its organisation played a role in the latter process.

One would have expected that Latgalia would have been one of the first areas to accept collectivisation. This area still possessed the smallest farming plots in the republic even although the 1944 land reform had been more generous to the peasants of this area than elsewhere. Physical environmental conditions and distance from the main consumer centres still continued to hamper the success of agriculture in the area. It was therefore the poorer peasants who had materially least to lose by opting for collectivisation. The rural population of Latgalia had also been recently uprooted by the introduction of the mājas in the early 1930's. This individual form of settlement had played little part in the Latgalian peasant past. However, the area was still plagued with traditional ties to the land, a legacy of the remnants of the institution of the mir and a result of the general socio-economic backwardness of this area compared with the rest of the political region.

Outwith Latgalia, the rural population tended to farm larger economic units with a greater degree of success due to the more favourable relief and pedological conditions and, particularly around the Riga-Jelgava area, had a large and readily accessible market for their

dairy and vegetable products. They were also more aware of the success of running larger economic enterprises and had been more receptive to innovation and change than the population of Eastern Latvia. Their ties with the mājas were also stronger and were viewed as part of the national heritage and individualism which characterised the Latvian people. In general, Sovietisation and the establishment of Soviet forms of rural organisation tended to meet with more success in these more modernised areas of the republic. But on balance, a combination of the impact of the modernisation process and the agricultural geography of the LSSR resulted in a sporadic development of collectivisation with no spatial trends as such being discernible.[34]

By the end of 1947, there were only 49 kolkhozy in the LSSR.[35] Six months later there were 189.[36] By January 1949, there were 1,090 kolkhozy encompassing only 23,500 peasant households and cultivating in common 360,000 hectares of land covering less than 10 percent of the 251,000 households in the LSSR.[37]

The success of collectivisation was therefore limited. In a study conflicting with official Soviet data,[38] Starodubsky presented evidence,[39] based on a survey undertaken in the LSSR in 1948-49, that the re-distribution of land and collectivisation had not been at all successful and that there were still massive inequalities in farm distribution. He classified all farmers and lease-holders in the region into three classes based on the assumption that a person who formerly belonged to a class continues to belong to it even after conditions have changed. His

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34 This hypothesis is partly backed up by the evidence presented by Ya. Kalnberzin, 1951, op.cit., p. 171, who mentions that the first four collectives were set up in Dobele (west-central), Jēkabpils (east-central), Smiltene (north) and Daugavpils (Latgale) districts.

35 K.Ya. Strazdin, (editor), Istoriya Latviiskoi SSR - Sokrashchennyi kurs, Riga, 1955, p. 545.

36 ibid

37 Ya. Kalnberzin, 1951, op.cit., p. 172.

38 See for example K.Ya. Strazdin's evidence in table 49.

39 I. Starodubsky, Statistika burzhuaznoi Latvii na sluzhbe reaktsii. Riga.

division into three classes, poor farmers (bednyaki), 'medium sized' farmers (serednyaki) and rich farmers (kulaki), illustrated that a large percentage of the latter class worked land which was above the thirty hectare limitation as set by the state land fund and that there was a relationship between the three classes and the size of land that they owned, (table 51).

Table 51

Starodubsky's Classification of Farmers and Lease-Holders in the LSSR, 1948 - 1949[40]

	percentage of total in each class			
size of farm (in hectares)	poor farmers (bednyaki)	'medium size' farmers (serednyaki)	rich farmers (kulaki)	total
less than 2	7.1	-	-	2.7
2 - 5	20.4	0.4	-	7.9
5 - 10	44.7	4.6	-	18.6
10 - 15	23.6	23.7	3.1	18.3
15 - 20	4.0	41.0	6.7	17.9
20 - 30	-	30.3	22.2	16.6
30 - 50	-	-	42.2	11.0
over 50	-	-	25.8	6.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
% of total farmers and lease holders	38.0	35.7	26.3	100.0

Although Soviet official histories do not mention the number of farmers who owned land over the stipulated thirty hectares or who employed local labour on their farms, the authorities were nevertheless aware of this situation and later used it to their ideological benefit. These socio-economic anomalies were therefore rectified with a change in official policy toward collectivisation. Moscow decided to introduce more drastic measures employing draconian techniques to force the overwhelmingly large number of

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40 ibid., p. 38.

individual farmers to join collectives.

The success by which deportations and harassment completely altered the organisation of Latvian agriculture is evident by the massive increase in the number of kolkhozy. By May 1949, there were 3,700 kolkhozy in the region,[41] a three fold increase on the January figure. By the end of that year, there were 4,109 of these rural institutions in the LSSR.[42] At the beginning of 1949, only 10 percent of peasant farms had been incorporated into the kolkhozy. By the end of that year, this figure had risen to 93 percent and by December to 98.4 percent.[43]

Table 52

Collectivisation in the LSSR, 1947 - 1953[44]

year (on 1st July)	% households collectivised	% area collectivised
1947	0.1	0.03
1948	2.4	2.40
1949	76.7	80.90
1950	90.3	94.70
1951	97.7	99.50
1952	98.4	99.80
1953	98.7	99.90

The kulak was liquidated with this forced collectivisation and blamed for the slowness by which this process had been adopted by the peasantry in the 1946-49 period. As nationalism was seen as a product of the capitalist superstructure stemming from its means of production, the Soviets viewed that to destroy the kulak class was one of the most effective ways of debasing Latvian nationalism. By using the kulak as a scapegoat, class antagonism within the rural areas was heightened thus

41 Pravda, 14th May, 1949.

42 K.Ya. Strazdin, 'Pobeda sotsializma v Latviiskoi SSR', Istoricheskie Zapiski, vol. 45, 1954, pp. 80-102, p. 90.

43 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., pp. 549 and 552

44 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1957, op.cit., p. 67.

questioning a common identity between the peasantry and richer farmers toward the tauta.

Strazdin was quite adamant in pointing out what sector of the Latvian population was responsible for the slowness by which collectivisation was taking place 1949. He attributed it to,

> "...the stubborn resistance from the side of the kulaki and other bourgeois-nationalist elements."[45]

In a major policy article, Sotsialisticheskoe preobrazovanie sel'skogo khozyaistva Latvii, (The Socialist Transformation of Latvian agriculture), Kalnberzin, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) blamed the Latvian 'nationalist' kulaki as the social class which were most concerned with opposing socio-economic change in rural Latvia. He suggested that they tried everything within their power to disrupt the movement toward successful collectivisation.[46]

Although by July 1953, Soviet statistics claimed that 98.7 percent of all rural households had been collectivised and 99.9 percent of the land had been successfully incorporated into the kolkhozy, sovkhozy and auxiliary rural services,[47] collectivisation failed to geographically move the peasant from his traditional single farmstead into the nucleated village form of settlement which was characteristic of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the rest of the Soviet Union.

The kolkhozy in the LSSR were therefore composed of a series of scattered individual settlements which due to their geographical distribution, hampered the organisation and functioning of the collective. The members of the kolkhoz, the kolkhozniki, lived in their homesteads often a mile apart from their nearest neighbours. As a consequence, there were

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45 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., p. 644.

46 Ya. Kalnberzin, 'Sotsialisticheskoe preobrazovanie sel'skogo khozyaistva Latvii', Bol'shevik, vol. 26, nr. 20, 1949, pp. 39-48, p.41.

47 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1957, op.cit., p. 67.

few centrally located buildings with which the kolkhozniki could efficiently use. The kolkhoz managers had therefore to locate the community owned livestock and machine equipment in a number of majās usually a great distance apart. The Soviet ethnographer, Terent'eva, cites an example in a kolkhoz where in 1953, six years after its inception, horse-sheds were located in eight different majās and storage houses and production buildings in a further twenty-six.[48]

There are also a number of other reasons which can be attributed to the general failure of the kolkhozy in the late 1940's and 1950's and which were related to the transformation of the Latvian countryside into a form of agricultural organisation which was both alien and unpopular with the indigenous population and which was generally unsuited to the physical geography of the region. Many of the collective farms which had come into being were larger than the nineteenth century estates of the Ritterschaften. They encompassed areas divided by physical environmental conditions. Rural Latvia, characterised, particularly in the east, by a terrain which was segmented by hills, large areas of scattered forestry and marshland, worked against the construction of fields which were necessary for this form of modern farming. Mechanised agriculture found it difficult to adapt to areas where periodic flooding took place and where the population distribution and a road network constructed mainly during the 1920-40 period had been adapted to suit the small individual farm unit form of agricultural production. Latvian agriculture therefore required tremendous capital investment, a complete re-orientation in its rural organisation and a transformation in its rural morphology.

The situation in the rural areas was made even worse with the decision by a June 1950 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers calling for the consolidation of the kolkhozy throughout the Soviet Union. The

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48 L. Terent'eva, 'K voprosu o perekhode ot khutorskogo rasseleniia k kolkhoznym poselkam v Latviiskoi SSR', Sovetskaya etnografiya, nr. 1, 1954, pp. 63-84, pp. 78-80.

creation of these larger collectives continued unabated into the contemporary period. Thus Strazdin reported that in 1955, of the 1,414 kolkhozy in the region, the average encompassed 130 mājās, covered a total area of 1,600 to 2,000 hectares, approximately half of which was arable land.[49]

Table 53

Number of kolkhoz Farms & Households in the LSSR, 1950-1976[50]

selected year	nr. of kolkhozy	nr. of collectivised households (in thousands)
1950	1,794	227
1955	1,414	n.a.
1960	1,122	174
1965	798	153
1970	669	140
1975	403	128
1976	371	124

(n.a. data not readily available)

Commenting on the continued policy of consolidating the kolkhozy into larger units, the first secretary of the CPL in 1961, A. Pelshe, criticised the re-structuring of Latvian agriculture for not taking into consideration local geographical and settlement conditions and therefore resulting in the particularly poor production levels reached by these farms.[51]

The management of these large collectives was in the late 1940's and early 1950's predominantly in the hands of farm managers who were unfamiliar with the geography, economy and people of the area. Due to the lack of rural CPL members, Soviet Latvian agriculture had to rely on the

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49 K. Ya. Strazdin, 1958, op.cit., p. 646.

50 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, op.cit., p. 75; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., p. 183.

51 Sovetskaya Latviya, 31st January, 1961, p. 3.

import of specialists from outwith the region. These cadres tended to be either Latvians who had remained in the Soviet Union during the period of Latvian statehood, or more likely, Russians. The peasantry particularly resented the latter influx. With the exception of some areas in rural Latgale, the Russian managers found it difficult to communicate with the native Latvian population and resentment built up between the indigenous population and their 'foreign' managers. Thus to many of the peasantry in rural Latvia, collectivisation, with its alien methods and techniques, became synonymous with Russian management and its incompetence. They also drew a parallel between this contemporary situation and their socio-economic relationship with regard to the Ritterschaften in the early 1900's.

As a backlash to collectivisation and its unpopularity, many of the peasantry remained aloof from this rural institution neither identifying with it nor co-operating fully in its daily running. The impersonal character of the kolkhoz due to its sheer size contributed to the peasant remaining in his traditional homestead. As Vardys points out,[52] the agricultural population concentrated on farming their small private plots which today still function as an integral part of Soviet agriculture. Other opposition to the collectives was manifested in the movement of the kolkhozniki to the local urban-industrial centres of the republic where the material standards of living were more attractive than that of the kolkhoz. The decline in the number of peasant households (table 53) is partly indicative of this attraction to the towns.

All these factors contributed to a decline in agricultural production which did not equal independence levels until the 1960's. At the twentieth Party Congress of the USSR, CPL leader Kalnberzin accepted the criticism which attacked Latvian agriculture for lagging behind expected

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52 V.S. Vardys, 'The Baltic Peoples', Problems of Communism, Sept/Oct 1967, pp. 55-64, p. 58.

production levels.[53]

Table 54

Agricultural Production in the LSSR, 1940 - 1976[54]

(% of 1940 where 1940 = 100%)

year		year	
1940	100	1970	135
1945	42	1975	135
1950	77	1976	147
1960	106		
1965	115		

It is also evident from the rather limited Soviet statistics on the rural economy that there were quite marked regional variations in production levels. These differences exist even today although the impact of modernisation, particularly in Latgalia, has tended to lessen such contrasts.[55] However, this eastern area is still plagued by its physical geography, lower education levels, historical antecedence and distance from the core area and major consuming centres in the republic. Figure 23 illustrates these spatial variations as typified in kolkhoz production levels.

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53 Sovetskaya Latviya, 17th February, 1956.

54 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, op.cit., pp. 76-77. Although 1940 is a rather bias choice of year in which the turmoil of war had already affected Latvian agriculture, the above table nevertheless illustrates its general failure in the first twenty years of Moscow rule.

55 See for example raion* data in Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1957, pp. 69-94, compared with Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, pp. 87 & 93.

* a raion is an administrative district.

Fig. 23: LSSR : Kolkhoz Production, 1965



Key to rajony: 1. Balvskii 2. Bauskii 3. Valkskii 4. Valmierskii 5. Gulbenskii 6. Daugavpilskii 7. Dobel'skii 8. Ekabpilskii 9. Kraslavskii 10. Kuldigskii 11. Liepaiskii 12. Ludzenskii 13. Madonskii 14. Ogrskii 15. Preil'skii 16. Rezeknenskii 17. Rezhskii 18. Saldusskii 19. Talsinskii 20. Tukumskii 21. Tsesisskii.

Source: Ya. Ya. Yankevits, 'Voprosy Ukrepleniya Material'no-tekhnicheskoi Bazy Sel'skogo Khozyaistva Latviiskoi SSR', V. Purin, et.al., Uchenye zapiski aspirantov Latviiskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Riga, 1967, pp.39-50, p.41.

In general, collectivisation has been more successful in western Latvia. This in part is due to the popular experience with the operation of larger farms, better soil, topographical and climatic conditions and more easily accessible urban markets for dairying and vegetable products, a sector of agriculture which is ideally suited to the republic's enironment. Modernisation and its greater impact on this area of Latvia compared with the east has also played its part in setting a more amicable framework in which the establishment and running of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz has resulted in a more successful agrarian enterprise.

The continuation of the mājas has created major socio-economic headaches for Soviet Latvian agriculture. Terent'eva referred to it as a, "burdensome heritage of the past", and a major obstacle to the transformation of Latvian agriculture.[56] Kalnberzin viewed it as the main prop for the continuation of private property.[57] At the 9th Party Congress of the CPL in 1952 he stated:

> "As in Lithuania, we are confronted with a great and complicated task, to erect kolkhoz villages instead of individual living quarters. The continued existence of the many individual farm locations causes great difficulties, disturbs the organisation and economic strengthening of the kolkhozy and hinders moves aimed at a speedy development of socialist agriculture."[58]

Although the creation of kolkhoz villages had been the prime aim of central government since the inception of collectivisation, it was not until 1951 that more radical measures were taken to move the kolkhozniki into nucleated settlements. A number of material incentives were offered to the peasantry in order to persuade them to move. A two year exemption from agrarian tax, the supply of building materials to erect their homes in the kolkhoz village, and the MTS, up until their abolition in 1957,

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56 L. Terent'eva, 1954, op.cit., p. 75.

57 Sovetskaya Latviya, 7th February, 1951.

58 Cīņa ('Struggle'), 9th October, 1952.

were to assist in this re-settlement.

In a unique and major study examining collectivisation of the Seliya kolkhoz in Jēkabpils (Ekabpils) raion, Terent'eva presents evidence to suggest that collectivisation and moving the population to the village took considerable time.[59] This kolkhoz, established in 1948, was one of the first collectives in the LSSR to begin a re-settlement policy. Seliya kolkhoz was in a rather unique position in that the majās in the area were distributed in a fairly compact manner. Yet even these more favourable geographical circumstances were not enough. The movement of all the kolkhozniki in Seliya had not been completed by 1958.

> "If we consider which of the kolkhozniki are building in the new settlements, we find that all the re-settled people are among those who did not have homesteads in the kolkhoz. They are either new arrivals or previously were landless peasants. During the first years after collectivisation, they lived in flats provided by the kolkhoz or rented rooms from other kolkhozniki. After they were economically firmly established, they began to work on the construction of their own homes. As far as the kolkhozniki who owned homesteads are concerned, none of those in a given kolkhoz have yet re-settled from their khutor* to the new settlements. The administration of the kolkhoz and the civil organisations, as we could observe, do not provide for explanatory work amongst the kolkhozniki to explain the importance of changing their settlement pattern."[60]

The continuation of the mājas within the Seliya kolkhoz has, as Terent'eva pointed out, resulted in the abandonment of building new public and farm units within the village. They were, "...postponed until an indefinite date in the future."[61] Terent'eva's study showed that 80 percent of the majās of the kolkhozniki were privately owned, 8 percent belonged to the kolkhoz and 6 percent were state

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59 L. Terent'eva, Kolkhoznoe Krest'yanstvo Latvii, Moscow, 1960.

60 ibid., p. 272.

61 ibid., p. 270.

* the khutor is the Russian equivalent of the mājas.

property.[62]

The mājas therefore remains an integral part of the Latvian landscape. Rypalo suggested that in 1958, there were still well over 200,000 majās in existence in the LSSR.[63] The Latvian newspaper, Cina, recorded that at the end of 1960, of the 180,000 kolkhoz families, nearly 90 percent lived in the mājas, while of the 50,000 sovkhoz families, 80 percent still lived in their individual farmsteads.[64]

Table 55

Rural Settlement Hierarchy in the LSSR, 1959[65]

no. of persons living in a rural settlement	no. of settlements		total no. of residents	
up to 5	79,551	67.1%	251,640	27.6%
6 - 10	24,048	20.3%	178,686	19.6%
11 - 25	9,626	8.1%	147,527	16.2%
26 - 50	2,911	2.5%	104,877	11.5%
51 - 100	1,726	1.5%	121,089	13.3%
101 - 200	467	0.4%	62,020	6.8%
201 - 500	95	0.1%	30,882	3.4%
501 - 1000	20	0.0%	13,002	1.4%
1001 - 2000	1	0.0%	1,151	0.2%
Total	118,445	100.0%	910,874	100.0%

62 ibid., p. 277.

63 D. Rypalo, 'Nekotorye voprosy stroitel'stva kolkhoznykh poselkov', Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, February 1958, pp. 39-45.

64 Cina, November 26th, 1960, as cited in a note by J. Von Hehn, 'Lettland, Mai - Dezember 1960', Osteuropa, nr. 3, March 1961, pp. 232-34, p. 234.

65 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR: Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 goda, Moscow, 1962, vol. on Latviiskaya SSR, p. 92. (Hereafter this source is cited thus: Itogi ... 1959 g. and all citations refer to the data in the Latvian volume.) The first two groups include typical rural farms, the majās, with one or two families living in them. The settlements with populations of 11 to 25 and 26 to 50 comprise a cluster of farms while the remaining groups include administrative centres of collectives.

In a speech to the 17th CPL Congress in 1960, first secretary Pelshe was still stressing the importance both economically and socially of re-settling the kolkhozniki in villages.

> "The khutor settlement pattern hinders the further development of the social economy."[66]

He optimistically suggested that the CPL had set themselves the task of moving and re-settling all kolkhozniki and sovkhoz workers into villages by 1970.

Today, the problem of the mājas still remains unresolved for the CPL and the central authorities. Writing in the early 1970's, the eminent Soviet Geographer, Pokshishevsky observes the contemporary Baltic landscape:

> "The bulk of the rural population lives in homesteads. This scattered character of settlement is a left-over from private farm ownership and does not encourage large scale socialist agriculture. Consequently measures are being taken to gradually re-settle the collective farmers in the more conveniently located modern villages."[67]

It is an on-going process still only meeting with limited success.

Resistance to social and spatial change as manifested in the continuation of the mājas has and continues to have important connotations attached to it for the nation. Here within the Soviet landscape is visible evidence of a Latvian national identity, a symbol of the tauta and the period of statehood setting the settlement geography of Latvia apart from the rest of the Soviet Union. In 1970, Drizul, secretary of the CPL central committee, pointed out the ideological connotations the homestead has with Latvian nationalism.[68]

Inter-connected with the continuation of this relic of a former

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66 Sovetskaya Latviya, February 17th, 1960, p. 3.

67 V. Pokshishevsky, Geography of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1974, p. 155.

68 Izvestiya, 10th September, 1970, p. 3.

agrarian system is the importance the peasantry and traditionalism play in preserving symbols of the past. To a large number of the kolkhozniki, "my house is my fortress"[69] and a preserve and attachment to a way of life which is a cumbersome obstacle to Soviet attempts at the modernisation of the rural areas and its inhabitants. By rejecting the village, which in the late 1960's has in a few cases become more or less an 'agrogorod' ('agrarian city'),[70] with all the benefits of urban type amenities and services, the kolkhozniki have protected a fundamental part of Latvian history which is unique to the tauta and its region.

The kolkhoz village is therefore an effective means by which the rural population can be brought into a more modernised type of society. A large nucleated settlement can administer its inhabitants a lot easier than a geographically dispersed farming community. Thus the Sovietisation of the population and the disintegration of traditional affiliations with the nation could be better achieved within an agglomerated and organised node. On the other hand, the mājas means a certain degree of isolation from political adaptation to Soviet norms and a less rigidly governed life-style to which the members of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz villages are subjected.

Latvian agriculture has been transformed into a societal pattern in which the whole basis of its geography has been introduced and subjected to a more modernised and specific Soviet form. In recent years,

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69 Sovetskaya Latviya, July 6th, 1955.

70 The idea of the 'agrogorod' was put forward and partly implemented by Krushchev in the 1950's. Proposals were set forward for the reconstruction of rural areas into rural towns with good housing conditions, schools, hospitals, cultural amenities, etc. The eventual elimination of differences between cities and the countryside, which is the promised achievement of Soviet communism, was taken a step further with the consolidation of kolkhozy and hence the creation of a larger central nucleus to serve the kolkhozniki. A. Voss, Lenin's Behests and the Making of Soviet Latvia, Riga, 1970, p. 80.

the increasingly important role of the sovkhoz, particularly in western Latvia, and its more scientific methods of farming, greater efficiency in production processes and urban amenities has meant that the rural population living on these state farms are influenced more by modernisation and by the decision-making processes emanating from Moscow compared with the kolkhoz which has in comparison a limited amount of autonomy, (table 56).

The sovkhoz has also been influential in diversifying Latvian agriculture. It has introduced into the region crops which were not traditionally connected with the area. There has, for example, been the partial substitution for traditional crops such as rye, potatoes, barley, etc. for those more fashionable with the central authorities (e.g. the koksagiz plant, maize) and which are not necessarily compatible with the local physical environment. Livestock and dairying, however, still remain the traditional and most important branches of the agrarian economy.[71]

Table 56

The Number of Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz Farms in the LSSR, 1950 - 1976[72]

year	sovkhoz	kolkhoz
1950	57	1794
1960	162	1122
1965	187	798
1970	230	669
1975	230	403
1976	246	371

As a comparison of the growth rates in industry and agriculture will show, the former economy has grown at a tremendous rate, in part at the expense of the latter, (tables 46 & 54). A consequence of such a marked one way process and concern with industrialisation has been the urbani-

71 V. Pūriņš, 1971, op.cit., pp. 319-337.

72 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, op.cit., p. 75.

sation of the majority of the population. In 1935, 36.4 percent of the region's inhabitants lived in urban centres.[73] By 1950 this figure had increased to 45.3 percent reaching 62 percent by January 1970. At the beginning of 1977, 67 percent of the LSSR population resided in towns with populations over 2,500 persons.[74] The Republic now ranks second after the Estonian SSR in its proportion of urban inhabitants.

The demands of industrialisation and the needed supply of labour has re-orientated the region and its population into an urban milieu. An indication of this phenomenal rate of urban growth is given in figure 24. Between this 1944 and 1977 period, two main trends are apparent in the region's urbanisation. Firstly, an intra-regional movement into the cities until the mid 1950's. This in-migration was overwhelmingly Latvian. From 1946 to 1950, a net increase of 72,000 rural inhabitants were added to the urban population, a yearly average of around 14,000. In the proceeding five year period, another net increase of 68,000 of the local population moved into Latvian towns, an average of 13,620 per year. Secondly, since 1955, the local rural areas have been overtaken by inter-republic migrations as the main source of labour for the region's towns. The net increase into the cities from rural Latvia has declined remaining at an average of around 8,000 per year. Migration into the republic is reflected in the overall population growth of the region, a reduced indigenous natural increase being substituted by this immigration. Between the 1959 and 1970 census, the rural population declined by 32,000 whereas during the 1950 - 1959 period, the decrease was in the order of

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73 Latvijas Statistikās gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., p. 2.

74 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp. 42-44. The rate of urbanisation is even more marked when the definition of what constituted 'urban' in the statehood period is compared with the Soviet numerical delimitation. The former considered a settlement urban when the population exceeded 500 people.

Fig. 24: LSSR: Urban, Rural And Total Population Increase; 1935-77



Sources: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1974, op.cit., p.6; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp.42-44; Ekonomiki i Kul'tura Sovetskoi Latvii, op.cit., p.9.

144,000.[75] Thus intra-regional migration particularly from rural eastern Latvia into the towns concluded such internal movements. As a consequence, a disproportionate number of young and aged persons are left in the rural areas. The countryside has declined as a major source of natural population increase and labour supply for local urban growth.

Despite this relatively recent re-orientation of the in-flow of labour into the region's urban centres, one of the main trends in the Soviet period has been the urbanisation of ethnic Latvians, a population movement in some respects comparable to that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1935, 462,765 ethnic Latvians resided in the region's towns, 31,4 percent of the total ethnic group.[76] By 1959, this figure had increased to 606,305 urban Latvians, 46.7 percent of their nationality residing in the region.[77] Between 1959 and 1970, Yanvyarak estimates that 2.2 percent of all Latvians were urbanised,[78] reaching 693,579 of the nationality living in the region's towns, or nearly 52 percent of the total ethnic group.[79] A large number of the ethnic Latvian population has therefore been geographically re-organised and uprooted into an urban environment characterised by greater social mobility and subjected to both modernising processes and, as a consequence, Sovietisation.

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75 ibid., pp. 42-44; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, op.cit., p. 7; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., p. 6; Ekonomika i Kul'tura Sovetskoi Latvii, 1966, Riga, 1966, p. 9.

76 Latvijas Statistikā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

77 Itogi...1959g., op.cit., p.92.

78 E.E. Yanvyarak, 'Osnovnye Izmeneniya v Sotsial'noi Strukture Naseleniya Sovetskikh Respublik Pribaltika', Istoriya SSSR, vol. 5, 1976, pp. 119-137, p. 121.

79 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR; Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda, vol. 4, pp. 280-281. (Hereafter this source is cited thus: Itogi...1970g., followed by the volume number).

The tremendous rate of industrial growth has also resulted in the increase in the number of large urban centres with their wide array of urban functions, institutions and nodes of modernity. In 1939, 60.5 percent of the urban population lived in the only two towns (Riga and Liepāja) with populations exceeding 50,000. By 1977, the total population living in centres over 50,000 has trebled with five towns (Riga, Daugavpils, Liepāja, Jelgava and Jūrmala) representing nearly 70 percent of the region's urban inhabitants.[80] (tables 43 and 57)

Table 57

The Urban Hierarchy of Latvia, 1970[81]

size of town	population	% population in town size	no. of towns
less than 3,000	77,823	5.3	44
3,000 - 5,000	65,628	4.4	18
5,000 - 10,000	114,285	7.7	15
10,000 - 20,000	70,549	4.8	5
20,000 - 50,000	114,041	7.7	4
50,000 - 100,000	202,014	13.7	3
100,000 - 500,000	100,431	6.8	1
over 500,000	731,831	49.6	1
Total	1,476,602	100.0	91

An urban-industrial economy has also produced the desired effect of the Soviet authorities by creating a large industrial working class in the Republic. In 1950, there were approximately 262,000 workers (rabochie) and white collar employees (sluzhashchie). By 1976, this figure had increased to 1,142,000.[82] The vast majority of these workers are found in the urban areas, the remainder more or less all coming from the sovkhozy.

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80 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1976, op.cit., pp. 8-9; Itogi... 1970g., op.cit., vol. 1, p. 71.

81 ibid., vol. 1, p. 71.

82 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., p. 352; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., p. 465.

White collar workers are also an urban phenomenon. The new social structure of the region is therefore not surprisingly dominated by urban industrial workers. As table 58 indicates they now constitute by far the largest social group in both the urban areas and in the LSSR as a whole. With the decline in significance of the kolkhoz and the increasing importance of the sovkhoz in the Republic, the workers are also the largest group in the countryside mainly at the expense of the kolkhozniki.

Even between 1959 and 1970, there have been quite fundamental changes in the social composition particularly with regard to the declining importance of the kolkhozniki. The latter social group are being absorbed into the urban environment as industrial workers and into the more productive and more industrially inclined sovkhozy. The importance accredited to the large proportion of white collar workers is indicative of the increase in social mobility amongst the LSSR population and the influx of cadres filling managerial jobs.

Table 58

The Urban & Rural Social Structure of the LSSR, 1959 and 1970[83]

Social class	% of total year	LSSR	urban	rural
Workers (including sovkhoz workers)	1959	52.0	66.0	35.0
	1970	58.0	63.3	47.0
	% change	+6.0	-2.7	+12.0
white collar	1959	19.8	29.3	8.0
	1970	28.9	36.0	14.2
	% change	+9.1	+6.7	+5.9
kolkhozniki	1959	27.6	4.2	56.0
	1970	12.7	0,5	38.1
	% change	-14.9	-3.7	-17.9

83 E.E. Yanvyarak, 1976, op.cit., p. 125.

Nearly 70 percent of all workers are employed in industry, construction and transport, 16 percent in the rural economy (mainly sovkhoz workers) and the remainder in non-productive activities. On the other hand, the white collar workers are distributed evenly between industry, trade and related employment, and the professions with the remaining 24.5 percent mainly in productive employment.[84]

There has also been a general increase in those employed in non-productive activities, an indicator of a higher standard of living, greater access to social and occupational mobility and the general impact of a modernised society.

The Latvian nationality group differs slightly in social structure from the LSSR norm. Over half of them are classified as workers but in proportion to their size, urban Latvian workers constitute a smaller percentage compared with non-Latvians in a similar locational occupation. This reflects the type of occupational category migrants coming into the republic tend to belong. A similar observation is made by Yanvyarak with regard to white collar workers.[85]

In contrast, the proportion of native Latvian rural kolkhozniki to the total number in the LSSR is greater suggesting that social mobility amongst Latvians as a group from agriculture into industry and management is slightly less than that of non-Latvians.[86] However, this is mainly due to the far larger proportion of rural Latvians in the rural population.

Other manifestations of a modernised society have also had their impact on the Latvian nationality. Consistently since the 1960's, the natural increase of the LSSR population has fallen, (figure 25). In 1960, the republic had a rate of natural increase of 6.7 per thousand people. By 1976, it had fallen to 1.7, making it the lowest of any

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84 ibid., p. 128 - 131.

85 ibid., p. 134.

86 ibid., p. 134.

Fig. 25: L.S.S.R.: Birth-Rate, Death-Rate And Natural Increase: 1940-76



Sources: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp.72-73; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1974, op.cit., p.23; Ekonomiki i Kul'tura Sovetskoi Latvii, op.cit., p.16.

republic in the Soviet Union.[87] Besides the effects of the war, the impact of modern ideas, changing attitudes toward the size of families and the inclusion of women in the labour force coupled with a general standard of living comparable with many areas of Western Europe have all been contributory factors in forming an age structure which has a large percentage of the population over sixty years of age and a declining percentage of indigenous work force, (figure 26). Thus in 1973, 17.8 percent of the total population were over sixty years of age compared with 15 percent in 1959 and 14.4 percent in 1939.[88] Between 1959 and 1970, the percentage of that age group which falls within the labour force to the total population has declined by 2 percent constituting 56.2 percent.[89] Modernisation and a policy of rapid industrialisation has produced the need for the in-migration of labour from other republics.

An inheritance from the independence period has been the continuing high levels of literacy, education and general standard of living amongst the majority of the LSSR population. The urban areas, particularly Riga, record the highest levels of literacy and those educated beyond formal school years. Since incorporation into the Soviet Union, the urban-rural disparities have lessened. By 1959, 99.4 percent of all the urban population between nine and forty nine years of age were literate, 0.9

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87 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp. 72-3. The 1976 Soviet average was 8.9 per thousand, the birth rate 11.1 and the death rate 9.2. The only republic which is comparable to Latvia in its low rate of natural increase is neighbouring Estonia which recorded 3.1 per thousand in 1976. The LSSR has also the lowest birth rate and the highest death rate in the Soviet Union.

88 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., p. 9.

89 ibid., p. 8. Those included in the potential labour force are males between the ages of 16 and 59 and women between 16 and 54.

Fig. 26: Age Structure Of The LSSR Population: 1939, 1959 & 1973
(Percentage of Total Population For Each Year)



Source: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1974, op cit, p.8

percent higher than the rural figure. In 1939, the disparity between urban and rural was 5.3 percent with 96.1 percent recorded literate urban inhabitants.[90] In educational achievement there is however a marked difference between urban and rural. In 1970, 58 per thousand of the Latvian nationality over the age of ten and residing in the towns were in higher education. Only 15 per thousand rural Latvians were found to have attained this level.[91]

Although areal and social disparities exist they are less marked than they were during the period of statehood. Indeed, in some respects, modernisation has helped accentuate the differences existing between the Latvian political region and its population from that of many other parts and inhabitants of the Soviet Union. The increase in the general standard of living in Latgale and the raising of services and amenities in rural Latvia, particularly amongst the sovkhoz workers, has helped bring the population of these peripheral areas of the region closer toward the mass of the urban inhabitants. At the same time, the LSSR and the Latvian population, although starting from a generally higher material base than most Soviet areas, has within a very short period raised its living standards to become the highest in the Soviet Union. In 1970, Koropeckyi reported that the annual earnings per employee in the LSSR was second only to Estonia.[92] According to evidence presented by Katz, et.al., the republic had the highest trade turnover of rubles per capita in the 1960-70 period after the Estonian SSR.[93] The same authors rank Latvia second after Estonia in their index of economic development.[94]

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90 Itogi...1959g., op.cit., p. 29.

91 Itogi...1970g., op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 518-23.

92 I.S. Koropeckyi, 'National Income of the Baltic Republics in 1970', Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 7, nr. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 61-73, p.71.

93 Z. Katz, et.al., editors, Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, New York, 1975, p. 454.

94 ibid., p. 462. Included in this index are such factors as income per capita, savings per capita and trade turnover per capita. A cumulative index of these indicators assesses the rank of each republic.

In other respects, the modernisation process has had a retrograde effect on the continuation of the nation. Greater economic, social and political interaction with other areas and peoples of the state have meant that there is a greater movement of commodities, people and ideas into the republic. Within this context, a peripheral location plays less of an important role in promoting isolation from the Soviet core than it did during the Tsarist period. The effects of the intra-regional aspects of movement are counteracted by the economic interactions which take place with the rest of the Soviet Union. A modernised community is also more receptive to political socialisation and with a highly urban-industrialised economy, members of the Latvian nation are more likely to accept and switch their group loyalties from a national identification to that of a Soviet and/or Russian form of community.

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4.2 Territorial Re-organisation and Centralisation

Territoriality and the political organisation of the Latvian region has had an important impact upon the political and social position of the tauta. The centralisation of decision-making emanating from the Politbureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow and its more or less reiteration by its main organ in the Republic, the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) as "...the leading nucleus of all public organisations and of the State"[95] has contributed to a weakening of national group expression through a political apparatus. Although access to decision-making is limited, the Latvian nationality, like the other SSR's, have a political geographical structure in their Republic status, itself a major determinant of the continuation and survival of a national group identity.

Thus although political decisions at the LSSR level are limited in scope and function its very existence as a political administrative unit has helped re-affirm the raison d'être of the nation. The method employed by the Soviets in giving their numerically larger nationalities a territorial expression through the creation of Soviet Socialist Republics gives the tauta an identity with a particular part of defined and recognised geographical space. Soviet federalism therefore at least accommodates the nation even although in practice its synonymity with an important politically organised entity is more or less non-existent.

The creation of the LSSR reflects the Latvian political region with the only major boundary changes since its inception involving 1,201 square kilometres of previous Latvian territory being ceded mainly to the RSFSR.

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95 Article 97 of the LSSR constitution. B. Kalnins, 'How Latvia is Governed - The Structure of the Political Apparatus', The Second Conference on Baltic Studies in Scandinavia, vol. 3, June 1973, pp. 21-9, p. 21. The 1978 Draft proposals of the LSSR constitution re-affirm the CPL's position. Sovetskaya Latviya, 19th April, 1978, p.3.

This boundary alteration, involving the controversial Abrene district with its handful of Latvian inhabitants and overwhelming majority of Russians has strengthened and implicitly defined the ethno-linguistic Latvian area as being synonymous with the political unit of the LSSR.[96]

Within this territorial entity still reside the vast majority of the Latvian nation. In 1970, of the 1,429,844 Latvians in the Soviet Union, 93.8 percent inhabited the LSSR making it, after the Georgian SSR, the highest concentration of one nationality in a specific geographical area.[97] The remaining Latvians are to be mainly found in Moscow (5,391), Leningrad (4,346) and Pskovskaya oblast' (1,406), the latter administrative area absorbing the Abrene district from Latvia in 1944.[98]

The LSSR, like other constituent Republics has its own legislative bodies and clearly defined administrative apparatus. From its very existence as a Republic stem a number of symbols for the nation. A flag, official language, capital city and the treating of Latvia as a distinctive entity in statistics, newspapers and various cultural and sporting competitions all contribute to giving the nation legal and territorial expression.

As part of its republican status and recognised nationality, the Latvian region and its peoples have in theory the right to secede from the Soviet Union. This was re-affirmed in the 1978 draft proposals of the Republic's constitution.[99] Although this right has never been contested and Moscow can over-rule and subordinate all decisions made by the LSSR government, its continuation as a political unit and location on the periphery of the state makes secession at least a geographically feasible proposition, thus re-affirming an important aspect of national-territorial identification.

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96 A.M. Prokhorov, et.al., (editors), Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1973, vol. 14, pp. 517-518.

97 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 14.

98 ibid., p. 98, 103, and 113.

99 Sovetskaya Latviya, 19th April, 1978, p. 2.

The numerical predominance of the Latvian nationality within the LSSR also contributes to a safeguarding and inter-relationship between a political administrative unit and a peoples. This is despite the demographic composition of the region being radically altered since inclusion in the Soviet Union. The effects of the war, the mass emigration by the Baltic Germans in the 1939-40 period,[100] and exodus of various numbers of peoples from a wide spectrum of national and social groups from the area as a result of both German and Soviet occupations, account for the major changes. The first post-war census, carried out in 1959, records 62 percent of the region's population as belonging to the Latvian nationality, 26.6 percent Russians and the remaining 11.4 percent composed mainly of Belorussians, Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and Lithuanians.[101] By 1970, the Latvians had declined as a total percentage constituting only 56.8 percent while the Russian community recorded nearly 30 percent of the republic's population.[102]

Having obtained for itself the highest level in the administrative hierarchy below the Soviet Union, the Latvian nation has remained as an organised and predominant entity identified by and the raison d'être on which its indigenous peoples receive territorial recognition. Although the LSSR has been established on the principle of nationality distribution, there is little doubt that Riga and its tributary area play an important role in keeping alive a regional delimitation. Besides Leningrad, no other centre in the Baltic has such a large concentration of industrial workers, a fact which has always played an important part in the Soviet method of constituting and delimiting planning and administrative regions.

The internal spatial re-organisation of the administrative structure

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100 One estimate suggests that 53,000 Baltic Germans emigrated to Germany in the 1939-41 period, that 86,000 Jews perished as a consequence of the war and that somewhere in the region of 310,000 Latvians were deported, exiled, missing or killed in the 1940-50 period. R.G. Shillers, 'Population Changes of Latvia in Consequence of World War II' E. Andersons, (editor), Cross Road Country - Latvia, Iowa, 1953, pp. 335-41, p. 340.

101 Itogi ... 1959, op.cit., pp.92-93. 102 Itogi ... 1970, op.cit. vol.4

of the LSSR has been one of the main methods employed by Moscow in attempting to subordinate national group identification to that of loyalty to the Soviet state. A sound administration was necessary in order that policies could be implemented which at times were unpopular but would not detract from the main goal of the rapid transformation of the economy and society of the region.

One of the major obstacles in achieving this desired political integration with the Latvian peoples was the lack of local Communist Party members and machinery, and a loyal educated urban élite to manage the republic. The basis of Latvian statehood had been constructed as much on anti-Marxist lines as it was anti-Soviet. The Communist Party had been officially banned during this interwar period. Also many middle class Latvians had either fled to the west or had been liquidated by the German and Soviet occupying forces. Those that remained were not trusted by the Soviets as they still suspected that many retained strong nationalistic sympathies and a desire to re-vamp the defunct Latvian state. Thus in order to create a local administrative structure and effective Party machinery, personnel were brought into the region, mainly from the European part of the RSFSR. The majority were Russians with a few Latvians who had remained in the Soviet Union during the 1920-40 period.

The CPL therefore became an organisation dominated by an urban élite with little or no understanding of the regional problems and peculiarities of Latvia. The cadres brought in from the RSFSR and the Ukraine tended to agglomerate in Riga and the larger cities establishing themselves a power-base from which they could disseminate and hopefully implement decisions from Moscow. It was particularly those areas where the CPL were not so active that the major problems in administration were felt.

Sovetskaya Latviya reports[103] that in the first few years of Soviet

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103 Sovetskaya Latviya, 24th April, 1946.

rule, the basis of the regional organisation of Latvia during the 1920-40 period was kept adding only to the already existing 19 *aprinki* and 510 *pagasti* a smaller unit, the *selsovet* (village soviet). The introduction of this lower tier in the administrative hierarchy was designed to combine the administration of the immediate local area with that of more effective party control. It was hoped that the rural population which was both more difficult to geographically administer and to recruit into the Party, would begin to identify with this 'grassroots' form of political and administrative organisation.

The success of the *selsovet* was limited. Although some 1,334 had been set up by 1950,[104] the lack of nucleated settlement which was the whole basis on which the *selsovet* relied on for its administrative effectiveness, testifies to the lack of insight planners and administrators had to this area. Indeed, even with the implementation of forced collectivisation in 1949-50, which became the main rural base on which Soviet administration became more effective, few party members were found in the countryside. Von Hehn suggests that even by 1961, there were only 13,000 Party members engaged in Latvian agriculture.[105]

By 1950, the *pagasti* and *aprinki*, the last vestiges of nationalist symbolism in the administrative structure, were replaced by 58 rural *raiony*, the towns (*goroda*), being given separate administrative functions.[106] These new rural districts or regions (*sel'skie raiony*) were somewhat similar in areal extent to the *aprinki*. According to Kovalov,[107] the rural *raion* had its centre in a small town after which the area was usually

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104 *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974*, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

105 J. Von Hehn, 'Lettland', *Osteuropa*, nr. 1/2, January/February, 1962, p. 122. Data based on statistics from *Cina*, 29th September, 1961.

106 K.Ya. Strazdin, 1958, *op.cit.*, p. 637

107 S.A. Kovalov, 'Rayonnykh Tsentrov SSR', *Voprosy Geografii*, vol. 56, 1962, p. 58.

named. These nodal points functioned as the headquarters for basic state, party institutions, and social organisations besides being central places for various cultural activities and services. As nodes for their surrounding urban spheres of influence, these centres evolved into main points of dissemination for the political socialisation of the countryside.

Two years later the administrative hierarchy was again radically re-organised this time dividing the republic into three oblasti centred around the three largest cities in the region - Riga, Liepāja and Daugavpils. Although the LSSR as an organised administrative entity was not really in question with the creation of these three top tier of oblasti, as the latter unit was directly responsible to the republic's government, it would appear that the introduction of another tier of administration above the selsovet and raion was motivated as much by political considerations than economic or administrative reasons. Certainly this tri-partite system proved cumbersome and ineffective.

Part of the rational behind introducing the oblasti into the region appears to be related to Moscow's obsession with the necessity to weaken national-territorial sentiment. The LSSR could not be absorbed or divided into another Republic for fear of an organised opposition. However, to partition the internal administrative structure along regional lines could contribute to the disintegration of the tauta. It was particularly the delimitation of an oblast based on the urban centre of Daugavpils encompassing the geographical area of Latgalia which threatened the continuation of a national identity. During the independence period, the Soviet Union had continually stressed the regional peculiarities of Latgale more or less treating Latgalians as a separate ethnic group, (i.e. 'Latgalsti'). After 1944, Latgalia became an integral part of the LSSR receiving no geographical recognition. It was not until 1952 that Latgalia was given some form of geographical expression. In

so doing, it could be suggested that by giving the Latgalian area a sense of autonomy from the rest of the Latvian nationality which they were more or less deprived of during statehood, that moves calling for the territorial secession in the name of the nation would become less likely.

The actual administrative and economic functions of the region's oblasti appeared to be unclear even to the Soviets. They existed as unnecessary appendages to Soviet and party structure. They were delegated very little economic scope for planning as they covered small areas and few people. Sovetskaya Latviya gave no detailed reasons for their establishment nor for their abrupt elimination only a year after they had been created.

With the abolition of the region's oblasti and the rapidity by which collectivisation had managed to organise people into rural units, the need for a large number of small administrative areas proved less necessary. The number of selsovety were therefore reduced. By 1976, there were only 507 in the LSSR. The rural raiony suffered a similar fate, their number halfing in the 1950 to 1976 period to 26.[108]

The decline in the number of administrative divisions, particularly at the immediate local level testifies to the apparent success of Sovietisation and a policy geared to further centralising decisions either from Riga or Moscow. However in relation to the effectiveness of recruiting Party members, the rural areas continued to be a political backwater even in relation to the region's towns. It was especially those areas where collectivisation was more unpopular and where the mājas hampered social and physical communication that CPL membership was slight.

There is evidence to suggest that party membership, both amongst rural and urban Latvians was proportionately less in relation to their total nationality than it was amongst non-Latvian nationalities residing

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108 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1976, op.cit., p. 14.

in the region, (table 59). Such data indicates that although Party membership has on the whole increased with all the connotations of greater centralisation and acceptance by members of the Soviet state, that the political and administrative organisations of the region have failed to attract to its ranks the Latvian nationality. However, factors such as social mobility amongst the various national groups and the degree to which membership of the party actually weakens national group identification have to be considered besides just simply the implications a large membership would have on the Sovietisation of the Latvian nationality and the effectiveness by which such a process could better accommodate Moscow's policies in the region.

Table 59

Estimate of the Number of Latvians in the LCP, 1949-73 [109]

year	total members	ethnic Latvian members	% members ethnic Latvian	% total Latvians in Republic
1949	31,200	16,500	53	-
1958	38,000	18,500	49	-
1959	61,000	21,700	35	62
1960	66,000	20,600	32	-
1966	n.a.	n.a.	33	-
1970	115,939	n.a.	n.a.	56.8
1973	129,476	55,675	43	-

n.a. data not available.

The importance of a territorial administrative delimitation for the Latvian nationality and its implications for the nation is well illustrated

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109 V. Haznees, 'Who is Power in Latvia?', Baltic Review, nr. 16, April 1959, pp. 51-52; Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1973, op.cit., vol. 14, p. 186; T. Parming, 'Roots of Nationality Differences', E. Allworth, editor, Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Baltic Region, New York and London, 1977, pp. 24-57, p. 51.

by the events following the introduction of the Regional Economic Councils (Sovnarkhozy) in 1957. The territory of the LSSR was given, like 104 other areas in the Soviet Union, the status of sovnarkhoz which was formed to administer and plan local industry and construction projects. During its nine years of existence, the sovnarkhoz system of economic management became the basis on which decision-making processes were devolved to the Latvian region. Industrial enterprises were made subordinate to the sovnarkhoz which was in turn responsible to the Latvian republic's Gosplan (State Planning Office) and eventually through the LSSR government to Moscow.[110]

> "The establishment of the Economic Regions and the Peoples Economic Councils in the Republics will contribute widely to the extension of their rights. The Republican organs will work out plans for the development of the Republican economy and will carry out the organisational work. Of course, guided by the tasks imposed by the entire Union, they could better consider the geographical, economic and national peculiarities of their Republics and would solve quickly and precisely the complex questions pertaining to the development of their own economic regions."[111]

With the LSSR as with a number of other sovnarkhoz geographical units, there was an emphasis on delimiting boundaries on a national-republican basis rather than on economic and physical geography. Thus de-centralisation in the Latvian case was constructed on the basis of the territorial distribution of the tauta which was not necessarily synonymous with the most rational method of creating a functional economic region.

The Chairman of the C.C., L.C.P., Latsis, points out that in 1958, the Latvian sovnarkhoz controlled nearly 98 percent of the LSSR's indus-

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110 For criticisms of the administrative and economic functioning of the sovnarkhoz see Sovetskaya Latviya, 7th January, 1958.

111 Padomju Latvijas Komunists (Soviet Latvia Communist), nr. 6, June 1957.

trial output.[112] It is therefore not surprising that this system of economic and regional planning lent itself toward geographical autarchy reflected in the members of the economic councils giving far more significance to projects and developments within their own territory than Khrushchev had intended.

The nation was therefore given a degree of political expression through their own administrative region. From 1957 until the middle of 1959, the managers of the sovnarkhoz and a number of key officials in the CPL attempted to promote a policy of near self-sufficiency as was at all possible within the framework of the Soviet economic and political system. They were particularly concerned with promoting policies designed to strengthen the economic base of Latvia particularly reflecting the type and form of economy which had been traditionally characteristic of the region. A resumé of some of the policies pursued by the indigenous Latvian élite during this brief three year period illustrates the importance the devolving of decision-making processes had in satisfying regional economic aspirations.

In the late 1950's, the development of heavy industry, always a Moscow priority, was given only secondary importance by the region's sovnarkhoz. Food-processing, timber and related industries, the development of limited natural resources and textile industries received most attention. The metal-working and machine-construction industries, which were labour-intensive and thus requiring the import of additional labour from the RSFSR and other republics, were given less capital outlay than central authority would have hoped. The general agrarian base which had been neglected at the expense of industrialisation was encouraged to develop - particularly those branches which had been relatively successful during the period of statehood and which were more favourable and

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112 V. Latsis, 'Blagotvornye Preobrazovaniya', Partiinaya Zhizn', nr. 16, August 1959, pp. 14-21, p. 14.

adaptable to the terrain, climate and soil conditions of the region. Thus grain and corn production which had been introduced by Moscow into the republic was abandoned in many areas while dairy and livestock products were encouraged. Greater scope was also given to kolkhoz workers to use their private plots thus particularly developing the market-gardening and vegetable farms around the large industrial centres of Riga in Rīgas raion.

There were a number of conclusions which could be arrived at with regard to the re-orientation in planning. A number of Latvian economists felt that the only rational way of overcoming the problems created by the rapid development of heavy industry and the necessity to import both raw materials and additional labour from other republics was to expand those branches of the Latvian economy which were more inter-related with the available resources, skills and environment of the region. Central authority was not always acquainted with the peripheral republics and coupled with the bureaucratic controls which it had imposed on the running and organisation of the state, production was not always as efficient as it could be.

Many of the new policies pursued by members of the LSSR government were based on the findings of a report published by the Institute of Economics in Riga. This institution had advocated that the goals of the Latvian economy should be:

> "To develop Latvia's industrial structure and specialisation so that the most rational and economical use of all Latvian natural and labour resources would maximise the Latvian contribution to the development of the Soviet Union's economy as well as the living standard in Latvia."[113]

Although the central concern of this report was with optimising production reflecting the economic geography of the region, it was evident to Moscow that the Latvian sovnarkhoz had emerged as a basis for

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113 Karogs (Banner), nr. 1, January 1959, p. 103; Padomju Latvijas Komunists, nr. 1, January 1960, p. 11.

'nationalist deviations'. Commenting on such a state of affairs, A.E. Voss, the first secretary of the CPL in 1960 who replaced Ya. Kalnberzin as a direct result of the policies pursued by a number of the Latvian national élite, commented:

> "In the economic field, nationalist survivals are shown in localist tendencies, in the striving to create a nationally secluded economy under the semblance of the composite development of the economy of the Republic and of economic raiony."[114]

It is difficult to ascertain whether the policies pursued by the so-called Latvian autonomists were nationalist or merely a manifestation of 'mestnichestvo' (localism). E. Berklavs, the Deputy Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers and one of the leading autonomists, had, for example, advocated that developing heavy industry in the LSSR was irrational and that such a sector of the economy should be located where the raw materials were extracted thus lessening the burden on the railway network. He suggested that it was unproductive to transport raw materials from Siberia and then return the finished product.[115] Dserve, the Director of the Latvian Institute of Economics, had outlined plans for more productive methods in agriculture. The development of hydroelectric power stations tapping the resources of the Daugava river were suggested in order that power could be more widely available to kolkhoz and sovkhoz farms. Other proposals included reclamation schemes within the rural economy which would aid in the expansion of consumer goods industries tapping local resources.[116] Moscow viewed such policies as putting forward the interests of the Latvian republic before that of the Soviet Union.

A concern with safeguarding not only the economy of the region but also other aspects of the republic's life such as the Latvian language,

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114 Sovetskaya Latviya, June 10th, 1960, p. 2.

115 V. Latsis, 1959, op.cit., p. 15.

116 G. King, 1965, op.cit., p. 201.

culture and literature can only lead to the surmise that there was a concern over the future development of the region and that de-centralisation made possible an expression by a small clique of Latvians for autonomy and a preservation of geographical uniqueness for the LSSR. All the policies which they attempted to implement were tied up with protecting the tauta and its territory and central to this was the issue of labour in-migration from the rest of the Soviet Union.

The low level of natural increase amongst the Latvian population coupled with an increasingly large number of Russians and Ukrainians establishing themselves in the region suggested to the autonomists that measures had to be undertaken whereby this immigration would decline thus keeping the LSSR a Latvian republic. However, Pelshe viewed such an attitude as verging on a revival of nationalism:

> "Some of our comrades, induced by completely baseless worries that our Latvian Republic might lose its national identity, wanted to stop the objectively natural process of population shifts. In their speeches they repeatedly maintain for instance, that the mechanical increase of the population of Riga should be prevented by all means. Such an attitude is not only harmful, but also politically dangerous. By cultivating national isolation they identify with bourgeois nationalism, they impair not only the interests of all other peoples of the Soviet Union, but endanger also the vital interest of the Latvian nation."[117]

The issues with which the autonomists were concerned highlight an aspect of the desire to continue the nation. A call for the reduction in the number of immigrants, a manifestation of a Latvian "territorial imperative"; the political connotations attached to heavy industry, often viewed by Latvians as a peculiar Russian method of developing the region broken only by the interlude of Latvian independence; the expansion of rural industries and agriculture; self-sufficiency; and the development

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117 Padomju Latvijas Komunists, September, 1959, pp. 7 - 14.

of Latvian as opposed to Russian institutions all heralded a regionalism which before the creation of the sovnarkhoz had no political or economic outlet.

The gradual demise of the powers of the sovnarkhoz after the removal of Berklavs and other prominent officials of the CPL[118] continued until 1965 when the Kosygin Economic Reforms eventually liquidated these areal units transforming the Soviet Union into seventeen economic regions. There is little doubt that the growth of mestnichestvo among a number of the Soviet republics as a direct consequence of being given some form of economic and political power over their own respective territories contributed to their abandonment.

The creation of the 17 "krupnyi" (large or major) economic regions in 1961, designed to guide the affairs of the sovnarkhozy, resulted in the establishment of a Pribaltika (Baltic) which included the three Baltic Republics and later the southern enclave of Kaliningrad oblast'. With the abandonment of the sovnarkhozy, the economic regions were retained including the Pribaltika region.

With a return to a greater emphasis on centralised ministerial control, the LSSR has lost many of its economic functions. An indication of its relative weakness in controlling its resources and territorial administration is reflected in its ministerial concerns. These include such ministries as consumer services, forestry, municipal services, local industry, road transport and social security.

In strategic economic planning, the continuation of the Pribaltika has not in itself questioned the administrative unit of the LSSR but it has contributed to weakening the overall power exercised by the CPL to plan and organise the economy of Latvia. The LSSR is now treated by Moscow as part of the Pribaltika and its economic future is seen within

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118 Sovetskaya Latviya, November 18th, 1961.

this wider context.

A number of debates amongst Soviet economists, geographers and planners arguing about the validity of nationality boundaries for planning purposes has gone on since the inception of the sovnarkhozy. An article in Voprosy Geografii (Problems of Geography) highlights the main argument against national-territorial delimitations:

> "...the delimiting of large economic-geographic regions assists in the planning of the correct geographic distribution and the most economical spatial organisation of the national economy of the Soviet Union."[119]

Thus although re-centralisation was a manifestation which had been partly a product of the sovnarkhozy, the creation of a Sovetskaya Pribaltika was based not on the prime consideration of physical and economic geography but again on nationality criteria.

The Soviet economist, V. Kristanov, recently criticised the necessity to keep the Republics as political, economic and administrative units. He suggested that more economic and planning power should be given to the economic region. To him, the LSSR, like the other SSR's, had outlived their usefulness.

> "Consequently, it was stated in the programme of the CPSU, that nationality boundaries within the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance. This has already made it necessary in certain instances to create inter-republic economic agencies but also, through legislation, to institute certain changes in boundaries between Union Republics."[120]

Thus because of the significance of economic co-operation and the

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119 Yu. Saushkin & T.M. Kalashnikova, 'Basic Economic Regions of the USSR', Voprosy Geografii, nr. 47, 1959, pp. 42-73, p. 42, in G.J. Demco & R.J. Fuchs, (editors), Geographical Perspectives in the Soviet Union, Ohio, 1974, pp. 139-167.

120 V.Kristanov, 'Leninskaya natsional'naya politika i ekonomicheskoe raionirovanie v SSSR.' Voprosy Ekonomiki, nr. 12, December 1972, pp. 56-65, p. 65.

importance attributed to regionalisation, the federal status of the LSSR is gradually losing its economic validity. In effect, economic regionalisation is taking priority over nationality delimitations. This is indeed in line with the Moscow goal of the eventual merging of all nationalities in the Soviet Union in order to create an economic homogeneity throughout Soviet space.

Since the creation of the Pribaltika region, Moscow has openly encouraged the establishment of closer economic, political and cultural ties between the four administrative units. As early as April 1963, a joint meeting of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian workers in Riga proposed various ways in which the region could merge more closely in various socio-economic and political areas.[121] Such an economic region has enhanced the movement of commodities, labour and the setting up of a number of common projects and organisations in order that the varying economic geographical attributes of the region can be exchanged and inter-twined to effectively strengthen the economic base of this coastal area.

The Soviet Geographers, Saushkin and Kalashnikova view the Pribaltika region as a viable economic unit reflecting a scientifically based system of delimitation:

> "The national-economic complex of the Baltic region is characterised by its outstanding role in sea-transport, the combination of a diverse processing industry based mainly on outside raw materials, highly intensive agriculture in dairy products and swine-breeding, and maritime fishing. In the past decade, industrial growth has been especially intensive; the pace of the Baltic exceeded that of many other basic economic regions of the USSR. By combining the utilisation of shale, peat and hydro-resources, a considerable energy base is being developed."[122]

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121 'Economic Regionalisation and De-nationalisation in the Soviet Union', editorial, Lituanus, vol. 9, nr. 2, June 1963, pp. 33-34, p. 34.

122 Y.G. Saushkin & T.M. Kalashnikova, 1959, op.cit., p. 164.

Covering an area of only 174,000 square kilometres and with a population of less than seven million, the Pribaltika is the smallest of the 17 economic regions of the Soviet Union. Although in some respects there are similarities between the four administrative units, and that they face similar economic problems, particularly with regard to raw materials and labour shortages,[123] within the Soviet context the region is certainly not a viable economic entity and is more a reflection of administrative and locational convenience rather than making good economic planning sense. The inclusion of Kaliningrad oblast' with its 564,469 or 77.1 percent Russian inhabitants,[124] would have the appearance of being as much a political as geographical move in order to increase the Russian population of this economic region.

Territorial re-organisations for planning, administrative and Party purposes have implemented and superimposed upon the tauta a system of decision-making which only indirectly accommodates the continuation of the nation as a group phenomenon. The CPL, as was shown during the years of the sovnarkhoz has been in an unenviable and precarious political position, attempting to take into consideration both the wishes of central government and that of the inhabitants of the Latvian region. During the sovnarkhoz period, it established itself more of an organ of the Latvian people whereas in the late 1940's and early 1950's, it was overwhelmingly organised by an alien élite of hardliners whose goals were to rapidly transform the region into an integrated and cohesive part of the Soviet political and economic system.

As a main support factor of the nation, the LSSR has been subjected to periodic re-organisation, its economic and political functions continually being modified. However, the very existence of such a unit, irrespective of its share in the decision making processes, gives the

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123 A.B. Margolin, et.al., Pribaltiiskii Ekonomicheskii Raion, Moscow, 1970

124 Itogi ... 1970, op.cit., vol.4, p.88.

nation an official delimitation and cultural centre thus making assimilation and integration with the Soviet Union less likely than with a nationality which has been given no basis for territorial recognition, (e.g. Jews, Poles). There is little doubt that centralisation and all its connotations for the Sovietisation of the republic continues to question the nation irrespective of whether a territorial base remains or not. The sovnarkhoz period at least highlighted the problems facing the region and its inhabitants, an important facet of national group awareness.

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4.3 Spatial and Societal Aspects of Disintegration

Within the territory of the Latvian region there has emerged a geography of national group disintegration and disassociation which is a direct consequence of the modernisation process and the nationality and economic policies pursued by Moscow. By examining the cause-effect of such processes, it becomes evident that many of the group attributes of the tauta are being questioned and that although modernisation and the Soviet political system have largely failed to dislodge an identity with the nation these specific processes affecting the region are reflected in a geographical pattern commensurate with disintegration.

Central to an understanding of the disintegrative process is Russification. It is the process by which ethnic Latvians are assimilated into a Russian culture, language and group identity, turning their backs on a Latvian national group consciousness. In the contemporary period, Aspaturian defines it thus:

> "Russification is defined as the process whereby non-Russians are transformed objectively and psychologically into Russians and is more an individual process than a collective one."[125]

It was particularly during the Stalinist period that Russification was at its height. This was despite the cardinal feature of the Soviet nationalities policy which aimed at the elimination of 'nationalist deviations', be they Russian chauvinism or local (bourgeois) nationalism. The political, socio-economic and geographical position of the Russians within the Soviet state lent itself to accusations of coercing the peripherally-located non-Russian peoples into accepting particularly the Russian language as the lingua franca of the state to the detriment of their own vernaculars. Statements such as Pankratova's claim that the Greater Russians were the "...first among the equal peoples in the

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125 V. Aspaturian, 1968, op.cit., pp. 159-160.

brotherly family of the nations of the USSR"[126] and Stalin's remarks on the superiority of the Russian people,[127] added validity to the feeling amongst a number of the borderland peoples that in practice, Sovietisation and Russification were more or less synonymous.

Rakowska-Harmstone similarly claims that the pre-eminence of the Russians within the Soviet Union has a resounding effect on all aspects of life within its territory:

> "Russian nationalism is deeply embedded in the attitudes of the ruling majority in the country, and as such it supplies ...the dominant element of the official Soviet value system, of Soviet culture, and of the required norms and patterns of social behaviour."[128]

It is postulated that modernisation can help accommodate Russification in some instances, through, for example, social mobility and its relationship between occupation and a need to speak Russian. Similar to the political socialisation into accepting Soviet norms of political behaviour, there emerges a spatial pattern within the Latvian region, a corollary of the varying impact modernisation has had on the area. However, unlike Sovietisation, which has been an on-going policy of central authority, Russification cannot now be presumed to have the blessing of Moscow even although a number of western writers appear to suggest that it is the case.[129]

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126 A.M. Pankratova, Veliky Russky Narod, Moscow, 1953, p. 3, as cited in R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, London, 1967, p. 90.

127 Pravda, 25th May, 1945.

128 T. Rakowska-Harmstone, 1977, op.cit., p. 22.

129 See for example, A.E. Senn, 'Sovietisation of the Baltic States', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 317, 1958, pp. 123-129; J. Penner, 'Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic States', E. Goldhagen, (editor), Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, New York, 1968, pp. 198-217; K.M. Smogorzewski, 'The Russification of the Baltic States', World Affairs, vol. 4, nr. 4, October 1950, pp. 468-481.

Although in the Stalinist era there is little doubt that Russification was in some instances viewed as a logical method of integrating the non-Russian borderlands with the core area of the state, in the Brezhnev period it is more a product of circumstances than design.

Russification in the Latvian region has therefore a geographical pattern which is related to the modernisation process, the in-migratory settlement of Slavs in the area and the more rapid and effective political socialisation of specific sections and communities of the indigenous population. The modernised urban milieu with its differing life-styles, aspirations and values can weaken traditional family ties and village/rural solidarities through exposure to various forms of social communication, institutions and technology. This environment can prepare the ground far more effectively than the countryside for identity re-orientation and change. As in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Latvian migrant coming into contact with an alien urban environment and subjected to a more modernised and less tradition-bound form of behaviour often found common identification and awareness with the tauta, so in the mid and late twentieth century under Soviet rule, the Latvian in the urban milieu is subjected to and is often under greater societal and political pressure to voluntarily accept the Russian language and culture as part of his life-style and identity.

As has already been mentioned, in-migration has played its part in the re-orientation of the Latvian peoples toward accepting Moscow authority. The ethnic composition of this population movement has also had important manifestations on the Russification of the region. Due in part to the social geography of the state, it is the Slavic community which constitutes the most mobile sector of the population. Szporluk suggests that besides the Russians, the Ukrainian and Belorussian communities establishing themselves in the non-Russian republics have a similar effect in switching ethnic group loyalties of the indigenous nationality

to that of the dominant culture of the state. He observes:

> "In view of the total lack of cultural or educational facilities for the Ukrainians and Belorussians outside the Ukraine and Belorussia respectively, and their linguistic closeness to the Russians, members of these nationalities outside their own Republic function in practice as a Russifying element."[130]

The Ukrainian and Belorussian migrants tend to agglomerate in similar areas of the LSSR as the Russians. They are usually engineers, technicians, functionaries and industrial workers, a large number of whom hold key positions in the CPL. Thus their similar location and social class status to that of the Russian immigrants tends to augment an identity with the Russian community. This is well illustrated in the number of Ukrainians and Belorussians who speak Russian as opposed to Latvian and the large number who actually claim Russian as their native language.[131]

The table below illustrates the changing ethnic composition of the Latvian region with regard to the Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian communities.

There are therefore three main characteristics of this population movement into the LSSR. Firstly, in-migration is in effect a Slavic phenomenon, particularly Russian. Secondly, the destination of the migrants is mainly to the urban centres of Latvia although this trend has changed somewhat within the last decade. Lastly, the intensity of immigration has been consistently high since 1960. Previously population increase by in-migration varied.

The ethnic, socio-economic and varying temporal intensity of migration into the LSSR has only been sporadically documented by Soviet geographers, historians and demographers. The first Soviet estimates on the nature and character of migrations only began in 1964 in Vestnik

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130 R. Szporluk, 'The Nations of the USSR in 1970', Survey, vol. 17, 1971, pp. 67-100, p. 82.

131 Itogi ... 1970, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 278-283.

Table 60

The Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian Communities in the Latvian Region, 1935, 1959 & 1970 [132]

year		Russians		Belorussians		Ukrainians	
		number	% of total LSSR pop.	number	% of total LSSR pop.	number	% of tot LSSR po
1935:	total	206,499	10.6	26,867	1.4	n.a.	n.a.
	urban	51,251		8,729		n.a.	
	rural	155,248		18,138		n.a.	
1959:	total	556,448	26.6	61,587	2.9	29,440	1.4
	urban	404,511		34,733		25,995	
	rural	151,937		26,855		3,445	
1970:	total	704,599	29.8	94,898	4.0	53,461	2.3
	urban	561,558		59,589		44,071	
	rural	143,041		35,309		9,390	

(n.a. = data not available)

Statistiki (The Statistical Herald). From this journal, the 1959 and 1970 enumerations, the Narodnoe Khozyaistvo (National Economy) series and a number of works by Soviet academics, a picture can be loosely drawn.

From the evidence presented in the figure below, an indication of the main trends in net immigration into the Republic illustrates the overall magnitude of such a population movement. Two main trends are discernible. From 1950 until 1959, population increase through net mechanical increase is sporadic and in some years, notably 1952 and 1955, there is actually a net loss of population. Since incorporation into the Soviet Union, 1956 had the largest net increase of 26,800 persons while the following three years, when sovnarkhoz policies had an effect in limiting in-migration through a re-orientation in the economic

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132 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata, 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9; Itogi ... 1959, op.cit., pp. 92-95; Itogi ... 1970, op.cit., vol.4, pp. 280-282.

Fig. 27 LSSR: Net In-Migration; 1950-1977*



* Data refers to the beginning of each year.

Sources: B. Mežgailis & R. Zvīdriņš, Padomju Latvijas Iedzīvotāji, (The Population of Soviet Latvia), Riga, 1973, p. 86; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1974, op.cit., pp. 6 & 23; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1976 godu, op.cit., pp.7 & 13.

structure of the region, immigration fell markedly. From 1960, there has been a continuing and steady high trend of net immigration averaging out at approximately 14,900 per annum.[133]

As the most socially and spatially mobile ethnic group in the Soviet Union, the Russians have continued to play an increasingly important role within Latvian society. In 1935, the Russian minority in Latvia comprised a tenth of the population concentrated mainly in rural Latgale and Riga. By 1970, nearly 30 percent of the LSSR was composed of Russians, 80 percent of their total residing in the towns. The Belorussian and Ukrainian community have also increased dramatically since 1944. Like the Russians, the vast majority of them reside in the towns,[134] (table 60).

Soviet sources do not give any data on population movement by nationality. However, it is self-evident that the bulk of the net mechanical increase of the LSSR is due to a massive Russian influx.

By considering data on natural increase, population increase and net migration figures, some estimation can be tentatively made of the main trend since 1944 toward an increasing Slavic element in the LSSR. Of the 852,958 or 36 percent of the total LSSR population in 1970, approximately 26 percent of this total can be accounted for by Slavic residents in independent Latvia and up to 1944, and their natural increase to 1970. In the period of the first post war five year plan (1944-50), net mechanical increase of Slavic migrants plus their natural increase up until 1970 accounts for 50 percent of the 1970 total. The remaining

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133 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1974, op.cit., pp. 6 & 23; Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp. 42-44 & 72-73; B. Mežgailis & R. Zvīdriņš, Padomju Latvijas iedzīvotāji (Populations of Soviet Latvia), Riga, 1973, p. 86; Vestnik Statistiki, nr. 6, 1964.

134 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1936, op.cit., pp. 8-9; Itogi ... 1970, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 280-282.

24 percent of Slavs can be attributed to net immigration increase after 1950 and their resulting natural increase to 1970. These rather crude findings suggest and bear out the hypothesis that nearly three-quarters of the Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian community in the Latvian region is due directly to immigration.[135]

The location, better environment and standard of living, much needed manpower and better opportunities for Russians are the main reasons why movement to Latvia is on such a large scale. However, it is ironic that in accordance with Tatevosyan's findings,[136] which estimates that the average distance travelled by migrants to their new cities in the Baltic is only 592 kilometres contrasting with the USSR mean of 1,317 kms., thus emphasising an exit from the European RSFSR, that migrants are coming from one area of labour shortage into another adjacent area which suffers from a similar deficiency.

With the need to firmly establish Soviet rule in Latvia, the 1944-50 period was characterised by an in-migration of cadres and industrial workers in order to create an environment in which the main goals of Soviet political socialisation and industrial growth could be quickly and effectively implemented.[137] At this time there was no overall shortage of labour in the LSSR despite the effects of the war and the movement and elimination of opponents to the regime. With the emphasis on industrialisation, there was a plentiful supply of rural labour which could effectively be utilised in the cities.

It would therefore appear that the main motive behind immigration

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135 for sources see note 133.

136 R.V. Tatevosyan, 'Methods of Analysis of Inter-regional Migrations in the USSR in relation to the process of Urbanisation', Soviet Geography, Review and Translation, vol. 13, nr. 2, 1972, pp. 126-131.

137 A. Voss, 1970, op.cit., p. 74.

into the LSSR in this earlier period was not based on the lack of local manpower but instead to reconstruct the Latvian economy along the political lines laid down by Moscow and to establish a political base in the towns from which the area could be effectively governed.

From the mid 1950's, local rural supplies of labour for the cities were being gradually replaced by migrants from outside the Republic. This deficiency was a consequence of the massive pace at which industrialisation had been achieved, and the effects of the war and the modernisation process in reducing the birth rate. If growth was to continue at a similar level, it was necessary for immigration to continue and increase in intensity. With such an aging population and low birth rate (figures 25 & 26) immigration was viewed as the most rational method of increasing the deficiency in the labour supply.[138] As far as the first secretary of the CPL was concerned, the Latvian economy had by the early 1960's reached a crisis through manpower shortage:

> "It is necessary for us to seriously take into consideration the fact that the labour resources of the Republic are very limited and industry feels the shortage of the labour force."[139]

The reliance on heavy industry has meant that the area is committed to employing and requiring a more intensely based labour supply than it would have if more emphasis had been put on the development of modern agriculture, food-processing and traditional light industries. Despite the somewhat geographical irrationality of developing a heavy industrial base in a region devoid of the necessary raw materials and characterised by a falling rate of natural increase, the Soviet Latvian economists, Baltiņš and Ieva openly pointed out:

> "...the industry of Soviet Latvia has been concentrated in the production of such goods which need a highly-skilled labour

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138 P. Mežgailis & P. Zvīdriņš, 1973, op.cit., p. 374.

139 Sovetskaya Latviya, March 3rd 1966, p. 2.

> force. The Latvian SSR is not rich in natural resources and the agricultural sector of the Republic supplies only a small portion of the raw materials needed by its light industry; therefore, the majority of raw materials and other inputs is received by our industry from other fraternal republics."[140]

With the construction of industry on such a wide scale, the lack of a local labour supply and local specialists has obviously become quite a problem, so much so that labour has to be brought in from the neighbouring RSFSR in order to construct and build the necessary industrial plants and housing. This is particularly the case in the building of power stations, pipelines, rail networks, and new towns.

An example of the use of non-Latvian labour is well illustrated by the construction of a hydro-electric power station on the Daugava river during the first half of the 1960's. Evidence that Russian labour was extensively used in the building of this 825,000 kw plant was given in the Latvian newspaper, Cīņa. As a result of this project a new town, Stučka, near Jaunjelgava, was built in 1967, its population composed of those workers who had been employed in the construction of the HEP station. Referring to the town, Cīņa stated:

> "The composition of the inhabitants has not yet been established. Many builders and specialists leave while not so few people come from neighbouring areas."[141]

A letter from 17 Latvian communists to the west in 1972,[142] gives further

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140 G. Baltiņš & T. Ieva, Latvijas PSR Tautas saimniecības izaugsme, (The Economic Growth of the Latvian SSR), Riga, 1971, p. 7.

141 Cīņa, 6th July, 1968.

142 A letter by 17 Latvian Communists which was sent to a Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter (Daily News) in 1972 and was requested by the authors to be forwarded to Communist Party leaders in a number of both west and east European countries. The letter was also reproduced in Samizdat, New York, 1974, pp. 427-40, edited by G. Saunders. It is from this source, hereafter The Letter, that the document is cited.

evidence on the nationality composition of the new town:

> "Although Latvia has a sufficient number of generating stations, which have provided electric power for the Republic, and Russia has many rivers, imported workers have built a hydro-electric station in the River Daugava at Plavinas, and a city - Stučka - has been built for the construction forces..."[143]

The Letter also mentions that the construction personnel for these projects which are overwhelmingly Russian and Ukrainian immigrants, have been used in the establishment of:

> "...a diesel equipment factory, a factory making electrical accessories for automobiles (Autoelektropribor), a hydro metric equipment factory (Gidrometpribor), and a turbine factory were built in Riga. Extensive synthetic-fibre plants were built in Daugavpils... A large knitwear factory and many other plants have been established in Ogre."[144]

The Incukalns area project, near Riga, which involved the construction of an underground reservoir for natural gas is also typical of the extent to which a manpower and specialist shortage plagues the Latvian economy. In 1968, Cina reported on this project:

> "This complex project is a difficult undertaking which can only be mastered by especially qualified and experienced experts. As yet we have no such specialists in our Republic (LSSR). Therefore our local builders received aid from the mass of the All-Union Gas Line Assembly Trust."[145]

The spatial distribution of industrial activity within the political region has also contributed to a labour supply problem. The concentration of industry in and around the city of Riga has added to a shortage of enterprises in some areas of the LSSR. Ironically, excess labour

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143 ibid., pp. 432-433.

144 ibid., p. 432.

145 Cina, 28th January, 1968.

resources are more abundant outwith the Riga area, particularly in Latgale.

> "The rapid development of all fields of industry in Riga has resulted in the fact that at the present time, some enterprises in the city have already begun to experience a shortage in the labour force although each day several tens of thousands of people from the suburbs of the capital and from nearby cities come to work in Riga. Consequently, with each year the duration of these journeys made increases."[146]

With a population in 1977 of 816,000 or 32.5 percent of the LSSR total and containing nearly fifty percent of the region's urban inhabitants, Riga has consistently remained a nucleus able to utilise its labour resources through its concentration of industry.[147] In 1972, nearly 52 percent of the total number of industrial workers in the Republic worked in Riga,[148] producing somewhere in the region of nearly 70 percent of the total industrial output of the LSSR. As a result of this phenomenal rate of industrial expansion, the city is having to recruit labour not only from other parts of Latvia but also from the rest of the Soviet Union.

A comparison of the number of industrial workers in the seven largest urban centres illustrates the continuation of Soviet policy which concentrates on the growth of specific centres within a given area. Although the number of industrial workers in Daugavpils has increased three fold as a percentage of the total employed in the LSSR and the increase in the nearby Latgalian town of Rēzekne has been dramatic, particularly in the 1950-1960 period, there has been little concern for developing those urban centres with population of less than 30,000 people.[149] As a result, Riga still remains the only urban centre which

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146 Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, nr. 12, 1965, p. 13.

147 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR za 60 let, op.cit., pp. 42-44, 59-60.

148 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR 1974, op.cit., p. 119.

149 ibid, p. 119.

can accommodate all the needs of large scale industrial enterprises. Indeed, even starting with such a higher production rate in 1940, compared with the other large centres of the political region, the gross industrial growth rate of Riga between 1940 and 1973 was up 3,661 percent with only Rēzekne (17,969 percent), Daugavpils (7,455 percent) and Ventspils (3,788 percent) of the larger towns recording a greater increase in the rate of production.[150]

Table 61

The Distribution of Industrial Workers in the Largest Urban Centres in the LSSR, 1940-1972 [151]

	percentage of total				
urban centre	1940	1950	1960	1970	1972
Riga	56.6	54.8	57.2	52.6	51.9
Daugavpils	2.1	2.2	3.6	6.2	6.4
Liepāja	5.0	4.1	4.9	5.3	5.3
Jelgava	3.2	1.5	2.5	3.2	3.2
Jūrmala	0.8	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.6
Ventspils	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3
Rēzekne	0.3	0.4	1.0	1.4	1.6
other urban centres in the LSSR	31.4	34.7	28.3	28.6	28.7

This economically evolved core area has been further accentuated by the growth of existing centres near Riga such as Jūrmala and Ogre which have increased in size during the Soviet period from 12,700 to 57,000 inhabitants and 1,700 to 22,000, respectively.[152] Of the seven new towns created in the Republic since 1960, two of them, Olaine, established in 1967, and Vangazi in 1961, are within the Riga conurbation.[153]

The location and historical importance of the core area has there-

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150 ibid., p. 109.

151 ibid., p. 119.

152 ibid., p. 7.

153 SSSR Administrativno-Territorial'noe Delenie Soyuznykh Respublik, Moscow, 1977, 'Latviiskaya SSR', pp. 473-78.

fore contributed to an over-emphasis on this centre at the expense of the rest of the republic. Although Riga is some distance from the necessary raw materials this is partly counteracted by a comprehensive rail network converging on the city thus enhancing its locational favourability. As one of the most modernised and environmentally attractive cities in the Soviet Union, the city acts as a magnet and natural destination point for Russian and Ukrainian migrants, a population movement which reflects not only the wide array of Russian institutions and cultural activities in Riga but also the continuing emphasis in developing this centre at the seeming expense of the peripheral areas of the region.

Although dispersal of industry away from the core area toward the periphery of the Baltic Republics has been suggested by a number of Baltic economists,[154] thus curtailing both intra- and inter-republican population movement, Riga-Jūrmala, Tallin-Tartu and Vilnius-Kaunas remain the major destinations for in-migration from outwith their respective republics. Although from the inception of a Soviet industrialisation policy in the LSSR an emphasis had been laid on developing heavy industry which required an accessible and plentiful supply of geographically concentrated and organised labour, in the contemporary period this has continued even although some peripheral areas in the region suffer from lack of industrial activity.

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154 T. Remeikis, 'The Impact of Industrialisation on the Ethnic Demography of the Baltic States', Lituanus, vol. 13, nr. 1, Spring 1967, pp. 29-41; Remeikis mentions that in Lithuania in the 1960's, a number of Lithuanian economists were advocating a policy of industrial de-centralisation in favour of the peripheral areas of the Lithuanian SSR. They argued that the following benefits would arise out of such a scheme - reduction in house building, employment of labour supplies in the countryside, the containment of young people in the rural areas thus not creating an aging and numerically declining agrarian population. Although the Lithuanian economy is not so well developed as that of the LSSR, similar advantages would arise if such a policy were applied to the latter region.

In-migration is partly reflected in the geographical distribution of the ethnic composition of the region, the destinations of migrants being overwhelmingly to the larger urban centres of the Republic, particularly Riga.

Statistical evidence on the breakdown of destinations by migrants in the LSSR is only sporadically given in Soviet sources. An indication of the impact this urban immigration has had on the cities of Latvia is illustrated in the percentage of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians in the urban areas compared with the countryside.

Table 62

Percentage of Each Nationality Residing in Urban Latvia, 1959 & 1970[155]

nationality	1959	1970	% change
Latvian	56.1	62.5	+6.4
Russian	72.7	79.7	+7.0
Belorussian	56.4	62.8	+6.4
Ukrainian	88.3	82.4	-5.9
Polish	63.6	68.0	+4.4
Lithuanian	43.6	42.1	-1.5
Jewish	98.8	99.1	+0.3
Estonian	61.3	68.3	+7.0
All non-Latvians	45.9	51.7	+5.8
Total urban	53.0	62.0	+9.0

It is evident that between 1959 and 1970, the importance of this Slavic element in the composition of urban Latvia has increased to the detriment of the Latvian nationality. Although the flow of Ukrainians into the republic has, since the 1960's, changed toward a more rural inclined destination, besides the Jews who have traditionally inhabited Latvian towns, the Russians and Ukrainians constitute the most urbanised ethnic communities in the LSSR.

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155 E.E. Yanvyarak, 1976, op.cit., p. 132.

Another indicator of the direction and impact of immigration is given in the table below. Compared with the independence period, the ethnic composition of the towns has altered dramatically whereas the rural population still remains overwhelmingly dominated by the Latvian nationality. In 1970, Latvians comprised 73 percent of the total rural population while the majority of the remainder were composed of Russians.[156] Within urban Latvia, the number of non-Latvians is now greater than the total number of Latvians.

Table 63

The Ethnic Composition of Urban Latvia, 1930, 1959 & 1970[157]

% of total urban

	1930	1959	1970
Latvian	65.1	51.6	47.0
Russian	7.2	34.5	38.0
Belorussian	1.2	3.0	4.0
Ukrainian	n.a.	2.2	3.0
Polish	4.4	3.2	2.9
Lithuanian	n.a.	1.2	1.2
Jewish	12.2	3.0	2.5
Baltic German	7.2	n.a.	n.a.

(n.a. = data not available)

Soviet data gives only the nationality breakdown for Riga and not for any of the other urban centres in the region. As the main terminus for migrants coming into the republic, the demographic composition of the capital has been totally altered as a direct consequence of immigration In 1970, nearly 56 percent of all urban Russians in Latvia resided in Riga. It can be presumed that the majority of the remainder would be

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156 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 282.

157 Latvijas Statistiskā gadā grāmata 1930, op.cit., p. 6; Itogi...1959, op.cit., p. 92-93; Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 281.

native to Latgalia.[158] There is a similar spatial distribution with regard to the Ukrainian and Belorussian communities, (figure 28). In 1970, 57.4 percent of all urban Ukrainians in Latvia resided in Riga and of the 59,589 urban Belorussians, just over half were resident in the capital.[159]

As can be seen from the table below, the Russian community of Riga has increased from constituting 7.4 percent of the city's population in 1930 to becoming the largest ethnic group within Latvia's major city.[160]

Table 64

Nationality Composition of Riga, 1959 & 1970 [161]

	1959		1970	
	number	percent	number	percent
Latvian	270,055	44.7	299,072	40.9
Russian	238,572	39.5	312,857	42.7
Belorussian	19,377	3.2	30.114	4.1
Ukrainian	16,984	2.8	25,293	3.5
Polish	16,676	2.8	17,324	2.4
Jewish	30,261	5.0	30,581	4.2
others	12,746	2.0	16,590	2.2
Total	604,671	100.0	731,831	100.0

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158 V. Pūrinš, 1971, op.cit., p. 227, points out that 61.3 percent of Latgale is composed of Latvians. If this data is correct then we can conclude that the majority of the remainder are Russian and Belorussian. Also according to the above author, Kurzeme comprises 83.7 percent Latvians, a figure suggesting that few Russians have migrated to this western area of the LSSR.

159 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 281 and 283.

160 K. Apīnis, 1931, op.cit., pp. 96-99.

161 Itogi... 1959, op.cit., pp. 94-95; Itogi... 1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 283.

Fig.28 The Distribution of Ethnic Minorities in the LSSR



As contemporary data on the geographical distribution of ethnic groups is available only for total urban and rural areas and for the city of Riga, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions about specific urban centres. However, from the above trends it can be assumed that other large towns, particularly in Latgale, have now a non-Latvian majority and many, such as Daugavpils, Rēzekne, Ludza and Krustpils possibly having sizeable Russian majorities.

There has therefore emerged a spatial pattern within specific areas of the country where immigrants have settled. Since the late 1960's, this trend has changed somewhat in orientation from being more or less an urban phenomenon to that of settlement also in rural areas of the region. Recently Vestnik Statistiki published data on the breakdown of the urban-rural location of migrants who permanently settled in the Republic. The data is given below for the three years, 1967, 1969 and 1970, for which material is available.

Table 65

Destination of Migrants from outside the LSSR, 1967, 1969, & 1970[162]

	1967	1969	1970
total number of migrants	12,200	12,300	14,200
urban destination	4,800	3,950	6,597
rural destination	7,400	8,050	7,603
% rural destination	60.7	65.4	53.4

According to Cina,[163] the official organ of the CPL, it is planned that the rural areas should be given some sort of priority with regard to labour recruitment. The newspaper outlined a policy to introduce material incentives for migrants to move to rural areas of the Republic. It would therefore appear that the above data on the destination of migrants re-

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162 Vestnik Statistiki, nr. 3, 1971; Nr. 11, 1971.

163 Cina, November 8th, 1973.

iterates part of a new policy geared to encourage inter and intra-republican movement to specific rural areas of the region.

It would therefore appear that if Latvian national group disintegration is occurring that it would be more of an urban phenomenon and would be particularly evident in Riga. The Soviet ethnographer, Susokolov, inferred that spatial agglomeration can account in part for change in ethnic identity:

> "In our society, ethnic preference is produced not by discrimination against certain ethnic and racial groups, as is commonly the case in capitalist countries, but by differences in the numbers of contacting groups, differences in their social structure, the degrees to which they have assimilated cultural values common to all humanity, and so forth."[164]

One of the major determinants of this national group disintegration is the degree to which the Latvian language has been eroded and its previous native speakers adopted Russian as their first language. In the Soviet period, even more than during the period of statehood, the importance of the Latvian language to the continuation of the nation is recognised by Soviet, émigre and western writers as central to a Latvian national identity. Kholmogorov, a Russian residing in the LSSR writes:

> "National language and national self-consciousness are closely related ethnic determinants. Change of the native language, although not necessarily signifying restructuring of national self-consciousness, still testifies to deep ethnic changes, to the development of assimilative processes."[165]

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164 A.A. Susokolov, 'Vliyanie razlichii v urovne obrazovaniya i chislennosti kontaktiruyushchikh etnicheskikh grupp na mezhetnicheskie otnosheniya', Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1976, nr. 1, pp. 101-111, pp. 103-4; K. Deutsch, 1966, op.cit., pp. 130-137, came to similar conclusions with regard to ethnic contacts.

165 A.I. Kholmogorov, Internatsional'nye cherty Sovetskikh natsii - na materialakh konkretnost' sotsialogicheskikh issledovanii v Pribaltike, Moscow, 1970, p. 141.

The Latvian language is recognised by Moscow as the official language of the Latvian nationality.[166] Russian, as the vernacular of the Soviet Union, has continued to question the validity of communication in Latvian as the pressure to communicate in Russian either as the native language or as a second mode of speech becomes more apparent. As the number of Russians have increased within the LSSR, there has arisen more situations whereby the indigenous population have had to speak Russian. In essence, social and spatial mobility tends to favour the promotion of the Russian language at the expense of Latvian.

The 1959 and 1970 censuses asked respondants what language they regarded as their native language (rodnoi yazyk). Within both the urban and rural areas, very few Latvians regarded another language other than that of their nationality language as their native tongue, (table 66). However, in comparison with the rural areas where 7,257 Latvians pointed out that Russian was their native language, well over twice as many urban Latvians were recorded as native Russian speakers.[167] A lower percentage of urban Russians claimed Latvian as their native tongue. In the rural areas a similar number regarded Latvian as their mother language. The other national minorities, particularly the Ukrainians, Belorussians and Jews inhabiting the cities regarded Russian as their first language rather than the language of their respective nationalities. In the rural areas this trend was less evident. In contrast, few of the minorities regarded Latvian as their native language.

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166 Article 34 of the 1978 Draft Constitution of the LSSR re-iterates the All-Union and previous constitutions in stating that the opportunity is given for nationalities "...to use the native language and other languages of the peoples of the USSR." Sovetskaya Latviya, April 19th, 1978.

167 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 281.

Table 66

Native Language Spoken Amongst Nationalities in the LSSR in Urban and Rural Areas - 1970 [168]

	total nationality	percentage those speaking own nationality language	% those speaking another language other than nationality language		
			Russian	Latvian	other
u r b a n					
Latvians	693,579	97.4	2.5	-	0.1
Russians	561,558	99.0	-	0.9	0.1
Belorussians	59,589	40.0	57.4	2.0	0.6
Ukrainians	44,071	49.2	50.2	0.5	0.1
Poles	42,855	42.6	42.2	13.1	2.1
Jews	36,364	46.4	52.2	1.0	0.4
Other	38,586	66.6	20.4	12.2	0.8
total	1,476,602				
r u r a l					
Latvians	648,226	98.8	1.1	-	0.1
Russians	143,041	97.4	-	2.5	0.1
Belorussians	35,309	49.5	46.4	3.3	0.8
Ukrainians	9,390	76.4	21.7	1.7	0.2
Poles	20,190	48.2	32.7	13.0	6.1
Jews	316	26.3	61.4	11.4	0.9
other	31,053	81.2	5.5	12.8	0.5
total	887,525				

168 ibid., pp. 281-282.

In Riga, the percentage of the Latvian nationality registering Russian as their first language was slightly higher at 3 percent (9,213) than other urban areas. Within this city fewer Russians also declared themselves as native Latvian speakers.[169]

From the above data, it would appear that few Latvians have been assimilated into the Russian language but where they have switched linguistic affiliation, it tends to be in the cities, particularly Riga, where the social pressure to communicate in Russian is greater.

The trend between 1959 and 1970 in the increase in the number of urban Latvians declaring Russian as their first language is not all that numerically significant, advancing by only 0.5 percent in this inter-censul period. Within the rural areas, the trend has remained static.[170]

The significance of the Russian language to the LSSR's population is more evident when the number of Latvians who speak Russian as a second language is examined. The 1970 census is the only enumeration which has data on the second language LSSR citizens claim to be able to speak.

Over half of all urban ethnic Latvians can speak Russian while in Riga 56.5 percent of all Latvians register Russian as their second spoken language,[171] (table 67). In the rural areas well over a third of all Latvians can communicate in the Russian language, a lower figure but still significantly high.[172]

Far fewer Russians can speak Latvian illustrating that Russian is the language of both social mobility and the lack of adaptability and need of the Russian community to learn Latvian. Again in the rural areas, a higher percentage of Russians have a spoken knowledge of Latvian, an index of the predominance and degree of pressure put on the rural

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169 ibid., p. 283.

170 ibid., pp. 281-282; Itogi...1959, op.cit., pp. 92-95.

171 Itogi... 1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 283.

172 ibid., p. 182.

population to speak the language of the majority. Very few of the national minorities do not speak Russian throughout the Republic.

Table 67

The Percentage of Each Nationality Bilingual in the LSSR in Urban and Rural Areas, 1970*[173]

nationality	percentage speaking second language: Latvian urban	Latvian rural	Russian urban	Russian rural	other urban	other rural	total urban	total rural
Latvian	-	-	52.4	37.8	0.3	0.4	52.7	38.2
Russian	15.8	22.0	-	-	1.4	0.8	17.2	22.8
Belorussian	10.6	13.8	35.6	32.6	0.4	0.2	46.6	46.6
Ukrainian	4.9	5.8	43.9	62.8	0.4	0.3	49.2	68.9
Polish	24.9	24.1	41.2	45.6	2.4	2.0	68.5	71.7
Jewish	20.4	14.9	36.1	26.3	5.2	10.8	61.7	52.0

(* Data does not include those who did not declare themselves as non-native nationality speakers)

Kholmogorov's 1970 study which comprehensively examined nationality relations within the three Baltic Republics contradicted some of the findings of the 1970 enumeration.[174] With regard to the number of Latvians who could communicate in Russian, the 1970 census suggested 47.2 percent[175] while Kholmogorov put the figure mugh higher at 70 percent.[176]

In a large sample using occupations and social groups, Kholmogorov presented further evidence backing up the general hypothesis that those Latvians who are more socially mobile and live in the cities are more likely to have a knowledge of the Russian language than those in the rural areas. It was particularly the professional and managerial group that

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173 ibid., pp. 281-282.

174 A.I. Kholmogorov, 1970, op.cit.

175 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 280.

176 A.I. Kholmogorov, 1970, op.cit., pp. 116-121. It should be noted that the census only asked respondents for knowledge of a second language. Thus the number of Russian speakers could therefore be much higher.

could communicate in Russian while a far fewer percentage of Latvian agricultural workers had a knowledge of Russian. Kholmogorov's findings also pointed out that 95 percent of all Party members in the LSSR could speak Russian.[177]

The frequency of use of Russian was markedly low amongst Latvians outside the work situation. On average, only 7.4 percent of all Latvians spoke Russian within the family environment.[178] It would therefore appear that the most significant features of Kholmogorov's study which is also backed up by the 1970 census is the importance of bilingualism in the region and Russian as more or less the lingua franca of both social mobility and the working environment.

A 1966 study undertaken in Valmiera raion and published in Sovetskaya Latviya in the same year reiterates much of the evidence presented by Kholmogorov.[179] In a limited sample of only 1,549 non-Russian respondents, 66 percent declared that they could speak the Russian language while 47.8 percent of the 480 Russians said they could communicate in Latvian. According to official Soviet data, Valmiera raion had a population of 88,600 in 1966 of which 53 percent resided in the towns.[180] Of all the raiony in the Latvian region, Valmiera can be presumed to be one of the most characteristically Latvian in demographic composition. If the findings of this survey are accurate, it would appear that in an area where ethnic Latvians predominate both in the urban and rural areas and that they are in effect the non-Russian population, that the number of Latvians who can speak Russian is as much a consequence of the impact of the modernisation process in this traditionally highly literate and socially mobile district. It also emphasises the case that bilingualism is not necessarily limited to the larger cities and the more ethnically hetero-

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177 ibid., pp. 119-21.

178 ibid., pp. 116 and 121.

179 Sovetskaya Latviya, 13th September, 1966, p. 2.

180 Ekonomiki i Kul'ture Sovetskoi Latvii, 1966, op.cit., p. 12.

geneous areas of the region and that there is also a fair degree of pressure put on the Russians to communicate in the language of the majority nationality.

The Latvian language has therefore remained an important feature of the nation. The ethnographer, Susokolov suggested that:

> "It is natural to surmise that the larger the number of members of each group citing as native language the tongue of another ethnic group, the more open are the boundaries between ethnic groups."[181]

In the case of the Latvians, it would appear that on Susokolov's criteria that the erasure of ethnic boundaries has not occurred and that the assimilation of Latvians into the Russian language, although higher in urban areas, has failed to reach the parallels which it has done in such SSR's as Belorussia and the Ukraine. However, the Russian language has played a role in negating the significance of Latvian as Kholmogorov's study indicated. Bilingualism, itself influenced by the modernisation process and a response to the geographical composition of any multi-national state, is the main threat to the continuation of spoken Latvian and a Latvian identity.

The above studies also illustrate that if there is a process of linguistic assimilation it is not all one way. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that a number of Russians are actually being "Latvianized". An earlier study by Kholmogorov in 1969,[182] estimated that between 30 to 50 percent of Russian workers in urban centres had a knowledge of the Latvian language while in the countryside, the figure was in some areas as high as 90 percent.[183] The Valmiera raion study also illustrated this phenomenon and the 1970 census gave more concrete evidence that 2.5 percent of rural Russians chose Latvian as their native tongue while 24.5 percent

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181 A.A. Susokolov, 1976, op.cit., pp. 102.

182 R.I. Kholmogorov, 'Sblizhenie i ratsvet sotsialisticheskikh natsii', Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, nr. 9, 1969.

183 ibid., p. 25.

of their rural total claimed Russian as either their native or second language of communication.[184]

Inter-marriage data between different nationality groups also tends to indicate that assimilation is not taking place on the scale whereby the Latvian nationality is being extensively Russified. Terent'eva estimated that in 1948, 29.5 percent of all marriages in Riga were between peoples of differing nationalities rising to only 35.5 percent in 1963.[185] Vitols' mentions that his findings for 1970 conclude that 38 percent of all marriages were between nationalities.[186] Thus in the very centre where the societal and geographical factors are more favourable for assimilation, marriage between nationality groups remains relatively low.

Kholmogorov presents data illustrating that mixed marriage in the LSSR in the second half of the 1960's was less marked amongst ethnic Latvians than any other of the nationality groups.[187] Only 11.8 percent of Latvian males and 11.3 percent of Latvian females married someone of a different nationality while the equivalent Russian percentages were around a third of the total marriages involving that nationality. Amongst the rest of the national minorities, with the exception of the Jews, inter-nationality marriage was more the rule than the exception.

Terent'eva's controversial 1960-1968 study of how teenagers of mixed nationality parents determined their nationality in Riga, Vilnius and Tallin illustrates that when inter-marriage does occur the offspring

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184 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol.4, p. 282.

185 L. Terent'eva, 'Kž divtautu gimenes jaunieši izškir savu tautību', (How Youths in Mixed Nationality Families decided on their Nationality), Zinātne un technika (Science and Technology), August 1970, nr. 8, pp. 10-12.

186 J. Vitols, Nauka i technika, February 1972, pp. 32-35.

187 R.I. Kholmogorov, 1970, op.cit., pp. 277-294.

tends to adopt the Latvian nationality.[188] Under Soviet law, children of such mixed marriages can freely choose the nationality of either parent. The results of her findings are given below.

Table 68

The Nationality Chosen By Sixteen year olds from Mixed Nationality Families in Riga [189]

marriage	percentage offspring choosing Latvian Nationality
Latvian-Russian	57.0
Latvian-Polish	79.0
Latvian-Belorussian	75.0
Latvian-Ukrainian	76.1

If this survey were undertaken in other areas of the LSSR, one can suggest that a more marked trend in teenagers choosing Latvian nationality would be apparent. Terent'eva concludes by stating that Latvians (as well as Lithuanians and Estonians),

> "...are assimilating members of the Russian nationality to a slight degree."[190]

It would therefore appear from the above evidence that social interaction and assimilation between the Latvian nationality and other ethnic groups is minimal and that when it does occur it tends to be in specific areas of the republic, notably Riga. The immigration of Russians has not seriously negated the national identity of the tauta. Nor has the general introduction of the Russian language had serious implications on the Latvian educational system. Unlike the Russians in the LSSR and in the rest of the Soviet Union, there is an eleven year schooling at secondary level for Latvians (as well as Lithuanians and Estonians) where-

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188 L.N. Terent'eva, 1970, op.cit., pp. 10-12.

189 ibid.

190 ibid.

as the Russians have desyatiletka (ten year schooling). This in part gives wider scope to the indigenous Balts to teach their native language and literature. Even where bilingual schools exist, classes are taught separately in both Russian and Latvian.[191] And printed matter in the Republic is also still predominantly in the nationality language of the region. Of the 14,200 books published in the LSSR in 1973, 82 percent were in the Latvian language while only 15 percent were in Russian, figures which are out of proportion to the actual ethnic composition of the region.[192]

As far as the Latvian culture is concerned, it has been widely encouraged by Moscow being central to the 'form' which Stalin had implied in his slogan "national in form, socialist in content". The importance of such a well developed cultural tradition as manifested in folklore, folksongs, literature and the arts,[193] a legacy not only of the independence period but also of the attitude of the Soviets toward culture in general, implies for the Latvians a security in a group attribute which is inextricably connected with the nation. This is despite the institutions of the cities, particularly Riga, becoming centres for Russian culture.

The disintegration of the nation through some of its more important characteristics has failed to dislodge a Latvian national identity. Where this has occurred, a spatial pattern has emerged reflecting the geography of in-migratory settlement and the impact of the modernisation process. It would therefore appear that if disintegration is occurring through assimilation into a Russian language, culture and social institutions that the more heterogeneous the territory of the republic becomes and the greater the subjection to modernisation within the framework of Soviet

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191 V.S. Vardys, 1967, op.cit., pp. 60-61.

192 Pechat' SSSR v 1973 godu, Moscow, 1974, pp. 94-96.

193 A.A. Drizula, (1971), op.cit., pp. 844-888.

political socialisation that the more likely the nation is to become a remnant of the past. However it is also evident that modernisation and the re-organisation of the ethnic composition of the region has failed to destroy the nation as a social and regional phenomenon.

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4.4 The New Integrative Process

From the evidence presented, it would appear that the Latvian nation exists as a social entity and that its survival can partly be attributed to factors which although attempting to promote national group disintegration have, in some instances, had the contrary effect. An examination of such factors helps explain the basis of the tauta in this contemporary period and why in a modernised society, accommodation is given by its members to a phenomenon which Moscow is theoretically opposed to.

It is difficult to infer from the Soviet period that there is still in existence a Latvian nationalism. As a political movement with its members organised toward the final goal of achieving statehood and independence from Moscow, it no longer exists. The supposed constitutional right of the LSSR to secede from the Union has therefore never been questioned nor would it appear likely to be in the future. However, this does not negate the tauta to just simply a social phenomenon. There are, for example, decentralist tendencies evident amongst members of the nation which have periodically surfaced. The sovharkhoz period highlighted such a move toward autonomy by prominent functionaries within the CPL. They attempted to seek methods to accommodate a national identity and distinctiveness for their nation both within the LSSR and the Soviet Union as a whole.

Although it could be argued that such centrifugal tendencies are a product of Soviet bureaucracy and the consequent desire by the CPL to expand their role in the decision making process, it also cannot be denied that many of the policies pursued by Berklavs and his group had nationalistic connotations attached to them. The motives behind such moves were aimed at the preservation of the tauta and were based on a desire to enhance its integration. By identifying specific policies of Moscow as having a retrograde effect on the continuation of the nation, the auto-

nomists at least succeeded in highlighting new issues which the nation had to come to terms with in order that it could continue to function as an entity.

Charges have continually been made by Moscow and by loyal members of the CPL that nationalism is still very much evident in the Latvian region. In 1953, the first secretary of the CPL, Kalnberzin, suggested that remnants of Latvian nationalism were still evident.[194] Allegations have continued to be made that Latvians have been guilty of 'nationalist tendencies',[195] 'localism',[196] 'narrow national interests',[197] 'national limitedness'[198] and 'bourgeois nationalism'.[199] Central authority have at times used nationalism as a convenient scapegoat to cover up moves simply aimed at territorial political decentralisation based on a motive designed to combat Soviet bureaucracy rather than to put 'national' concerns first. The ethnic composition of the LSSR therefore lends itself to being accused of 'nationalist deviations' even although this may not be the reasoning behind specific policy decisions of the CPL or other Latvian organisations.

With a population of just over 1.3 million or 56.8 percent of the total inhabitants of the LSSR,[200] the Latvian nationality is numerically weak. In this respect, because of its smallness and somewhat limited territorial base, the socio-economic and political effects of the policies pursued by central authority could potentially have a dramatic effect in group disintegration than it could have with a larger nationality. As a modernised people and their smallness acting as an axiom on which its members are aware of their size and numerical decline, this numerical

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194 Pravda, 15th March, 1953.

195 Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, September 1959, p. 16 & December 1961, p.9

196 ibid.

197 V. Latsis, 1959, op.cit., p. 15.

198 Sovetskaya Latviya, June 10th, 1960.

199 Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, nr. 6, 1974, p. 50.

200 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 14.

insignificance within the Soviet Union has emerged as one of the main support factors in keeping alive a national consciousness and perceived threat of disintegration through Russification and specific aspects of Soviet political socialisation. Many of the issues with which Moscow has accused the Latvians and the CPL of expressing 'nationalist tendencies' stem from this basic desire to preserve a region and its peoples from encroachment by another culture.

Territory and its political delimitation on the basis of republican status gives the nation an important attribute which is intrinsically connected with defining such a group. To preserve its territoriality is viewed by some members of the nation as being linked to the retention of its numbers. Loss of such a geographical expression could result in the greater assimilation of its peoples into the Russian language and culture.[201]

The 1957-59 period highlighted such a concern for territorial and ethnic homogeneity. By limiting the influx of migrants coming into the Republic through such measures as instituting registration requirements for those residing in the towns and implementing legislation stipulating knowledge from migrants of the Latvian language in such key posts as administration and management,[202] the autonomists illustrated a 'national'

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201 The Abrene district, which was ceded from the LSSR to the RSFSR, helps illustrate this point. Of the 1,406 Latvians recorded as inhabiting Pskovskaya oblast' in 1970, the majority of which would have resided in the Abrene area, 584 claimed Russian as their native language even although 57.1 percent were rural inhabitants. Loss of a territorial base and residence in a geographical environment where the vast majority of the population speak another language which is recognised by that area in various institutional processes can lead to assimilation and group disintegration. Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 113.

202 J. Dreifelds, 'Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness since 1959', in G.W. Simmonds, editor, Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Detroit, 1977, pp. 136-156, p. 142.

concern for the preservation of their institutions, language, culture and territorial predominance within the region. Ozolin, a high ranking functionary within the CPL, for example, called for workers to communicate in the language of the dominant nationality of the Republic,[203] while legislation was also passed in March 1959 increasing the number of compulsary hours of study of the Latvian language and Latvian studies for Russian schools in the LSSR. An article in Sovetskaya Latviya criticised such a move fearing that this could eventually lead to a reduction in the influence of non-Latvian languages in the Republic.[204] In the same newspaper, concern was also shown for the introduction of a Latvian language qualification as an indice of social mobility, a move which gave priority to Latvians in the promotion to key jobs within the SSR at the general expense of non-Latvian speakers.[205]

With the removal of Berklavs and other prominent officials of the CPL in the latter half of 1959 and the continuation of labour movement into the Republic, opposition still occasionally appears. This is evident in comments from the Soviet and Latvian press. In a leading article in Pravda in March 1971, A. Voss, first secretary of the CPL wrote:

> "We cannot overlook the localist tendencies and national narrowmindedness that can still be encountered in the views and attitudes of some people. Such people do not understand that at times communist construction is inconceivable without technical, political, economic and cultural co-operation, and the fraternal assistance of all peoples of the USSR. (They) think, for example, that it would not be worthwhile to build certain major industrial power engineering and other facilities in our Republic. Why? Because so they say, that in the Latvian SSR, the numbers of the non-Latvian population would increase in this connection, and the Republic's national composition would become mixed. The Republic's party organisation, following Lenin's teachings, the general party line of the

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203 Speech delivered at the 15th Congress of the CPL; Sovetskaya Latviya, 26th January, 1958.

204 Sovetskaya Latviya, 10th June, 1960.

205 Sovetskaya Latviya, 13th January, 1959.

> CPSU and on the guiding support of the people, has always absolutely opposed such sentiments and continues to do so. Our unchanging course is aimed at the all-encompassing strengthening of fraternal friendship, comprehensive co-operation and mutual assistance among the peoples of the USSR."[206]

A year later, Voss was still re-affirming the need for the continued integration of all nationalities in the Latvian region.[207]

The changing geographical structure of the Latvian region through the greater movement of commodities and people still concerns a number of leading writers and functionaries. The Letter from the seventeen Latvian Communists continued to pinpoint similar issues.

> "In our Republic there are already many firms where almost no Latvians remain among the workers, technician-engineers, or management,...and there are other companies where the majority of workers are Latvian, but management does not understand the Latvian language."[208]

The Letter expressed similar concern over the Russification of place and street names,[209] and communications, alleging that all business in the Republic is conducted in Russian.[210] They also pointed out that where the majority of the population in a collective were Latvian and only a handful of Russians were members, the latter demand for Russian to be the lingua franca of the farm was met.

> "If this is not done, the collective is accused of nationalism."[211]

A 1975 document sent by representatives of Estonian and Latvian Democrats to the Helsinki Conference, although differing from The Letter in its anti-Marxist rhetoric, nevertheless highlights similar

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206 Pravda, March 20th, 1971, p. 2.

207 Pravda, March 12th, 1972, p. 2.

208 The Letter, 1972, op.cit., p. 433.

209 ibid., p. 435.

210 ibid., p. 434.

211 ibid., p. 434.

issues.[212] Again territoriality and the concern for the ratio of Latvians to non-Latvians in the LSSR was emphasised:

> "Forced expansion of industry provides most convenient pretext for increased migrations of the Russians into the Union Republics."[213]

Like the Memorandum, the Letter from the Latvian Communists feared that with the changing geographical composition of the region and declining birth-rate that the LSSR would become another Kazakhstan, possibly like the Karelian SSR, losing its administrative-territorial status due to the indigenous population constituting less than half of the total population of the Republic.[214] The largest urban centre of the region, Riga, had already become a Russian city by 1970.

The dominant position of the Russians in decision-making, and the importance of their culture and language throughout the state also partly explains the continuation of the Latvian integrative process. In some respects, Latvians often identify Moscow policies with the USSR's largest nationality. Some, for example, hold the Russians directly responsible for the loss of statehood, the deportations and forced collectivisation. As a convenient scapegoat, the Russian nationality are identified as a vehicle in Moscow's policies, their group attributes used as part of an on-going process designed to destroy the tauta and broken only by the period of independence.

The large number of Russians in the region's decision making is proportionately greater than their actual number in the Republic. In

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212 Estonian and Latvian Memorandum to the Conference on Security and Co-operation - 1975; a document sent by representatives of the Estonia and Latvian Democrats, dated June 17th 1975 and signed in Tallin and Riga. The Memorandum was also reproduced in Lituanus, 1975, vol. 21, nr. 3, pp. 65-73. It is from this source, hereafter Memorandum, that the document is cited.

213 ibid., p. 70.

214 The Letter, 1972, op.cit., p. 433.

terms of educational levels amongst the various nationalities in the region, in-migration has altered the composition of the population. Migrants tend to have a far higher level of education than the general indigenous population. This has contributed to giving the former group greater access to employment in key jobs. In 1970, besides the Jewish community, the Ukrainian and Russian nationalities in the LSSR had attained far higher levels of education than the Latvians. In the rural areas, with the exception of the Jews and the Ukrainians, the contrasts in educational attainment were less evident amongst the nationalities.[215]

A representative sample of the origins and occupations of residents in Riga in the 1967-68 period also illustrates that immigrants tend to be employed in top jobs in the Republic. In a category of occupation entitled 'enterprise, organisation, department and section leaders', 66 percent of those employed at this level had moved to Riga after 1945. Just over half of these recent immigrants to the city had previously lived in the RSFSR.[216]

In consequence, a large number of Russians and Ukrainians hold jobs which are directly concerned with the running of the economy and administration of the LSSR, a fact which lends itself to the conclusion that a large number of Latvians are seen to be denied access to prominent positions in their own Republic due to the newly constituted socio-economic composition of the region.

Kholmogorov's study also illustrates that Latvians were less keen than other nationalities in the region to develop collectives which reflected a heterogeneous ethnic composition.[217] Although the motives behind such a desire were not examined by the author, it would appear that such a response was possibly based on an anti-Russian feeling and a reflection of the desire for a halt to in-migration.

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215 Itogi...1970, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 518-523.

216 B. Mežgailis and P. Zvīdriņš, 1973, op.cit., p. 365.

217 A.I. Kholmogorov, 1970, op.cit., p. 172.

Latvian nationalism, if it does exist, is not based on anti-colonialism or economic exploitation. The LSSR and its population has, for example, the highest standard of living in the Soviet Union. It would therefore appear that modernisation has in itself destroyed a basis which was central to the development of Latvian nationalism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed the rapid economic growth of the Republic and the success by which its resources have been utilised have had the contrary effect. Modernisation has differentiated this region from other less successfully developed areas of the state. As a consequence, the Latvian nationality view such a rapid transformation from an agrarian to a highly industrialised society as their achievement. A sense of self-esteem and superiority toward their industrial products is evident in the Latvian press.[218]

The modernisation process and the nature of the Soviet multi-national state has therefore added a new dimension to the raison d'être of the tauta. For example, religion, a factor which in the past played only a passive role in a Latvian national identity has more significance for the nation in this contemporary period. It is seen as part of the Latvian national heritage and of Latvian individualism and is a component in what Voss critically referred to as "... the idealisation of the historical past."[219] Protestantism is also uniquely associated with one specific geographical area of the Soviet Union thus reflecting a regional and cultural enclave.[220]

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218 Examples of this are periodically evident in Sovetskaya Latviya. See, for example, November 14th, 1972, p. 2 and January 1st, 1973, p. 3 issues highlighting Latvian achievements in technology and science.

219 Sovetskaya Latviya, 10th June, 1960, p. 2.

220 Memorandum, 1975, op.cit., pp. 68-69, emphasises the continuance of Protestantism in the LSSR. Kholmogorov, 1970, op.cit., pp. 74-75, suggests from his survey that 10 percent of Latvians participated in religious holidays compared with 6.6 percent of Russians in the LSSR.

A modernised society is also intricately connected with a greater perception and awareness of the social environment. Many of the inherent problems attached to the region's society can be subjectively interpreted by the inhabitants into attributing central authority as being the cause. The Letter mentions concern for the depletion in the LSSR's forestry resources, a consequence they suggest of Moscow mismanagement.[221] As an indirect consequence of immigration there has emerged a shortage of housing,[222] of amenities and lack of services. In Riga this situation is particularly acute. Although many of the policies pursued by Moscow have exacerbated this situation, such problems are as much a consequence of urbanisation than central policy decisions.

One can only deduce from the limited evidence available that the political-geographical framework of the LSSR and the issues which have arisen are a product not only of the policies pursued by central authority but also of the impact modernisation and the geographical milieu in which the nation has attempted to accommodate itself.

To suggest within this context that a Latvian political nationalism still exists would be ambiguous. Although in theory the constitution of the Soviet Union gives credibility to the possibility of secession, there would appear to be little wish amongst the majority of Latvians for the creation of a state of their own. The Letter did highlight and emphasise the success of Latvian statehood,[223] but there was no call nor concrete proposals put forward for secession. The authors of the letter were more concerned with loss of national identity through assimilation and political centralisation than with the issue of independence. There is little doubt that they favoured greater political and cultural autonomy for the tauta. In contrast, the Memorandum argued that the self-

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221 The Letter, 1972, op.cit., p. 433.

222 Emphasised by the Institute of Economics in Riga during the Sovnarkhoz period. G. King, 1965, op.cit., p. 201.

223 The Letter, 1972, op.cit., p. 429.

determination of nations was a basic human right and they openly called for the re-establishment of Latvia (and Estonia and Lithuania) as a sovereign non-Marxist state.[224]

If nationalism does exist it has to be viewed within the context of a cultural and regional concern for greater autonomy for the nation within a less bureaucratised and more democratic Soviet state. Nearly forty years of functioning within Soviet society has destroyed any myths of regaining independence. However, the modernisation process has continued to introduce into the region new demands and aspirations for the tauta. The nation has responded to this by identifying issues which it views as central to the continuation of its language and culture and is nurtured by a need to subjectively maintain the main support factors of its group attributes which modernisation and the policies of central authority have both directly and indirectly attempted to destroy.

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224 Memorandum, 1975, op.cit., pp. 69-70.

Chapter Five

Conclusions

The spatial development of the Latvian nation through three distinct manifestations in its political organisation has entailed the emergence of salient integrative processes which have tended to recur and can be identified as the basis from which the tauta functions as a group phenomenon. Its political development has gone hand in hand with spatial change regulated by the impact of the modernisation processes and the particular political system superimposed upon the Latvian region. The nation therefore has been a function of a specific period in its historical, political and geographical development and from this milieu the process of political integration has occurred. It is within this context that an attempt has been made to analyse the Latvian nation.

Although it is necessary to re-appraise the tauta at each stage in its development from its inception to statehood and subsequent incorporation into a multi-national state, there nevertheless appears recurring facets to its political integration. This chapter attempts to conclude this empirical study by identifying some of these factors as they appear in both time and space.

The locational significance of the Latvian region on the Baltic coast and its core-periphery relationship with the Russian core area has contributed not only to formulating much of the human geography of the region but also to setting the context in which integration at the national level occurred. Its accessibility to the coast partly accounts for the speed by which the modernisation process was diffused to the region. The impact of such a process owes much to the favourable location of the region's ports and their importance as a transit area in the exchange of commodities between the Russian and Soviet core areas

and the West.

A peripheral location has contributed to a 'distance barrier' with decisions emanating from the Tsarist and Soviet nodes of decision-making being viewed by the tauta as outwith their control. Administrative and bureaucratic distance enhanced centrifugal forces on the periphery, contributing to the ethnic and perceived socio-economic cleavages and differences as the basis of an ambivalence toward the state and the dominant national group, the Russians.

The region's location within space also dictated the feasibility of formulating a nationalism with defined territorial aspirations. Without a peripheral location, Latvian statehood both would have been geographically more difficult to achieve and would have been less of a feasible alternative to that of remaining within the Russian Empire or the newly constituted Soviet state.

The whole basis of independence depended on location and the ensuing economic and political viability which was a necessary pre-requisite to national integration and political stability. Geographical access to the West via the Baltic gave the state a basis for economic existence and an orientation away from the traditional Russian heartland. In the contemporary period, the proximity of the region to the coast and the West partly accounts for the pre-eminence of the area in the economy of the state and to the continued contrasts between the Latvian region and the rest of the Soviet Union in its level of industrialisation and adaptation to a modernised society.

Accessibility within the region due to the development of its economy and technological progression has within the context of a peoples' uniformity in group attributes, either as objective fact or subjectively the product of the Latvians themselves, made social communication easier. The geographical extent of this is defined by the population distribution of its inhabitants. Thus the area they occupy

in space, the Latvian region, gives the nation an important facet to their identity and a pre-requisite to their integration, that of territory.

The concept of territory and its relationship to the region's population is implicit in the integrative process. As with other group attributes, territory only became important to the tauta with modernisation. This pre-requisite for regional identification has, in the Latvian case, remained a central focus for their nationalism and a basis from which their nation could be accommodated with a geographical expression. Continuity in the distribution of its population and numerical predominance within the political region gave a sense of 'territorial homogeneity' to the members of the nation and an intertwined relationship between what were the goals of the nationalist movement and of the majority of the members of the Latvian region. Thus, this defined area in space as far as the Latvians were concerned was their rightful possession and political ambit, and what concerned the territory they occupied was intrinsically part of their national demands and aspirations.

The importance of territoriality in defining the Latvian nation is illustrated in the years before statehood when the various political movements debated the form and geographical extent a Latvian political unit should take. The nationalist parties were particularly concerned with keeping a 'united ethnic Latvia' which reflected the geographical distribution of all Latvians. During the independence period, the territorial extent of the state's boundaries were viewed by the members of the nation as an important facet of the national group. In their view, the state was a product of the nation and thus by questioning the territorial basis of the former, the latter was seen to be in jeopardy. Thus the fervour attached to the retention of Valka by Latvia as shown in the actions of the Latvian government testifies to the importance of

territory to the raison d'être of the state, the tauta.

Within the contemporary period, territory and its political-geographical expression through the LSSR has given a continued dimension to the importance of this integrative factor to the nation. By defining the LSSR on the basis of the Latvian nationality, Moscow has given credence to the region's population identifying with a specific area of administrative territory. The Sovnarkhoz period highlighted the importance of such a territorial delimitation to the continuation of the nation as does the on-going objection by a number of prominent Latvian officials to the continued in-migration of Slavs into their Republic. By viewing their territory and group attributes threatened, the LSSR has been brought to the fore as a main support factor in the retention of a Latvian territoriality.

A similarity in group attributes, either real or perceived, has given the national group a sense of social and cultural uniformity reinforced by a spatial contiguity thus making social communication accessible within, for example, a defined geographical language community. Not only has the Latvian language enhanced communication and mutual identity between the Latvian peoples to the detriment of those outwith this linguistic group it has also contributed to defining the nation and its group attributes. Literature, culture and social transactions within a specific language have stemmed from this common vernacular as has a re-inforcement of awareness and feeling of mutual concern for similar socio-economic problems facing group individuals.

During the nineteenth century, a similarity in social composition, largely synonymous with ethnicity and language, acted as an axiom from which the members of the tauta could eventually argue that in the past they faced similar societal barriers to their socio-economic development a product of their position within the region's social structure. The impact of industrialisation and its corollary in urban growth, greater

population mobility and agrarian change, superimposed upon the Latvian peoples a social hierarchy from which a Latvian middle class emerged as the major bulwark of nationalism. Thus, defining social class on the basis of ethnicity and vernacular became largely impossible. However, the Latvian middle class used their common social origins as well as their similar language and ethnic background to their best advantage. Although due to social stratification they could not identify with the Latvian peasantry *per se*, they could point out similarities in ethnic background, language, history and ambivalence toward the *Ritterschaften* which the peasantry could see as meaningful to them. By centring their policies on the question of land, an aspect which touched upon their social and ethnic origins and anti-Baltic German feelings, the peasantry became interested in the politics of nationalism.

During statehood, homogeneity was also used as a convenient integrative attribute by the ruling élite. Indeed, they attempted to promote a social homogeneity through land re-distribution in favour of the bulk of the agrarian population (i.e. the Latvians). By economically rewarding the peasantry for their support and strengthening the position of the Latvian small-holders, the nationalist ruling élite attempted to show that a similarity existed within the *tauta* and that this was manifested in a more equal distribution of wealth. In reality, however, there were marked social and regional inequalities.

Since incorporation into the Soviet Union, social homogeneity and its inevitable relationship with the impact of modernisation has had a differing effect, and in some ways an ironic twist to it, with regard to national group uniformity in attributes. There is little doubt that the Moscow policy of economic equality, although being far from successful, has had the desired effect in giving the Latvian peoples a similarity in social composition and wealth. Although contrasts still exist, notably between the *kolkhozniki* and urban-industrial élites, there has neverthe-

less taken place an eradication of wide disparities in personal wealth and educational attainment. Coupled with this social homogeneity are those differences existing between the Latvian and Estonian Republics and the bulk of the rest of the Soviet Union. The modernisation process has had a more positive effect in the Latvian SSR than other Republics. Thus the Latvian nationality, through its Republican status and by courtesy of the Moscow policies of rapid economic transformation, can, both in real and perceived terms, views itself apart from the majority of the rest of the state - a factor which has contributed to re-inforcing 'national isolation' and 'Republican separativeness'.

Economic and social inequalities in space can therefore contribute to both integration and disintegration. In the case of the latter process, the group cohesiveness of the Latvian peoples is threatened when areal, socio-economic and demographic variations within their region take precedence over national affiliations.

The importance of regionalism came to the fore particularly during the independence period. Statehood separated the Latvians from their traditional ruling groups, a fact which implied that some form of re-orientation in group togetherness was needed. With sovereignty, the external enemy which the Latvians could identify as being responsible for their past social position and economic backwardness was lost. As an indirect consequence of this, Latgalia manifested a political regionalism, a response to its undeveloped economy, anachronistic institutions and differing religious and ethnic composition. Riga was now seen as responsible for the socio-economic problems facing Latgalians. Many of the policies pursued by this central authority contributed to a small percentage of the population of this peripheral area becoming dis-illusioned with the need to identify with the tauta. It was particularly the spatial re-organisation of the settlement pattern of farming coupled with a general feeling of being economically neglected by Riga which

culminated in questioning the value and worth of the nation.

In part, the large number of Latgalian parties was a manifestation of this regional backwardness and social uniqueness. However, it can be suggested from the evidence presented in Chapter Three that the tauta and the Latvian state still remained the support base for the majority of Latvians in Latgale. There is no evidence to suggest that the contrary was the case. There was no concerted call by Latgalians for independence; the majority of Latvians perceived that they had more in common with the national majority in west-central Latvia than they had with non-Latvians in Latgale. Other group attributes therefore helped cement the Latvians into a common Latvian national idea which superseded a regional one.

The differing geographical environments within the Latvian region can therefore shed light upon some of the spatial patterns and trends in national identity. Generally, support and identity with the tauta was greater in the west than in the east, a product of the impress of the modernisation process and the social and ethnic distribution of the population. The peripheral location of Latgale in relation to the Latvian core area and its economic underdevelopment sets a pretext for possible national disunity and for the emergence of political issues which are in part a response to the political-geographical and social environment of this area.

In the contemporary period as within the Tsarist era, spatial differences exist which still lend themselves to the conclusion that a geography of nationalism is present. During Tsarist rule, urban areas, because of industrialisation and the concomitant modernisation processes, became the vortex of social change and of national awareness. It was, however, left to the traditional peasant rural areas to be the main expression and authentification of a Latvian nationalism. Since 1944, some of the main support factors for the nation, that of language,

ethnicity, identification with the past, remain more a prerogative of rurality. National group identity tends to be more of a rural phenomenon where once the initial processes of modernisation are underway, loyalties to the tauta remain stronger and disintegration at the national level less likely. However, at the same time, the major issues confronting the Latvian nation within the Soviet Union are more evident within an urban environment. The injection of heavy industry, the immigration of Slavs, the questioning of the Latvian language, etc., are affecting the industrial areas and the inhabitants of the larger cities more than the rural regions. Because of this, the urban population are more aware of the threat to their national existence than their counterparts in the countryside. Thus, the new integrative processes operating within the LSSR and the issues which concern the members of the tauta, although similar, may differ in perspective.

Nationalism, therefore, continues to have a recurring spatial pattern, a product not only of the modernisation process but of the social and ethnic heterogeneity of the inhabitants of the region.

Competition for the scarce resources within the region and the political and economic dominance and exploitation of the indigenous population by those outwith the national group has reinforced integration. The ambivalence of the Latvians toward the Ritterschaften and the Russians, in both the pre-independence and contemporary period, is partly explained by the role this group has played with regard to the population and territory of the region. Both the policies of the Tsarist and Soviet states and that of their ruling groups as well as the Ritterschaften's relationship toward the indigenous population contribute to an explanation of the xenophobia felt by the varying social groups within the tauta toward these peoples. Thus, central to understanding the spatial and societal development of the nation is the role central authorities have contributed to creating an environment in which the Latvian peoples have been re-organised and the degree to which they have

been accommodated within the region and given polity. Decisions emanating from outwith the territory and national group have been viewed by the nationalists as a basis from which they could formulate and structure their aspirations with regard to the future of their nation. As far as the Latvians are concerned, the late nineteenth century Tsarist policy of Russification has similar connotations as has the processes emanating from Moscow and the dominant position of the Slavs within the USSR in the present period.

During the independence period, the nation received support and acquired authority and legitimacy to promote nationalist policies. In this respect, a new and progressively integrating political community arose superseding the pre-existing one. Members of the national group could therefore identify with the policies pursued by the Riga governments and, as long as the decisions and policies of Latvian central authority met with the demands of the mass of the population, members continued to support the nation. Independence, therefore, became one of the main support factors of the nation. In the contemporary period, its legacy continues to be of central importance to its existence.

The spatial development of the nation and the recurring integrative processes have, therefore, tended to highlight important geographical perspectives. Land reform has, for example, been of central importance in understanding this impact of spatial change. In all three periods, the social re-organisation of agrarian society had important connotations attached to it for the nation. In the nineteenth century, it was intricately connected with the emergence of the nation and the establishment of a modernised Latvian society who could use the question of land as a nationalist issue. During statehood, land reform was central to the establishment of peasant support for the tauta and a pre-requisite to continued integration. The effects of 1940-41 and collectivisation in the late 1940's have gone hand in hand with establishing a society which both questions the value of identifying with the nation as a consequence

of the eradication of traditional societal roles in the countryside, and views such a transformation as questioning the basis of their national identity. Concomitant with the question of the land has been the importance attached to the settlement pattern, a central theme in national group identification and traditional affiliations to the nation.

Similarly, the development of industry and related spatial and societal re-organisations such as urbanisation, the greater movement of commodities and peoples, and changing levels of literacy and spatial growth, etc., have had an important bearing on the type of policies pursued by the various central authorities toward the tauta. The consequence of such processes emanating also from the impact of policy decisions has helped mould a geography of nationalism.

Thus, the integrative processes operating within the region are in part a response to the milieu in which the inhabitants find themselves. To postulate that the tauta is completely integrated at a specific time in its spatial development would be over-presumptious and misleading. Political integration has been used as a relative concept in this thesis. This method of approach attempts to identify integrative processes rather than to pinpoint levels of national integration. After examining and identifying the factors working for and against the integration of such a phenomenon, societal circumstances are detected, within which the Latvian peoples are more likely to be integrated. Thus, for example, the period of statehood can be viewed as a period of consolidation in which the members of the nation were given the greatest possible opportunity and facility to integrate through common politically defined territory, institutions and group attributes.

To examine integration in a narrow sense would, therefore, defeat any valid examination of the nation in its temporal and spatial totality. By taking a spatial perspective, the nation can be differentiated from other social phenomena by rigorously studying the factors which explain

its existence and development. Its adaptation to changing political structures and the role the integrative processes play in a given polity both give an insight into how its integration evolves and the form its raison d'etre takes.

A study of the political integration of the nation has a spatial perspective because, as a social phenomenon, it cuts across social differences, thus giving a spatial significance which should be the domain of political geography. Its relationship with geographical change, employed in this text with modernisation and the changing political systems, adds a further dimension to a spatial approach.

This work therefore has attempted to explain specifically the spatial development of the Latvian nation. By using an integrative approach within the context of changing political structures and the modernisation process, parallels can also be drawn with other nations. Besides the Estonians and Lithuanians, a study of this nature can also help explain the development of East European nations, as their evolutions are inherently similar to that of the Latvian case. By treating the nation as a differentiated phenomenon from the state and other polities, an explanation of its development is more readily given and neither obscures nor detracts from a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon which has received little attention in political geography and has often been misunderstood within social thought in general.

A P P E N D I X 1

Major Place Name Changes in the Latvian Region

The list below is a guide to place name changes of the major towns in the Latvian region. The Latvian place names, introduced into official statistical works and maps during the independence period have continued to be used under Soviet rule although their Russian transliteration often differs (e.g. Elgava instead of Jelgava).

Latvian	German	Russian
Independence & Contemporary place names	nineteenth century place names	nineteenth century place names
Aizpute	Hasenpot	Gazenpot
Bauska	Bauskenburg	Bausk
Cēsis	Wenden	Venden
Daugavpils	Dünaburg	Dvinsk
Illukst	Illuxt	-
Jaunjelgava	Friedrichstadt	-
Jēkabpils	Jacobstadt	-
Jelgava	Mitau	Mitava
Kuldiga	Goldingen	-
Liepāja	Libau	Libava
Ludza	Ludsen	Liutsin
Rēzekne	Rositten	Rezhitsa
Sloka	Schlock	Shlok
Talsi	Talsen	-
Tukums	Tuckum	Tukkum
Valka	Walk	Valk
Valmiera	Wolmar	Volmar
Ventspils	Windau	Vindava

APPENDIX 2

Glossary

The following are some Russian and Latvian terms, and abbreviations used frequently in the text. Where appropriate, the pluralised form is given in brackets.

agrogorod - 'agrarian city'.

apgabals (apgabali) - Latvian state region.

aprinkis (aprinki) - Latvian state administrative district smaller in size than that of the apgabals.

bednyaki - poor peasants

CPL - Communist Party of Latvia

CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

desyatine - Old Russian land measure. 1 desyatine = 1.09 hectares (2.70 acres).

Gosplan - Gosudarstvennaya Obshcheplanovaya Komissiya: State Planning Commission.

guberniya (gubernii) - top tier Tsarist administrative province.

Iskolat - Executive Committee of the Council of Workers, Soldiers and Landless Peasants.

Iskorad - Council for Workers Deputies.

jaunsaimnieciba - a 'new farm' created as a result of the 1920 land reforms.

jaunsaimieks (jaunsaimnieki) - a 'new farmer' who was a product of the 1920 land reforms.

Jaunā Strāva - 'New Current', a political movement formed in the 1880's around the Latvian newspaper, Dienas Lapa (The Daily Journal).

khutor - Russian equivalent of the mājas or individual farmstead.

kolkhoz (kolkhozy) - Kollektivnoe khozyaistvo: Collective farm.

kolkhozniki - collective farm workers.

Kulak (Kulaki) - rich peasant.

Lantag - Baltic German parliament in the Baltic provinces.

LNDP - Latvian National Democratic Party.

LPU - Latvian Peasant Union.

LSDP - Latvian Social Democratic Party.

LSDU - Latvian Social Democratic Union.

LSDWP - Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party.

LSSR - Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

mājas (majās) - Latvian individual farmstead.

mestnichestvo - 'localism'. A term often employed by Moscow during the period of the Sovnarkhoz implying a criticism of the economic councils putting Republican or regional interests before those of the Soviet Union.

mir (miry) - rural commune.

MKPP - Machine Horse Renting Points.

MTS - Machine Tractor Stations.

oblast (oblasti) - administrative district.

pagasts (pagasti) - Latvian state small administrative rural district below the aprinkis.

pood or pud - Old Russian measure of weight. 1 pood = 16.38 kilograms (36.11 lbs.).

raion (raiony) - administrative district.

Ritterschaften - German order of the nobility.

RSDWP - Russian Social Democratic Workers Party.

RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

Saeima - Latvian State Parliament.

sel'skie raion (sel'skie raiony) - rural administrative district.

selsovet (selsovety) - village Soviet.

serednyaki - medium placed peasants.

skhod - communal assembly which governed the mir.

sluzhashchie - white collar workers.

sovkhoz (sovkhozy) - sovetskoe khozyaistvo: State farm.

sovkhozniki - state farm workers.

sovnarkhoz (sovnarkhozy) - regional or republican council of national economy.

talu - Estonian equivalent of the mājas or individual farmstead.

tauta - the Latvian nation, equivalent to the German concept of the Volk.

uyezd (uyezdy) - Tsarist administrative district below the guberniya.

zemstvo - representative assemblies of landlords, townsmen and peasants introduced into some areas of the Tsarist Empire in the 1860's.

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For the purposes of clarity, the works in this bibliography have been divided into two parts. The first part includes material consulted in relation to the theory developed on the nation and is sub-divided into (a) books and major publications, and (b) articles. The second part contains sources directly and indirectly related to the study of the Latvian nation. In the latter, the material is broken down into the following classes of publication: (a) bibliographies, directories and reference works; (b) statistical works, documents and related primary sources; (c) books and other major works; (d) articles, monographs and conference papers. The bibliography is concluded with a comprehensive list of all newspapers and periodicals which have been consulted both in relation to the theory and the empirical study.

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